Earnings Management Choices Research Articles

Politically connected business and real earnings management: the moderating role of family control and audit quality

PurposeThis study examines whether real earnings management (REM) choices are connected with the ownership structure of politically connected businesses (PCBs). The authors also discuss the moderating role of audit quality (AQ) and family control (FC) on the relationship between PCBs and REM.Design/methodology/approachThe authors' study sample comprises firms registered on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE). The sample examines the financial data of the firms that remained listed for the last eight years, i.e. from 2011 to 2018, excluding nonfinance companies and firms with incomplete data. The authors test the hypothesis using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression methods.FindingsThe authors find that PCBs show a high level of involvement in income-decreasing REM compared to nonPCBs due to lower litigation risk in REM. However, the authors' results also show that two monitoring mechanisms, AQ and FC, curb the opportunistic behavior of PCBs and reduce the intensity of REM in PCBs.Practical implicationsThe findings of the study are beneficial in decision-making for both internal and external stakeholders, such as creditors, shareholders and competitors. In countries like Pakistan, which fall in the category of emerging economies, PCBs show involvement in income-decreasing REM to change the accurate picture of financial information to attain personal goals, and investors in such countries have a low level of knowledge about earnings management strategies; thus, this study offers detailed knowledge and information to investors and shareholders about political connections and REM. This plays a crucial role for regulators in stiffening the rules and regulations to further assist in more secure financial reporting.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by providing a nuanced understanding of the interplay between political connections, REM, FC and AQ in the business context. Second, family-controlled businesses often exhibit distinct characteristics and governance structures compared to nonfamily-controlled firms. Exploring the moderating role of FC in the following relationship could provide valuable insights into how family dynamics influence the financial reporting practices of PCBs. Third, AQ is a critical factor in ensuring financial reporting transparency. However, the interaction between AQ, political connections, and REM remains relatively unexplored. This study explains how audit oversight affects the earnings management behavior of PCBs.

It's Not Always Black and White—Identifying Characteristics of Managers Who Perceive and Use Ambiguity in Accounting to Their Advantage

ABSTRACT Prior research shows that rules ambiguity often leads to self-serving decision making and ethical violations. We extend this research by identifying characteristics of managers that associate with increased perceptions of ambiguity in accounting standards. Specifically, we find higher levels of narcissism (entitled self-interest), impulsivity (affective reactivity), and construal mindset (abstract thinking) are all significant contributors, individually and in combination. Our integrated, interactive model shows impulsivity interacts with both construal mindset and with narcissism in perceptions of rules ambiguity. Path analysis further documents that perceived ambiguity mediates trait characteristics and self-serving earnings management choices. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of underlying processes driving earnings management and may explain, in part, recent mixed evidence in psychology regarding the effects of higher level construal thinking and the cognitive processes driving the interaction of narcissism and impulsivity in business settings. We also address potential implications in an era of increased principles-based guidance. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Earnings management by family firms to meet the debt covenants: evidence from India

PurposeGiven the unique nature of Indian family firms and the recent failure of many business houses (Bhushan Steel Ltd., Hotel Leela Ventures Ltd. etc.) it is important to understand the relationship between the earnings management practices of the family firms and the debt. In this paper an attempt towards this has been made.Design/methodology/approachThis study makes use of an empirical approach to understand the relationship between earnings management and debt in the Indian context. This study was conducted by considering a large sample data of 16,629 family firm years spread across nine years. This study makes use of fixed effects and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions to test our hypothesis.FindingsFirst and foremost, this research supports the socioemotional wealth theory. It indicates that maintaining the control of the business is one of the socioemotional factors for the Indian family business and Indian family businesses ladened with debt engage in earnings management to protect their socio emotional wealth (control of the business). Evidence for higher earnings management practices for firms with above average debt has also been documented. Further, the fact that real activity earnings management is the preferred earnings management choice over the accrual-based earnings management as majority of debt is from the banks and financial institutions has also been demonstrated. Finally, the analysis indicates that accrual-based earnings management and real activity earnings management are complementary to each other. However, real activity earnings management can also act as a substitute for the accrual-based earnings management but the reverse is not true. Even among the real activity earnings management, cost-based real activity earnings management was preferred over the revenue-based real activity earnings management as the former is more elusory.Research limitations/implicationsThis research is limited to the listed family firms of India. Since the family firms around the world are heterogeneous the findings from this research might not be extended to other economies.Practical implicationsThe study has meaningful insights for policy making and monitoring of the family firms. It also aides the investors in taking investment decisions with respect to family firms in India.Originality/valueThe study is unique as it integrates the family firms, debt and various types earnings management. Previous studies have focused mainly on accrual-based earnings management. The study also provides insights on the relationship between earnings management practices and debt covenants at various levels of family holdings.

