AbstractIn the summer of 2020, Turkey and Greece deployed naval vessels in the contested eastern Mediterranean waters, which led first to a standoff and eventually a collision. Soon after, a US warship arrived at Crete. While this move should have been intended to calm tensions between the two historical rivals, some observers saw this as a show of support for Greece, marking a significant shift from the traditional American role of mediator. This article examines the US responses to gas exploration and other disputes in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Greek‐Turkish divide over Cyprus. It argues that Washington's tilt toward Athens has been pushing Ankara to deepen its economic, diplomatic, and even military relations with Moscow. The United States could rebalance with Turkey and drive a wedge between it and Russia, for instance through incorporating its NATO ally into strategies for reducing Europe's reliance on President Vladimir Putin for energy resources. But if the current zero‐sum approach persists, Turkey is likely to continue to look east—which is not in the American interest.
Read full abstract