Dual-use Potential Research Articles

Assessing ChatGPT's cybersecurity implications in Saudi Arabian healthcare and education sectors: A comparative study.

This study aims to critically evaluate ChatGPT's impact on cybersecurity in healthcare and education sectors. This study employed a cross-sectional survey design, collecting data from healthcare and educational professionals in Saudi Arabia through a structured questionnaire, with 205 healthcare workers' and 214 educators. The survey assessed perceptions of ChatGPT's impact on cybersecurity opportunities and challenges, with data analyzed using descriptive statistics and ANOVA to explore differences across professional roles. Healthcare professionals viewed artificial intelligence (AI) more favorably (mean scores 4.24 and 4.14) than those in education, who showed moderate enthusiasm (mean scores 2.55 to 3.54). Concerns over data privacy and the cost of securing AI were significant, with high mean scores of 3.59 indicating widespread apprehension. A balanced approach to ChatGPT's integration that carefully considers ethical implications, data privacy, and the technology's dual-use potential is required.

The Unsettled Governance of the Dual-Use Items under Article XXI(b)(ii) GATT: A New Battleground for WTO Security Exceptions

Abstract In an era marked by the ‘technologization’ of modern warfare and the privatization of military supply chains, numerous items possess dual-use potential, capable of serving both civilian and military ends. Concurrently, governments increasingly view the acquisition of specific goods, materials, services, and technologies by rival states as a threat to their security. As a result, economic restrictions imposed on dual-use items, including export controls, have proliferated in recent years. These measures have elicited concerns regarding disguised protectionism and potential non-compliance with trade agreements. Central to the debate is the difficulty to strike a balance between addressing legitimate security imperatives and preventing economic protectionism. This article delves into the intersection of trade and security in the regulation of dual-use goods. It offers a focused examination of Article XXI(b)(ii) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concerning trade restrictions on products destined for military use. The paper first reveals limitations of this provision in governing the regulation of dual-use items. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of a ‘purpose test’ provided by the provision as a safeguard against abusive invocation. Lastly, it sheds light on the challenge posed by the standard of proof issue, which complicates the review and mitigation of bad-faith invocations of security exceptions.

Qualify AI Drug Discovery Tools through FDA ISTAND Program to Model Responsible Drug Discovery AI and Mitigate Dual Use Concerns

Artificial intelligence (AI) is poised to revolutionize many fields of science and technology. One field that stands to benefit significantly is drug discovery, which is a time-consuming and expensive process. AI can predict compounds and some of their relevant characteristics, including their efficacy and toxicity. In doing so, AI can help refine the pool of potential compounds that progress in the drug discovery pipeline, while excluding those that will later likely prove to be too toxic or ineffective (Tran et al. 2023). Essentially, AI can make the early stages of drug discovery more efficient by helping to avoid unnecessary human clinical trials and prevent costly, late-stage failures (Tran et al. 2023). Yet, as drug design AI capabilities burgeon, so does the concern that these algorithms could be used for malicious purposes, such as harnessing AI to instead predict compounds that are both highly effective and highly toxic, posing biosecurity risks. Although concerns about the dual-use potential of AI are warranted, there is great potential for AI’s beneficial application in drug discovery, so eliminating the use of AI in this space altogether is undesirable. We recommend that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) place a special call for submissions of drug design AI with safeguards in place to prevent dual-use to its Innovative Science and Technology Approaches for New Drugs (ISTAND) Pilot Program. This would allow the FDA to open up a line of communication with drug design AI creators, educate the broader public on the potential for dual-use of these technologies and emphasize the need for safeguards, and select a drug design AI that models responsible AI applications for the field at large.