Earnings management and investor reaction

The purpose of the article is to investigate the contraction between the behavior of managers and investors toward Iran's capital market and the focus on agency theory which ends up with the conflict between the utilities of manages and investors because a conflict of interest implies an attempt to spread opportunistic behavior. In the current study, the benefit of reducing capital cost (manager's utility) and return on assets (investor's utility) are considered variables of interest of either party, in that Osborne's game theory was used in a two-step manner. The study population consisted of the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Iran Over-the-Counter Market, classified in the game table according to managers' behavior toward high or low earnings management and investor's behavior toward acceptance non-acceptance of stock. The experimental results presented in this paper uphold the agency theory, indicating a conflict between managers and investors in Iran's capital market, particularly in the Tehran Stock Exchange. According to game theory, Nash's dominant equilibrium comes to the fore when dealing with the manager's low earnings management and investor's choice of strategy to accept a share in Iran's capital market and Tehran Stock Exchange. Alternatively, the presentation of transparent financial statements and the acceptance of such a company stock can maximize parties' utilities.

SHORT-TERM DEBT AND FIRMS' EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CHOICES: THE CASE OF VIETNAM

The primary purpose of this research is to explore the link between short-term debt and firms' earnings management choices. It focuses on understanding how and when short-term debt will improve or reduce the earnings management activity of companies. Our proxy for real earnings management is based on the measure developed by (Roychowdhury, 2006). Using a sample of listed firms in the period of 2009-2018 in Vietnam, the study determines an important positive correlation between short-term debt and real activities manipulation. Our results further show that firms having lower levels of short-term debt tend to use real earnings management activities, but those that have higher levels of short-term debt are prone to use accrual-based earnings management method rather than altering real activities, inducing an inverted U-shaped relationship between short-term debt and real earnings management.

Short-Selling Threats and Real Earnings Management—International Evidence

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the effect of a short-selling threat on managers' earnings management choices in an international setting. Using data from 22 countries between 2003 and 2015, we find that a short-selling threat constrains real earnings management, and this effect is mainly driven by firms operating in countries with weak shareholder protection. Furthermore, we also reveal that the monitoring effect of short selling is more pronounced in countries where short selling is not only legal, but also feasible.

Does new performance appraisal system (EVA) affect earnings management?

Purpose Currently, most research studies focus on ownership reforms and governance reforms, while only a few research studies focus on management system innovations. Based on an evolution of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) performance appraisal systems, this paper investigates the influence of performance appraisal system on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach Using a natural experiment that central government-owned enterprises (CGOEs) carried out economic value-added performance appraisal (EVA-PA) in 2010, the authors adapt difference-in-difference method to analyze the relationship between EVA-PA and earnings management choice. Furthermore, the authors consider the situation which contained financial status, separation between decision-making rights and decision-control rights, separation between ownership and control and industrial characteristics. Findings The research finds that after carrying out EVA-PA, CGOEs prefer accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management, and there is substitution effect between the two types of earnings management. Moreover, further research studies reveal that enterprises suffering losses in the previous year and featuring higher separation between decision-making rights and decision-control rights and higher separation between ownership and control have stronger earnings management motive under EVA-PA. In contrast, enterprises achieving satisfactory financial performance in the previous year and engaging in businesses within protective industry have weaker earnings management motive under EVA-PA. After the implementation of EVA-PA, accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management both impair operating performances of CGOEs. Originality/value Theoretically, this paper enriches research studies on earnings management from the perspective of incentive mechanism and expands research studies on economic consequences of EVA-PA. In addition, it validates the relationship between the two types of earnings management. As an important mechanism of corporate management and control, performance appraisal system is an important part for establishing ownership management system and improving internal management system of SOEs.

Short Selling Pressure, Reporting Transparency, and the Use of Real and Accruals Earnings Management to Meet Benchmarks

Prior literature finds that short selling is beneficial to the market because it increases liquidity and helps to discipline optimistic market prices. The authors use 2 controlled experiments to examine the potential for an unintended consequence of allowing short selling or easing short selling restrictions. Because prior research identifies short sellers as sophisticated market participants who have the ability to see through accrual earnings management choices, we predict and find that, when reporting is transparent, managers are more likely to use real earnings management relative to accrual earnings management when short selling restrictions are relaxed. This is consistent with the idea that real earnings management activities are more defensible as the result of legitimate operating decisions and are therefore more likely to hold up to scrutiny from short sellers. Overall, the results suggest that regulations that are unrelated to financial reporting can affect how managers respond to the transparency that arises from financial reporting regulations.

