ECSC Treaty Research Articles

Why Does Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 Provide for the Imposition of Penalties Only on Undertakings?: A Historical Perspective

According to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission may impose any fines for the breach of substantive competition rules only on ‘undertakings’. The provision does not contemplate the imposition of fines on individuals considered responsible for the conduct of the undertaking concerned, even though, as explained in this article, this position is not imposed by the relevant legal basis (Article 83 EC [the Treaty establishing the European Community in the version following the Treaty of Amsterdam], corresponding to Article 87 EEC Treaty [the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in its version of 1957] and the present Article 103 TFEU [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]) That legal basis would indeed allow such liability to be established. From a policy point of view, however, it is often argued that sanctions should also be imposed on such individuals. This raises the question as to why the Union legislator chose not to provide for corresponding powers on the Commission’s part. From the relevant legislative history exposed in this article, it emerges that the approach of Article 23(2)(a) ultimately originates from the ECSC Treaty [theTreaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community]. In this latter context, it reflected the particular limits placed by its authors on that Treaty. It did not reflect the contemporary orientations at national level regarding punitive sanctions. The approach gradually found its way into Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 without any further specific discussion on the way, despite the different context offered by the relevant provisions of the EEC/EC Treaty. It was first transplanted into Regulation No 11, based on Article 79 EEC Treaty (today Article 95 TFEU) and concerning the abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions. The negotiations preceding the adoption of this Regulation brought to light strong reserves regarding the conferral of sanctioning powers upon the (then) EEC, and it was no doubt unrealistic to expect that it would have been granted powers more far-reaching than those available under the ECSC Treaty. When Regulation No 17 (and specifically Article 15) was elaborated, the drafters were aware of the scheme established by Regulation No 11, which served as a reference. No genuine discussion regarding possible powers to punish the persons considered responsible for the conduct of the ‘undertaking’ took place. It is likely that any such innovation would not have been realistic at that point. Lastly, the reform brought about by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 focused on other aspects regarding the implementation of competition law, and the scheme of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 has been taken over into Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2013 without major changes. No consideration was given to the possible imposition of penalties on natural persons implicated in the commission of breaches of competition law. EU antitrust sanctions, European Commission, individual sanctions, Regulation No. 1/ 2003, Regulation No 17, Regulation No 11, ECSC Treaty, history

Monolingualism or multiple versions for Erasmus+ Guidelines? Incompatibilities and utopia.

<p><em>Since the ECSC Treaty signed in Paris in 1951, marking the beginning of the commun destiny of the first international integration organization until the most recent decisions, such as the single currency or the immigration policies, it is a matter of fact that European Union progresses only with harmonious dialogue and joint actions, built on mutual respect of others’ differences. Nowadays, in the </em><em>rapidly changing societies, financial concurrence and geopolitical stakes together with arrogance, or dominance, often outweigh the plurilingual communication, thereby leading to worries about linguistic equality within the Union; hence, the subject of the present stydy. Communication in this polyglottic supranational union should be based on an equal pattern, without what the impact of English as lingua franca<a title="" href="file:///F:/JOURNAL%20BA%20TEIEP%201/PAPER_HATZIDAKI.doc#_ftn1"><strong>[1]</strong></a> may be contested and criticised. This combined with the fact that translations are not fully compatible with the English text, implies that European Union does not always resonate at the same frequencies</em>.</p><div><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div><p><a title="" href="file:///F:/JOURNAL%20BA%20TEIEP%201/PAPER_HATZIDAKI.doc#_ftnref1">[1]</a> http://www.euractiv.fr/section/langues-culture/news/l-anglais-se-confirme-comme-la-lingua-franca-de-l-europe/</p></div></div><div><br clear="all" /><br /></div>

Nachholende Europäisierung? Reaktionen und Strategien der IG Metall gegenüber der Montanunion in den 1950er Jahren

Confronted with a fait accompli by the ratification of the ECSC Treaty in 1951, the biggest German metalworkers’ organization – IG Metall – initially came to the conclusion, not to support the foundation of the new community. However, switching to the year 1957, when the Treaties of Rome marked the next step of European integration, this position became significantly modified: IG Metall was not merely participating in all the trade unions related ECSC structures, but rather drew the conclusion, that the ECSC has been an economic success and that integration should be deepened. Reviewing the development of this change and its reasons, this article states that IG Metall had undergone a process of Europeanization.