„Magnetic particle imaging“

Magnetic particle imaging offers far-reaching potential with aunique range of applications. Identification of application scenarios with added value for clinical use. Overview of previous application scenarios in phantom and small animal models, evaluation of dual-use potential. With its unique application profile, magnetic particle imaging offers asolution for clinical use where common, established imaging techniques reach their limits. As atracer imaging technique, it is particularly characterized by its high speed, sensitivity and contrast-to-noise ratio. The low magnetic fields and low power consumption allow imaging to be mobile and taken to locations that were previously inaccessible. Magnetic particle imaging has seen rapid development in recent years. The applications demonstrated in the small animal model and phantom were able to support the versatility and added value of the method. With the availability of human imaging systems, the technology must face clinical verification studies.

Dual-Use and Trustworthy? A Mixed Methods Analysis of AI Diffusion Between Civilian and Defense R&D

Artificial Intelligence (AI) seems to be impacting all industry sectors, while becoming a motor for innovation. The diffusion of AI from the civilian sector to the defense sector, and AI’s dual-use potential has drawn attention from security and ethics scholars. With the publication of the ethical guideline Trustworthy AI by the European Union (EU), normative questions on the application of AI have been further evaluated. In order to draw conclusions on Trustworthy AI as a point of reference for responsible research and development (R&D), we approach the diffusion of AI across both civilian and military spheres in the EU. We capture the extent of technological diffusion and derive European and German patent citation networks. Both networks indicate a low degree of diffusion of AI between civilian and defense sectors. A qualitative investigation of project descriptions of a research institute’s work in both civilian and military fields shows that military AI applications stress accuracy or robustness, while civilian AI reflects a focus on human-centric values. Our work represents a first approach by linking processes of technology diffusion with normative evaluations of R&D.

Dual-Use Quickscan: A Web-Based Tool to Assess the Dual-Use Potential of Life Science Research.

Research on pathogenic organisms is crucial for medical, biological and agricultural developments. However, biological agents as well as associated knowledge and techniques, can also be misused, for example for the development of biological weapons. Potential malicious use of well-intended research, referred to as “dual-use research”, poses a threat to public health and the environment. There are various international resources providing frameworks to assess dual-use potential of the research concerned. However, concrete instructions for researchers on how to perform a dual-use risk assessment is largely lacking. The international need for practical dual-use monitoring and risk assessment instructions, in addition to the need to raise awareness among scientists about potential dual-use aspects of their research has been identified over the last years by the Netherlands Biosecurity Office, through consulting national and international biorisk stakeholders. We identified that Biorisk Management Advisors and researchers need a practical tool to facilitate a dual-use assessment on their specific research. Therefore, the Netherlands Biosecurity Office developed a web-based Dual-Use Quickscan (www.dualusequickscan.com), that can be used periodically by researchers working with microorganisms to assess potential dual-use risks of their research by answering a set of fifteen yes/no questions. The questions for the tool were extracted from existing international open resources, and categorized into three themes: characteristics of the biological agent, knowledge and technology about the biological agent, and consequences of misuse. The results of the Quickscan provide the researcher with an indication of the dual-use potential of the research and can be used as a basis for further discussions with a Biorisk Management Advisor. The Dual-Use Quickscan can be embedded in a broader system of biosafety and biosecurity that includes dual-use monitoring and awareness within organizations. Increased international attention to examine pathogens with pandemic potential has been enhanced by the current COVID-19 pandemic, hence monitoring of dual-use potential urgently needs to be encouraged.

Integrating evolutionary aspects into dual-use discussion: the cases of influenza virus and enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli.

Research in infection biology aims to understand the complex nature of host–pathogen interactions. While this knowledge facilitates strategies for preventing and treating diseases, it can also be intentionally misused to cause harm. Such dual-use risk is potentially high for highly pathogenic microbes such as Risk Group-3 (RG3) bacteria and RG4 viruses, which could be used in bioterrorism attacks. However, other pathogens such as influenza virus (IV) and enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC), usually classified as RG2 pathogens, also demonstrate high dual-use risk. As the currently approved therapeutics against these pathogens are not satisfactorily effective, previous outbreaks of these pathogens caused enormous public fear, media attention and economic burden. In this interdisciplinary review, we summarize the current perspectives of dual-use research on IV and EHEC, and further highlight the dual-use risk associated with evolutionary experiments with these infectious pathogens. We support the need to carry out experiments pertaining to pathogen evolution, including to gain predictive insights on their evolutionary trajectories, which cannot be otherwise achieved with stand-alone theoretical models and epidemiological data. However, we also advocate for increased awareness and assessment strategies to better quantify the risks-versus-benefits associated with such evolutionary experiments. In addition to building public trust in dual-use research, we propose that these approaches can be extended to other pathogens currently classified as low risk, but bearing high dual-use potential, given the particular pressing nature of their rapid evolutionary potential.

