Doctrine Of Humanitarian Intervention Research Articles

Looking for the Impossible: The Futile Search for a Balanced Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention

Many in the West, especially in the human rights community, saw the end of the Cold War as a great opportunity for a normative transformation in international relations. They argued that the concept of sovereignty was an anachronism and that a new international regime should be created allowing for easier intervention against states that subject their citizens to violence. It seemed like a relatively straightforward issue of clashing normative principles at fi rst. As the conversation about interventions has evolved, however, it has become increasingly clear that the problem is much more complex. This article examines the set of complex trade-off s between various values and norms related to humanitarian intervention and demonstrates that no interventionist doctrine that balances these values and norms is possible. It empirically examines these tensions in the context of interventions in Kosovo and Libya.

Exploring the UK's Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention

ABSTRACT UK governments have often claimed that humanitarian intervention – without the consent of the target state and if necessary without express UN Security Council authorization – is legally permissible in exceptional circumstances, a stance that is highly controversial. The UK’s position is at odds with prevailing international legal doctrine, which is counterintuitive for a country that is generally committed to international law, the UN framework, and multilateralism. It is also in tension with normative developments related to human protection, such as the international ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle, which established that coercive responses to human suffering must be authorized by the UN Security Council. This article explores the background to the UK’s position on humanitarian intervention, and it argues that this reflects an element of continuity in the UK’s foreign policy in historical perspective, as a legacy of global engagement and a sense of moral righteousness and duty. The article also considers whether the UK’s position may be contributing to an evolution of the norms governing the use of force for human protection.

How russian intervention in syria redefined the right to protect in armed conflict

The use of military force to forestall humanitarian crisis remains a controversial issue in international law. This strategy is considered antithetical to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host country. This legal quandary emanated in 1998 after NATO launched a series of airstrikes against the Yugoslavian forces under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This legal conundrum prompted the United Nations to craft comprehensive legal principles to determine the parameters of foreign interventions in armed conflict. The objective was realised in 2005 after the UN adopted the Right to Protect (R2P) as means of resolving humanitarian crisis. This doctrine intended to harmonise the foreign intervention in light of the shortcomings of unilateral humanitarian intervention. However, the abysmal failure in resolving the Libyan crisis exposed its soft underbelly as tool for perpetuating regime change against unpopular leaders. Subsequently, when Security Council proposed similar remedy for Syrian conflict, Russia strenuously objected and advocated for a political and diplomatic solution. This geopolitical gridlock prompted the divided council to adopt a different scenario in dealing with the Syrian conflict with the west supporting the rebels while Russia stood by Assad. This prompted Assad to appeal for assistance from Russia in counteracting ISIS and rebel forces that threatened to depose his government. In 2017 President Putin announced the success of the Russian intervention and called for peace talks among the various warring factions. As such Russia had realised the humanitarian objective behind R2P while respecting the sovereignty of Syria.

To Wreck a State

The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P), a modernized version of the doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, seemed to gain growing acceptance amongst scholars and statesmen during the first decade of the twenty-first century. When Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi faced an insurgency against his rule in 2011, R2P was deployed as the legal justification for the United Nations’ intervention in Libya via NATO, which resulted in the elimination of the Gaddafi regime. However, in the five years since the intervention, Libya has devolved into a broken and failed state. Its social and economic demise raises the question: Should there be consequences in international law for “wrecking” a state, provided the wrecking is accomplished through the pretextual and fraudulent use of humanitarian concerns? This Article answers this question in the affirmative, and proposes the recognition of a new crime in international law, “aggression-by-pretense,” to be prosecuted at the international level in the International Criminal Court. It explores the key theoretical and practical dimensions of this new crime, moving us past the long and somewhat tired debate over the wisdom of R2P and toward an exploration of the concrete legal consequences that should ensue for the world’s statesmen in the event R2P is abused.

