Effects Of Political Competition Research Articles

The effects of political competition on the funding of public‐sector pension plans

AbstractIn politically competitive jurisdictions, there can be strong electoral incentives to underfund public pensions in order to keep current taxes low. I examine this hypothesis using panel data for over 2,000 local pension plans from Pennsylvania spanning the period 1985–2017. The results suggest that more politically competitive municipalities tend to have pension plans that are less funded. The effects of political competition are driven by municipalities that have a higher proportion of uninformed voters and are absent for pension plans offered by municipal authorities. The negative relationship between political competition and funding status is present for state pensions as well.

Pengaruh Kompetisi Politik, Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Dana Alokasi Umum, Dan Opini Audit Terhadap Implementasi E-Government

This study aims to determine the effect of political competition, local own-source revenue, general allocation funds, and audit opinions on the implementation of provincial e-Governments in Indonesia in 2011-2018. Data in this study uses secondary data from BPK, BPS, and KPU. The sampling technique uses a purposive sampling method with a total sample of 8 provinces in 5 years. Data analysis uses regression analysis. The results of this study indicate that (1) political competition has a negative and insignificant influence on e-government implementation, (2) Local original income has a positive and significant effect on e-government implementation, (3) general allocation funds have a positive and not significant effect on implementation e-government. (4) audit opinion does not significantly influence the implementation of e-government.

Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems

Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation of turf war and a tool to maintain and disrupt political territorial control. Consequently, contrary to expectations derived from the cross-national literature, pre-election violence is more likely in uncompetitive than competitive constituencies. Locally dominant as well as locally weak parties have incentives to perpetrate violence in uncompetitive constituencies. For locally dominant parties, violence is a tool to shrink the democratic space in their strongholds and maintain territorial control. For locally weak parties, violence can disturb the dominance of the opponent and protect their presence in hostile territory. We hypothesize that pre-election violence will be particularly common in opposition strongholds. In such locations, ruling parties can leverage their superior repressive resources to defend their ability to campaign, while the opposition can use their local capacity to reinforce the politics of territoriality. We test our hypotheses with original constituency-level election violence data from the 2016 Zambian elections. Data come from expert surveys of domestic election observers and represent a novel way of measuring low-level variations in election violence. Our analysis shows patterns of pre-election violence consistent with our theory on pre-election violence as a territorial tool.

The effects of political competition on the generosity of public-sector pension plans

In politically competitive jurisdictions, there can be strong electoral incentives to increase the generosity of public pensions and simultaneously, to not fund them fully, in order to keep taxes low. I examine the relationship between political competition and generosity of public pensions using a panel dataset for 3000 local plans from Pennsylvania for the period 2003–2013. I find that as the level of political competition in a municipality increases, pension plans become more generous but this relationship holds true only for plans run by municipal governments. A one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal plans by about 3 percent ($340–504/ retiree/ year) with no effect on plans run by municipal authorities. The effects of political competition are driven by municipalities that have a higher proportion of uninformed voters and are absent for defined contribution plans.

Comment on “Accuracy in Public Law Enforcement under Political Competition”

In this Comment, I discuss Marie Obidzinski’s (2019) paper considering the effects of political competition on the accuracy of law enforcement and criminal justice. The paper develops an economic model to explain the empirical findings of Lin (2007) and McCannon (2013). The model generates novel insights, showing that political competition does not foster optimal enforcement and accuracy in criminal justice and that distortions are generated by political competition relative to the Becker’s (1968) optimality benchmark by a benevolent social planner. The model shows that when law enforcement actors operate under the pressures of political competition, they engage in lower than optimal levels of enforcement and accuracy for small crimes and a higher than optimal levels of enforcement and accuracy for larger crimes.

Effects of Political Competition on Socio-economic Context during Non-electioneering Period in Nakuru County, Kenya

Political competitions within and between political parties in a society and other forms of violence have negatively affected many African societies, Kenya included. This has led to deaths, destruction of property and displacement of citizens. This study is based on the recurrence of ethnic conflict especially during electioneering period unlike other regions in the Country. The specific objective of the study was to examine the socio-economic context during non-electioneering period in Nakuru County, Kenya. The study was guided by the social change theory. The study used descriptive research design. A sample of 384 respondents was selected from Nakuru residents and 33 key informants: 9 Members of County Assembly, 8 Religious Leaders, 8 Civil Society Organisations and 8 Administrators, using probability and non-probability sampling techniques. This gave a sample size of 417 respondents. Both secondary and primary data were collected. Primary data was collected by use of questionnaire, focus group discussion, interview schedules and field observation. Secondary data was obtained through desk research, libraries and journals. Data collected was analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) version 21 and presented using two measures of distribution; percentages and frequencies. Key findings for the study were that men, women and children experience varied forms of both physical and psychological violence as a result of electioneering conflicts. The only way to tame this violence is for members for the society to purposely choose to coexist. The study findings would contribute to helping policy makers in coming up with new policies or modifying the existing ones to address influence that political competition has on ethnic conflicts and add knowledge in the field of peace and conflict studies. (274 words)

Electoral Competition and Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces

What is the effect of political competition on subnational social spending? Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original budget panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 and 2009, the study finds that social spending increases the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office. It also finds that other arguments in the literature are relevant in explaining variations on types of spending, such as partisan fragmentation in the districts. The article discusses these findings for the Argentine provinces and explores their implications with regard to the debates on the effects of electoral competition and the design of social policies, especially in developing countries and federal democracies.

