Drone Campaign Research Articles

Lethal Targeting and Adaptation Failure in Terrorist Groups

If terrorist organizations wish to thrive, they often must adapt to lethal targeting. Over time, terrorist leaders can identify countermeasures that evade or erode state surveillance capabilities. Lower-level operatives will resist implementing these adaptations, however, so leaders must enforce their implementation. Leaders of groups with decentralized command relationships will struggle to directly monitor and enforce compliance. Leaders with limited resources at their disposal will also be unable to invest in the bureaucratic capacity to discipline operatives’ behavior. These organizational deficiencies become increasingly costly when state surveillance capabilities increase. I find support for this thesis by examining Arabic language correspondence from Usama bin Ladin’s compound related to the drone campaign in Pakistan. My argument contributes to theories of adaptation and the coercive power of warfighting technologies. It also suggests that advanced surveillance and strike capabilities may be insufficient for future counterterrorism success.

The drawbacks of drones: The effects of UAVs on escalation and instability in Pakistan

Growing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the effort to combat militant groups has led to considerable debate about the consequences of this new mode of warfare. While critics have focused on the impact of civilian casualties on militant recruitment and the resulting use of terrorism, evidence suggests that ‘drones’ are paradoxically more effective in limiting civilian deaths compared to other forms of military force. This article demonstrates a different causal pathway connecting militant use of force to terrorist attacks. Drone strikes encourage militants to displace operations to urban centers. Confronted with unfamiliar terrain and greater government capacity, militants emphasize terrorist attacks against civilians. The article explores these dynamics in the longest running drone campaign, in Pakistan. While civilian casualties from drone strikes have no discernible effect on terrorism, strikes that kill militants increase terrorist attacks against civilians in urban settings, while failing to reduce attacks on government targets.

The Impact of External Support on Insurgency

Insurgency is an organized struggle to overthrow an existing government. External support has played an important role in the success and failure of insurgencies. Insurgencies externally supported both militarily and financially lasted long and succeeded. In contrast, many insurgencies failed, lacking external support. The existing literature has discussed how external support contributes to the success and failure of insurgencies. This study, however, discusses the external support to counter insurgents, not insurgents and its impact on insurgency in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The article explains that after Pakistan became an ally of the US in the war against terror, it allowed the CIA to undertake targeted operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After their distrust increased,the US started its drone campaign to target the militants. The drone campaign helped the militants to exploit the innocent killed by drones and attracted more support and recruited more youth against the government.

What’s in it for Us? Armed Drone Strikes and the Security of Somalia’s Federal Government

Strikes conducted by the US using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the terrorist group al-Shabaab have received widespread attention documenting the number of strikes, the reactions of the local Somali, and the disparity between AFRICOM and local reporting. Using interview data from individuals in Mogadishu, Nairobi and elsewhere in the region, this article provides a counterpoint to previous studies by measuring the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) reliance on the US drone campaign in Somalia in order to maintain its tenuous hold on power. It measures the extent to which the drone campaigns of external parties are able to insulate weak host governments from the threat of an internal foe. It finds that US drone strikes offer the occasional but only reliable check on al-Shabaab thereby allowing the FGS to continue functioning in Mogadishu. Yet strikes should not be construed as a sign of overt US support for the FGS. Rather, the US government, deeply suspicious of a highly corrupt and incapable FGS, continues to prosecute drone strikes against al-Shabaab because Washington assesses the group poses a national security threat to the US.

U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan’s Pashtun ‘tribal’ region: beginning of the end under President Trump?

ABSTRACT The U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan’s Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas, formerly known as FATA, has remained one of the most contentious issues since the war on terror began in 2001 in Afghanistan. Though drone strikes have polarised opinions, they have also resulted in the elimination of lower, middle and higher-level leaders of all militant groups based in the ‘tribal’ region. The U.S. drone campaign in the former-FATA region had some success in the elimination of terrorists. But lack of access to the ‘tribal’ areas coupled with the secrecy surrounding the drone campaign resulted in major discrepancies in the total number of U.S. drone strikes and the resultant casualties. These factors have contributed towards an anti-drone and anti-U.S. narrative in Pakistan, largely manufactured by Pakistani mainstream media. With the last drone strike taking place almost a year ago, this article argues that the U.S. drone campaign may have finally halted in Pakistan. However, even with a gradual halt, the ‘tribal’ areas can witness drone strikes in the future if high-profile terrorists, based on actionable intelligence, are located in the region.

