Dual-process Models Of Cognition Research Articles

The Sociocognitive Origins of Personal Mastery.

This article examines the relationship between cognitive processing and mastery. While scholars have called for the integration of sociological and cognitive analyses of mastery, sociological research has focused almost exclusively on mapping its social correlates. As a result, sociologists have relied on untested and underspecified assumptions about cognition to explain the efficacy of mastery. Taking an interdisciplinary approach integrating research on mastery, dual-process models of cognition, and intersectionality, we specify and test the hypothesis that deliberate thinking dispositions are associated with a greater sense of control over one's life chances and assess whether this relationship varies across different intersections of social positions. Regression results from survey data in a diverse student sample (N = 982) suggest a positive correlation between deliberate cognitive style and personal mastery. However, results from a quantitative intersectional analysis demonstrate that this relationship does not hold for East Asian women.

Fast and slow language processing: A window into dual-process models of cognition.

Our understanding of dual-process models of cognition may benefit from a consideration of language processing, as language comprehension involves fast and slow processes analogous to those used for reasoning. More specifically, De Neys's criticisms of the exclusivity assumption and the fast-to-slow switch mechanism are consistent with findings from the literature on the construction and revision of linguistic interpretations.

Dueling with Dual-Process Models: Cognition, Creativity, and Context

Sociologists increasingly draw on dual-process models of cognition to account for the ways context, cognition, and action interrelate. Drawing from 40 interviews with improvisers and observations from improvisational theater, I find that dual-process model scholarship is limited in three respects: It does not consider how cognition operates in situations where order and disruption are concurrent, it fails to realize there is interindividual variation in cognitive processing, and it underestimates the creativity emerging through automatic processes. Interactions in improv contain elements of both order and disruption, and they place demands on automatic and deliberate cognition simultaneously. Improvisers respond to these competing demands through either automatic or deliberate thinking dispositions, which are engendered through explicit instruction, practical experience, and artistic commitments. These dispositions, in turn, shape creative decision-making, predicting interindividual differences in how improvisers respond to contingencies on stage. I conclude by discussing the implications for culture, cognition, and action.

Automatic and controlled antecedents of suicidal ideation and action: A dual-process conceptualization of suicidality.

Dual-process models of cognition distinguish relatively automatic from relatively controlled processes in terms of their interactive impact on perception, judgment, and behavior. Such models have advanced explanation and prediction in a variety of domains across psychology but have yet to be comprehensively applied to the pressing societal and public health problem of suicide. We propose a model of suicide that integrates dual-process models of social cognition with ideation-to-action conceptualizations of suicide. The model specifies: (a) suicide-relevant automatic associations involving the self, others, the future, death, and bodily harm, (b) suicide-relevant motives involving the self, interpersonal relations, the future, and the desire to die, and (c) hypotheses regarding the conditions under which automatic associations and motives individually and interactively impact suicidal ideation and lethal action at various stages of an ideation-to-action framework. The model recasts a number of suicide-relevant variables in terms of the opportunity factor of dual-process theories of attitudes, which encompasses capacity-relevant variables (e.g., time, cognitive resources) that determine whether suicide-relevant judgments and behavior are the result of relatively automatic associations or more controlled, deliberative cognition. Accordingly, the model articulates a number of novel predictions regarding the sources of suicide-relevant automatic associations, motives, and opportunity factors, as well as their interactive influences on suicidal ideation and action. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The predictive brain model in diagnostic reasoning

Introduction: Clinical diagnosis is a pivotal and highly valued skill in medical practice. Most current interventions for teaching and improving diagnostic reasoning are based on the dual process model of cognition. Recent studies which have applied the popular dual process model to improve diagnostic performance by “Cognitive De-biasing” in clinicians have yielded disappointing results. Thus, it may be appropriate to also consider alternative models of cognitive processing in the teaching and practice of clinical reasoning. Methods: This is critical-narrative review of the predictive brain model. Results: The theory of predictive brains is a general, unified and integrated model of cognitive processing based on recent advances in the neurosciences. The predictive brain is characterised as an adaptive, generative, energy-frugal, context-sensitive action-orientated, probabilistic, predictive engine. It responds only to predictive errors and learns by iterative predictive error management, processing and hierarchical neural coding. Conclusion: The default cognitive mode of predictive processing may account for the failure of de-biasing since it is not thermodynamically frugal and thus, may not be sustainable in routine practice. Exploiting predictive brains by employing language to optimise metacognition may be a way forward

Machine Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Machines do not 'think fast and slow' in the sense that humans do in dual-process models of cognition. However, the people who create the machines may attempt to emulate or simulate these fast and slow modes of thinking, which will in turn affect the way end users relate to these machines. In this opinion article we consider the complex interplay in the way various stakeholders (engineers, user experience designers, regulators, ethicists, and end users) can be inspired, challenged, or misled by the analogy between the fast and slow thinking of humans and the Fast and Slow Thinking of machines.