Biosecurity risks associated with vaccine platform technologies

Vaccine platforms have been critical for accelerating the timeline of COVID-19 vaccine development. Faster vaccine timelines demand further development of these technologies. Currently investigated platform approaches include virally vectored and RNA-based vaccines, as well as DNA vaccines and recombinant protein expression system platforms, each featuring different advantages and challenges. Viral vector-based and DNA vaccines in particular have received a large share of research funding to date. Platform vaccine technologies may feature dual-use potential through informing or enabling pathogen engineering, which may raise the risk for the occurrence of deliberate, anthropogenic biological events. Research on virally vectored vaccines exhibits relatively high dual-use potential for two reasons. First, development of virally vectored vaccines may generate insights of particular dual-use concern such as techniques for circumventing pre-existing anti-vector immunity. Second, while the amount of work on viral vectors for gene therapy exceeds that for vaccine research, work on virally vectored vaccines may increase the number of individuals capable of engineering viruses of particular concern, such as ones closely related to smallpox. Other platform vaccine approaches, such as RNA vaccines, feature relatively little dual-use potential. The biosecurity risk associated with platform advancement may be minimised by focusing preferentially on circumventing anti-vector immunity with non-genetic rather than genetic modifications, using vectors that are not based on viruses pathogenic to humans, or preferential investment into promising RNA-based vaccine approaches. To reduce the risk of anthropogenic pandemics, structures for the governance of biotechnology and life science research with dual-use potential need to be reworked. Scientists outside of the pathogen research community, for instance those who work on viral vectors or oncolytic viruses, need to become more aware of the dual-use risks associated with their research. Both public and private research-funding bodies need to prioritise the evaluation and reduction of biosecurity risks.

Анализ текущего состояния КБТО: проблемы и возможные пути их решения

The COVID‑19 pandemic has highlighted the relevance of biosecurity and biosafety issues, including such risks as the deliberate use of biological weapons, agroterrorism, and developments in life sciences with dual-use potential. Throughout its almost 50-year history, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regime has faced many challenges, a majority of which have demanded attention ever since. For example, the problem of universality remains topical. The verification mechanism has not received enough development since 2001. Also, the BTWC regime has to face the inequality of economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties that, altogether with the inequalities in the BTWC implementation experience, makes the regime vulnerable. Amid these long-standing and profound issues new threats continue to emerge, like the erosion of global arms control and disarmament architecture as well as developments in science and technology. Even though States parties to the BTWC agree on the need to establish effective mechanisms for reviewing scientific and technological developments, there is no unanimity in approach or possible format. Moreover, agroterrorism, despite its increased relevance, is not covered properly within the BTWC regime. The list of challenges is extensive, however, there is a larger list of possible measures designed to strengthen this regime. Given that the sustainability of any regime is based on the political will of its members to comply, it is essential to enhance states’ commitments and stimulate their interest through a variety of proposed measures. Joint activities, like the renewal of confidence building measures, addressing risks of bioterrorism, or reviewing scientific and technological developments related to the Convention, in particular, may give the impetus needed.

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution.

This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (“DNA signatures”) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al., 2017) in Europe could have been—or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of “zero-knowledge” and “invisibility.” This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.

Awareness and Attitudes of Research Students Toward Dual-use Research of Concern in Pakistan: A Cross-sectional Questionnaire.