The start of European integration and the parliamentary dimension: the Common Assembly of the ECSC (1952–1958)

SUMMARY This article examines the development of the role of the Common Assembly, the parliamentary assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. This assembly, which was composed of seventy-eight members appointed to yearly terms by the national parliaments, was the institution least privileged in the 1951 ECSC Treaty of Paris. It had no legislative powers and could only perform a function of control over the action of the High Authority. But from the outset, the Common Assembly sought to strengthen its role by exploiting the spaces granted it by the Treaty as much as it could. It set up a system of standing committees, and in addition to its ordinary session, it held extraordinary sessions. A very important factor of its development was the formation and consolidation of the transnational political groups. If the national element dominated the first meetings of the Common Assembly, over time the political affinities took precedence over national origin. The Common Assembly devoted great attention to developing its administrative structure as well. So, starting from a position of clear disadvantage, the ECSC Common Assembly managed to conquer broader space in the Community's institutional dialectic.

The research fund for coal and steel and the steel technology platform

50 years ago, ECSC programmes have introduced collaborative scientific and technical research on a European scale. They have created the foundations for the European Research framework programmes (FP). The ECSC treaty has expired. A new research programme, complementing the FP of the European Union: the Research Fund for Coal and Steel, is born. The Steel Technology Platform will secure its full coordination with all other available steel research instruments. All of this constitutes a very tangible and lively legacy of the ECSC, in a more global world, in the light of new priorities of the European Union, of the objectives of Lisbon and Barcelona, and finally of the today reaffirmed strategic importance of the knowledge-based economy.

Selected Opinions Delivered by Advocate General Lagrange

Maurice Lagrange was appointed Advocate General in 1953 and retired in 1964. He delivered over 80 Opinions in a period of 10 years, covering a wide range of issues. The first 40 or so Opinions concerned the European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECSC Treaty) exclusively, whilst the remainder covered all three Treaties.

Selected Opinions Delivered by Advocate General Lagrange

Maurice Lagrange was appointed Advocate General in 1953 and retired in 1964. He delivered over 80 Opinions in a period of 10 years, covering a wide range of issues. The first 40 or so Opinions concerned the European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECSC Treaty) exclusively, whilst the remainder covered all three Treaties.

Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: The Law and Policy of the EEC (Second Edition) by Frank L. Fine

The above work is an excellent treatise on an area of very considerable practical importance, with which practitioners are increasingly concerned. The author, who has practised extensively in the relevant area, has succeeded in giving an authoritative view of a very complex field, and it is likely that the present work will prove of great value to practitioners and teachers. One of the great merits of the book is its well-nigh exhaustive treatment of the relevant case law, and its frequent citation of the views of other text writers. The book attempts to examine the application of the EC competition rules to changes in corporate structure and to all fields of industrial cooperation. For reasons of space, the book fails to consider the competition rules of the ECSC Treaty. The first chapter, the contents of which were influenced by Professor Korah, contains an overview of EC antitrust enforcement. This chapter...

Third Country Nationals and the Treaty on European Union

The Treaty on European Union follows well-established Community practice in treating third country nationals separately from EC nationals (i.e. nationals of Member States). Article 100c was introduced into the EC Treaty to empower the Council to enact measures regarding visa requirements for TC nationals engaged in 'international movement', meaning movement between the Community and a third country. Competence may also be acquired pursuant to Article K of the Treaty on European Union as regards 'internal movement', i.e., movement between Member States, by TC nationals as well as other aspects of international movement by such persons. Pending such acquisition. Article K envisages such matters being treated within the framework of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. No attempt is made in these provisions to link treatment of TC nationals and the freedom of movement of EC nationals. Separate treatment might be thought to simply reflect the fact that in the case of TC nationals, the EC Treaty provides for no equivalent of the common customs tariff or the common commercial policy, which apply to trade in goods with third States. However, this justification may be of more formal than substantial significance. The absence of a common customs tariff or common cdmmercial policy for coal and steel products under the ECSC Treaty did not prevent the European Court from ruling that this Treaty secured free movement for coal and steel products originating in third States, once they had been properly admitted to one Member State. In any case, provision for the common customs tariff and the commercial policy in the EC Treaty did not in itself ensure that problems of separate treatment in the case of trade in goods were resolved. Indeed, such provision implied separate treatment of international trade and internal trade, and

