Dual-use Policies Research Articles

Understanding Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was accompanied by unfounded Russian allegations of bioweapon activities in Ukraine conducted by the United States and its allies. While false, such allegations can cause substantial damage to disarmament efforts and international cooperation for strengthening disease surveillance and global health security. The purpose of this article is to describe Ukraine's biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use policies and to provide important context for understanding the unwarranted Russian allegations. Moreover, the analysis of Ukraine's biorisk management system highlights some of the international efforts underway to ensure that life sciences research across the world is conducted safely, securely, and responsibly. With the help of international partners, Ukraine has strengthened its biorisk management governance, as well as identified areas for improvement that it is working to address.

Angels and Devils: Dilemmas in Dual-Use Biotechnology

Dual-use research, which results in knowledge that can be used for both good and ill, has become increasingly accessible in the internet age to both scientists and the general public. Here, we outline some major milestones for dual-use policy and present three vignettes that highlight contemporary dual-use issues in biotechnology.

Exploring the effect of dual use on the value of military technology patents based on the renewal decision

Concerns regarding the high level of research and development (R&D) expenditure on military technology have prompted many nations to pursue a dual-use regime in military R&D. However, the value of dual-use military technology has not yet been quantitatively investigated. We explore whether military technology with a higher level of duality has been more valuable than that with a lower level of duality. We assume that the patent of valuable military technology was renewed until its termination. We retrieve military patents from the United States Patent and Trademark Office during 1976–2014 based on their International Patent Classification (IPC) as F41 or F42. Then, we propose three indicators to assess the duality level of them. The first indicator is based on the determination of whether the patented technology is utilizable in both the military and the civilian sectors using its IPC. For the second indicator, we estimate the potential of convergence of a patented technology with various technological fields using the degree of centrality of the IPC’s co-occurrence network. The third indicator is based on ratio of forward citation by the civilian sector over the total number of forward citations as a measurement of technology diffusion toward the civilian sector. Using logistic regression, we found that the first two indicators are positively associated with patent renewal decision, while the last indicator is nonsignificant. The effects of the two significant indicators suggests that military technologies are more valuable when the technology itself can be used in various sectors, including the civilian sector, and can be converged with technologies in different fields. However, the nonsignificant influence of the third variable suggests that the relation between patent value and diffusion effects toward following inventions is not confined to the civilian sector. Our findings provide evidence of the impact of dual-use policies in military R&D.

Do Latin American Scientific Journals Follow Dual-Use Review Policies?

During the past decade, a number of journals have implemented dual-use policies in order to analyze whether the papers submitted for publication could raise concern because of the potential for misuse of their content. In this context, an analysis was performed on Latin American scientific journals to examine whether they apply formal written dual-use review policies and whether they inform their authors and reviewers about potentially sensitive issues in this area, as other international journals do. Peer-reviewed life sciences journals indexed in Latindex from Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were analyzed. The Guide for Authors and the Instructions to Referees of 216 journals included in the Latindex catalogue (which means that they meet the best quality standards of the Latindex system) were screened for biosecurity-related information using the keywords biosecurity, biological weapons, and dual-use research of concern. Results showed that the screened publications had a total lack of dual-use review policies, even though some of them pointed out ethical behaviors to be followed related to authorship, plagiarism, simultaneous submission, research results misappropriation, ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects, guiding principles for the care and use of animals in research, research standard violations, and reviewer bias, among others.

Dual-Use Review Policies of Biomedical Research Journals

To address biosecurity issues, government agencies, academic institutions, and professional societies have developed policies concerning the publication of "dual-use" biomedical research-that is, research that could be readily applied to cause significant harm to the public, the environment, or national security. We conducted an e-mail survey of life science journals to determine the percentage that have a dual-use policy. Of the 155 journals that responded to our survey (response rate 39%), only 7.7% stated that they had a written dual-use policy and only 5.8% said they had experience reviewing dual-use research in the past 5 years. Among the potential predictors we investigated, the one most highly associated with a journal having a written dual-use policy was membership in the Nature Publishing Group (positive association). When considered individually, both previous experience with reviewing dual-use research and the journal's impact factor appeared to be positively associated with having a written dual-use policy, but only the former remained significant after adjusting for publishing group. Although preventing the misuse of scientific research for terrorist or criminal purposes is an important concern, few biomedical journals have dual-use review policies. Journals that are likely to review research that raises potential dual-use concerns should consider developing dual-use policies.