The Effects of Political Competition on Rural Land: Evidence from Pakistan

Can more vigorous political competition significantly raise rural land values, or contribute to more robust land rental markets? Exploiting exogenous variation in the national popularity of Pakistan’s political parties during the 2008 elections, we show that provincial assembly constituencies with greater competition between political parties had significantly higher land values and more active land rental markets four years later. A standard deviation decrease in a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of political concentration is associated with a 36 percent increase in land values, an 8 percentage point increase in the share of landowners renting out land, and an additional 4 percentage points of each landowner’s land being rented out. Land values appear to increase most among the poorest households, suggesting that benefits are greatest for those with the fewest resources to influence policy. Exploring potential causal mechanisms, we show that political competition leads to more stable and business-friendly governance and institutions, better amenities, and greater provision of publicly provided goods. The effect of political competition on security is ambiguous, suggesting that political competition may decrease security along some dimensions and increase it along others.

The Effects of Political Competition on the Funding and Generosity of Public-Sector Pension Plans

In politically competitive jurisdictions, there can be strong electoral incentives to underfund public pensions in order to keep current taxes low. I examine this hypothesis using panel data for 2,000 municipal pension plans from Pennsylvania. The results suggest that as a municipality becomes more politically competitive, it tends to have pension plans that are less funded, more generous, and use higher interest rates at which to discount future actuarial liabilities. An increase in the level of political competition by one standard deviation leads to a decline in the actuarial funded ratio of about 7-10 percent, an increase in the annual average retirement benefits of about $470-620 per retiree, and an increase in the interest rate for discounting actuarial liabilities of about 5 basis points. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates generated using demographic characteristics of the population as instruments corroborate these findings.

From Posting to Voting: The Effects of Political Competition on Online Political Engagement

How does living in a battleground state during a presidential election affect an individual’s political engagement? We utilize a unique collection of 113 million Facebook status updates to compare users’ political discussion during the 2008 election. “Battleground” state users are significantly more likely to discuss politics in the campaign season than are users in uncompetitive “blackout” states. Posting a political status update—a form ofday-to-dayengagement with politics—mediates ∼20 percent of the relationship between exposure to political competition and self-reported voter turnout. This paper is among the first to use a massive quantity of social media data to explain the microfoundations of how people think, feel, and act on a daily basis in response to their political environment.

The Effect of Political Competition on the Provision of Municipal Public Services in Mexico

Economists and political scientists often argue that political competition in local elections can have positive impact on government services similar to as the impact of economic competition in the marketplace. Using cross-section data on local elections in Mexico, we evaluate the impact of political competition on the provision of local public services, using socio-economic and demographic factors. Evidence suggests that political competition relates positively to the provision of municipal public services, having a greater effect in those municipalities with the highest poverty and income inequality.

Erratum to: The Effect of Political Competition on Democratic Accountability

Erratum to: The Effect of Political Competition on Democratic Accountability

The Voter's Blunt Tool

When do voters win? In this paper we derive conditions under which a democracy will produce policies that favor the voter over special interests. We show that increasing political competition, increasing office holding benefits, decreasing potential rents to firms and increasing the salience of policy implies improved policies for the representative voter. We also find a positive interaction between the effect of political competition and office holding benefits. Panel data from the United States supports the model’s predictions. The ratio of taxes paid by individuals relative to corporations is decreasing with governor salary (a proxy for office holding benefits), protest activity (a proxy for policy salience), and political competition. Additionally, minimum wages are increasing with governor salary, protest activity, and political competition.

The Effect of Political Competition on Democratic Accountability

Representing uncompetitive, homogeneous constituencies is increasingly the norm for American legislators. Extensive research has investigated how competition affects the way representatives respond to their constituents’ policy preferences. This paper explores competition’s effect on the other side of representation, how constituents respond to their legislators’ policy record. Combining multiple measures of state competitiveness with large-N survey data, I demonstrate that competition enhances democratic accountability. Voters in competitive states are more interested in politics, more aware of the policy positions their U.S. senators have taken, and more likely to hold them accountable for those positions at election time. Robustness checks show that these effects are not due to the intensity of campaigning in a state: general competition, not particular campaign activities, drives citizens’ response. The recent increase in uncompetitive constituencies has likely lessened the degree to which legislators are held accountable for their actions in office.

