Effective Number Of Candidates Research Articles

District Competition in Japan’s 2014 Election: The Roles of Nominations, Incumbency, and Dual Listing

Duverger’s Law expects two-party competition in single member districts (SMDs), but evidence from mixed member systems is less consistent with these theoretical expectations. Rather than simply focusing on whether Japan’s most recent House of Representatives election converges toward Duvergerian equilibrium, this article focuses on three factors within Japan. In particular, how do the roles of major party nominations, incumbency, and dual-listing shape district competition vis-à-vis Duverger? Empirical results find that the lack of a Democratic Party of Japan candidate decreases the effective number of candidates, while the lack of a Liberal Democratic Party candidate, multiple incumbents, and dual-listing correlates with an increased number of candidates. The results suggest that often ignored underlying effects of Japan’s mixed system influences its consistency with theoretical expectations.

SENATORIAL ELECTIONS: THE MAJORITY MODEL IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

This article describes and analyses elections to the upper house of the parliament of the Czech Republic, the Senate (Senat). Its chief aim is to outline a typology for election districts and assess the competitiveness of each district based upon the effective number of candidates. Results of the analysis are presented cartographically, with an accompanying description of long-term trends. The article will focus on the most recent elections in October 2012, analysing the results of political parties/candidates, as well as changes to the political elite within the Senate.

Electoral Competition and Local Government Responsiveness in Brazil

The main objective of this paper is to verify whether electoral competition increases the supply of public goods in a federalist country where the decision-making process about public policy occurs at the local level (there are both local executive and legislative branches) and the political system has fewer barriers to the entry of new competitors. Brazilian local governments fulfill these characteristics. Our results show that the number of effective candidates running for the executive branch enhances the supply of local public goods (increasing the percentage number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants and immunization coverage per capita, and reducing infant mortality per capita). Moreover, our robustness tests show that the difference between both the first and second candidates running for the executive branch (more competitive elections) and the elected mayor’s quality of management do not affect these results significantly.

Social Identity, Electoral Institutions and the Number of Candidates

The empirical literature in comparative politics holds that social cleavages affect the number of candidates or parties when electoral institutions are ‘permissive’, but it lacks a theoretical account of the strategic candidate entry and exit decisions that ultimately determine electoral coalitions in plural societies. This article incorporates citizen-candidate social identities into game-theoretic models of electoral competition under plurality and majority-runoff electoral rules, indicating that social group demographics can affect the equilibrium number of candidates, even in non-permissive systems. Under plurality rule, the relationship between social homogeneity and the effective number of candidates is non-monotonic and, contrary to the prevailing Duvergerian intuition, for some demographic configurations even the effective number of candidates cannot be near two. Empirical patterns in cross-national presidential election results are consistent with the theoretical model.

Electoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections

This study employs data from 33 countries over a 50-year period to analyze the institutional determinants of the effective number of presidential candidates. I find the presidential electoral formula-plurality versus majority runoff-to have a strong and significant impact on the effective number of candidates, thereby providing the most substantial support thus far for Duverger's propositions at the presidential level. Unlike previous cross-national studies, I also test for the effect of the presence or absence of an incumbent presidential candidate. The presence of an incumbent has a significant reductive effect on the effective number of candidates.

Racial heterogeneity and the effective number of candidates in majority runoff elections: Evidence from Louisiana

The majority runoff formula is employed by a multitude of countries to elect executives and legislators at the national and subnational levels. This study examines the impact of racial heterogeneity on the number of effective candidates in majority runoff elections employing data from Louisiana House of Representatives elections. This is the first district level test of the emerging theory that the effective number of candidates and parties in a polity is the product of an interactive relationship between electoral laws and social heterogeneity. Using a much larger data set with more reliable data and valid measures than previous studies, I find that the level of racial heterogeneity in the House districts does indeed have a significant positive impact on the effective number of candidates in the House elections.