Duhem-Quine Thesis Research Articles

Unpacking underdetermination: Theoretical challenges in understanding macroecological and biogeographic patterns

AbstractMacroecology and biogeography have made significant strides in understanding the patterns and processes underlying biodiversity, yet the problem of underdetermination (the Duhem–Quine thesis) remains an ongoing challenge. Underdetermination arises when multiple explanations are consistent with the observed data, resulting in challenges in theory and model development and testing. Here, we explore the different forms of underdetermination in macroecology and biogeography and their implications for understanding biodiversity patterns. We highlight the gradient ranging from optimistic to pessimistic views in addressing the problem, coupled then with realistic and instrumentalist scientific reasonings, illustrating these issues by evaluating how underdetermination may affect our understanding of the latitudinal diversity gradient. We show how evolution and diversification introduce a new and unexpected source of underdetermination, and that unpacking the underdetermination problem in macroecology and biogeography requires deconstruction methods in a more comprehensive and integrated approach that considers both hierarchical scale and phylogenetic relationships between organisms and trait‐based explanations.

Reinterpreting Science as a Vocation

Weber's 'science as a vocation' has often been viewed as a therapeutic concept with no functional significance in the fully bureaucratized and professionalized modern science. However, development in the philosophy of science in the last century, especially the Kuhn thesis of the discontinuity of scientific progress and the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination, shows that Weber's distinction between science as a vocation and science as a profession (career) can potentially answer one of the oldest questions in science studies: What makes scientific breakthroughs possible?

Disputes over the Definition of the Concept of An Enterprise

Purpose: The aim of the article is to indicate the methodological possibility of reconciling empiricist and phenomenalist views in the consideration of the concept of ‘an enterprise’ carried out within the framework of economic, management and organizational theory. Design/Methodology/Approach: The proposal is an attempt to use and generalise the hitherto achievements of these disciplines in the field of enterprise studies and takes into account the state of methodological reflection resulting from discussions on the grounds of contemporary empiricism and hermeneutics. Findings: The article is a presentation of various views in the discussion on the essence of the enterprise in the light of contemporary empiricism and hermeneutics. The ‘indefiniteness’ and ‘imprecision’ of the concept of ‘an enterprise’ or ‘a firm’, as it has been stated for example in the framework of the European Union law, confirms the validity of the statements of Godel, Church, Lovenheim-Skolem as well as of the Duhem-Quine thesis, which are well known in the contemporary methodological thought. The practice of functioning of enterprises as entities of the market economy, the history of business as reflected in the ‘path of dependence’ and the analysis of the existing system of institutions mean that the disputes waged in the theory of economics and management about the essence of the enterprise as an empirically knowable entity may be effectively overcome on the grounds of the interpretative approach relevant to the phenomenalist methodology. The relaxation in the contemporary methodology of sciences of the rigours of traditional empiricism, especially in its restrictive form offered by neopositivism, and the introduction of phenomenological aspects in attempts to define the concept of ‘an enterprise’ as a multidimensional vector, whose components are certain sets of types of characteristics of different types of enterprises creates an opportunity on the ground of economic theory of enterprise to formulate empirically verifiable or falsifiable sentences. Practical Implications: The definition of the enterprise concept proposed in the article may be useful in legislative practice concerning the enterprise, its organisation and operation. Originality/Value: The article proposes a new way of defining the concept of ‘an enterprise’ using the achievements of empirical and phenomenalist theory of scientific cognition. This definition makes it possible to increase the precision of research within the economic theory of enterprise.