Competition and turnout revisited: The importance of measuring expected closeness accurately

This study aims at contributing to the literature on the effect of political competition on electoral participation. I test the Downsian Closeness Hypothesis (DCH) on data from runoffs in general elections in Hungary. The expected closeness of the runoffs is proxied with first round margins of victory. The findings of the paper are consistent with the DCH: increases in margins between two parties in the first round significantly decrease turnout in the second, even when turnout in the first round is controlled for. This is in line with the theoretical considerations of the DCH but contrary to a large part of the existing empirical literature. The estimates of closeness are substantially greater than in previous papers and suggest that previous studies of the DCH using actual closeness as a proxy for expected closeness encountered a serious measurement error problem.

Political Competition and Fiscal Status: Evidence from Municipalities in Israel

This paper analyzes the link between fiscal balance and political competition. Two conflicting hypotheses are formulated and tested in the literature, with no consensus as to which is correct. The first hypothesis states that political competition increases the accountability of politicians and thus increasing the efficiency of the public sector. The second states the opposite, suggesting that political competition leads to inefficiencies which are the result of the necessity to form a coalition. I test these hypotheses with budgetary and political data on municipalities in Israel for the years 1997-2006. The results suggest that the aforementioned hypotheses could both hold true, depending on the level of the competition. Low levels of political competition are associated with large debts. However, high levels of political competition are also associated with large debts, while the smallest levels of debt arise when political competition is intermediate. Low levels of political competition might be caused by the tendency of Arab residents to vote according to their clan affiliation. I also find evidence of political budget cycles in Israeli municipalities, where election years result in greater deficits. These cycles might be another mechanism by which the effect of political competition takes place, as they are also affected by the level of political competition.

Nation states vs. united empire: Effects of political competition on economic growth

Is political fragmentation, i.e., nation states, more favorable to economic growth than political unification, i.e., a united empire? This study develops an endogenous-growth model to analyze the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification. Under unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan taxation and possibly subject to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations. Under fragmentation, the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. If capital mobility is above (below) a threshold, then fragmentation (unification) would favor growth, and this threshold is increasing in the degree of defense competition and decreasing in the costs of heterogeneity.

Letting Go Without a Fight: Decolonization, Democracy and War, 1900—94

Does the type of regime really make no difference to the likelihood of violent conflict over basic issues of stateness such as separatism and decolonization? Can democratic peace theory be successfully applied when dealing with the national identity or stateness question? This article extends the application of the democratic peace to the process of decolonization. It examines conflict between imperial states and their colonies during the process of decolonization and investigates the question of whether democracy affects the likelihood of conflict. The central finding is that, contrary to the implications of some prominent theories of state formation and democracy, democratic imperial states are significantly less likely to go to war with their colonial possessions in the process of achieving independence. Further, the authors find only a monadic, not dyadic, democratic peace effect. The regime type of the colony does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of war. It is the nature of the regime of imperial states, rather than that of colonies, that is a significant factor. In addition, the predominant source of this effect appears to be the institutional constraints placed on executive action within democracies, rather than the influence of mass politics or the effects of political competition. Regarding power-related factors, power parity between sovereign and colony makes conflict more likely (a colonial power-transition effect), but imperial decline actually makes war with colonies less likely. Sensitivity analysis reveals that a number of other hypothesized effects cannot find robust support. Simulations are used to assess the magnitude of the effect of regime type pre- and post-independence. Overall, the article contributes to theory development by investigating different institutional aspects of democracy and by distinguishing monadic and dyadic effects.

Political Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political Competition on Youth Voter Turnout

Adolescence is an important time for political development. Researchers have concentrated on the family as the sole socializing agent of youths; however, as Campbell, Gimpel, and others have shown, political contexts also matter for young citizens. Using the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, the Record of American Democracy, and election outcomes data, I find that adolescents who resided in politically competitive locales or states have higher turnout years later compared to those who lived in uncompetitive contexts. These effects are not mediated by the home political environment and act through political socialization. This research adds to a growing literature on the influence of political contexts on political behavior and is the first to explore how political competition during adolescence influences voter turnout in young adulthood.

The Political Determinants of Economic Performance

The authors present and test a theory about the effects of political competition on the sources of economic growth. Using Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s model of economic growth and data for roughly 80 countries, the authors show that political competition decreases the rate of physical capital accumulation and labor mobilization but increases the rate of human capital accumulation and (less conclusively) the rate of productivity change. The results suggest that political competition systematically affects the sources of growth, but those effects are cross-cutting, explainingwhy democracy itself may be ambiguous. These findingshelp clarify the debate about regime type and economic performance and suggest new avenues for research.