Dual-use research poses a significant challenge for scientists in the biomedical field and for global health security in general. As the scientific knowledge and materials required for the development of biological agents become progressively more accessible and inexpensive, there is an increased need to understand and improve the governance of scientific research. Prevention of the misuse of facilities, equipment, agents, and scientific knowledge requires high levels of awareness of the concept of dual-use research, starting with early-career scientists and graduate students. In this study, the attitudes and level of awareness of postgraduate students in Pakistan toward the issues surrounding dual-use research were assessed through a survey containing both quantitative and qualitative questions in 32 universities in 4 provinces, federal area, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir regions of Pakistan; 933 students responded. Most (58.2%) had never heard of dual-use research of concern (DURC), while 18.5% had heard the term but were unsure of its meaning. Irrespective of prior knowledge, a higher percentage of students (68.6%) felt an obligation to report research misuse. Considering the need for DURC training, 94.1% of the respondents agreed that the principal investigator should take the responsibility to train students on DURC at the start of a research project. When experimental results having dual-use potential, 69.1% indicated they would publish with limited protocol, with 43.5% indicating they would publish the limited protocol only if there was a way for scientists to access their data. The survey results revealed limited DURC awareness among researchers across Pakistan. However, the respondents, although not formally educated about DURC, were quite aware of its impact. The information gained in this survey will be valuable in addressing country-specific awareness and training needs.

Democratizing cognitive technology: a proactive approach

Cognitive technology is an umbrella term sometimes used to designate the realm of technologies that assist, augment or simulate cognitive processes or that can be used for the achievement of cognitive aims. This technological macro-domain encompasses both devices that directly interface the human brain as well as external systems that use artificial intelligence to simulate or assist (aspects of) human cognition. As they hold the promise of assisting and augmenting human cognitive capabilities both individually and collectively, cognitive technologies could produce, in the next decades, a significant effect on human cultural evolution. At the same time, due to their dual-use potential, they are vulnerable to being coopted by State and non-State actors for non-benign purposes (e.g. cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare and mass surveillance) or in manners that violate democratic values and principles. Therefore, it is the responsibility of technology governance bodies to align the future of cognitive technology with democratic principles such as individual freedom, avoidance of centralized, equality of opportunity and open development. This paper provides a preliminary description of an approach to the democratization of cognitive technologies based on six normative ethical principles: avoidance of centralized control, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, user-centeredness and convergence. This approach is designed to universalize and evenly distribute the potential benefits of cognitive technology and mitigate the risk that such emerging technological trend could be coopted by State or non-State actors in ways that are inconsistent with the principles of liberal democracy or detrimental to individuals and groups.

Militarising the Mind: Assessing the Weapons of the Ultimate Battlefield

Advancements in behavioural neuroscience have revolutionised the treatment of mental illness by elucidating the mechanisms underpinning human behaviour and cognition. These advancements are not completely benevolent, but have dual-use potential which harkens back to a darker time when states sought to influence and control each other’s citizenry through psychological means. This article puts proposed behaviour-altering neuroscience weapons into their appropriate technical, historical, and geopolitical contexts to present a sober and critical analysis of the threat arising from the weaponisation of behavioural neuroscience. It argues that by using psychiatric drugs, brain stimulation, brain imaging or neurobiochemical weapons, states may be able to leverage neuroscientific advances to influence, control, and manipulate human behaviour and cognition. However, these approaches are extremely nascent and face technical and operational challenges that make their deployment difficult. Despite this, in consideration of the rapid pace of scientific advancement, growing geopolitical instability, and ambiguities in international law, scientists and the international community must remain vigilant as these technologies become more refined and the practical barriers to use begin to lower.

Military Logistics in Natural Disasters: The Use of the NATO Response Force in Assistance to the Pakistan Earthquake Relief Efforts

Abstract The main argument of this paper is that the logistical structures of rapid reaction forces offer great dual-use potential. It means they may be used in military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as civil defence or humanitarian assistance. The theoretical model of Haas, Kates and Bowden (1977) is presented in order to defend this argument, as it indicates the utility of intense military actions in the very first moments following a natural disaster due to their ability to rapidly respond in hard-to-access areas. The NATO Response Force humanitarian operation launched to assist the Pakistani government after a major earthquake in 2005 is presented as a practical example. The text concludes by arguing that the dual-use potential of military logistics is an important way to justify the high financial costs of rapid response forces in times of defence budget constraints while also providing other than war operations capabilities, such as civil defence support.