Cognition in Situations

The symbolic interactionist tradition can contribute to advancing sociological studies of cognition by setting dual process models on more solid ground. I draw on Blumer's epistemological statements and the interactionist tradition more broadly to consider how dual process models of cognition could be applied to naturally occurring situations. I suggest that attending to the ways the past and the future are handled and modified within social interaction provides a usable inroad for the sociology of cognition to engage with situational analysis. I identify “resonance” and “iterative reprocessing” as concepts that are suitable to this end.

Parental Attitudes in Child Maltreatment.

An information-processing approach to maladaptive parenting suggests that high-risk and maltreating parents are likely to hold inaccurate and biased preexisting cognitive schemata about child development and child rearing. Importantly, these schemas, which may include values, beliefs, expectations, and attitudes, are known to influence the way parents perceive and subsequently act toward their children. However, the few studies specifically addressing parental attitudes only considered global maltreatment, not distinguishing abuse from neglect. Moreover, few have considered dual-process models of cognition, relying mostly on the explicit level of parental attitudes that can be prone to various biases. Based on the Social Information Processing (SIP) model of child abuse and neglect, this study examines the association of parents preexisting cognitive schemata, namely explicit and implicit parental attitudes, and child abuse and neglect. A convenience sample of 201 mothers (half with at least one child referred to child protection services) completed a measure of explicit parental attitudes and a speed-accuracy task related to parenting. Abuse and neglect were measured with self-report and professionals-report instruments. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that maladaptive parenting is related with more biased preexisting cognitive schemas, namely attitudes related to parenting, but only for neglect and particularly when reported by professionals. Moreover, the results observed with both the explicit and implicit measures of attitudes were convergent, with mothers presenting more inadequate explicit attitudes also exhibiting an overall lower performance in the implicit attitudes task. This study is likely to contribute to the SIP framework of child abuse and neglect, particularly for the elucidation of the sociocognitive factors underlying maladaptive parenting, while also providing relevant cues for prevention and intervention programs.

Feasibility of Attachment-Focused Self-Hypnosis to Change Insecure God Attachment

ABSTRACT Secure God attachment is related to less psychological distress and greater well-being, while insecure God attachment is associated with higher levels of psychological distress and various forms of maladaptive coping. Cognitive resistance may arise, however, when therapists directly address insecure attachment beliefs through overt cognitive-behavioral techniques. Based on principles of the dual process model of cognition, the authors hypothesized that self-hypnosis may be a theoretically sound and feasible treatment to alter insecure attachment, since hypnosis addresses the emotional, experiential cognitive system rather than the analytical, deliberative cognitive system. To test this hypothesis, 35 college students practiced a prerecorded, self-guided hypnotic script for 6 weeks. The treatment group’s scores indicated significant postintervention decreases in insecure attachment compared to a wait-list control. Qualitative responses also indicated that the majority of participants (62.8%) noticed these relationship changes and attributed them to the intervention.

Explicit Attitudes, Working Memory Capacity, and Driving After Drinking.

Attitudes toward driving after drinking are strongly predictive of drinking and driving behavior. This study tested working memory capacity (WMC) as a moderator of the association between attitudes and drinking and driving behavior. Consistent with dual process models of cognition, we hypothesized that the association between perceived danger and drinking and driving would be stronger for individuals with higher WMC. Participants (N=161) enrolled in larger alcohol administration study were randomly assigned to an alcohol (n=57), placebol (n=52), or control (n=52, not included) beverage condition. Past-year frequency of driving after drinking and WMC were assessed at baseline. Attitudes were assessed by asking participants to rate the perceived danger of driving at their current level of intoxication twice on the ascending limb (AL1, AL2), at peak breath alcohol concentration (BrAC), and twice on the descending limb (DL1, DL2). Analyses across the BrAC curve indicated that the hypothesized interaction was observed for the alcohol but not placebo condition. Analyses for each assessment point indicated that the interaction was significant for the ascending limb and peak BrAC. In the alcohol condition, for those higher in WMC, lower perceived dangerousness was strongly associated with increased driving after drinking (AL1: incident rate ratios [IRR]=5.87, Wald's χ2 =12.39, p=0.006, 95% CI [2.19, 15.75]; AL2: IRR=8.17, Wald's χ2 =11.39, p=0.001, 95% CI [2.41, 27.66]; Peak: IRR=5.11, Wald's χ2 =9.84, p=0.002, 95% CI [1.84, 14.16]). Associations were not significant at low WMC. Results suggest that individuals higher in WMC are more likely to act consistently with their explicit attitudes toward drinking and driving. Findings may have implications for existing drinking and driving interventions and suggest the potential for novel interventions targeting implicit associations or WMC.

