Doha Development Agenda Negotiations Research Articles

WTO Reform: Back to the Past to Build for the Future

AbstractSince its formation, with a few notable exceptions, WTO members have not been able to negotiate new rules on policies that generate negative international spillovers. The Doha Development Agenda negotiations, launched in 2001, became deadlocked in 2008. Problems extend beyond negotiations – other functions of the WTO are also not performing well. The dispute settlement mechanism, long perceived as the crown jewel of the organization, no longer is operational because of US refusal to appoint new WTO Appellate Body members. Calls for WTO reform have been mounting. This article provides an overview of the WTO reform agenda, drawing on the findings of recent multidisciplinary research to provide context for the papers included in this special issue on trade conflicts, multilateral cooperation and WTO reform.

WTO 체재 개혁과 한국의 다자통상정책 방향 (Reshaping the Multilateral Trade Policy for Korea)

WTO 체재 개혁과 한국의 다자통상정책 방향 (Reshaping the Multilateral Trade Policy for Korea)

Pour une démocratisation des relations commerciales internationales : analyse des manifestations du Groupe consultatif des pma à l’ omc

Cette étude analyse la volonté des pays les moins avancés et leur organisation en un Groupe consultatif en vue d’influencer la gouvernance économique mondiale, dans le cadre de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, lors du programme de Doha pour le développement À partir d’une analyse positiviste des textes officiels, l’article montre qu’il ne s’agit que d’une tentative chimérique de redéfinition de la gouvernance économique mondiale : le néolibéralisme reste la doctrine en vigueur et les tentatives de démocratisation des relations commerciales internationales ne constituent qu’une stratégie politique destinée à préserver l’ordre actuel. Classification JEL : F02, F1, K33

Trade Capacity Building in the WTO: Main Achievements since Doha and Key Challenges

This contribution reviews the WTO's achievements in the field of trade capacity building since the launch of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001, and discusses the key challenges. The DDA has clearly created a strong footing for the delivery of the WTO's trade capacity building programmes. The evidence suggests that the beneficiaries are now much better equipped to address the challenges of the Multilateral Trading System (MTS), to take active part in the negotiations, define their strategic objectives and defend their economic and trade interests. There is no room for complacency, however, as key challenges remain to be addressed. Human and institutional capacity building remain a priority for developing countries, and irrespective of the outcome of the DDA negotiations.

Global Trade Governance and the Challenges of African Activism in the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations

This article develops a bottom-up approach to global trade governance and explains how subordinate states are able to develop resistance strategies to top-down processes in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It highlights the growing activism and influence of African states in the global governance of international trade through a case study of the involvement of African states in the current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations. In so doing, it presents new evidence of the role played by non-dominant states in shaping and contesting the rules and practices of contemporary global trade governance. The article also provides theoretical insights into the source of African resistance in the WTO by drawing attention to the role of discourse in contemporary global trade governance. In this case study the analysis focuses in particular on how subordinate African actors make use of prevailing discourses of development to hold major powers and the WTO to account for their public commitment to negotiate new trade rules that will deliver development. It underlines the extent to which subordinate actors tend to use what is available to them—in this case the discourses of dominant actors—to challenge existing power structures. The conclusion reached is that African resistance creates an African dilemma; while resistance to existing power processes means that African member states can no longer be ignored in WTO negotiations, it also means that the WTO as a forum for global governance is less effective since consensus-based agreement becomes more difficult to achieve. And the less effective the WTO is in multilateral trade governance, the more member states—and in particular dominant states—ignore the WTO and seek bilateral and regional alternatives in order to secure market opening.

Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries and Export Promotion Policies under the WTO

AbstractThis paper explains the export promotion measures that can be utilised by developing countries under the current World Trade Organization (WTO) system and compares the WTO Members’ proposals on modification of export promotion provisions in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. Non‐reciprocity between developed countries and developing countries in favour of the latter needs to be strengthened in modifying the current WTO regulations, because of the very different levels of economic development between those two groups of countries. Therefore, from the viewpoint of ‘distributional fairness’, it suggests ways of modifying special and differential treatment provisions applied to export promotion policies of developing economies in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO.

Difficulties in International Cooperation: The Case of WTO Agricultural Negotiations

In the course of current global economic crisis, once again it is observable how important international cooperation is. However, generally international negotiations are complicated and long and bargaining agreements are often unsatisfying. The Doha-Development Agenda negotiations can be taken as a prime example to show the difficulties in international conflict resolution. In order to structure the WTO agricultural negotiation process, dynamic aspiration adaptation theory is applied. In a first step, the negotiations on export subsidies are analyzed, as it is the most progressed negotiation area within agricultural negotiations. It is shown that aspiration forming and aspiration adaptation has taken place. Aspiration adaptation is due to own economical objectives and environmental changes, but to a large extend it is due to opponent’s bargaining behavior. Furthermore, it is shown, that agreements follow the aspiration balancing principle.