Dual-use as Knowledge-Oriented Policy: France during the 1990-2000s

This contribution aims at demonstrating that dual-use policies represent now a dimension central to military R&D policies and should not be understood only as a transfer mechanism between the civilian and the military. The paper investigates the concept of dual-use policies in the framework of Knowledge-Oriented Policies (KOP). Il will elaborate on the conditions of the emergence and development of dual-use policies. From a conceptual perspective, it will point out the difficulty associated with sequential and linear interpretations of innovation processes associated with armaments programmes. The main important critic developed in this contribution relates to the simplistic view associated with armaments life cycle, which hardly accounts for the complexity of exchanges and the reality of decision-making in military R&D.

Potential of dual-use policies to meet family planning and HIV prevention needs: a case study of Zimbabwe and Mozambique

Background and methodologyThe fight against the HIV epidemic in many high-prevalence countries is a struggle to motivate culturally relevant risk reduction in general populations that have been educated to associate...

Éléments pour un repositionnement de la R&D de défense au sein du système d'innovation français

Are governments right to support technological evolution through military R&D ? If the answer is positive, which are the most suited institutions and organisation patterns for a fruitful relationship between military R&D and the overall economic performances? It seems to us that the answer lies in integrating civilian and military innovation structures appealing on the concept of dual-use. The purpose of this article is to introduce organisational tools and patterns on which to build a French dual-use policy.

Suggested repositioning of defence R&D within the French system of innovation

Are governments right to support technological progress through military R&D? If so, which are the most appropriate institutions and organizational patterns for a fruitful relationship between military R&D and the economy in general? A comparative analysis of the US and the French systems of innovation leads us to the idea that the answer lies in integrating civilian and military innovation structures around the key concept of dual use. Building on a model developed by Metcalfe and Saviotti (Res Policy 13 (1984) 141), the purpose of this article is to introduce organizational patterns and tools (so-called “pillars”) on which to build a dual-use policy. We then apply this model to the French case and formulate recommendations regarding the repositioning of its defence R&D.

From technology generation to technology transfer: the concept and reality of the “Dual-Use Technology Centres”

“Dual-Use policies” are one response to the challenges faced by defence research establishments and defence producers. This article traces the development of Dual-Use Technology Centres (DUTCs), a UK initiative to exploit the capabilities generated in defence research establishments by providing a channel for technology transfer. We find that a number of persistent tensions are creating problems under the current arrangements and conclude that there should be a clear separation within the research organisation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), between offices concerned with managing research programmes conducted “extra-murally”, and MoD-owned facilities carrying out research.

Which way to go? Defence technology and the diversity of ‘dual-use’ technology transfer

In recent years, ‘dual-use policies’ have become a widely promoted response to the problems faced by defence producers confronting the decline in defence expenditures, the continuing growth in the cost of new weapons systems, and the changing relationship between military and civilian technologies. A consensus has developed on the importance of dual-use policies, but no agreement seems apparent on what they are; such confusion derives from the variety of dual-use technologies, and the even broader array of mechanisms by which they can be transferred across military and civilian applications. By suggesting a typology of dual-use technology transfer mechanisms this paper provides a platform for the comparison and analysis of different dual-use policies. It identifies four main types of dual-use technology transfer mechanisms, all different in nature and purpose. The main difference is established between straight and adaptational mechanisms, depending on whether the technology transfer mechanism is concerned with adapting the technology to its new applications. Straight mechanisms do not require any change in the ways in which defence-oriented R&D and production is organised. In comparison, adaptational mechanisms are more ambitious policies and riskier, but may be a necessary answer to the structural problems faced by the industry.

Beyond guns and butter: managing dual-use technologies

This paper notes an international convergence towards explicit dual-use policies among a wide variety of technological systems. It explains that convergence as a response to three trends: market globalization; the increasing international division of labor; and the fact that developments in civilian technologies are leading military applications in many industrial areas. Yet, most commonly used models of technological diffusion do not provide policymakers with tools or language adequate to address the complex problems posed by dual-use technologies. The most important dual-use investments are those that increase industrial capacity to absorb or share technologies from other industrial sectors. A capacity for this ‘creative technology absorption’ has as much to do with social and cultural aspects of industrial structures and the organization of work as it does with technical artifacts. Policy debate should shift away from a focus on specif technology programs towards a focus on making the structures and culture of the civil and military technology systems more similar.