How the dual process model of human cognition can inform efforts to de-implement ineffective and harmful clinical practices: A preliminary model of unlearning and substitution.

Rationale and objectivesOne way to understand medical overuse at the clinician level is in terms of clinical decision‐making processes that are normally adaptive but become maladaptive. In psychology, dual process models of cognition propose 2 decision‐making processes. Reflective cognition is a conscious process of evaluating options based on some combination of utility, risk, capabilities, and/or social influences. Automatic cognition is a largely unconscious process occurring in response to environmental or emotive cues based on previously learned, ingrained heuristics. De‐implementation strategies directed at clinicians may be conceptualized as corresponding to cognition: (1) a process of unlearning based on reflective cognition and (2) a process of substitution based on automatic cognition.ResultsWe define unlearning as a process in which clinicians consciously change their knowledge, beliefs, and intentions about an ineffective practice and alter their behaviour accordingly. Unlearning has been described as “the questioning of established knowledge, habits, beliefs and assumptions as a prerequisite to identifying inappropriate or obsolete knowledge underpinning and/or embedded in existing practices and routines.” We hypothesize that as an unintended consequence of unlearning strategies clinicians may experience “reactance,” ie, feel their professional prerogative is being violated and, consequently, increase their commitment to the ineffective practice.We define substitution as replacing the ineffective practice with one or more alternatives. A substitute is a specific alternative action or decision that either precludes the ineffective practice or makes it less likely to occur.Both approaches may work independently, eg, a substitute could displace an ineffective practice without changing clinicians' knowledge, and unlearning could occur even if no alternative exists. For some clinical practice, unlearning and substitution strategies may be most effectively used together.ConclusionsBy taking into account the dual process model of cognition, we may be able to design de‐implementation strategies matched to clinicians' decision‐making processes and avoid unintended consequence.

Psychological Misconceptions: Recent Scientific Advances and Unresolved Issues

Psychological misconceptions present problems for psychology students as well as for laypersons, experts, and others who need to think critically about psychological information. Recent progress in measuring psychological misconceptions has led to fresh understandings of how people with better critical thinking skills and dispositions are less prone to misconceptions and how people who adopt a more intuitive approach to thinking are more prone to them, as predicted by dual process models of cognition. Recent studies also suggest that people who endorse more misconceptions show more impaired metacognition by failing to accurately monitor what they know. These new findings help to explain why refutational approaches, which explicitly activate misconceptions and debunk them with contrary evidence, often reduce misconception endorsement. Nevertheless, they may not readily explain why some efforts to eliminate misconceptions backfire or are otherwise ineffective, highlighting the need for more research on misconception content and individual differences in cognition, personality, and attitudes that predict misconception endorsement.

Belief and Acceptance for the Study of Religion

“Belief” in the study of religion has been vexed by complexities underlying the relationship between language, cognition, and religious behavior. Drawing on anthropological, sociological, and psychological literature, this article discusses the degrees and textures of “belief” to highlight the inadequacies of language and the variety of motivations for participating in rituals. Particular emphasis is given to discrimination, implicit bias, and the issue of discrepancy. The article argues that dual-process models of cognition provide a richer account of “belief” and then goes on to map an epistemological distinction between belief and acceptance as a viable methodology for the investigation of “belief” in the study of religion.

Affective decision-making moderates the effects of automatic associations on alcohol use among drug offenders

ABSTRACTBackground: This study used a dual-process model of cognition in order to investigate the possible influence of automatic and deliberative processes on lifetime alcohol use in a sample of drug offenders. Objective: The objective was to determine if automatic/implicit associations in memory can exert an influence over an individual’s alcohol use and if decision-making ability could potentially modify the influence of these associations. Methods: 168 participants completed a battery of cognitive tests measuring implicit alcohol associations in memory (verb generation) as well as their affective decision-making ability (Iowa Gambling Task). Structural equation modeling procedures were used to test the relationship between implicit associations, decision-making, and lifetime alcohol use. Results: Results revealed that among participants with lower levels of decision-making, implicit alcohol associations more strongly predicted higher lifetime alcohol use. Conclusion: These findings provide further support for the interaction between a specific decision function and its influence over automatic processes in regulating alcohol use behavior in a risky population. Understanding the interaction between automatic associations and decision processes may aid in developing more effective intervention components.