A New Approach to Evaluating the Risk-Benefit Equation for Dual-Use and Gain-of-Function Research of Concern.

In the twenty-first century, biology faces a problem that has previously vexed other disciplines such as physics, namely the prospect that its knowledge domain could be used to generate biological agents with altered properties that enhanced their weapon potential. Biological weapons bring the additional dimension that these could be self-replicating, easy to manufacture and synthesized with commonly available expertise. This resulted in increasing concern about the type of research done and communicated, despite the fact that such research often has direct societal benefits, bringing the dual-use dilemma to biology. The conundrum of dual use research of concern was crystallized by the so-called “gain-of-function” type of experiments in which avian influenza viruses were endowed with new properties in the laboratory such as increased virulence and the capacity for mammalian transmission. After more than a decade of intensive discussion and controversy involving biological experiments with dual-use potential, there is no consensus on the issue except for the need to carry out such experiments in the safest conditions possible. In this essay, we review the topic with the hindsight of several years and suggest that instead of prescribing prohibitions and experimental limitations the focus should be on the importance of scientific questions at hand. We posit that the importance of a scientific question for medical and scientific progress provides a benchmark to determine the acceptable level of risk in biological experimentation.

From Healthcare to Warfare and Reverse: How Should We Regulate Dual-Use Neurotechnology?

Recent advances in military-funded neurotechnology and novel opportunities for misusing neurodevices show that the problem of dual use is inherent to neuroscience. This paper discusses how the neuroscience community should respond to these dilemmas and delineates a neuroscience-specific biosecurity framework. This neurosecurity framework involves calibrated regulation, (neuro)ethical guidelines, and awareness-raising activities within the scientific community.

Biosecurity and dual-use research: gaining function - but at what cost?

Biosecurity and dual-use research: gaining function - but at what cost?

Dual-use decision making: relational and positional issues.

Debates about dual-use research often turn on the potential for scientific research to be used to benefit or harm humanity. This dual-use potential is conventionally understood as the product of the magnitude of the harms and benefits of dual-use research, multiplied by their likelihood. This account, however, neglects important social aspects of the use of science and technology. In this paper, I supplement existing conceptions of dual-use potential to account for the social context of dual-use research. This account incorporates relational and positional concerns that feature in the success or failure of dual-use. I then defend this account against foreseeable objections.

Selected Abstracts From the 2013 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting

Selected Abstracts From the 2013 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting

Dual-use nanoresearch of concern: Recognizing threat and safeguarding the power of nanobiomedical research advances in the wake of the H5N1 controversy

The issue of dual-use leapt to the attention of the broader research community in 2012, when papers detailing the changes that allow H5N1 (avian) influenza virus to be transmitted between mammals were published after months of controversy. Although there is little overlap between nanomedical research and the organisms, toxins, and aims recognized by governing bodies as “of concern,” dual-use potential is increasing along with the rapid pace of advances in nanotechnology and other converging technologies (biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science) that introduce novel capabilities to the global community. The capacity for harmful misuse of research enabled by converging technology progress is evident in molecular manipulation of virulence factors and directed traversal of the blood–brain barrier by nanoparticles. Increased awareness on the part of nanobiomedical scientists about dual-use potential will serve the interest of public health and safety as well as the integrity of the research enterprise. From the Clinical EditorThe recent controversy about publishing vs. withholding a paper about the successful manipulation of H5N1 (avian) flu to be transmitted between mammals triggered this thought provoking “Perspective” article. Given the possibility of misusing medical research results for the purposes of bioterrorism, the ideas, moral and ethical dilemmas presented in this paper should be considered by every practicing clinician-scientist.