Domestic Lobbies Research Articles

Domestic Lobbying for External Change: Textile Sector and Pakistan’s Entry into Generalised System of Preferences Plus

How do export-oriented factions influence trade policy? Export-oriented industries have incentives to expand trade, as doing so results in greater market access and higher profits. To achieve higher trade, such industries lobby policymakers through associations and interest groups that vie for policy influence. This paper suggests that such organization allows exporters to lobby governments at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, exporters can take vocal positions on policy and pressure the government into concessions. Externally, exporters can placate opposition to their proposals by engaging in diplomacy and negotiation to finalize agreements. This paper uses Pakistan’s quest for Generalised System of Preferences Plus status with the European Union (EU) as an illustration of this mechanism. Influential domestic factions in Pakistan’s textile sector stood to benefit from preferential trading with the EU, and they successfully lobbied for favorable change in the country’s domestic policy and external relations. Evidence for this argument is presented using archival newspaper research from 2009 to 2013.

AIPAC’s founding and the evolution of aid to Israel

ABSTRACT This exploration delves into the intricate history of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), navigating its genesis and the concurrent establishment of U.S. aid to Israel. The narrative unfolds against the post-World War II backdrop, exploring pivotal moments involving key figures like Isaiah L. Kenen, Abba Eban, and Louis Lipsky. As the Israeli embassy grappled with challenges in securing financial aid, Kenen’s vision crystallized into the creation of a domestic lobby group. AIPAC, initially known as the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), emerged, meticulously navigating the American legislative landscape to advocate for Israel. The lobby’s focus on bipartisan support, strategic alliances, and grassroots efforts paved the way for the landmark Morse–Taft Act, representing the first-ever U.S. financial aid to Israel. The narrative unfolds with a spotlight on Kenen’s strategic maneuvering, demonstrating how he deftly linked Israel’s aid to a broader regional approach, garnering support and mitigating opposition. The bill’s journey through Congress, from committee discussions to public endorsements, reflects Kenen’s orchestration of a multifaceted campaign.

A Diplomatic Meeting: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Art of Summitry by James Cooper

<i>A Diplomatic Meeting: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Art of Summitry</i> by James Cooper

Corporate Political Activity and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of International and Product Diversification

Prior research has found that corporate political activity (CPA) can both positively and negatively impact firm performance. Combining agency theory with the resource-based view, we examine the relationship between domestic lobbying (a key form of CPA) and firm performance by explicating the moderating effects of international and product diversification. We argue that expansion into international and product markets increases a firm's resources and reduces agency costs in domestic lobbying. Our results, based on a sample of 737 firms, show that lobbying is positively associated with performance for firms that are diversified in both international markets and along product-lines; whereas lobbying is counter-productive for purely domestic and undiversified firms. Our results contribute to the literature on the firm performance implications of corporate political activity by highlighting the roles of international and product diversification.

Global Supply Chains and Domestic Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War

This study integrates the political lobbying and market strategies in the setting of protectionism. I argue that multinational firms are incentivized to employ political lobbying to address disruptions to their global supply chains caused by domestic protectionist policies. I further theorize that the lobbying strategy critically hinges on firms’ market strategies including the use of specialized inputs and level of commitments to foreign markets. Empirically, I examine the U.S.-China trade war using a novel firm-level panel dataset and a difference-in-differences design. In addition, I investigate how firms benefit from lobbying and find that lobbying firms gain greater access to policy formulation and more favorable regulatory enforcement in the exclusion process.

The East Timor Action Networkand Transnational Advocacy:Domestic Lobbying and International Pressure for Self-determinationin Timor-Leste

Many factors contributed to the timing, in August 1999, of the referendum in Timor-Leste that led to the country’s independence; among them: Suharto’s abdication, Indonesia’s vulnerability to pressure after the East Asian economic crisis, Indonesia’s confidence that it will prevail using its usual methods of intimidation and manipulation, and, of course, the political and armed struggle of who supported and died for independence in Timor-Leste. Another element was the solidarity networks that emerged among activists from various countries who exerted internal pressure on their governments to force them to change their policy towards Indonesia. This article examines the East Timor Action Network, founded in 1991 in the United States, and its lobbying and internal pressure strategy. Building on Sikkink and Keck’s model of principle-based issue networks and their ability to exert domestic pressure for international results, this article shows how the Network successfully lobbied for change in US foreign policy toward Indonesia and contributed to the selfdetermination in Timor-Leste.

