Effect Of Patent Protection Research Articles

Dynamic effects of patent policy on innovation and inequality in a Schumpeterian economy

This study explores the dynamic effects of patent policy on innovation and income inequality in a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure and heterogeneous households. We find that strengthening patent protection has a positive effect on economic growth and a positive or an inverted-U effect on income inequality when the number of differentiated products is fixed in the short run. However, when the number of products adjusts endogenously, the effects of patent protection on growth and inequality become negative in the long run. We also calibrate the model to US data to perform a quantitative analysis and find that the long-run negative effect of patent policy on inequality is much larger than its short-run positive effect. This result remains consistent with our empirical finding from a panel vector autoregression.

Export quality and patent protection: Stage‐dependent effects in development

AbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of patent protection on the vertical innovation of developing country exporters. We find that the relationship between export quality upgrading and patent protection is dependent on the technological stage of an economy. Specifically, patent protection promotes quality growth if an economy's product quality is sufficiently close to the world frontier level. We characterize the density of the distribution of country products, determining the share of country–product combinations that fall under or pass a threshold, and draw some implications for patent policy design. While a majority of combinations exceed the critical threshold, the results nevertheless call for differentiation in the strength of patent protection by income group and product class. To establish these findings, we employ a very extensive index of export product quality at the four‐digit SITC level and utilize a country‐level measure of effective patent protection for the period 1990–2010.

The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor Mobility

This paper investigates the effect of obtaining a patent on the mobility of early employee inventors. If patents serve as signals of inventor ability, they should increase the mobility of their aut...

A note on the effect of patents in endogenous growth models

ABSTRACTThis note examines the effect of patent protection in an endogenous growth model with a generic innovation process. It indicates that increasing patent breadth stimulates innovation when R&D is less intermediates-intensive than production, whereas it has a non-monotonic effect on innovation when the former is more intermediates-intensive than the latter.

The Diffusion of Military Technology

The impact of national defense research and development spending on overall innovation depends on the extent to which the knowledge and technologies generated by defense funding diffuse. This article uses an original data-set of patents assigned to defense-servicing organizations to investigate the diffusion of military technologies. Contrary to the predictions of the prevailing scholarship, I find no difference in the rate of diffusion between civilian and military technologies. Neither do military technologies assigned to government agencies diffuse at different rates than those assigned to firms. The overall technological experience of the patent assignee is found to be a positive predictor of the diffusion of military technologies. The effect of the prevailing intellectual property rights regime is ambivalent: when US patents are included in the sample, the effect of patent protection is positive, when the US is excluded, the effect is either non-significant or negative depending on the model specification that is utilized.

Effects of Patent Protection on Optimal Corporate Income and Consumption Taxes in an R&D‐Based Growth Model

Does reducing the corporate income tax accompanied by an increase in the consumption tax to meet the government's budget constraint improve welfare? To respond, we examine the welfare‐maximizing corporate income tax and consumption tax rates in an R&D‐based growth model under the constraint that the government's budget is balanced at each point of time. Further, we consider how welfare‐maximizing tax rates change as patent protection becomes stronger, as seen in many countries. The results show that as patent protection becomes stronger, the corporate income tax rate should be higher and the consumption tax rate should be lower. This implies that under stronger patent protection, recovering production at the expense of innovation by raising corporate income tax and reducing consumption tax improves welfare.

Patent Protection in a Model of Economic Growth in Multiple Regions

We study the effects of patent protection on economic growth in the ith region when this ith region is part of an aggregate economy of i = 1,…,N regions. The regulatory authority in the ith region attempts to curtail the monopoly power of patent holding input producers by requiring them to charge a price that is parametrically related to the unconstrained monopoly price. Our analysis generates three results. First, we show the manner in which the equilibrium growth rate of the ith region is related to the above mentioned parameter. Second, we demonstrate the impact that changes in the stringency of patent protection have on the ith region’s equilibrium growth rate. Finally, we explain why eliminating the monopoly distortion does not maximize social welfare in the ith region.

Brevets et accès aux médicaments dans les pays en développement

Patent and Drugs in Developing Countries. This article surveys the empirical literature on how patents affect access to drugs in developing countries. In the short run, higher prices and lower access rates are very likely, notably for those countries that benefited from a competitive supply before the TRIPS agreement came into force. The increase in prices can be mitigated if the pharmaceutical firms take into account the low revenues of their patients, which is more probable if external pricing and parallel imports are banned. The importing states can also bargain down the prices, thanks to price controls, compulsory licensing and grouped procurement. The effect of patent protection in the long run remains more uncertain, but the incentives to innovate are likely to be only marginally influenced by the added patent protection, mainly because of the sheer poverty of the countries where patent protection has been introduced.

The Effect of Patent Protection on Foreign Direct Investment

The Effect of Patent Protection on Foreign Direct Investment