Informal institutions and managers’ earnings management choices: Evidence from IFRS-adopting countries

In this study, we investigate the role of informal institutions (religiosity and culture) in determining managers’ choices of earnings management methods (accruals vs. real activities), after controlling for formal institutions (investor protection, enforcement quality and equity market development). Using an ethical perspective, we find that managers tend to choose an earnings management strategy that meets the prevailing social (informal) norms of the environment where the firm is headquartered. Specifically, our analysis shows that firms domiciled in countries with strong religious adherence and high-power-distance cultures prefer to manage their earnings ‘upwards’ through real activities rather than accruals. Overall, our results suggest that informal institutions determine managers’ earnings management choices at least as strongly as formal institutions do. It would therefore be misleading to analyze managers’ choices in managing earnings solely from the formal rules perspective without considering the role of informal constraints or vice versa.

EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PADA TITIK KRITIS PERUBAHAN TAHAP LIFE CYCLE: STUDI EMPIRIS PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR DI INDONESIA


 
 
 Corporations pass every stage of their life cycles through different ways. At each point of these stages a company has the possibility to turn into decline. When this occurs, a company has the incentive to manage earnings in order to maintain its performance reflected in reported earnings. The objective of this study is to examine whether earnings management choices are different in corporate life cycles from growth to mature and mature to stagnant. The differences in earning management behaviour were indicated by negative and positive discretionary accruals. The sample was taken from manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (2006 to 2013) in different life stages. The results show that firms in growth-mature and mature-stagnant did manage earnings through discretionary accruals, as indicated by significant differences as compared to those in other corporate life cycles.
 
 

Earnings management strategies to maintain a string of meeting or beating analyst expectations

Prior studies provide consistent evidence that firms use a combination of management forecast guidance, accrual earning management (AEM), and real activity earnings management (REM) to meet or beat analyst expectations (MBE). While recent evidence (e.g. Kross, Ro, & Suk, 2011) suggests that management forecast guidance is a less effective MBE strategy for firms with longer strings of MBE, less is known about the use of AEM and REM to manage MBE strings as the string lengthens. Since managements' incentives and actions taken to maintain earnings strings may differ as the string lengthens and becomes more difficult to sustain, we examine the extent to which managers use AEM and REM to MBE as the string grows longer. We find evidence that while firms with shorter MBE strings appear more likely to use income increasing AEM to sustain their MBE strings, the use of income increasing AEM decreases for longer MBE strings. Further, we document that firms with longer MBE strings use more income increasing REM to avoid breaking the MBE string. Collectively, our results suggest that researchers investigating firms' earnings management choices to sustain MBE strings should control for the length of the MBE string in their research design.

"The Relation between Real Activities based and Accrual-based Earnings Management in U.S. Banking Industry"

We examine whether bank managers use real activities manipulation (or transaction-based earnings management) and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes in managing earnings based on U.S. banking industry. We find that bank managers trade off these two earnings management methods based on their relative costs and that managers adjust the level of accrual-based earnings management according to the level of real activities manipulation realized. In addition, banks with higher exposure to fair value accounting rely less on accrual-based earnings management using loan loss provisions as the extent of fair value exposure increases the availability of transaction-based earnings management. Finally, the trade-off relation between accrual-based earnings management and real-activities manipulation is more pronounced after the 2008 financial crisis. In sum, we provide evidence that bank characteristics and the level of alternative earnings management are important determinants of earnings management activities in banking industry. We also contribute to the literature on the effects of financial crisis and fair value accounting on earnings management choices. In particular, the role of fair value accounting in banks’ earnings management practices should be of interest to regulators as they consider ways to increase stability in the banking sector.

The Effect of Internal Control Certification Regulatory Changes on Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management

ABSTRACTThis study examines the effect of changes in internal control certification requirements (ICCR) on the earnings management choices of Australian firms in the period 2007–2015. The Australian setting is unique as the certification requirements change from voluntary in 2004–2007 to mandatory in 2008–2014, before being abolished in 2015. Consistent with the notion that real earnings management (REM) is less susceptible to detection, the results suggest that firms place greater reliance on REM than on accrual-based earnings management (ABEM) when having to comply with certification requirements. In particular, I find voluntary certifiers have lower REM and ABEM relative to first-time certifiers in the mandatory period between 2008 and 2014, and there is an increase in REM activities among first-time mandatory period certifiers. Moreover, firms that discontinue certification, after the abolition of the requirement in 2015, switch from REM to ABEM. This suggests that regulatory ICCR changes affect firms’ earnings management choices.

Earnings Management Preferences of Family Firms and Its Impact on the Market Value of the Firm

In this paper we analyze the preference for earnings management techniques by the family firms and the impact of the same on the performance of the firm. Family firms contrary to non-family firms are driven by different objectives. Using socio emotional wealth theory, we hypothesize that family firms prefer an earnings management technique, which is less risky in the long term. Using the publicly available data on all the family firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), our analysis indicates prevalence both accrual based and real activity earnings management among Indian family firms. However, revenue based real activity earnings management was preferred by those family firms that have exhausted the possibility of accrual based earnings management. Our analysis of the impact of earnings management choice on market value indicates a short-term positive impact of the accrual based earnings management. Revenue based real activity earnings management was found to have long term positive impact but the cost based real activity earnings management had a long term negative impact on the value of the market value of the firm.