Energy policies of the USA in the first decade of 21st century

At the end of the 20th century, the USA’s environmental and energy policies were based on its international influence and domestic lobby groups. However, by the beginning of the new millennium, this country on the did not believe in its undisputed global leadership position in the unipolar world and changed its policies in line with global domination under the new conservatives’ influence. After 2001, the events allowed the neoconservatives to apply the philosophies theoretically formed and developed since 1930 in practice. The policies, including energy, environment and other strategic issues, of the government administration, which was determined with neoconservative motives, faced a great reaction and the domestic support began to decline. The neoconservatives faced that their policies that were inconsistent with the facts and resulted in a great disappointment in the U.S. public opinion.

Domestic Sources of India’s Trade Policy Preferences in RCEP Negotiations

After negotiating for seven years, fifteen member countries of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement concluded text-based negotiations on 4 November 2019 at a summit held in Bangkok, conveying that participants will sign the agreement in 2020. However, India refused to join the RCEP agreement on the ground that its ‘outstanding and domestic concerns’ remained unresolved. This article examines key factors that shaped India’s decision not to participate in the RCEP. To examine these key factors, two-level game literatures are used to focus on domestic factors and interest groups explaining the role of actors that shaped India’s trade policy preferences regarding the RCEP. Specific cases from the steel and agricultural sector are used to examine powerful sector-specific interest groups in this article. Findings show that powerful and well-organized interest groups within the steel sector successfully pressurized the government to withdraw from the RCEP. In the agricultural sector, interest groups are fragmented, but because of their large number as an electoral group, farmers and workers provided power to influence the government to opt out from the RCEP. RCEP negotiations, free trade agreements, India, WTO, sector-specific groups, domestic lobby, interest groups, and industry associations

SOME HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOBBYISM IN UKRAINE AS AN INSTITUTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The article presents a research on the history of lobbying in modern Ukraine and the development of domestic lobbying during the Russian Empire, the period of the National Liberation struggles of the Ukrainian people and the USSR. The author focuses on the peculiarities of domestic lobbing, which was formed under conditions of a totalitarian system and transformed into post-Soviet years.

OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF LOBISTRY ACTIVITY IN UKRAINE: REALITIES TODAY AND EVOLUTIONARY FORECAST

The article is devoted to the research of goals and functions of lobbying activity. The author has processed the ideas of domestic and foreign scientists, proposed his own approaches to the definition of goals and functions of lobbying activities through the prism of public administration. As a result, a generalized vision of the goals and functions of lobbying activities as interrelated elements of the lobbying system was proposed, and a forecast for further evolution of the goals and functions of domestic lobbying was provided.&#x0D; The analysis of lobbying functions allowed us to notice the tendencies in shifting the goals of this activity. If the objectives were fully covered by functions such as mediation between citizens and the state, the information function and the function of organizing plurality of public interests, then the role of strengthening the self-organization of civil society and the function of compromise become increasingly important in the process of formation in the developed countries of civil society and the development of telecommunication technologies.&#x0D; Ukrainian lobbyism will not be left to the side of this process. Already, politicians of the highest level, leaders of financial and industrial groups have to act, adjust their goals (even if they are — declared), taking into account the reaction of the public. In the future, this trend will only increase. The analysis of current research and political events provides all grounds for believing that, while proper regulatory legislation is being formed in Ukraine, the goals and functions of domestic lobbying will essentially shift towards a compromise with the public.&#x0D; It is noted that in spite of the existence of a basic direction of action, lobbying may have several ramified goals. Guided by the goals set, lobbyism can manifest itself in various spheres of the political system of society, combining the closely intertwined interests of various actors in the lobbying process, or even — contrasting them.

OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF LOBISTRY ACTIVITY IN UKRAINE: REALITIES TODAY AND EVOLUTIONARY FORECAST

The article is devoted to the research of goals and functions of lobby- ing activity. The author has processed the ideas of domestic and foreign scientists, proposed his own approaches to the definition of goals and functions of lobbying activities through the prism of public administration. As a result, a generalized vision of the goals and functions of lobbying activities as interrelated elements of the lobbying system was proposed, and a forecast for further evolution of the goals and functions of domestic lobbying was provided.The analysis of lobbying functions allowed us to notice the tendencies in shift- ing the goals of this activity. If the objectives were fully covered by functions such as mediation between citizens and the state, the information function and the function of organizing plurality of public interests, then the role of strengthening the self-organization of civil society and the function of compromise become in- creasingly important in the process of formation in the developed countries of civil society and the development of telecommunication technologies.Ukrainian lobbyism will not be left to the side of this process. Already, politi- cians of the highest level, leaders of financial and industrial groups have to act, adjust their goals (even if they are — declared), taking into account the reaction of the public. In the future, this trend will only increase. The analysis of current research and political events provides all grounds for believing that, while proper regulatory legislation is being formed in Ukraine, the goals and functions of do- mestic lobbying will essentially shift towards a compromise with the public.It is noted that in spite of the existence of a basic direction of action, lobbying may have several ramified goals. Guided by the goals set, lobbyism can manifest itself in various spheres of the political system of society, combining the closely intertwined interests of various actors in the lobbying process, or even — contrast- ing them.

Abenomics and Japan's Trade Policy in a New Era

Trade policy, in particular, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), has been a centerpiece of the Abe administration's economic strategy. The TPP's contributions to Japan's growth strategy include: (i) creating trade and investment opportunities abroad for Japanese companies through ambitious liberalization targets; (ii) advancing domestic reforms – with the largest service and agricultural liberalization commitments to date; and (iii) increasing bargaining leverage in other trade negotiations. But the domestic reform goals of Abenomics in agriculture have come up short due to opposition from domestic lobbies. American trade politics – which culminated in the US withdrawal from the TPP – have upended the goals of trade policy under Abenomics. Japan's best option in this new environment is to deliver on high quality, multi‐party trade agreements: concluding negotiations with Europe; scaling up the ambition of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; and salvaging a TPP 11. The merits of a bilateral free trade agreement with the USA will depend on how the Trump administration operationalizes its America First policy.

The ambiguity of US foreign policy towards Africa

Since 9/11, the American policy towards Africa has been strongly influenced by national security interests and in particular by the fight against international terrorism and Islamic radicalisation. Traditionally, the American Africa policy has been the result of bureaucratic policymaking with the Pentagon and the State Department playing prominent roles. The paper argues that in the current century, evangelical Christian lobby groups have gained increasing influence on policymaking on Africa. Because policymaking has been influenced by a number of different actors, the American Africa policy may appear incoherent and ambiguous if judged narrowly on the expectation that it only aims to take care of US national security concerns and economic self-interests. The paper concludes that Africa was important to the United States during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama because of the combination of strong security interests and strong domestic lobby groups that have pressured to place Africa on the US foreign policy agenda.

Lobbying for a Common External Tariff from inside and out

We consider the interactions between domestic lobbying and cross-border lobbying in a Customs Union (CU) in determining the Common External Tariff (CET). There are two types of cross-border lobbying: (i) lobbying from member-nation firms to the governments of other CU countries, and (ii) lobbying by firms from outside to the CU nation governments. Within this context, we analyze the effect of regulations on foreign lobbying on the equilibrium lobbying levels, and on the CET. If lobbying levels are strategic complements, tightening of restrictions on lobbying from outside the CU unambiguously reduces all types of lobbying. If non-CU firms are relatively large, the CET will rise in response to tighter regulations.

FDI Regulatory Reform and Political Beliefs: A Political Economy Approach

This paper analyzes the setting of a reform towards liberalization of FDI policies as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of a domestic lobby and a foreign MNC lobby. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we show that, under specific conditions, the interest group’s influence is not distortive for a critical distribution of supporters over non-supporters of the reform. Also, our political economy framework shows that exogenous provision of information on the beneficial effects of FDI liberalization paradoxically weakens the reform process.

Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization: A New Player Joins the Trade Game

To date, no country has taken longer to join the World Trade Organization than the Russian Federation despite the fact that the ussr (of which the Russian Federation is the legal successor) participated in the drafting conference of the Charter to the International Trade Organization, i.e., the original source of the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the later wto. While the ussr never joined the ito, Russia finally joined the wto in 2012, eighteen years after its first application had been made. The reasons for the lengthy accession process were partially economic, as the wto was established to remove trade impediments; however, the context also was highly politicized. The economic aspects of the wto accession process are the concessions made to existing members. These entail removing the cover offered to domestic producers by opening up to international competition. This process also has political aspects, as domestic lobbies representing economic sectors likely to suffer from an increasingly competitive international environment seek compensation. The politicization is facilitated by a custom contra legem in wto decision-making procedures that gives a de facto veto to existing members. Georgia used this to reassert its position on South Osetiia and Abkhaziia. China brought a border dispute into the process, and the us entangled the process in a broad-ranging debate linked to human rights. In joining the wto, a dual process of domestic and international negotiations results in the final package of commitments to which an acceding member needs to agree as it joins the wto. Part of our focus in this article will be on key economic and political obligations that the Russian Federation took upon itself by becoming a member of the wto.

A Comparison of Optimal Tariffs and Welfare under No Lobbying, Domestic Lobbying and Domestic‐foreign Lobbying

AbstractWhether and what type of the lobbying‐induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare? We show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying, the domestic‐foreign lobbying may achieve the lowest tariff and may also realise the highest welfare for the domestic country. Our finding provides a theoretical explanation to the prevalent lobbying competition between Asian firms and US firms in USA recently. We argue that the domestic‐foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in the domestic country, and lobbying competition may be one of the strongest forces pushing for trade liberalisation.

When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Co-operation?

Lobbies are active participants in international co-operation. In a repeated game, this article allows domestic lobbies to offer contingent rewards to influence their government to make pro-co-operation policy adjustments. The effect of lobbies depends on the type and intensity of their preferences. If the lobbies are ‘internationally benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in whether the foreign government reciprocates with adjustments of its own, they unambiguously improve co-operation. However, if the lobbies are ‘domestically benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in their own government's policy, they are less beneficial for co-operation. A domestically benefiting lobby that is willing to compensate its government even without foreign reciprocity undermines the credibility of punishing free riders. This article demonstrates this argument in the context of trade and environmental co-operation.

A Commitment Theory of Subsidy Agreements

Abstract: This paper examines the rationale for the rules on domestic subsidies in international trade agreements through a framework that emphasizes commitment. We build a model where the policy-maker has a tariff and a production subsidy at its disposal, taxation can be distortionary and the import-competing sector lobbies the government for favorable policies. The model shows that, under political pressures, the government will turn to subsidies when its ability to provide protection is curtailed by a trade agreement that binds tariffs only (policy substitution problem). When the factors of production are mobile in the long-run, but the investments are irreversible in the short-run, the government cannot credibly commit vis-à-vis the domestic lobby unless the trade agreement regulates production subsidies in addition to tariffs (policy credibility problem). We employ the theory to analyze the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement within the WTO system. We show that WTO rules on nullification or impairment solves the policy substitution problem, while serious prejudice rules can address the policy credibility problem in sectors with tariff commitments.

Lobbying for a Common External Tariff from Inside and Out

We consider the interactions between domestic lobbying and two types of cross-border lobbying in a Customs Union (CU). The two types of cross-border lobbying are (i) lobbying from firms in one CU country to the governments of other CU countries, and (ii) that from firms outside the CU. We focus on the determination of the common external tariff (CET) in a two-stage game-theoretic model. When firms within the CU cooperate in lobbying, a sufficient condition for the CET to be higher compared to the noncooperative case is that the CU firms' lobbying is a strategic substitute for the lobbying done by the non-union firms. Furthermore, the same strategic substitutabilty condition is sufficient to ensure that the CET must rise, when stricter regulations are imposed on lobbying from outside the CU.