Objective: This study aims to explore the dynamic game process of training participation strategies among hospitals, clinical departments, and newly recruited doctors, as well as the impact of hospital intervention on this process. By applying game evolution theory, a comprehensive model is constructed to analyze the decision-making logic of training participation and propose new training strategies to promote the professional growth of newly recruited doctors and improve hospital service quality. Methods: The stability of dynamic game equilibrium points was analyzed by constructing Jacobian matrices, considering nine different game scenarios with and without hospital intervention. An empirical study from a hospital was introduced to verify the theoretical model's predictions. Results: The study found that without hospital intervention, clinical departments and newly recruited doctors tend to choose not to participate in training. After hospital intervention, through the provision of resources and incentives, the participation and effectiveness of training significantly improved. Conclusion: The study reveals the crucial role of hospital intervention in promoting the participation of newly recruited doctors in training and proposes a training strategy that combines theory and practice. This strategy not only helps new doctors quickly adapt to the hospital environment but also improves the quality of medical services, providing talent support for the hospital's continuous development. It offers theory-based decision support for hospital managers and provides new ideas for the improvement of future medical education and practice.
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