Dollar Bloc Research Articles

Ruled by “fear of floating”. Mexico’s exchange rate policy during the interwar period, 1925-1936

This article argues that the Mexican exchange rate policy during the interwar years should be characterized asan archetypal case of “fear of floating”. Conventional accounts claim that Mexico escaped the Great Depressionbecause its policymakers deliberately repealed the gold standard ideology. Drawing on new archival data, Iargue that national policymakers remained conservative with respect to any regime change, and their preferencewas always for a fix or pegged exchange rate. Overall, this article claims that the monetary regime choicein Mexico was not driven by some new heterodox insights, and once the financial crisis of 1931 had forced adepreciation of the peso, the national monetary authority promptly rushed to join the dollar bloc.

Comments by Naoyuki Yoshino, on RMB Bloc in East Asia: Too Early to Talk About It?

October 01 2018 Comments by Naoyuki Yoshino, on RMB Bloc in East Asia: Too Early to Talk About It? Author and Article Information Online Issn: 1536-0083 Print Issn: 1535-3516 © 2018 by the Asian Economic Panel and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018Massachusetts Institute of Technology Asian Economic Papers (2018) 17 (3): 50–53. https://doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00630 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Comments by Naoyuki Yoshino, on RMB Bloc in East Asia: Too Early to Talk About It?. Asian Economic Papers 2018; 17 (3): 50–53. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00630 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsAsian Economic Papers Search Advanced Search Naoyuki Yoshino: There was a discussion on the possibility of a yen bloc in the early 1990s. Frankel and Wei suggested that the U.S. dollar had a dominant influence in the western hemisphere and the Deutsch mark similarly dominated in Europe. On the other hand, East Asian countries were more properly classified as a dollar bloc than a yen bloc. This paper provides empirical evidence on whether East Asia can be considered a RMB bloc. The paper focuses on measuring empirical evidence in exchange rate determination. Many papers use the Swiss franc as a numeraire currency. Here, however, the authors found that the New Zealand dollar leads to a more stable coefficient compared with the Swiss franc. Empirical results are based on two-step regressions to avoid multicollinearity with time-varying coefficients and suggest that the RMB gained influence in exchange rate determination in East Asia, especially since the 2008–09 Global Financial... You do not currently have access to this content.

U.S. monetary policy and China's exchange rate policy during the great recession

AbstractI examine the transmission of expansionary U.S. monetary policy in cases where emerging economies—including China—peg their currencies to the dollar. I evaluate the value of the dollar peg as a fraction of consumption that households would be willing to pay for the dollar peg to remain as well off under the dollar peg as they would be under a flexible exchange rate. The value of the dollar peg is typically positive for the dollar bloc because the United States can no longer improve its terms of trade at the dollar bloc's expense. This provides a rationale for fixing the exchange rate. The dollar peg is typically harmful to the United States, providing a rationale for criticism of China's exchange rate policy during the Great Recession.

Reserve Currency Blocs: A Changing International Monetary System?

What is the extent of currency diversification in the international monetary system? How hasit evolved over time? In this paper, we quantify the degree of currency diversification usingregression methods of currency co-movements to determine the extent to which nationalcurrencies across the world belong to a reserve currency bloc. We then use these estimates tocalculate the economic size of each currency bloc. A key contribution of our paper is that wequantify the size of the Chinese renminbi bloc. Our analysis suggests that the internationalmonetary system has transitioned from a bi-polar system - consisting of the U.S. dollar andthe euro - to a tri-polar one that includes the renminbi. The dollar bloc is estimated tocontinue to dominate, having the largest share in global GDP (40 percent), followed by therenminbi (30 percent) and the euro blocs (20 percent). The geographical area of influence forthe RMB bloc appears to be most evident among the BRICS' currencies. The British poundand the Japanese yen blocs appear to play minor roles.

Reserve Currency Blocs: A Changing International Monetary System?

What is the extent of currency diversification in the international monetary system? How has it evolved over time? In this paper, we quantify the degree of currency diversification using regression methods of currency co-movements to determine the extent to which national currencies across the world belong to a reserve currency bloc. We then use these estimates to calculate the economic size of each currency bloc. A key contribution of our paper is that we quantify the size of the Chinese renminbi bloc. Our analysis suggests that the international monetary system has transitioned from a bi-polar system - consisting of the U.S. dollar and the euro - to a tri-polar one that includes the renminbi. The dollar bloc is estimated to continue to dominate, having the largest share in global GDP (40 percent), followed by the renminbi (30 percent) and the euro blocs (20 percent). The geographical area of influence for the RMB bloc appears to be most evident among the BRICS’ currencies. The British pound and the Japanese yen blocs appear to play minor roles.

Exchange Rate Regimes in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe: A Euro Bloc and a Dollar Bloc?