Effects of Declining Bank Health on Borrowers' Level of Earnings Management

This study investigates whether deterioration of the financial health of a bank affects their borrowers’ level of earnings management. In order to examine the effects of declining bank health on firms’ earnings management activity, we use a difference-in-difference design and the setting of the European sovereign debt crisis as a shock to the health of certain European banks. These European banks have been severely affected and significantly decreased their lending volume during the crisis. Based on this observable supply shock, we consider these banks as exposed. This setting represents an exogenous shock to European non-financial firms. To reduce a potential self-selection bias, we only analyze earnings management from European firms headquartered in non-directly crisis-affected countries. Using different discretionary accrual measures and a timely loss recognition concept to evaluate earnings management, we find evidence that borrowers of exposed main banks are more likely to engage in earnings management compared to borrowers with healthy main banks during the crisis. One potential explanation for these results could be the increased bargaining power in the development of new banking relationships and in negotiations for new or prolonged funding. Interestingly, we only find evidence for non-listed firms. Overall, our results provide new insights into the consequences of a threatened banking relationship on the borrowers’ earnings management choices.

The Role of Overbilling in Hospitals’ Earnings Management Decisions

This paper examines the role of overbilling in hospitals’ earnings management choices. Overbilling by hospitals is a form of revenue manipulation that involves misclassifying a patient into a diagnosis-related group that yields higher reimbursement. As overbilling allows hospitals to increase revenues without altering operations, affecting costs, or having to reverse such behavior in the future, I propose and find that overbilling reduces hospitals’ use of managing accruals or cutting discretionary expenditures. Next, I find that hospital managers prefer overbilling to managing accruals (cutting discretionary expenditures) when cutting discretionary expenditures (managing accruals) is constrained, and vice versa. Collectively, my findings suggest that overbilling is an important alternative manipulation tool in hospitals.

The Role of Overbilling in Hospitalss Earnings Management Decisions

This paper examines the role of overbilling in hospitals’ earnings management choices. Overbilling by hospitals is a form of revenue manipulation that involves misclassifying a patient into a diagnosis-related group that yields higher reimbursement. As overbilling allows hospitals to increase revenues without altering operations, affecting costs, or having to reverse such behavior in the future, I propose and find that overbilling reduces hospitals’ use of managing accruals or cutting discretionary expenditures. Next, I find that hospital managers prefer overbilling to managing accruals (cutting discretionary expenditures) when cutting discretionary expenditures (managing accruals) is constrained, and vice versa. Collectively, my findings suggest that overbilling is an important alternative manipulation tool in hospitals.

Accounting Quality and Media Attention Around Seasoned Equity Offerings

This paper investigates how media coverage affects quality of accounting information for seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms. Media attention can either serve as a “watchdog” (watchdog hypothesis) and effectively reduce earnings management; or, alternatively, can create an extra pressure on managers putting them under spot so that managers try to fulfill market expectations and manage earnings (attention pressure hypothesis). We consider two types of earnings management: accrual earnings management, and real earnings management. Using a sample of SEOs from 1993 to 2014, we find that media serves as a watchdog for real earnings management, but does not affect accrual manipulations. Our findings hold after we control for endogenous factors affecting firms’ earnings management choices, and when we use alternative time periods for media coverage. This paper is the first to demonstrate that media attention affects the quality of accounting information during equity offerings as it successfully reduces real earnings management.

Accounting quality and media attention around seasoned equity offerings

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate how media coverage affects the quality of accounting information for seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms.Design/methodology/approachThe sample includes SEOs completed between January 1993 and December 2014 in the USA that are available from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company. The FactSet database was used to measure the amount of media coverage. The paper considers two types of earnings management: accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management.FindingsThis study finds that the media serves as a watchdog for real earnings management but does not affect accrual manipulations. These findings hold when endogenous factors affecting firms’ earnings management choices are controlled for and also when alternative time windows for media coverage are examined.Originality/valueThis paper is the first to demonstrate that media attention affects the quality of accounting information during equity offerings, as it successfully reduces real earnings management.

Regulation and the interdependent roles of managers, auditors, and directors in earnings management and accounting choice

In this paper, we examine the growing number of behavioral studies of how financial reporting, auditing, and other corporate governance regulations affect earnings management and accounting choice-related decisions of managers, auditors, and directors. We first describe how experimental and survey studies can add unique insights into our understanding of earnings management and accounting choice. We then organize our review of the literature by the type of regulation (financial reporting, auditing, or corporate governance) and secondarily by which of the three parties are affected. Finally, we point out useful directions for future research and discuss key methodological choices faced by those who will conduct that future research.