TOWARDS UNILATERALISM? HOUSE OF COMMONS OVERSIGHT OF THE USE OF FORCE

AbstractEngaging democratically elected assemblies in national decision-making over the extraterritorial use of force seemingly provides a secure check on executive abuses of power. Many liberal democracies therefore maintain constitutional requirements that their elected national assembly must authorize decisions to use military force. By comparison, the UK Parliament has historically played a limited and often indirect role in authorizing the use of force. From the vote on the Iraq War in 2003 onwards, however, the UK Parliament's role has increased to the point where, in August 2013, the defeat of a Government motion seeking approval for the use of force undermined efforts to build an international coalition to intervene in the ongoing Syrian conflict. Whilst debate regarding this shift has hitherto concentrated on the degree to which parliamentary oversight of the war prerogative is desirable, in this article we consider what Parliament's evolving role heralds for the general relationship between domestic and UN mechanisms. We challenge the underlying assumption that Parliament's interventions mark an indisputably positive development in constraining the use of force. When coupled with the focus upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which has accompanied many controversial exercises of UK military force since the end of the Cold War, the involvement of Parliament in the decision-making process risks hollowing out UN Charter safeguards. Successive UK Governments have acquiesced to the extension of Parliament's role, with the effect of shifting the locus for legitimating uses of force away from UN institutions, where the UK cannot control the actions of other States, and into a domestic sphere which is susceptible to executive influence.

From non-intervention to R2P

This note examines the legal framework of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and R2P. It begins by briefly describing the debate on the legality of the doctrine, including the early opinions of International Law Association, the ICJ, and the UN General Assembly as they serve as indicators of the attitudinal and perceptual changes that materialized in later stages. The note then describes how the UN Charter Article 2(4) ideals have been defeated by an expansive use of self-defence by powerful states. It is notable that the arguments in favour of self-defence originated in the pre-UN world only to be misused later with impunity after decolonisation. The birth of the notion of R2P in 2001 has served the powerful states with an opportunity to use human rights discourse to intervene in Third World countries.

USA and Russia in Syria and Ukraine: The Irony of Geo-Political Interventions

The battle between the USA and Russia that had been snuffed by the demise of the Soviet Union has been rekindled. The USA and Russia have regional doctrines that demarcate areas to which outside powers cannot encroach. However, the Middle East has remained a contested region for the two powers. USA has also sought to encroach into the backyard of Russia in order to contain the resurgence of the Eastern power. Both states have sought to protect their regions of influence and in the era beginning with the Arab spring, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been used to justify geo-political interventions. This article argues that the current tussle between the USA and Russia on Syria and Ukraine can be understood more from geopolitical struggles than from the humanitarian intervention argument

Humanitarian Intervention and the Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law

A serious issue that has confronted the international community is the legality of humanitarian intervention. Although the majority of scholars reject the existence of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention, could the attacked state invoke the responsibility of an intervening state before an international tribunal? This article attempts to answer this question in light of the often misunderstood clean hands doctrine in international law. It first concludes that under thelex lata, humanitarian intervention is prohibited under international law. This raises the question whether the clean hands doctrine may nevertheless preclude a court or tribunal from adjudicating in favour of a state that has been subject to humanitarian intervention. Although the clean hands doctrine exists under international law in various manifestations, its applicability in cases concerning humanitarian intervention is lacking. The article finally considers whether thejus cogensstatus of the prohibition of the use of force would prevent the applicability of the clean hands doctrine to humanitarian intervention cases were the clean hands doctrine to evolve into a customary international legal norm.

A La Maison Blanchee: Le Prrsident Des Etats-Unis Se Soucie-T-Il Du Droit International LorsquuIl DDcide DDUne Intervention Militaire? ('The West Wing': The US President Does Care About International Law When Deciding Military Intervention?)

