Effects Of Government Ownership Research Articles

Why State-Owned Enterprises Often Do Earnings Management?

The requirement that the income statement provided be in the profit position all of the time encourages the use of earnings management. Managers manipulate data using accounting practices to fool stakeholders. The goal of this research is to see how the effect of government ownership on earnings management affects audit quality. For 2015-2020, the population is State-Owned Enterprises listed on the IDX. A sample of 24 State-Owned Enterprises is obtained using the purposive sampling method. Using EViews version 10, simple regression and moderated regression analysis (MRA) were used to analyze the data. The findings reveal that government ownership has no effect on earnings management and that audit quality has no effect on earnings management when it comes to government ownership. Big Four public accounting firms have been unable to curb earnings management practices due to government expectations and protection. The bank's earnings management profit maximization occurred as a result of the bank's desire to attract and increase the confidence of third-party funds, which are the bank's greatest source of funds. Income minimization, on the other hand, occurred because the corporation intended to lower the amount of tax it had to pay to the government.

The effects of government ownership and the global financial crisis on implicit taxes of Chinese companies

The government has implemented various tax incentive policies to support the generation and growth of corporate profits, leading to what is known as an implicit tax. In actuality, there is no implicit tax phenomenon because this phenomenon occurs in a perfectly competitive market where there are no barriers to entry, transaction costs, or transaction friction. Since most Chinese companies are owned by the Chinese government and are not fully capitalist markets, the possibility of more implicit taxes is not expected to occur. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the Chinese government’s ownership of enterprises and the global financial crisis have had an effect on the realization of the implicit tax phenomena. The results of this study are as follows. First, the pre-tax return on equity (PTROE) of listed Chinese companies had a statistically significant positive relationship with the pre-tax subsidy on equity (PTSE). Second, for companies with a higher level of Chinese government-owned interest, PTROE had a statistically significant positive relationship with PTSE; so this result shows that Chinese companies receive tax benefits, but an implicit tax in the market is not realized. Third, during the global financial crisis, the PTROE of Chinese companies showed an insignificant negative relationship with PTSE. In addition, companies owned by the Chinese government showed an insignificant negative relationship between PTROE and PTSE during the global financial crisis. This study provides policy implications that government ownership equity and macroeconomic events influence the level of freedom in a market economy.

The effect of government ownership on Indonesia’s state-owned enterprises’ (SOE) firm performance

This study aimed to analyze the impact of government ownership on Indonesia’s SOE’s financial performance, measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) of 20 SOEs that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2013 – 2019, using the panel data models. According to the results, government ownership has a positively significant impact on the firm performance (ROA and ROE). Furthermore, the results show that along with government shares, debt to equity ratio, dividend payout ratio, and log of total assets also have significant relationships to the firm performance.

Government Ownership Effect on Staffing Level and Financial Performance

It has always been believed that government ownership would lead to bad financial performance and overstaffing in any organization. This study aims to examine the effect of government ownership on staffing level and the financial performance of Kuwaiti bank over the period 2010-2018. Using the financial data of ten banks listed at Kuwait stock exchange (KSE), results shows that there was s statistically significant direct relation between government ownership and overstaffing and statistically significant inverse relation between government ownership and the financial performance of banks measured by return on assets (ROA). On the other hand results show that there was no relation between overstaffing and the financial performance of Kuwaiti banks.

중국상업은행에 대한 정부지분율이 수익성에 미치는 영향: 금융위기를 전후로

중국상업은행에 대한 정부지분율이 수익성에 미치는 영향: 금융위기를 전후로

Analysis on the effects of government ownership on efficiency of Chinese commercial banks

This study, targeting the data of 75 Chinese commercial banks (2003-2016), verified the effects of government ownership on efficiency of banks by applying stochastic frontier approach (SFA). The main results of the empirical analysis are as follows. First, as a result of the analysis using stochastic frontier model, high capital ratio, low loan-loss reserve ratio, and low cost to income ratio had positive effects on profitability of banks. Net loan ratio had positive effects on profitability of only joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs). Second, as a result of verifying efficiency determinants of banks, low government ownership, listed banks, and high asset growth rate and operating profit per employee had positive effects on efficiency of banks. The study results indicate that the inflow of private capital into Chinese commercial banks lowers government ownership, improving governing structure and efficiency through enhancement of supervisory function.

