Durable Democracy Research Articles

Theories of governance and development: How does India’s experience fit?

ABSTRACT This article examines the apparent paradox of India’s combination of durable democracy and electoral accountability with a capable bureaucracy, coinciding with a deficient development trajectory. It outlines the nature of the conceptual problem, where India is an outlier in global patterns. Then it compares different conceptual approaches to drawing connections from governance institutions to development outcomes. Next, it reviews some of the contributions to understanding India’s political economy in recent decades. Finally, it draws lessons from India’s experience for the appropriateness of different theories of governance and development. One conclusion is that the paradox recedes when attention is paid to the subnational level, where India’s states encompass considerable variation in initial societal and economic conditions and in development outcomes, and a sufficiently rich theoretical framework, that of limited access orders, is used to situate and encompass the different subnational experiences.

:Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy

:<i>Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy</i>

Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy

Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy

Puntland&amp;#8217;s Path to Durable Democracy and the Challenges of Having Inclusive Dialogue and Gun Control

Puntland&amp;#8217;s Path to Durable Democracy and the Challenges of Having Inclusive Dialogue and Gun Control

The Best Chance for Democratic Success: The Role of Well-Organized Actors and External Support

Abstract Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy makes a compelling case for the importance of well-organized and lengthy popular mobilization movements in contributing to lasting democracy. Through a mixed-methods approach, Mohammad Ali Kadivar draws a correlation between length of a mobilization and electoral democracy. However, his analysis is incomplete, and he fails to account for several important factors, most particularly the role of external actors in supporting (or harming) a democratic transition. And he fails to explain the large variance in his findings—why some of the most well-consolidated democracies lasting a half a century also have some of the shortest periods of mobilization, while some of the most repressive countries had lengthy mobilization periods leading up to their failed transitions.

Review of “Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy”

Review of “Popular Politics and the Path to Durable Democracy”

Popular politics and the path to durable democracy

Popular politics and the path to durable democracy

Popular politics and the path to durable democracy. By KadivarM. A, Princeton University Press. 2022. pp. 174. Cloth $120.00; Paper $35.00; E‐book $17.75

The British Journal of SociologyEarly View BOOK REVIEW Popular politics and the path to durable democracy. By Kadivar, M. A, Princeton University Press. 2022. pp. 174. Cloth $120.00; Paper $35.00; E-book $17.75 Rima Majed, Corresponding Author Rima Majed rima.majed@aub.edu.lb orcid.org/0000-0002-5651-1120 American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon CorrespondenceSearch for more papers by this author Rima Majed, Corresponding Author Rima Majed rima.majed@aub.edu.lb orcid.org/0000-0002-5651-1120 American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon CorrespondenceSearch for more papers by this author First published: 25 March 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.13017Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation

The road to durable democracy: dominant party regimes, party politics and democratic survival

ABSTRACT This study examines why regime survival rates vary across young democracies. The author argues that there is a relationship between the type of authoritarian regime and the survival of subsequent democracies. Old regime elites inherit valuable resources from former dominant party regimes that may increase the likelihood of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) performing well under democracy. This, in turn, for one thing, reduces the fragmentation of the new ruling parties, which inoculates young democracies against political instability that could lead to regime collapse. For another, it can effectively check the government’s power, thus preventing a new ruling party from crossing the line from democracy to authoritarianism. This study considers the hypothesis that dominant party regimes have a positive impact on the electoral performance of ASPs under democracy, thus contributing to the longevity of democracies, and tests that hypothesis by combining quantitative and qualitative analysis.

1989 and After: Morality and Truth in Postcommunist Societies

Nations that endured communist dictatorships must come to terms with the traumas of the past before durable democracies can take hold—a lesson the author learned firsthand in Romania.

Theories of Governance and Development: How Does India’s Experience Fit?

This paper takes on the apparent paradox of India’s combination of durable democracy, capable bureaucracy, but a deficient development trajectory. It begins by outlining the nature of the problem. Then it summarizes and compares some significant approaches to drawing connections from governance institutions to development outcomes. Next, it reviews some of the contributions to understanding India’s political economy in the last few decades. Finally, it attempts to draw some lessons from India’s experience for the application of different theories of governance and development. The central lesson is that the paradox recedes when attention is paid to the subnational level, where India’s states encompass considerable variation in initial societal and economic conditions and in development outcomes.

Machiavelli and the Fortress City

This article examines Machiavelli’s writings on fortresses as a new starting point for a genealogy of urban fortification. In contrast to theorists of Machiavelli who approach fortresses as defensive structures that preserve the present political order, this article considers fortresses as weapons to privatize civic life. It explores the significance of fortresses for democratic readings of Machiavelli, suggesting that Machiavelli offers a careful analysis of the spatial organization of power and its implications for popular self-government. This reconsideration of fortresses in Machiavelli brings his political thought into conversation with contemporary urban theorists critical of the enclosure of public space. The article argues that Machiavelli seeks to resignify notions of fortification and replace the construction of fortresses with practices of fortifying publics. Such practices find ways to strengthen public spaces and envision durable democracy.

