Duration Of Civil Wars Research Articles

Leadership Preferences, Minimum Acceptable Nationalist Demands, and Duration of Ethno-territorial Civil Wars

In standard conflict bargaining models, internal ethno-territorial dispute outcomes should be influenced not only by status quo conditions and relative military power, but also by leadership preferences. Since direct, large-sample measures of leadership preferences on both sides of conflicts have not hitherto been available, statistical research typically diverges from case study research in omitting leadership preferences. This paper utilizes a database that measures the ideological nationalist dimension of variation in state and ethnic minority group leadership preferences by examining and ranking leaders’ minimum acceptable nationalist demands. Controlling for the impact of other factors, more extreme minimum nationalist demands, on both the state and the rebel group sides, are robust predictors of longer war duration.

One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion

AbstractWhat effect does state violence have on the cohesiveness and fragmentation of insurgent organizations? This article develops a theory of how state violence against civilians affects insurgent cohesion and fragmentation in civil war. It argues that the state-led collective targeting of an armed group's alleged civilian constituency increases the probability of insurgent fragmentation, defined as the process through which insurgent organizations split into distinct entities, each with its own social composition, goals, and leadership. This effect is driven by the interaction of several mechanisms at the individual, group, and organizational levels: state-led collective targeting enlarges the supply of fresh recruits, strengthens the bonds between immediate group members (interpersonal cohesion), and disrupts intra-organizational coordination, strategic unity, and institutional arrangements that underpin the commitment of individual fighters to the organization as a whole (ideological cohesion). The implications of this argument are empirically tested in an analysis of armed groups fighting against their governments between 1946 and 2008. The results suggest that campaigns of massive state violence directed against the civilian constituency of rebel groups increase the overall risk of insurgent fragmentation, a finding that has important implications for the duration and escalation of civil wars.

Foreign Military Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars Revisited

Studies of the impact of foreign military intervention on the duration of civil wars most often fail to distinguish conflicts in which a single external state intervenes from those in which several outside states intervene. One influential quantitative analysis that does explore this distinction (Cunningham, Journal of Peace Research 47(2), 115–127, 2010) focuses primarily on whether or not the interests and preferences of the intervening state(s) coincide with those of prominent local actors. By revising this study’s dataset to clarify the distinction between single-state interventions and multiple-state interventions, it can be demonstrated that the latter are associated with lengthier wars than the former. Both types of foreign military interventions are correlated with civil wars that last longer than average.

Oil Wealth, Winning Coalitions, and Duration of Civil Wars

New research has begun to underscore the complicated relationship between democratic institutions and the duration of civil wars. Specifically, greater constraints placed on executives often lead to considerably longer civil wars as leaders are limited in how they bargain with dissidents. This presents a puzzle as democracies are often seen as credible negotiators in international disputes. This article suggests that the size of the government’s winning coalition represents a double-edged sword. Larger winning coalitions allow governments to bargain more credibly but also place constraints on what governments can offer since peace agreements may alienate coalition members. Fortunately, future access to postwar oil wealth provides the feasibility for the governments to compensate hard-liners who may lose out on any settlement, making them more likely to allow concessions to rebels. This combined credibility of large winning coalitions and the feasibility provided by oil wealth allows for peace agreements, therefore shortening the duration of civil wars. We test these propositions by examining the conditional relationship between oil wealth and coalition size on the duration of all civil wars between 1950 and 2009.

Forced urbanisation: A cross-national assessment of the effects of intranational political violence on a nation’s largest cities

This article offers a ‘first step’ toward understanding the consequences of intranational political violence on the growth of a nation’s largest cities. Theory and research from studies on forced migration and internal displacement are used to construct several hypotheses that assess the impact that various forms of intranational political violence have on the growth of major urban areas within the developing world. Hypotheses are tested using a cross-national time-series sample of 85 developing nations from 1974 to 2005. The results provide strong empirical evidence that various forms of intranational political violence are significantly related to population growth amongst a nation’s largest cities. Specifically, attacks on government personnel are associated with an increase in population growth among a nation’s largest cities. Violence targeting civilians are associated with decelerated growth in a nation’s largest city but increased growth in major secondary cities. Finally, increases in the intensity and duration of civil wars are associated with decreases in population among secondary cities but exhibit a curvilinear growth pattern in a nation’s largest city (i.e. an increase then decrease). It is argued that the findings are at least partially explained by the ‘spatial logics’ that arise from a given form of political violence. It is concluded that more attention should be given to studying the consequences of political violence on the urbanisation process for rapidly urbanising nations.

