Effects Of Occupational Licensing Research Articles

Effects of Occupational Licensing on DACA Recipients: A Synthetic Control Approach

Effects of Occupational Licensing on DACA Recipients: A Synthetic Control Approach

Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Minority Dental Assistants

Economic theory suggests that occupational licensing can be a barrier to entry that restricts labor supply (Friedman, 1962; Stigler, 1971) or a signal of quality that enhances the labor market (Leland, 1979). This paper studies two types of licenses for dental assistants (DAs) in the U.S. to illustrate the competing supply-restricting and quality-signaling effects of licensing on minority workers. Specifically, I study the effects of introducing the X-ray permit, a state-issued license to perform X-ray procedures that also carries information about a DA’ s competence, against that of the entry-level license, which provides little information about a DA’ s competence. I find that the X-ray permit requirement reduces the wage gap between non-Hispanic white and minority DAs by 8 percent, presumably because it helps minority DAs secure jobs that entail X-ray procedures. In contrast, entry-level licensing does not reduce the racial wage gap. These findings suggest that licensing alleviates statistical discrimination if it reveals information about the holder’ s productivity.

Does occupational licensing impact incomes? A replication study for the German crafts case

Large variation in the estimated income premium of occupational licensing can be found in the existing literature. I revisit the natural experimental design of a change in the German crafts regulation in 2004, which removed the traditional licensing requirement for self-employment in certain trades, using official survey data and difference-in-differences estimation. Previous studies of this deregulation have found significant, yet small effects on the incomes of employees in deregulated trades. I focus on the incomes of the self-employed and find no robust effects. Multiple channels through which occupational licensing may affect incomes such as price and quality competition in the regulated market and possible competitive pressure from outsiders are identified, which may also explain why the effects of occupational licensing on incomes appear to be context-specific.

Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Minority Dental Assistants

Economic theory suggests that occupational licensing can be a barrier to entry that restricts labor supply (Friedman, 1962; Stigler, 1971) or a signal of quality that enhances the labor market (Leland, 1979). This paper studies two types of licenses for dental assistants (DAs) in the U.S. to illustrate the competing supply-restricting and quality-signaling effects of licensing on minority workers. Specifically, I study the effects of introducing the X-ray permit, a state-issued license to perform X-ray procedures that also carries information about a DA’s competence, against that of the entry-level license, which provides little information about a DA’s competence. I find that the X-ray permit requirement reduces the wage gap between non-Hispanic white and minority DAs by 8 percent, presumably because it helps minority DAs secure jobs that entail X-ray procedures. In contrast, entry-level licensing does not reduce the racial wage gap. These findings suggest that licensing alleviates statistical discrimination if it reveals information about the holder’s productivity.

Effects of Occupational Licensing and Unions on Labour Market Earnings in Canada

AbstractUsing longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics from 1999 to 2011, the article compares the pay and benefits of licensed and unionized workers. In a cross section of respondents and using ordinary least squares estimates, it finds a pay premium of 0.155 log points for those with an occupational licence compared to those without one; the comparable union wage premium is slightly more than half, that is 0.085 log points. Fixed‐effects estimates go in the opposite direction (0.028 and 0.046 log points for licensing and unionization, respectively), suggesting the existence of unobservable factors correlated with licensing and union status. Unionized workers are more likely to access standard benefits, such as medical insurance and pension plans, but licensed workers benefit little from their licensing status in access to benefits. Finally, union workers are significantly less likely to receive incentive pay, such as profit sharing, while the association between occupational licensing and incentive pay is close to zero and statistically insignificant.

The Effects of Occupational Licensing: Evidence from Business‐Level Data

AbstractOccupational licensing currently affects more than 1,000 occupations in the United States. I use confidential US Census Bureau business micro‐data to shed light on the effect of occupational licensing in cosmetology on key market outcomes and study its effect on the providers of occupational training. Occupational licensing regulation does not seem to affect the equilibrium number of practitioners or prices of services to consumers, but is associated with significantly lower practitioner entry and exit rates. I further find states with more stringent licensing requirements to have more instructors and a larger median size of training facilities, suggesting possible barriers to entry for the training schools. Instructors, however, do not earn more in such states.

State Licensing Boards, Antitrust, and Innovation

Every state has occupational licensing laws or regulations, which require individuals seeking to offer a certain service to the public first to obtain approval from the state. Occupational licensing requirements historically derive from a desire to protect unwitting consumers from bad actors. In recent years, however, the number of licensed professions in the United States has skyrocketed and licensing requirements have become increasingly onerous. When incumbents wield licensing requirements not as a defensive shield to protect consumers but as an offensive sword to exclude new entrants, serious concerns regarding the competitive implications of the licensing schemes arise. Self-interested incumbents have incentives that may differ from consumers, and these self-interested incumbents can—and sometimes do—impose requirements that do not enhance quality, but rather restrict output, increase prices, and hamper innovation. This Paper explores the competitive implications of state occupational licensing regimes. Part I analyzes the historical development and justification for occupational licensing. Part II reviews the empirical evidence regarding the effects of occupational licensing on factors such as quality, price, innovation, and availability. Part III summarizes how antitrust law, and particularly the state action doctrine, treats state board-enacted occupational licensing. Part IV explores the interplay of occupational licensing and antitrust laws in the United States, delving into a particularly striking case at the intersection of occupational licensing and innovation: Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board. Part V provides some suggestions for agency engagement in monitoring the effective use of occupational licensing.

The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Consumer Welfare: Early Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality

Occupational licensing is intended to protect consumers. Whether it does so is an important, but unanswered, question. Exploiting variation across states and municipalities in the timing and details of midwifery laws introduced during the period 1900-1940, and using a rich data set that we assembled from primary sources, we find that requiring midwives to be licensed reduced maternal mortality by 6 to 7 percent. In addition, we find that requiring midwives to be licensed may have had led to modest reductions in nonwhite infant mortality and mortality among children under the age of 2 from diarrhea. These estimates provide the first econometric evidence of which we are aware on the relationship between licensure and consumer safety, and are directly relevant to ongoing policy debates both in the United States and in the developing world surrounding the merits of licensing midwives.

Effects of Occupational Licensing and Unions on Compensation in Canada

Based on longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) from 1993 to 2010, a pay premium of approximately 15 percent is estimated for both occupational licensing an...

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

AbstractOur study provides the first national analysis of the labour market implications of workers who are licensed by any agency of the government in the USA. Using a specially designed Gallup survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans, we provide an analysis of the influence of this form of occupational regulation. We find that 29 per cent of the workforce is required to hold a licence, which is a higher percentage than that found in other studies that rely on state‐level occupational licensing data or single states. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a licence. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a licence requirement than are non‐union or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions — that is about 15 per cent — and that being both licensed and in a union can increase wages by more than 24 per cent. However, unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

This study provides the first nation-wide analysis of the labor market implications of occupational licensing for the U.S. labor market, using data from a specially designed Gallup survey. We find that in 2006, 29 percent of the workforce was required to hold an occupational license from a government agency, which is a higher percentage than that found in studies that rely on state-level occupational licensing data. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a license. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a license requirement than are nonunion or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions -- that is about 15 percent, but unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.

The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Complaints Against Real Estate Agents

Does licensing increase the quality of services? This is a major unresolved question in the economic analysis of occupational licensing. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the simu...