After Comparative Philosophy:A Discussion of "Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue," by Dimitry Shevchenko Purushottama Bilimoria (bio) Wilhelm Halbfass (1940–2000) deserves to be celebrated as a leading pioneer of the history of Indian philosophy in the modern era. The sheer volume of work in recent times and the extent of citations devoted to Halbfass' works well attest to the impact of his gallant endeavors. Dimitry [End Page 815] Shevchenko's article "Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-cultural Dialogue" in this issue of Philosophy East and West is a most recent attempt to take further the goals and contours charted by Halbfass, with a focus, however, not so much on the history of Indian philosophy as on the prayojana (purpose) of inter-cultural or cross-tradition discursive engagement and the ramifications thereof for comparative philosophy. This makes for a timely discussion, and here I am grateful to be invited by the editors to offer a few comments by way of a response. Besides his remarkable oeuvre, some of my comments may be directed, albeit anecdotally, toward Halbfass' shyness, his wry style, and a certain motivation informing his scholarship. Halbfass placed himself within the European philosophical paraṃpara (lineage) of Hegel, Heidegger, and Gadamer (and to an extent Habermas), but, as will be noticed, I have a certain hesitation in acknowledging this grandeur; rather, I place him centrally within the German philological-Indological tradition—what elsewhere has been christened as 'Indologism' (Bilimoria 2009)—or at best in the interstices of Indology, philology, and classical philosophy (Mohanty 1997). And yet Halbfass' masterly exegetical study of traditional texts has provided a profound understanding of different traditions of India, from Vedānta to Vaiśeṣika to Mīmāṃsā, that stemmed from his commitment to non-orientalized scholarship and what it means to delve deep into a tradition's self-understanding. He wrote one of the more accessible books on Ādī Śaṅkara of Advaita Vedānta and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of Pūrvamīmāṃsā fame, which, not surprisingly, contains one of the finest studies on the origins of the Brāhmaṇic doctrine of karma from the sacrificial ashes as it were of the fading apūrva ("unprecedented potentiae") theory of the ritualist Mīmāṃsakas (Halbfass 1980, p. 274). That study highlights the unique insights that Halbfass has offered in his close reading of the rather difficult and often marginalized darśana of the Mīmāṃsā (for its apparent ritualistic excesses, at the expense of much else of philosophical significance in the textual oeuvre), which has earned him timeless gratitude from traditional paṇḍita-scholars who have yet to work through the Orientalist legacy bequeathed by colonial scholars in India and pay more attention to 'India in Europe'. So much so that J. N. Mohanty, circa the mid-1970s, would recommend Halbfass' appointment as professor of Indian Philosophy to the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (where Halbfass had arrived as visiting lecturer in 1973). Halbfass wrote a splendid essay—"Happiness: A Nyāya-Vaiśeśika Perspective"—for a volume on Bimal K. Matilal that Mohanty and I co-edited (1997), and it was a sheer delight to work with him (though largely remotely). He had also kindly agreed to write for a volume on Mīmāṃsā and another for the Routledge History of Indian Philosophy, but sadly he passed away all too prematurely. [End Page 816] Let me turn for a moment to Halbfass' vision of comparative philosophy, which is the main concern that triggers this discussion. Mention is made that some form of comparative philosophy was being practiced by Indian scholars around the beginning of the twentieth century, and that a learned Society founded by S. V. Ketkar in Pune used the appellation "Comparative Theology and Philosophy." However, in his plenary lecture on "India and the Comparative Method" in the 1984 Research Conference on Asian and Comparative Philosophy, held in Honolulu (Shaner 1986), Halbfass made the case that the term describing the practice of "comparative philosophy" was actually not invented until after 1923 with the publication in 1926 of Paul Masson-Oursel's...