The Duhem-Quine Thesis Reconsidered

Abstract The high point of the falsification of physical theories in a standard view of the philosophy of science is the so-called crucial experiment. This experiment is a kind of manipulated empirical test, which provides the criterion for distinguishing between two rival hypotheses, where one is an acceptable theory due to passing the test, and the other turns out to be an unacceptable theory as it does not pass the test. The crucial experiment was supposed to play a significant role because, in virtue of an empirical disconfirmation of one theory, the experiment was assumed to confirm the other as true. However, in 1906, in La théorie physique, son object et la structure (hereafter quoted in English translation as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954)), Pierre Duhem famously argued against this view and stated that crucial experiments in physics are impossible as they are necessarily ambiguous and logically incomplete. His contention rested on the claim that, “[a] physical theory is not an explanation [of true reality in itself in virtue of some broad metaphysical ramification of physics]. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as accurately as possible a set of experimental laws” (ibid., p. 19). Furthermore, different theories could be equally suitable to represent a given group of experimental laws. And, assuming holism, no hypothesis could be tested in isolation, but merely as a part of a set of an entire scientific theory. The problem which Duhem identified in 1906 was slightly overshadowed and neglected in mainstream philosophy of science until the appearance of a challenging paper by Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951 and entitled “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine’s paper caused a revival of interest in Duhem’s original formulation and gave a new impulse towards the problem in the form of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether Duhem was right to argue that there are no crucial experiments in physics. In order to assess the validity of the thesis, first, this paper makes an exposition of Duhem’s arguments in their favour, and analyses the major criticisms of this position offered in the subject-literature of Adolf Grünbaum, who explicitly attacked the arguments for the thesis as inconclusive and false. Then, this paper presents possible modes of defence of the Duhem-Quine thesis and argues that the original formulation of the thesis is well qualified and plausible. Finally, this paper offers a pragmatic interpretation of the theory choice.

Theory-Containment in Controversies: Neurath and Müller on Newton, Goethe, and Underdetermination

Olaf Muller’s book (More Light) develops a new case for underdetermination (prismatic equivalence), and, as he is focusing on theories of a ‘limited domain’, this assumes the containability of the theories. First, the paper argues that Muller’s theory of darkness is fundamentally Newtonian, but for Newton’s optical theory the type of theoretical structure Muller adopts is problematic. Second, the paper discusses seventeenth-century challenges to Newton (by Huygens and Lucas), changes in the proof-structure of Newton’s optical theory, and how these affect Muller’s reconstruction. Muller’s book provides empirically equivalent theories, yet the historical theories were not empirically equivalent, and the same experiments were used to extract different bodies of evidence to rebut the opponent. Third, Goethe’s multi-layered critique of Newton’s experimental proof is investigated, including his developmental account of prismatic colours, the role of experimental series in rejecting Newton’s observations, and his incorporation of the ‘limited domain’ of prismatic colours in a broader framework. Two key elements of Goethe’s method, polarity and strengthening are discussed in contrast to Muller, who only utilises polarity in his account. Finally Neurath’s attempts to come to grips with the optical controversies and the prism-experiments with ‘blurred edges’ are recalled. Muller also discusses in detail some of these experiments and heavily draws on Quine. Neurath developed Duhem’s and Poincare’s conventionalist insights and had good reasons to be pessimistic about theory-containment. Their differences provide some additions to the history of the Duhem–Quine thesis.

Magic in the Modern World: Strategies of Repression and Legitimization ed. by Edward Bever and Randall Styers