Credit Ratings and Bank Affiliation to Financial Holding Companies: Effects of Government Ownership and Financial Crisis

ABSTRACTThis study compares credit ratings between FHC affiliated banks and independent banks using Taiwan bank and FHC data. The results show banks that join Insurance- or Security-FHCs obtain better ratings than those that join Bank-FHCs. Second, banks that join FHCs with higher activity diversification can obtain better credit ratings. Third, joining government-owned FHCs enhances bank credit ratings and mitigates bank default risk compared to joining non-government-owned FHCs. Fourth, prior to the financial crisis, banks joining FHCs can obtain better credit ratings and reduce the cost of debt. However, during the financial crisis, rating agencies stopped regarding banks joining privately owned bank-based FHCs as risk diversification and assigning better credit ratings on this basis.

Government intervention and corporate policies: Evidence from China

This study examines two channels through which Chinese government intervenes in business activities: direct intervention via government ownership and indirect intervention via strategic development plans in selected areas. The findings show that these interventions affect corporate policies differently and have opposite effects on financing policies: while firms with higher level of government ownership tend to use higher leverage, more long-term debt and hold less cash, and such effects are more pronounced with central government ownership, reverse effect is related with strategic development plans. In addition, the study shows that indirect intervention alleviates the impact of direct intervention on firms' financing policy. In terms of investment policies, both forms of intervention are related to higher investment expenditures and poorer performance. The effect of government ownership on firms' leverage has become less significant after the establishment of corporate bond market in China.

Specialty and training differences in the reported use of endocarditis prophylaxis at an academic medical center

This paper synthesizes the major empirical findings of the burgeoning tax avoidance research in China from the accounting, finance, and economics literature over the last 13 years. It surveys the evidence in four main areas: (1) the mechanisms through which Chinese firms avoid income taxes; (2) the effects of government ownership and agency problem on tax avoidance; (3) tax avoidance and political connections; and (4) the roles of book-tax conformity, tax enforcement, and corporate governance. It also discusses the appropriateness of tax avoidance measures in the Chinese setting. Finally, it proposes important directions for future research.

How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from China’s Privatization Experience

The effect of government ownership on firm performance remains a controversial issue, especially in a transitional economy like China. Government ownership is typically viewed as adversely affecting firm performance. This study of that of Mainland China’s privatization experience indicates the opposite. No matter whether it is in the form of state ownership or legal person ownership, government ownership has a positive impact on partially privatized state‐owned enterprises. However, this relationship is nonlinear and shows an inverted U‐shape. Given the situation of highly indebted, non‐performing state‐owned enterprises, we argue that too much government control is indeed bad for enterprises. But too little government ownership may not be good either. It might mean a lack of the government’s political support and business connections, which are valuable and necessary to vitalize performance.

Internal Regulation: The Effects of Government Ownership on the Value of the Firm

Previous articleNext article No AccessInternal Regulation: The Effects of Government Ownership on the Value of the FirmCatherine C. Eckel and Theo VermaelenCatherine C. Eckel Search for more articles by this author and Theo Vermaelen Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 29, Number 2Oct., 1986 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467124 Views: 14Total views on this site Citations: 28Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1986 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Qing Hu, Wenjing Li, Chen Lin, Lai Wei Trade-induced competition and ownership dynamics, Journal of Development Economics 160 (Jan 2023): 102979.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102979Aidan Vining, Mark Moore, Claude Laurin Listed public–private enterprises: stock market information, agency costs and productive efficiency outcomes, International Journal of Public Sector Management 35, no.44 (Aug 2021): 388–409.https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-02-2021-0050Veljko Fotak, Haekwon Lee Public-private co-lending: Evidence from syndicated corporate loans, Journal of Banking & Finance 119 (Oct 2020): 105898.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105898Matteo Landoni Knowledge creation in state-owned enterprises, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 53 (Jun 2020): 77–85.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2020.01.001Abhinav Goyal, Shrikant P. 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The effect of government ownership and subsidy on performance: Evidence from the bus transit industry

Several theories have been advanced to predict difference in behavior of government-owned vs private firms, such as theories of bureaucratic growth, inefficiency, and concentration on vote-maximizing service with neglect of other important characteristics of service. This study tests the above theories in a declining industry, the U.S. urban bus transify industry of 1960–1975. The analysis bridges the period before and during the major federal capital grant program which was initiated under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. The empirical results indicate that subsidy at the federal level is associated with higher costs and lower real price and a redistribution of service toward an expanded area, served less frequently. Local and state subsidy is associated with smaller increases in costs and smaller decreases in frequency of service and ridership. The form of public ownership does affect performance, but the unknown size of inter-agency cross-subsidization and tax benefits makes comparison tenuous without case-level investigation. The conclusion is reached that although the bureaucratic growth, inefficiency and vote-maximization theories are supported, inefficiency and bureaucratic growth are associated with passive sponsorship and large size of firm, rather than with public ownership, per se.