There are 13 countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) with floating exchange rate regimes, de jure. This paper uses the framework pioneered by Frankel and Wei (1994) and extended in Frankel and Wei (2008) to show that most of them have been tracking either the euro or the US dollar in recent years. Eight countries, all of them current or aspiring EU members, track the euro. Of the five countries keying on the US dollar in various degrees, all but one belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The study shows that the extent to which each country’s currency tracks the euro (or the dollar) is correlated with the structure of its external trade and finance. However, some countries appear to track the euro or US dollar to an extent that appears inconsistent with inflation targeting, trade or financial integration, or the extent of business cycle synchronization. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced among the euro bloc countries in Emerging Europe, which may be deliberately gravitating around the euro in anticipation of eventually joining the euro area.

Exchange Rate Regimes in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe: A Euro Bloc and a Dollar Bloc?

There are 13 countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) with floating exchange rate regimes, de jure. This paper uses the framework pioneered by Frankel and Wei (1994) and extended in Frankel and Wei (2008) to show that most of them have been tracking either the euro or the US dollar in recent years. Eight countries, all of them current or aspiring EU members, track the euro. Of the five countries keying on the US dollar in various degrees, all but one belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The paper shows that the extent to which each country’s currency tracks the euro (or the dollar) is correlated with the structure of its external trade and finance. However, some countries appear to track the EUR or USD to an extent which appears inconsistent with inflation targeting, trade or financial integration, or the extent of business cycle synchronization. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced among the countries in the CESEE euro bloc, which may be deliberately gravitating around the euro in anticipation of eventually joining the Euro Area.

Exchange Rate Regimes in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe: A Euro Bloc and a Dollar Bloc?

There are 13 countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) with floating exchange rate regimes, de jure. This paper uses the framework pioneered by Frankel and Wei (1994) and extended in Frankel and Wei (2008) to show that most of them have been tracking either the euro or the US dollar in recent years. Eight countries, all of them current or aspiring EU members, track the euro. Of the five countries keying on the US dollar in various degrees, all but one belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The paper shows that the extent to which each country's currency tracks the euro (or the dollar) is correlated with the structure of its external trade and finance. However, some countries appear to track the EUR or USD to an extent which appears inconsistent with inflation targeting, trade or financial integration, or the extent of business cycle synchronization. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced among the countries in the CESEE euro bloc, which may be deliberately gravitating around the euro in anticipation of eventually joining the Euro Area.

Determining global currency bloc equilibria: An empirical strategy based on estimates of anchor currency choice

The study presents an empirical strategy for determining global currency bloc equilibria. The procedure includes, first, a nested logit estimation of the combined determinants of currency regime and anchor currency choice; second, a test for a welfare-maximizing regime decision, in which estimates of the relative welfare of alternative regimes are inferred from the results of the first step estimation; and third, taking the path dependency of regime choice into account, a currency bloc equilibrium is derived. In equilibrium, the dollar bloc is somewhat smaller and the euro bloc larger than at present. Counterfactual exercises assess among others the potential for a renminbi bloc.

China, the Dollar Peg and U.S. Monetary Policy

I examine the transmission of expansionary U.S. monetary policy in case where developing countries -- including China -- peg their currencies to the dollar. I evaluate the value of the dollar peg as a fraction of consumption that households would be willing to pay for the dollar peg to remain as well off under the dollar peg as under a flexible exchange rate. The value of the dollar peg is positive for the dollar bloc because the U.S. can no longer improve its terms of trade at the dollar bloc's expense. This provides a rationale for fixing the exchange rate. If the expenditure switching effect is weak, the peg is harmful to the U.S., providing a rationale for criticism of China's exchange rate policy.

Currency Blocs in the 21st Century

Based on a classification of countries and territories according to their regime and anchor currency choice, the study considers the two major currency blocs of the present world. A nested logit regression suggests that long-term structural economic variables determine a given country’s currency bloc affiliation. The dollar bloc differs from the euro bloc in that there exists a group of countries that peg temporarily to the US dollar without having close economic affinities with the bloc. The estimated parameters are consistent with an additive random utility model interpretation. A currency bloc equilibrium in the spirit of Alesina and Barro (2002) is derived empirically.

Currency Blocs in the 21st Century

Based on a classification of countries and territories according to their regime and anchor currency choice, the study considers the two major currency blocs of the present world. A nested logit regression suggests that long-term structural economic variables determine a given country's currency bloc affiliation. The dollar bloc differs from the euro bloc in that there exists a group of countries that peg temporarily to the US dollar without having close economic affinities with the bloc. The estimated parameters are consistent with an additive random utility model interpretation. A currency bloc equilibrium in the spirit of Alesina and Barro (2002) is derived empirically.

Monetary Integration in East Asia: Evidence from Real Effective Exchange Rates

This paper investigates the feasibility of forming a monetary union in East Asia by examining the cointegration and causality of the real effective exchange rates of local currencies. A “pentagon” group of five countries is found—South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia—which may have potential for success for further monetary integration. Singapore is loosely tied to this group. The Greater China area—China, Hong Kong and Taiwan—does not show any significant degree of integration either internally or externally. Neither a yen bloc nor a US dollar bloc is forming in East Asia.

Currency Blocs in the 21st Century

Based on a classification of countries and territories according to their regime and anchor currency choice, the study considers the two major currency blocs of the present world. A nested logit regression suggests that long-term structural economic variables determine a given country’s currency bloc affiliation. The dollar bloc differs from the euro bloc in that there exists a group of countries that peg temporarily to the US dollar without having close economic affinities with the bloc. The estimated parameters are consistent with an additive random utility model interpretation. A currency bloc equilibrium in the spirit of Alesina and Barro (2002) is derived empirically.

