Prior literature suggests that managers engage in inventory overproduction to inflate current earnings but this form of real earnings management can result in significant economic costs (Bruggen et al. 2011). Additionally, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 151 may inadvertently encourage overproduction by requiring that companies expense unallocated overhead in the current period (Young et al. 2014). In this study, we investigate whether, in recent years, managers’ overproduction decisions change, by examining whether abnormal production costs of suspect U.S. GAAP firms differ before versus after the adoption of SFAS 151. We also compare the behavior of suspect U.S. GAAP firms to that of suspect IFRS firms because the treatment of inventory costs under IFRS has always been similar to the treatment under SFAS 151. Thus, IFRS firms serve as a control group in our setting. We find that prior to the adoption of SFAS 151, suspect U.S. GAAP firms used overproduction to meet benchmarks, but we do not observe overproduction to meet benchmarks after the adoption of SFAS 151. In addition, we find that suspect IFRS firms do not engage in overproduction to meet benchmarks either before or after SFAS 151. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that suspect U.S. GAAP firms reduce overproduction relative to suspect IFRS firms following the adoption of SFAS 151. Finally, in a supplementary test, we find that the quality of working capital accruals improves under SFAS 151, in that working capital accruals better reflect past, contemporaneous, and future cash flows. Overall, our results suggest that, in recent years, managers of U.S. firms have generally avoided overproduction, presumably because of the economic costs associated with this practice and/or because of increased monitoring and skepticism of management decisions following corporate failures that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
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