Praying for Rain? Water Scarcity and the Duration and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Recent anecdotal evidence from the civil wars in Somalia and Yemen suggest that water scarcity may shape the dynamics of civil wars. While a considerable body of research has examined the connection between water scarcity (such as low rainfall) and the onset of civil war, very little research has examined how water scarcity may shape the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Looking specifically at rainfall, this paper argues that changes in access to water play a key role in the duration of civil wars. As rainfall declines, there is a reduction in resources available to both the government and the rebel group, leading to a stalemate in fighting. Furthermore, this paper argues that declines in rainfall are felt more acutely by rebel groups who seek to challenge the government through conventional warfare. This paper tests these propositions using hazard models. The results provide robust support for the propositions.

The Political Economy and Complex Interdependency of the War System in Syria

Duration of civil wars has been an elusive area of study particularly because of the tedious task of disentangling the interplay of actors’ agencies, incentives' structures and constraints. This article tackles Syria’s civil war that has completed its fifth year with little hope for an end any time soon. I examine a plausible cause leading to its protraction. Namely the formation of a war system, which made the costs of war less than the expected risks of peace giving the local, regional and international actors that are shouldering the costs. The war system approach combines class analysis with system-structural analysis capturing nuances and dynamics of conflict. This article is based in part based on primary sources collected by author in the Summers of 2014 and 2015 in Lebanon.

The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration

This paper considers how coups d’état influence the duration of civil wars. While previous work on civil war duration has ignored coups, grouped them alongside civil wars or considered them as a special type of conflict, this article recognizes coups as dramatic events that can quickly change the course of a conflict. Coups that take place during a civil war can shock an otherwise intractable bargaining situation, shortening the war’s duration. This shock influences both information and credibility concerns. Coups condense government preferences into a single, unified viewpoint and allow governments to efficiently translate preferences into action. They likewise combine the military with the government, effectively eliminating the military as a potential spoiler, which helps ease the commitment problem. These expectations are tested by examining the impact of successful coups on civil war duration, 1950–2009. Results suggest that coups indeed serve as peace-inducing shocks, primarily by working through the credibility mechanism.

The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post—Civil War Democracy

Although there is now a wealth of scholarship concerning the onset, duration, and termination of civil wars, there is not nearly as much empirical research by political scientists on the potential for postconflict democratization in countries that have been the site of civil wars. This relative scholarly neglect of post–civil war democratization stands in contrast to the efforts and resources that other actors—foreign ministries, international and nongovernmental organizations, and members of civil society—have invested in attempting to help construct democracy in postconflict states such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Uganda.

Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Does it matter whether a civil war is fought as a conventional, irregular, or symmetric non-conventional conflict? Put differently, do “technologies of rebellion” impact on a war’s severity, duration, or outcome? We find that irregular conflicts last longer than all other types of conflict, while conventional ones tend to be more severe in terms of battlefield lethality. Irregular conflicts tend to be won by incumbents, while symmetric non-conventional and conventional ones are more likely to end in draws. Substantively, these findings help us make sense of the evolution of civil wars, which are likely to become shorter, more intensely fought, and more challenging for existing governments. Theoretically, our findings support factoring in the technology of rebellion when studying the severity, duration, and outcome of civil wars; they also contribute a better understanding of the historical contribution of irregular war to both state building and social change.

Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Does it matter whether a civil war is fought as a conventional, irregular, or symmetric nonconventional conflict? Put differently, do “technologies of rebellion” impact a war’s severity, duration, or outcome? Our answer is positive. We find that irregular conflicts last significantly longer than all other types of conflict, while conventional ones tend to be more severe in terms of battlefield lethality. Irregular conflicts generate greater civilian victimization and tend to be won by incumbents, while conventional ones are more likely to end in rebel victories. Substantively, these findings help us make sense of how civil wars are changing: they are becoming shorter, deadlier on the battlefield, and more challenging for existing governments—but also more likely to end with some kind of settlement between governments and armed opposition. Theoretically, our findings support the idea of taking into account technologies of rebellion (capturing characteristics of conflicts that tend to be visible mostly at the micro level) when studying macro-level patterns of conflicts such as the severity, duration, and outcomes of civil wars; they also point to the specific contribution of irregular war to both state building and social change.

Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset

This paper introduces the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA), which contains detailed information on the state–rebel group dyads included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project Dyadic Dataset. Existing quantitative studies generally focus on characteristics of countries and conflicts to examine the duration, severity, outcome and recurrence of civil wars, in ways that often ignore the actors in civil wars. The NSA data provides additional information on the organizations involved in conflict dynamics. We describe the structure of the NSA data and the variables included, provide descriptive statistics of the indicators, and discuss areas for future research on non-state actors to enhance our understanding of conflict processes.

Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa

The article analyzes the impact of private military companies (PMCs) on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1990 to 2008. We develop an “opportunity structure” theory to argue that while PMCs are profit-oriented entities, the prevalent opportunities in conflicts will determine how they behave in war zones. Empirical findings for civil wars with at least 1,000 battle deaths show that as level of competition among government-hired PMCs increases, they are more likely to deliver optimal services and help bring an end to violence. In the absence of competition, the prevalent structure creates opportunities for PMCs to underperform in order to maximize profits by staying in conflicts longer. The authors also show that swift cessation of hostilities could benefit those profit-seeking PMCs that are compensated with contracts to extract natural resources because resource extraction generates more wealth in peace time. In such cases, the prevalent opportunities in conflict create an incentive for companies to deliver optimal service and terminate hostilities.

Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars

Civil war dynamics and outcomes are shaped by processes of change largely unaccounted for in current studies. This examination explores how the fragmentation of combatants, especially the weaker actors, affects the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Some results of a computational modelling analysis are consistent with the article's expectations, several of them are counterintuitive. They show that when combatants fragment, the duration of war does not always increase and such wars often end in negotiated agreements, contrasting with the expectations of literatures on spoilers, moderates and extremists. Empirical cases, such as Iraq, Congo, Chechnya and the Sudan, illustrate the importance of fragmentation. This study demonstrates the value of accounting for diverse changes in actors and circumstances when studying the dynamics of war.

Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants’ perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants’ goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars.

Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars

In this paper we analyze the relationship between ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars. Several recent papers have argued that the uncertainty about the relative power of the contenders in a war will tend to increase its duration. In these models, uncertainty is directly related to the relative size of the contenders. We argue that the duration of civil wars increases the more polarized a society is. Uncertainty is not necessarily linked to the structure of the population but it could be traced back to the measurement of the size of the different groups in the society. Given a specific level of measurement error or uncertainty, more polarization implies lengthier wars. Our empirical results show that ethnically polarized countries have to endure longer civil wars than ethnically less polarized societies.

War in the Third World: Does Interference Affect the Duration of Third World Civil Wars?

War in the Third World: Does Interference Affect the Duration of Third World Civil Wars?

Emerging Consensus: Results from the Second Wave of Statistical Studies on Civil War Termination

This study searches for consensus findings in the burgeoning statistical literature on civil war termination. Several trends are identified: the final outcomes of civil wars are largely dependent on the military situation; the duration of civil wars, by contrast, depends to a great degree on contextual factors such as inter-ethnic relations, the fragmentation of violence, and economic incentives; while compromise settlements reduce the risk of post-war massacres, they take longer to achieve than military victories and are more likely to collapse into renewed warfare. These results also suggest an intervener's dilemma: while external military intervention can lead to compromise and prevent genocide, it also prolongs the killing and may increase the risk of war recurrence. Interveners appear to have more success after wars than during them. Several other puzzles emerge from the statistical results, which call for theoretical development and further qualitative and quantitative analysis.

Duration of Peace and Recurring Civil Wars in Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Civil wars in Southeast Asia and the Pacific are perhaps the most intractable in the world and thus merit special attention. We adopt a regional approach for our analysis of the duration of peace after civil war terminations. Our contribution is three-fold: First, we capture all dyads (rebel versus government) rather than lumping multiple dyads into one war. This is appropriate in a region where there are multiple conflicts in a country at any one time. Second, we test a new conflict termination dataset developed at Uppsala University. These data allow us to offer a fine-grained analysis not normally found in the civil war literature. Third, we employ a method specifically suited to recurring data in a duration setting. The results generally support our hypotheses that wars in the region are intractable in the face of negotiated settlements and longer wars increase the duration of the subsequent peace. Also, there is a tendency for the peace to become longer with each recurrence. The impact of longer wars is obscured unless repeated events are carefully treated as non-independent events.

Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars

Much of the empirical literature suggests that outside interventions tend to lengthen the expected duration of civil wars; conversely, the policy community often acts as if it holds the opposite expectation for the outcome of intervention. The authors argue that the divergence can be found in how models of intervention are specified in the literature. They propose a model with two novel contributions. First, they incorporate mediations as the key to resolving the strategic problems that the civil war parties face. Second, they account for the decaying effect of interventions over time. Their results suggest that diplomacy is critical for understanding the duration of civil conflicts. They find that mediation has a dramatic effect on the expected duration of a civil war and that when controlling for diplomatic efforts, economic interventions can also reduce the expected duration.