The Pros and Cons of Identifying Critical Thinking with System 2 Processing

The dual-process model of cognition but most especially its reflective component, system 2 processing, shows strong conceptual links with critical thinking. In fact, the salient characteristics of system 2 processing are so strikingly close to that of critical thinking, that it is tempting to claim that critical thinking is system 2 processing, no more and no less. In this article, I consider the two sides of that claim: Does critical thinking always require system 2 processing? And does system 2 processing always result in critical thinking? I argue that it is plausible and helpful to consider that critical thinking requires system 2 processing. In particular, this assumption can provide interesting insights and benchmarks for critical thinking education. On the other hand, I show that system 2 processing can result in a range of outcomes which are either contradictory with critical thinking, or of debatable social desirability—which suggests that there is more to critical thinking than mere system 2 processing, and more to system 2 processing than just critical thinking.

The Primary Processes: A Preliminary Exploration of A-Rational Mentation from an Evolutionary Viewpoint

In this article we investigate research on nonhuman animal cognition revealing the predominance of primary processes-like operations that are effective and adaptive from an evolutionary perspective. But first and from a different direction, we review a body of recently popular empirical work on human heuristics and biases that proposes System 1 and System 2 as a dual-process model of cognition and emotion; this without acknowledging Freud’s primary and secondary processes. Thus, we explore the parallels between primary process and System 1, as we evaluate the case for the evolutionary nature of primary process. We guide the reader through literature on animal cognition and that of System 1 biases and heuristics to provide the psychoanalytic reader with the opportunity to make important links to psychoanalytic concepts.

The shifting sands of creative thinking: Connections to dual-process theory

Dual-process models of cognition suggest that there are two types of thought: autonomous Type 1 processes and working memory dependent Type 2 processes that support hypothetical thinking. Models of creative thinking also distinguish between two sets of thinking processes: those involved in the generation of ideas and those involved with their refinement, evaluation, and/or selection. Here we review dual-process models in both these literatures and delineate the similarities and differences. Both generative creative processing and evaluative creative processing involve elements that have been attributed to each of the dual processes of cognition. We explore the notion that creative thinking may rest upon the nature of a shifting process between Type 1 and Type 2 dual processes. We suggest that a synthesis of the evidence bases on dual-process models of cognition and of creative thinking, together with developing time-based approaches to explore the shifting process, could better inform the development of interventions to facilitate creativity.

Thinking about Food and Sex

Overemphasizing automatic, dispositional cognitive processes, research on social fields has tended to undertheorize the active, reflective dimensions of cognition that shape practice. This has occurred, at least in part, as a reaction to the overly instrumentalist premises of rational action theory. But redressing the errors of an excessively instrumentalist notion of action by overemphasizing the automatic nature of cognition leaves us with a similarly inadequate understanding of how cognition works to influence practice in a field and, as a consequence, the ways in which change may occur from pressures originating within the field itself. In this article, we draw from data on cognition and practice in two kinds of fields—a sexual and a culinary field—to demonstrate how inherent structural pressures encourage instances of deliberate nondispositional cognition and practice. These data suggest an expanded model of practice in field theory that moves beyond a dual-process model of cognition and toward a more nuanced understanding of the relationship of automaticity and deliberation, and habituality and nonhabituality, in the routine practices of a field.

Rapid recollection of foresight judgments increases hindsight bias in a memory design.

One component of hindsight bias is memory distortion. This component is measured with a memory design, in which individuals answer questions, learn the correct answers, and recall their original answers. Hindsight bias occurs when participants' recollections are closer to the correct answers than their original judgments actually were. The present study used a memory design to examine the relationship between response time in recalling original answers and the magnitude of hindsight bias. In Experiment 1, participants' response times were negatively correlated with a hindsight bias index. In Experiment 2, half of the participants were instructed to recall their original judgments quickly and the other participants were instructed to take time to recall their judgments. The hindsight bias index was greater among rapidly responding participants than among delayed responding participants. These results, in conjunction with other findings, support a separate components view of hindsight bias. The memory distortion component of hindsight bias appears to occur quickly, and unbiased responding requires time for processing. This finding relates the memory distortion component of hindsight bias to other cognitive biases, such as the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. The relationship of this hindsight bias component to dual-process models of cognition is discussed, and several avenues for additional research are suggested.

False prospective memory responses as indications of automatic processes in the initiation of delayed intentions

To analyze the role of automatic processes in the fulfilment of delayed intentions, we extended a typical prospective memory setting with a context signal to indicate whether the intended action is to be carried out or not. Building on dual-process models of cognition, we hypothesized that automatic and controlled processes are in opposition when the action is to be suppressed, because automatic processes trigger the associated response whereas controlled processes exert inhibition. Experiment 1 demonstrates the occurrence of false prospective memory responses to cues with the "suppress" signal. Experiment 2 shows that the rate of false prospective memory responses is sensitive to a manipulation that strengthens the role of automatic processes in prospective memory. The findings support the use of false prospective memory responses for the study of automatic processes in the execution of delayed intentions.