Durable Democracy? Economic Inequality and Democratic Accountability in the New Gilded Age

Scholarship in the U.S. provides mounting evidence of a linkage between economic inequality and inequality in representation and policymaking. In response, this article addresses a research question striking at the very heart of the resilience of the democratic capitalist design: Do voters punish elected officials for inequality? We advance the argument that voter punishment of incumbents for inequality will occur when inequality is locally salient and for officeholders that support inequality-enhancing legislation. Relying upon secondary analysis of large-N national survey data, we find that voters residing in high inequality contexts voted against incumbents who supported regressive tax policies and opposed minimum wage increases. Interestingly, for inequality-attenuating incumbents, we find increased support among voters in high inequality contexts. Importantly, robustness checks reveal that observed punishment effects hold for Democratic and Republican incumbents. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for American democracy in an era of rising inequality.

Equilibrium institutions: the federal-proportional trade-off

Durable democracies display a huge variety of combinations of basic institutional formulas. A quantitative logical model shows that while there are multiple equilibrium sets of institutions, each involves some trade-off between the size of the country, the territorial structure of government and the electoral system. Specifically, the larger the country, the more important is federalism in comparison to proportional representation electoral rules for the durability of democratic institutions. The explanatory power of the model is positively tested on all current durable democratic countries. It is also illustrated with a few both fitting and deviant cases. A relevant implication is that the room for manipulation of the choice of institutions is large, but not unlimited, as the choices for a durable democracy are constrained by bounded trade-offs between the values of major institutional variables.

Political Competition and Democratic Stability in New Democracies

This article examines the way in which the initial level of political competition in a new democracy affects the stability of that regime. The author argues that new democracies with low levels of initial political competition are more likely to fail because those initially excluded from the democratic game seek to subvert the regime in the future. Using data from ninety-two new democracies born since 1946, he finds that a higher level of initial political competition in a new democracy makes for a more durable democracy. New democracies at war and born during the Cold War are less likely to survive. Finally, he finds evidence that new democracies with low levels of initial political competition are also more likely to meet with civil conflict.

Authoritarianism in an age of democratization

Far from sweeping the globe uniformly, the 'third wave of democratization' left burgeoning republics and resilient dictatorships in its wake. Applying more than a year of original fieldwork in Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, and the Philippines, in this book Jason Brownlee shows that the mixed record of recent democratization is best deciphered through a historical and institutional approach to authoritarian rule. Exposing the internal organizations that structure elite conflict, Brownlee demonstrates why the critical soft-liners needed for democratic transitions have been dormant in Egypt and Malaysia but outspoken in Iran and the Philippines. By establishing how ruling parties originated and why they impede change, Brownlee illuminates the problem of contemporary authoritarianism and informs the promotion of durable democracy.

Monopoly rights in the privatization of telephone firms

Data from utility privatization sales in 74 countries is analyzed to investigate why governments award monopoly rights, and how monopoly affects government revenue from these sales. Financially constrained governments are more likely to award monopoly rights. Interest groups and institutions are important. Increased importance of taxed business users reduces the probability of a government granting monopoly rights, while an increase in the importance of subsidized residential users has the opposite effect. Durable democracies and market-oriented governments are less likely to award monopoly rights. Monopolies increase government revenue by 66 percent.

Democratic consolidation and community policing: Conflicting imperatives in South Africa

Community policing is currently seen as essential to public policing in a democracy. Yet the consolidation of a new democracy poses potentially conflicting demands that may defeat efforts to move in this direction. The study reported here examines the rise and decline of Community Police Forums in South Africa, a high‐priority effort to democratize the state police during the 1994–1999 transition from apartheid to democracy. The South African experience of building a durable democracy suggests that once the legitimacy of the new government has been established the imperative of regime performance carries more weight than the need to deepen democracy, and that the high crime levels that often accompany greater political freedom are likely to determine a definition of police effectiveness antithetical to community policing. The author notes the irony that the democratization process set in motion political and social forces that increased the political utility of demonstrating the state's authority through policing policy.

Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992

Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Is the greater violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? If both level of democracy and political change are relevant, to what extent is civil violence related to each? Based on an analysis of the period 1816–1992, we conclude that intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.

Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The British Laboratory Experience

Abraham Lincoln said in 1864, It has long been a grave question whether any Government, not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies.' The question still remains in doubt, although Great Britain and the United States have so far maintained their existence without abolishing the liberties of their people. Many less durable democracies have failed the test, often when the only emergency was a threat that their present rulers might fall from power by democratic processes. Lincoln spoke toward the end of the most formidable insurrection ever faced and overcome by a constitutional democracy, in which he had had constantly to balance the needs of national survival against the liberties of the citizen. He had taken many drastic actions, sometimes without the authority of Congress, including suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and military arrest, internment, and trial of civilians.2 But the United States emerged from the Civil War, as it did from subsequent foreign wars, still a constitutional democracy, with the citizen's rights pretty much intact. No democracy today faces an internal crisis of such magnitude as the American Civil War. But many of them, including England, France, West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan, are plagued by terrorists calling themselves urban guerrillas, or freedom fighters, or People's Armies, or whatever menacing and grandiloquent title happens to please their fevered fancies. The violent dissidents are, of course, an enormously diverse group; some have more or less definite, in a few cases arguably just, political goals; most of them profess some sort of Marxist philosophy, often of a highly idiosyncratic variety that would startle Marx, Engels, or even Mao, as much as Anabaptism startled Luther; some seem hardly more than bands of homicidal maniacs, reminiscent