CURRENCY LINKAGES AMONG ASEAN

The purpose of this study is to examine the potential linkages among ASEAN-5 currencies, in particular the possibility of a Singapore dollar bloc during the pre- and post-crisis periods by using the Johansen multivariate cointegration test and the Granger causality test. Significant nonstationarity and the presence of unit roots were documented for each currency under both study periods. Using ASEAN-4 exchange rates against the Singapore dollar, the Johansen cointegration test showed that there was no cointegrating relationship during the pre-crisis period. However there were two statistically significant cointegrating vectors among ASEAN exchange rates for the post-crisis period. These findings imply that there is low financial integration before the crisis, but that ASEAN countries are financially more integrated after the crisis. This finding also indicates increasingly role of the Singapore dollar in ASEAN. Therefore, the Singapore dollar may be a possible candidate as the common currency for ASEAN. The analysis is repeated by adding the US dollar to the model. The finding ascertains the influence of the US dollar on ASEAN currencies before the crisis.

Did Easy Money in the Dollar Bloc Fuel the Global Commodity Boom?

Among the various explanations for the runup in oil and commodity prices of recent years, one story focuses on the role of monetary policy in the United States and in developing economies. In this view, developing countries that peg their currencies to the dollar were forced to ease their monetary policies after reductions in U.S. interest rates, leading to economic overheating, excess demand for oil and other commodities, and rising commodity prices. We assess that hypothesis using the Federal Reserve staff's forward-looking, multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model, SIGMA. We find that even if many developing country currencies were pegged to the dollar, an easing of U.S. monetary policy would lead to only a transitory runup in oil prices. Instead, strong economic growth in many developing economies, as well as shortfalls in oil production, better explain the sustained runup in oil prices observed until earlier this year. Moreover, a closer look at exchange rates and interest rates around the world suggests that the monetary policies of many developing economies, including in East Asia, are less closely influenced by U.S. policies than is frequently assumed.

The currency denomination of external European Union imports after European Union expansion

Using a multiple market model I examine the impact of euro expansion on the optimal currency denomination of external EU imports. Results suggest euro invoicing will increase more in the EU-expansion country than in the original EU. Exporting firms from dollar bloc countries (the U.S. or countries with fixed exchange rates with the dollar) are more likely to invoice in the euro if price discrimination is already optimal. Firms from outside the dollar bloc are more likely to use the euro when the original EU market is relatively large or transaction costs of exchanging the euro are relatively small.

Did Easy Money in the Dollar Bloc Fuel the Global Commodity Boom?

Among the various explanations for the runup in oil and commodity prices of recent years, one story focuses on the role of monetary policy in the United States and in developing economies. In this view, developing countries that peg their currencies to the dollar were forced to ease their monetary policies after reductions in U.S. interest rates, leading to economic overheating, excess demand for oil and other commodities, and rising commodity prices. We assess that hypothesis using the Federal Reserve staff’s forward-looking, multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model, SIGMA. We find that even if many developing country currencies were pegged to the dollar, an easing of U.S. monetary policy would lead to only a transitory runup in oil prices. Instead, strong economic growth in many developing economies, as well as shortfalls in oil production, better explain the sustained runup in oil prices observed until earlier this year. Moreover, a closer look at exchange rates and interest rates around the world suggests that the monetary policies of many developing economies, including in East Asia, are less closely influenced by U.S. policies than is frequently assumed.

The price of gold and the exchange rates: Once again

This paper examines the theoretical and empirical relationships between the major exchange rates and the price of gold using forecast error data. Among other things, it is found that, since the dissolution of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, floating exchange rates among the major currencies have been a major source of price instability in the world gold market and, as the world gold market now seems to be dominated by the US dollar bloc, appreciations or depreciations of that dollar would have strong effects on the price of gold in other currencies. The results of this study are rather different from those obtained in an earlier study of the same subject.

Characterizing exchange rate policy in East Asia: A reconsideration

Frankel and Wei [Frankel, J. A., & Wei, S.-J. (1994). Yen bloc or dollar bloc: Exchange rate policies of the East Asian economies. In I. Takatoshi & A. Krueger (Eds.), Macroeconomic linkages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press] developed and popularized a method for uncovering the implicit weights assigned to major international currencies constituting a currency basket. We extend the methodology in two dimensions: include regional competitive pressure and employ a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to overcome simultaneity bias. With these modifications, we confirm the prominent role of the US dollar in the exchange rate policy of East Asian economies beyond the short run. However, despite the high degree of commitment to nominal exchange rate stability prior to the crisis, fluctuations in most East Asian currencies are also significantly influenced by country specific shocks. The findings of the post-crisis period suggest that East Asian exchange rate regimes have become more diverse, with the crisis countries (except Malaysia) exercising even greater flexibility in their exchange rate management. Overall, there is weak evidence that the East Asian economies have been benchmarking their currencies towards regional competitors’ currencies over the longer term.