Reviewed by: Magic in the Modern World: Strategies of Repression and Legitimization ed. by Edward Bever and Randall Styers Jasonā. Josephson-storm Edward Bever, Randall Styers, Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm, Magic, Modernity, Modernism, Anthropology, Sociology, Esotericism, Supernaturalism, Rationalism, Selfhood, Repression, Legitimization edward bever and randall styers, eds. Magic in the Modern World: Strategies of Repression and Legitimization. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2017. Pp. 208. Contemporary scholars often have difficulty explaining the presence of magic in the modern world. A number of foundational theorists posited that belief in magic would eventually decline and then vanish. They suggested that modernity was almost definitionally disenchanted. The issue is that those of us who work on magic know differently; countless scholarly studies (reviewed in this journal and elsewhere) have traced influential magical movements and occult revivals across the nineteenth century and down to the present day. Long after magic was supposed to have vanished, by some measures at least, it seems to be flourishing. The essays collected in this volume attempt to get at this issue of magic in [End Page 299] a disenchanted world in two different ways. The essays in the first part of the volume focus on various historical efforts to suppress magic. Those in the second part ask how magic survived persecution in modernity. The repression of magic is best highlighted in two chapters that begin and end the first portion of the book—Randall Styers's "Bad Habits, or How Superstition Disappeared in the Modern World" and Adam Jortner's "Witches as Liars: Witchcraft and Civilization in the Early American Republic." Taken together these two chapters provide an account of how European and American notions of "superstition," "magic," and "witchcraft" emerged in a Christian theological context to describe diabolical powers, but eventually came to refer to errors in thinking. In that respect, "superstition" was displaced from theology to psychology. Thus, in an extension of this logic, in nineteenth-century America, belief in witches came to be seen as a dangerous sign of irrationality incompatible with democracy. These two chapters complement each other quite well and, in that respect, do an excellent job of setting up the rest of the volume. Also in the first half of the volume is an essay by Edward Bever, "Descartes's Dreams, the Neuropsychology of Disbelief, and the Making of the Modern Self," which focuses on a set of Descartes's dreams as a foundational moment in the history of modern thought. It is followed by what is perhaps the single best chapter in the volume, Benedek Láng's "Why Magic Cannot Be Falsified by Experiments." Láng's chapter is an outlier in the first half insofar as it addresses one of the reasons disenchantment failed—namely the problem of falsifiability. It shows how a simplistic notion of "science" as falsifiable and medieval "magic" as irrational falls flat. Skeptical readers often think that magicians either must have been very irrational or must have noticed that their spells did not work. But as Láng notes, interpreting the failure of a spell is not so simple. In that respect he takes the Duhem-Quine thesis to the study of magic, noting that a particular experiment or magical rite never appears in isolation. Thus, it is always possible to adjust a background theory in the face of a seemingly failed trial. This is equally true of science and magic. If a spell to topple a tower or an experiment to test a cannonball's velocity does not produce the result the theory predicts, one can always explain the failure by adjusting auxiliary hypotheses (e.g. the weakness of demons or the strength of air resistance) without considering the grand theory to have been refuted. In this respect, no single scientific experiment or magic spell is ever crucial to proving or disproving a theory. The second half of the volume builds on Olav Hammer's notion that contemporary esoteric movements deploy three main strategies to assert their [End Page 300] legitimacy—"claiming of tradition, an appropriation of the rhetoric of scientific method and verification, and a reliance on the evidence of experience" (4)—and looks at these kinds of legitimization strategies in four...

“Ought Implies Can,” Framing Effects, and “Empirical Refutations”

This paper aims to contribute to the current debate about the status of the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle and the growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it. We report the results of an experimental study which show that people judge that agents ought to perform an action even when they also judge that those agents cannot do it and that such “ought” judgments exhibit an actor-observer effect. Because of this actor-observer effect on “ought” judgments and the Duhem-Quine thesis, talk of an “empirical refutation” of OIC is empirically and methodologically unwarranted. What the empirical fact that people attribute moral obligations to unable agents shows is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC has been refuted.

Quine's ‘needlessly strong’ holism

Quine is routinely perceived as having changed his mind about the scope of the Duhem-Quine thesis, shifting from what has been called an 'extreme holism' to a more moderate view. Where the Quine of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' argues that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (1951, 42), the later Quine seems to back away from this “needlessly strong statement of holism” (1991, 393). In this paper, I show that the received view is incorrect. I distinguish three ways in which Quine's early holism can be said to be wide-scoped and show that he has never changed his mind about any one of these aspects of his early view. Instead, I argue that Quine's apparent change of mind can be explained away as a mere shift of emphasis.

Why the Objectivist Interpretation of Falsification Matters

The article distinguishes between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of scientific method, links subjectivism with good reasons, and argues its uselessness for our understanding of science. It applies the distinction to the method of falsification, explains why objectivism regards falsification to be conjectural, immune to the Duhem–Quine thesis, and immune to the problem of underdetermination. It confronts the falsifying mode of inference with the fallacy of begging the question and with the paradox of inference, and suggests how modus tollens helps scientists to find out that a tested theory is false, in spite of the fact that the falsity of the theory is asserted in its premises.

Whatever Explains Whatever: The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Conventional Quantitative Methods In Political Science

The paper (for the first time, to the best knowledge of the author) applies the Duhem-Quine thesis to conventional quantitative methods in political science. As a result, the discussion of methodological problems associated with these methods is implanted into the epistemological issues highlighted by the Duhem-Quine thesis. Such a link between popular political science methods and philosophy of science could help clarify the difficulties of the former and give impetus to the improved research practices

Underdetermination in evidence-based medicine.