Caveat Emptor: The Computable General Equilibrium Approach to Assessing the Poverty Impact of Trade Liberalisation

Millennium Development Goals, increasing attention is being given to the poverty impacts of trade liberalisation. The high level of public interest has stimulated renewed research activity aimed at expanding the evidence-base available to trade negotiators and policymakers. Within this context, computable general equilibrium economic modelling tools have been widely employed. This paper provides a critical assessment of the CGE economic modelling approach to assessing the impact of multilateral trade policy reform on poverty. It first summarises the results of recent modelling studies that have been widely quoted during the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda negotiations. The paper goes on to argue that although traditional representative agent CGE models tend to be by design ill-suited for poverty analysis, single-country CGE models linked to household micro-simulation modules may provide more relevant insights. Nevertheless, the latter need to be further coupled to other modelling approaches on both the macro and the micro side for a meaningful economic assessment of the trade-poverty nexus. Furthermore, CGE modelling results need to be integrated into a broader cross disciplinary approach, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative methods and evidence.

The Problems Facing the Doha Development Agenda

The prospects of successfully concluding the Doha Development Agenda negotiations in 2008 are poor. Even a basic agreement on major issues with details to be filled in later is unlikely. Possibly, there may be an agreement this year on modalities. Deep divisions remain in all major negotiating areas—agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), services and rules. Moreover, in some respects, the Members do not even agree on the form the negotiations should take, e.g., the level of importance to be accorded to services.

China and the WTO: New Kid in the Developing Bloc?

This paper explores China's initial participation in the WTO from a development perspective. The analysis starts by examining whether China was recognized as a developing country in its accession through a comparison of its rules commitments with those of other countries acceding during the same time period, and then proceeds to look at whether China has emerged as a developing country actor in the first four years of its WTO membership. Even though China argued for recognition as a developing country throughout its accession process, from a legal perspective the study finds that China, for the most part, was not accorded the special treatment permitted by developing country status. Moreover, China made commitments beyond the standard WTO rules and agreed to reduce the rights it would normally be entitled to as a WTO member, despite the notion of the 'single undertaking' whereby all Members are bound by the same rules. The possible systemic implications this has for developing countries in the multilateral trading system are discussed briefly. On a political level, the paper analyzes China's early participation in the policymaking process of the WTO vis-a-vis development, through an examination of China's positions in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations and some other topics presently under discussion in the WTO. Based on criteria such as China's use of pro-development rhetoric, support for developing country positions, leadership of developing country groups, submission of independent proposals, and adoption of opposing positions, the analysis shows that while China portrays itself as a developing country and often uses pro-development rhetoric, in contrast to countries such as India and Brazil, it has not taken a clear-cut leadership role in the developing bloc. At times, China differentiates itself from other developing countries, and has even gone so far as to block developing country proposals. Hence, in answer to the question raised in the title, the paper concludes that China is not the new kid in the developing bloc, and suggests a number of factors that may be contributing to its ambivalence regarding its place among the developing countries.

Commentary: Assessing the Benefits and Costs of the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations -- a Labor Perspective

A commentary on the Doha Development Round by a representative of the AFL-CIO. Thea Lee is Policy Director at the AFL-CIO in Washington, D.C., where she oversees research and strategies on domestic and international economic policy. Previously, she worked as an international trade economist at the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. and as an editor at Dollars & Sense magazine in Boston. Lee is co-author of A Field Guide to the Global Economy, published by the New Press. Her research projects include reports on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the impact of international trade on U.S. wage inequality, and the domestic steel and textile industries. She has testified before several committees of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate on various trade topics. She serves on several advisory committees, including the State Department Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy and the Export-Import Bank Advisory Committee. She is also on the Board of Directors of the Worker Rights Consortium and the National Bureau of Economic Research. She received a Bachelor’s degree from Smith College and a Master’s degree in economics from the University of Michigan.

Commentary: A PRC Perspective on Manufactures Liberalization

A commentary on Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, University of Michigan, "Issues of Manufactures Liberalization and Administered Protection." Rengang Huang is the Minister/Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the World Trade Organization based in Geneva, Switzerland. Since the launching of Doha Development Agenda negotiations in 2001, he has served on many occasions as the head of the Chinese delegations in the WTO. Huang began his career in public service in 1986 with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) of China. He worked for six years in the Foreign Investment Administration of MOFTEC, and in 1992, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Interpreting and Translating Service (ITS) in MOFTEC and became ITS Director in 1997. He has participated in numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations between China and its trading partners, including China’s accession to the WTO. In 2000, he became Deputy Director General of the Protocol Department and was responsible for the foreign affairs agenda of MOFTEC. Huang received an M.A. degree in International Studies from the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, China; an MBA degree from Cardiff Business School, University of Wales, UK; and a B.A. degree in English Literature from Nankai University, Tianjin, China.

The Cancun Breakdown and the WTO's Doha Development Agenda in Global Governance

The fifth ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) collapsed in Cancun. Three sets of factors are postulated to explain the breakdown. First, there were ideological conflicts between mercantilism and liberalism, and between the three pillars of sustainable development: the economic, the social, and the environmental. The erosion of the linkage between liberalism and mercantilism in the compromise of embedded liberalism — as well as weak or absent linkages between the sustainable development goals — was also problematic in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. Second, changing power relations and priorities among the WTO member states were evident in Cancun. Among others, the newly emerged Group of 21 for agricultural negotiations with the support of civil-society groups was a notable development. Third, there were institutional and domestic constraints in the negotiation structure. The Cancun breakdown poses a serious challenge for WTO negotiations, multilateralism, and global governance.