The Democratic Dimension of European Integration

SINCE 1952, THAT IS SINCE THE SETTING UP OF THE FIRST European Community for Coal and Steel, there have been two views of European integration: the first regards and continues to regard European integration as the removal of state powers from the national administrations in specific sectors. This deliberately restrictive approach, with its overriding concern for efficiency, considers it is enough to limit the activities of national bureaucracies at European level. The view is that to a large extent one can do without the control and safeguard mechanisms which are usually built into the exercise of state power in all our member states. One eminent proponent of this view, Professor Ispen, an expert on German cotstitutional and European law, has described this form of integration, and the European Community it has produced, as an ad hoc association.The second view is also based on removing the exercise of state power from the national administrations in certain restricted areas. However it is not satisfied with a technocratic and bureaucratic approach but is concerned to preserve hard-won rights in the area of the control and exercise of sovereignty. I am of course thinking here first of all of the democratic element. Those who belong to this school of thought can cite the text of the Treaties establishing the European Communities in support of their view: the Preamble to the ECSC Treaty refers to ’… the basis for a broader and deeper Community among peoples …’. The Preamble to the EEC Treaty speaks of laying ‘the foundations for an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’.

Steel Quotas under the ECSC Treaty: the Scope and Limits of the Commission's Powers under Article 58 of the Treaty of Paris: A study of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the steel quota systems

Journal Article Steel Quotas under the ECSC Treaty: the Scope and Limits of the Commission's Powers under Article 58 of the Treaty of Paris: A study of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the steel quota systems Get access Frank S. Benyon Frank S. Benyon Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Yearbook of European Law, Volume 4, Issue 1, 1984, Pages 231–253, https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/4.1.231 Published: 01 November 1984

Crisis Policy in the European Steel Industry in the Light of the ECSC Treaty

Crisis Policy in the European Steel Industry in the Light of the ECSC Treaty

Federal Jurisdiction of the Common Market Court

PETER HAY is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois; Member of the Board of Editors and of the Editorial Committee. 1 For more comprehensive treatment of the Court and aspects of its jurisdiction see Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities (1962); Buergenthal, Appeals for Annulment by Enterprises in the E.C.S.C., 10 Am. J. Comp. L. (1961) 227; Buergenthal, Private Appeal Against Illegal State Activities in the E.C.S.C., 11 Am. Comp. L. (1962) 325; Lenhoff, Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Court of the European Communities and the Courts of the Member States, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. (1963) 296; Stein & Hay, Legal Remedies of Enterprises in the European Economic Community, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. (1960) 375; Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community (1955). Although the Court of Justice is one of the two common institutions of all three European Communities (EEC, ECSC, EURATOM), the present discussion will focus only on the federal aspects of its jurisdiction under the EEC Treaty: the EURATOM Treaty's provisions, on the one hand, parallel those of the EEC Treaty, so that the present discussion applies equally to that Treaty; on the other hand, judicial federalism is less pronounced in the ECSC Treaty which lacks a provision comparable to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. See Lenhoff, supra this note, at 320. 2For a discussion of the legal nature of the European Communities see Gaudet, La structure juridique de la Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Faculte Internationale de Droit Compare, sess. Et' (1958); De Visscher, Le Droit Public de la Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (1956); Schlochauer, Zur Frage der Rechtsnatur der Europaischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl, Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisationen, Festschrift fur Hans Wehberg (1956) 361. For a discussion of the term supranational as it is found in the ECSC Treaty and has been used to characterize the European Communities generally see Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, 91 Recueil des Cours (1957, I) 105, 143-148 and Haas, The Uniting of Europe (1958) at 33. 3 See EEC Treaty Arts. 181 and 215. The EEC Treaty may be found, in English translation, in 298 U.N.T.S. 14. 4 EEC Treaty Arts. 178, 183, and 215. Tort liability may also arise from a Community act which the Court has annulled. See Art. 176 para. 2. See Much, Die Amtshaftung im Recht der Europiischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl (1952).