What’s in it for us? Armed drone strikes and the security of Somalia’s Federal Government

ABSTRACT Strikes conducted by the US using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the terrorist group al-Shabaab have received widespread attention documenting the number of strikes, the reactions of the local Somalis, and the disparity between AFRICOM and local reporting. Using interview data from individuals in Mogadishu, Nairobi and elsewhere in the region, this article provides a counterpoint to previous studies by measuring the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) reliance on the US drone campaign in Somalia in order to maintain its tenuous hold on power. It measures the extent to which the drone campaigns of external parties are able to insulate weak host governments from the threat of an internal foe. It finds that US drone strikes offer the occasional but only reliable check on al-Shabaab thereby allowing the FGS to continue functioning in Mogadishu. Yet strikes should not be construed as a sign of overt US support for the FGS. Rather, the US government, deeply suspicious of a highly corrupt and incapable FGS, continues to prosecute drone strikes against al-Shabaab because Washington considers the group poses a national security threat to the US.

“No boots on the ground”: the effectiveness of US drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

ABSTRACTThe number of US drone strikes against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen has increased significantly since 2010, but received limited academic attention. This article examines the effectiveness of this drone campaign using an existing theoretical framework. Crucially, we contribute to the framework by adding a fourth intervening variable, namely target correspondence. Through a single case study, it is found that drones have only enjoyed limited success in degrading AQAP's hierarchical structure, qualified human resources and access to key material resources, and in some cases – owing to our target correspondence analysis – this limited success has come at a price. It is found that drones have temporarily disrupted AQAP by successfully eliminating senior leaders involved in coordinating and overseeing external operations. Overall, AQAP's ability to hit Western targets remains significant.

‘No Boots on the Ground’: Reflections on the US Drone Campaign through Virtuous War and STS Theories

Abstract Since 2004, the US Air Force (USAF) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have persecuted insurgents in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan with armed drones. Despite its alleged efficiency, this practice has been widely criticised on the grounds that it contravenes international humanitarian law. In order to understand the controversies involving this practice, we examine how this new technology was linked to and allowed the emergence of a new US international security strategy first applied in the Middle East. Drawing on James Der Derian’s post-structuralist theories about virtuous wars, the sociotechnical approach allowed by Science and Technology Studies (STS), and Gregoire Chamayou’s theories about drones, we argue that the US intention in adopting these technologies was not to enhance its military capability but to allow the USA to remain active in several risky theatres while avoiding the political and social costs of conventional military engagement.

Arguments against Drone Warfare with a Focus on the Immorality of Remote Control Killing and "Deadly Surveillance"

Arguments against Drone Warfare with a Focus on the Immorality of Remote Control Killing and "Deadly Surveillance"

The legality of unmanned aerial vehicles outside the combat zone: a case study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

The drone is the latest tool to promote interests of a nation-state. It is clear that USA as well as other major powers anticipate that robotics will play a key role in future warfare. Today, more than 70 countries have already acquired drone technology and many others are desperate to join the ranks. This urge for drone technology will ultimately lead to a “boundless and borderless war without end.” In the case of Pakistan, the US drone campaign has raised some important issues regarding how their use could, or should, be regulated in the future. This article analyses the legal issues raised by the US's use of drone technology in non-combat zones, such as Pakistan. It is argued that a reckless disrespect of Pakistan's sovereignty has had adverse implications and consequences for the legitimacy of the Pakistani government. Drone strikes have prompted instinctive opposition among the Pakistani population, hurt their feelings and estranged them from the government. This in turn has added to Pakistan's instability and stimulated a ground-swell of animosity toward the USA.

The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program

The rapid escalation of the CIA's drone program under the Obama administration has attracted the close attention of the media and academic experts. While such attention has helped shine a light on the scale, effectiveness and legality of drone warfare, there has been little attempt to explain the origins of the program and place it within wider US counterterrorism practice. This article meets that need. Drawing upon executive orders, national security directives, documents from the CIA's archive, memoirs of key individuals and technical specifications of drones themselves, the article demonstrates how the current drone campaign has its origins in America's first clash with international terrorism, fought against state sponsors such as the late Colonel Gaddafi. As such, the article concludes that the Obama administration's approach, whilst unique in scale, actually marks a return to, rather than a departure from, counterterrorism methods developed in the decades preceding 9/11.

The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study

ABSTRACTThis article examines the effects the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counterterrorism strategy.

Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities

The use of drones and other forms of targeted killings are being increasingly criticized at the international and domestic level. Before the backdrop of the most recent news that the United Nations has launched an inquiry into the overall legality of such a method of warfare and counterterrorism and its associated loss of civilian life, this article aims to give an overview on targeted killings as a means of warfare. The article asks what constitutes targeted killing and what distinguishes it from assassinations. It reflects on the safeguards, which are necessary to ensure the legality of the targeting process. This article further introduces the reader to an updated account of the use of Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems, or ‘drones’, in targeted killings, employed as a means of warfare by the USA in its ‘War on Terror’. The US drone campaign in Pakistan also raises questions in respect to State Sovereignty and potential violations of this central tenet of International Law. The article will also touch upon another field of global security, so called ‘Hybrid Threats’, where the use of targeted killing may have an operational military benefit as part of a holistic counterstrategy. It concludes with a sobering warning that while targeted killing operations may be an effective means of achieving short-term tactical goals within the scope of a wider operational objective, the unregulated and increased use of targeting killings by the USA in the ‘War on Terror’ would be both immoral as well as illegal in the long run.

Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan

This article examines the strategic wisdom of the US Predator drone campaign in Pakistan, particularly in light of the dramatic expansion in the number of strikes that has occurred under the Obama administration. First, it examines whether there is a compelling rationale for any drone strikes in Pakistan by evaluating the justification advanced by US authorities and the three main criticisms that have been leveled against the campaign. With the help of an original database of drone strikes and their effects compiled by the authors of the article, it shows that the criticisms lack merit and that some strikes may be justified in principle. Second, it turns to the reasons explaining the dramatic increase in strikes over the past 2 years. On examination, it finds that the arguments supporting the expansion of the campaign are forceful but not necessarily decisive. In the third section it considers some objections to an expanded campaign. Finally, in the closing section, it weighs these considerations against the points favoring the expansion of the drone strikes. The article ends with the conclusion that on balance it would be prudent to shift back towards a more narrowly focused campaign concentrating on al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and only leaders of the Pakistani Taliban.

What Use Overwhelming Air Superiority? A Tale of Two Campaigns

Longer wars between mismatched opponents often end with the militarily weaker side showing unexpected strengths. This article tests this tendency in two short wars in which overwhelming force superiority was applied in massive air attacks. Operation Enduring Freedom (the 2001 American campaign in Afghanistan) and Operation Cast Lead (the 2008–2009 Israeli campaign in Gaza) both began with air offensives that shifted to air-supported ground combat, but Enduring Freedom (a Type A operation) gave priority to aerial attack, while in Cast Lead (Type B) air operations primarily paved the way for ground combat. Neither campaign was fully decisive, suggesting that the residual capabilities of weaker combatants apply to short as well as protracted hostilities. The Type A attack was decisive against the Taliban, but not against al Qaeda. The more intensive Type B case, Cast Lead, did not lead to greater decisiveness than its counterpart, with Israel emphasizing force demonstration to enhance deterrence of attack, yet not seeking to destroy Hamas's residual military capability. The problem of translating large military superiority into decisive war results is also evident recently in more common, stretched out, and restrained airpower use supporting higher-priority ground combat, as in NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya and the aerial drone campaign in Pakistan supporting NATO war making in Afghanistan.

Drone Defense: The Inherent Right of Self-Defense and U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan

This paper examines the ongoing U.S. drone campaign against militant groups in Pakistan in the context of the inherent right of self-defense and customary international law. The paper provides some brief background information on drones and their technical capabilities and outlines the history of the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan. The paper examines the parameters of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as well as customary international law and evaluates drone strikes in Pakistan in this context. To the extent that the U.S. drone campaign clashes with current International Court of Justice interpretations of the law of self-defense, this paper distinguishes the conflict in Pakistan and posits that the restrictive requirements of state attribution and consent are untenable in light of the new realities presented in a 21st century asymmetrical war against non-state militant and terrorist groups.

The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign

This article provides the first overview of the CIA's secret drone campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas from its origins in 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom to the end of 2010. In the process it addresses the spatial dimensions of the campaign (where are the strikes being directed and where do the drones fly from), Pakistani reactions to this threat to both their sovereignty and an internal Taliban enemy, technological developments and Taliban and Al Qaeda responses to this unprecedented airborne assassination campaign. While the debate on this issue has often been driven by the extremes which either support the campaign as the most effective tool in killing terrorists or condemn it for driving Pakistanis to new levels of anti-Americanism, this article points out a third path. Namely, that many Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen living in the targeted areas support the strikes against the Taliban who have terrorized them in recent years.