This article explores the philosophical implications of evidence-based medicine's (EBM's) epistemology in terms of the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence as expounded by the Duhem-Quine thesis. EBM hierarchies of evidence privilege clinical research over basic science, exacerbating the problem of underdetermination. Because of severe underdetermination, EBM is unable to meaningfully test core medical beliefs that form the basis of our understanding of disease and therapeutics. As a result, EBM adopts an epistemic attitude that is sceptical of explanations from the basic biological sciences, and is relegated to a view of disease at a population level. EBM's epistemic attitude provides a limited research heuristic by preventing the development of a theoretical framework required for understanding disease mechanism and integrating knowledge to develop new therapies. Medical epistemology should remain pluralistic and include complementary approaches of basic science and clinical research, thus avoiding the limited epistemic attitude entailed by EBM hierarchies.

Modern statistical and philosophical framework for uncertainty assessment in biometric performance testing

The question of estimating uncertainty in measurement is fundamental to all scientific fields. In the field of automated human recognition, lack of repeatability and reproducibility of measurements has been noted since at least the 1970s. This study discusses current approaches to estimation of measurement uncertainty within the broader context of scientific philosophy and measurement science. The authors discuss the Duhem–Quine thesis on testing holism and international standards on estimating and reporting uncertainty in laboratory measurements, then apply these concepts to the estimation of uncertainty in technology, scenario and operational testing in biometrics. The authors advocate for moving beyond the calculation of ‘coverage’ intervals as defined in the ISO/IEC ‘guidelines for the expression of uncertainty in measurement’ to full application of the concepts of uncertainty assessment.

Large Deviation Strategy for Inverse Problem I

Taken traditionally as a no-go theorem against the theoretical organization of inductive processes, Duhem-Quine thesis may interfere with the essence of statistical inference. This difficulty can be resolved by "Micro-Macro duality" [9, 10] which clarifies the importance of specifying the pertinent aspects and accuracy relevant to concrete contexts of scientific discussions and which ensures the matching between what is to be described and what to describe in the form of the validity of duality relations. This consolidates the foundations of the inverse problem, induction method, and statistical inference crucial for the sound relations between theory and experiments. To achieve the purpose, we propose here the large deviation strategy (LDS for short) on the basis of Micro-Macro duality, quadrality scheme, and large deviation principle. In reference to the quadrality scheme consisting of dynamics, algebra of observables together with its states and universal notion of classifying space, LDS will be seen to consist of the corresponding four levels; we discuss in detail its first and second levels, respectively, in this paper and the succeeding one, aiming at establishing statistical inference concerning observables.

Duhem–Quine virtue epistemology

The Duhem–Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by appealing to a cluster of virtues called ‘good sense’, and it has recently been argued by Stump (Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci, 18(1):149–159, 2007) that good sense is a form of virtue epistemology. This paper considers whether Quine, who’s philosophy is heavily influenced by the very thesis that led Duhem to the virtues, is also led to a virtue epistemology in the face of underdetermination. Various sources of Quinian epistemic normativity are considered, and it is argued that, in conjunction with other normative commitments, Quine’s sectarian solution to underdetermination amounts to a skills based virtue epistemology. The paper also sketches formal features of the novel form of virtue epistemology common to Duhem and Quine that challenges the adequacy of epistemic value truth-monism and blocks any imperialist naturalization of virtue epistemology, as the epistemic virtues are essential to the success of the sciences themselves.

Chinese Management Research at a Crossroads: Some Philosophical Considerations

In this commentary, I discuss some philosophical issues related to contextualizing Chinese management research. First, it should be noted that contextualization can be interpreted in different ways by different philosophical perspectives. Second, the Duhem-Quine thesis implies that replications, in the form of empirical generalization, are an appropriate means of testing Western theories in a Chinese context. Third, owing to the difficulty of conclusively falsifying management theories, attempts to create theories that explain unique Chinese management phenomena may lead to theory proliferation and the perpetuation of weak, or even false, theories. Finally, I propose the study of empirical regularities as an alternative to the theory application and theory creation approaches.

Economics and underdetermination: a case study of urban land and housing economics

Underdetermination, associated with the Duhem–Quine thesis, is a familiar if under-researched theme in economics. In the light of this, we examine the development of urban land and housing economics. Through its Cartesian dualistic delineation of theory and data, the contemporary mainstream approach appears unable to circumvent the problem of underdetermination. In effect, it employs the strong version of Duhem–Quine in its retention of the assumption of a single, unitary competitive market (and associated access–space trade-off). Conversely, we highlight the affinity of Ely's (and the later Columbia School's) approach to pragmatists Dewey and Peirce, which provides a more fruitful basis for explanation.

