Costly signaling theory indicates that highly visible acts of public generosity and display, which exact costs not easily recouped, can provide social benefits to those engaged in such acts. Such signaling is associated with the strength or fitness of the provider. Costly signaling has been implicated by archaeologists in the rise of complex societies. But costly signaling theory, with modifications proposed in the article, might equally apply to theorizing political collapse and the regeneration of complex societies thereafter. This article explores how Maya elites and rural sub-elites engaged in costly signaling and modified their actions by cost shifting and cost masking, which significantly transformed their signaling behavior. The material culture media assessed for signaling are architecture, slipped and fineware ceramics, and obsidian in display contexts. The case study focuses on the Petén Lakes region of Guatemala from the Late Classic to Early Postclassic periods (AD 600-AD 1250).
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