The Ethics and Science of Placebo-Controlled Trials: Assay Sensitivity and the Duhem–Quine Thesis

The principle of clinical equipoise requires that, aside from certain exceptional cases, second generation treatments ought to be tested against standard therapy. In violation of this principle, placebo-controlled trials (PCTs) continue to be used extensively in the development and licensure of second-generation treatments. This practice is typically justified by appeal to methodological arguments that purport to demonstrate that active-controlled trials (ACTs) are methodologically flawed. Foremost among these arguments is the so called assay sensitivity argument. In this paper, I take a closer look at this argument. Following Duhem, I argue that all trials, placebo-controlled or not, rely on external information for their meaningful interpretation. Pending non-circular empirical evidence that we can trust the findings of PCTs to a greater degree than the findings of ACTs, I conclude that the assay sensitivity argument fails to demonstrate that placebo-controlled trials are preferable, methodologically or otherwise, to active-controlled trials. Contrary to the intentions of its authors, the fundamental lesson taught by the assay sensitivity argument is Duhemian: the validity of all clinical trials depends on external information.

Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science

Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethical or political commitments could play a positive role in good science by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and underdetermination of theories by observation. I examine several different interpretations of the claim that feminist values could play a legitimate role in theory justification and show that none of them follow from a logical gap between theory and observation. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach for defending the possibility that feminist political commitments could play a legitimate role in science.

Dr. Alexopoulos Replies

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Letter to the EditorFull AccessDr. Alexopoulos RepliesGEORGE S. ALEXOPOULOS, M.D., GEORGE S. ALEXOPOULOSSearch for more papers by this author, M.D., White Plains, N.Y.Published Online:1 Aug 2005https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.162.8.1552AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail To the Editor: Dr. Mender’s letter offers additional support for my view that experimentally sound scientific findings have only relative value and underscores the importance of nonscientific processes. He points out that thinkers from two disparate traditions raise questions about the safety of experimentally supported conclusions.Dr. Mender’s first point is that the experimental method cannot adequately confirm or reject scientific hypotheses. This view has been articulated in the “Duhem-Quine thesis” and is based on the assumption that hypotheses cannot be tested in isolation from the theoretical network in which they belong (1, 2). Scientists do not subject an isolated hypothesis to testing but only a whole group of hypotheses. Thus, testing a hypothesis depends on its background assumptions. When the background assumptions are challenged, the observations that initially were used to justify a hypothesis become irrelevant. However, when a predicted event fails to occur, it is evident that something in the hypothesis needs to be changed, but nothing in the experiment indicates what the change should be. Consequently, any hypothesis can be safeguarded from falsity, so long as scientists are prepared to make appropriate adjustments to other parts of the theoretical framework. Therefore, critical experiments alone may be inadequate to change the zeitgeist of science.Dr. Mender’s second point emphasizes the power of culture in the scientific process. It is based on the existentialist view that embeddedness in a cultural context contributes to an inveterate tendency toward conventionalism and inauthenticity (3). Scientists are not immune to this problem. As they become initiated in the practices of the scientific community, they are inclined to drift along with the crowd, enacting stereotyped roles. The current competitive funding and publication system encourages conformity and compromises the scientists’ ability to seize on and define their own scientific lives. Thus, to be authentic is not an expected consequence of the scientific process and requires action.Paraphrasing Socrates’s “εν οιδα οτι ουδεν οιδα,” one can argue that there is no safety in science or anything else. Nonetheless, despite its limitations, science has offered the soundest approach to understanding and treating psychopathology. Most of the recent treatment advances in psychiatry have been based on science. Thus, my argument is not one of scientific nihilism but one that emphasizes the need for awareness of the nonscientific forces influencing the scientific process, including the scientific culture and its extremes, the evolving means of experimentation, and the social factors that promote scientific productivity. Because scientific criteria alone cannot define scientific priorities, this responsibility falls on investigators and policy makers.

Duhem and Quine

The rejection of the idea that the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis in fact expresses a thesis upheld by either Duhem or Quine invites a more detailed comparison of their views. It is suggested that the arguments of each have a certain impact on the positions maintained by the other. In particular, Quine's development of his notion of ontological commitment is enlisted in the interpretation of Duhem's position. It is argued that this counts against the instrumentalist construal usually put on what Duhem says about approximation and historical continuity.