U.N. doesn't want this. They want to wring their hands and censure us after, but they expect us to take care of things like this. And after they’ve exhausted themselves calling us warmongers and imperialists they’ll go home and quietly drink toasts to their relief. Those words, pronounced by Leo McGarry, President Bartlet’s Chief of staff, can make us think that international law is absent — or at least neglected — in the well-known The West Wing TV series (7 seasons, 1999-2006). However, a comprehensive viewing of its 155 episodes reveals a more subtle representation of international law, particularly as far as the UN Charter rules are concerned. Generally, it can be said that The West Wing echoes, and at the same time supports, the traditional US doctrines about the use of force in international relations. Firstly, (preventive) self-defense is broadly conceived as an action that appears necessary in order to counter terrorist groups or States that support them: terrorists aren’t nations […]. International law has no prohibition against any government, superpower or otherwise, targeting terrorist command and control centers (President Bartlet, Season 5). Secondly, a right to overpass the multilateral procedures enshrined in Chapters 7 and 8 of the UN Charter can be deduced from several scenes. In Season 4, for example, President Bartlet states that « No country has ever had a doctrine of intervention when only humanitarian interests were at stake. That streak’s going to end Sunday at noon ». At that moment, he proclaims a new US doctrine of humanitarian intervention without even mentioning the opportunity of requesting a Security Council’s authorization. Finally, the representation of the UN Charter in The West Wing seems to correspond to the existing American film tradition, either in films like Air Force One (1997) and Zero Dark Thirty (2013), or in TV series like 24 (2001-) or Homeland (2011-): the President’s powers cannot be restrained by the existing rules; those rules must simply be interpreted as allowing any military action necessary to protect the interests of the United States. Against this background, it is not surprising that the US public opinion often shares this particular representation of international law when actual military interventions are triggered.

Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsibility to protect

European governments, parliaments and civil societies belong to the most important supporters of a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). However, despite a shared positive attitude towards R2P and co-ordinated diplomatic efforts, major European governments and therefore the European Union (EU) have never reached a consensual position on R2P. Based on 47 expert interviews and a review of official government documents, the article analyses the positions of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the common EU institutions across a series of critical junctures of the R2P debate between 2005 and 2013. The authors find that Paris and London agree with Berlin and Brussels that R2P requires longer-term multilateral norm-building. Yet, while Germany stresses military restraint and civilian crisis prevention, France and the UK continue to view R2P through their pre-existing traditions of a droit d'ingérence and the ‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention’, respectively. These differences are largely due to diverging strategic cultures based on different historical lessons on the use of force. Brussels’ efforts to co-ordinate a common EU position have been constrained by these diverging positions.

The Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law and Humanitarian Intervention

A serious issue that has confronted the international community is the legality of humanitarian intervention. Although the majority of scholars reject the existence of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention, could the attacked state invoke the responsibility of an intervening state before an international tribunal? This article attempts to answer this question in light of the often misunderstood clean hands doctrine in international law. It first concludes that under the lex lata, humanitarian intervention is prohibited under international law. This raises the question whether the clean hands doctrine may nevertheless preclude a court or tribunal from adjudicating in favour of a state that has been subject to humanitarian intervention. Although the clean hands doctrine exists under international law in various manifestations, its applicability in cases concerning humanitarian intervention is lacking. The article finally considers whether the jus cogens status of the prohibition of the use of force would prevent the applicability of the clean hands doctrine to humanitarian intervention cases were the clean hands doctrine to evolve into a customary international legal norm.

The Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes

Humanitarian intervention remains a very controversial area of international law. For many commentators the paradigm case is that of NATO's 1999 operation over Kosovo, but states are still divided on the legality of this use of force. As Kosovo pursues independence today the question whether it was created by the unlawful use of force is still important. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia raises similar questions. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is strongly opposed by the Non-Aligned Movement who see it as a pretext for intervention by powerful states. Few states openly support the legal doctrine; even fewer have relied on it to justify their use of force. Its legal basis is apparently an interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which allows the use of force to further the purposes of the UN, in particular the protection of human rights. The UK is the foremost supporter in public. It has invoked the doctrine to justify the no-fly zones over Iraq, and has made attempts to draw up a legal framework to govern the use of force on behalf of the international community to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. However, in his secret Memorandum on the 2003 use of force against Iraq the UK Attorney-General acknowledged that the doctrine was controversial. The position of the USA remains uncertain: President Obama's 2010 US National Security Strategy is equivocal to say the least.Recently there have been attempts to shift the focus away from this controversial doctrine to a new concept, that of the Responsibility to Protect. This was unanimously supported by the member states of the UN in the Outcome Document of the Millennium Summit, and was hailed as a major advance. There is some disagreement as to whether the use of force in the name of the Responsibility to Protect can be carried out only by the UN Security Council and whether it rules out the unilateral use of force by states. Various bodies within the UN have worked to elaborate on this concept and to further its implementation in practice, but it remains more an aspiration than an existing duty under international law.

Sovereignty-building: three images of positive sovereignty projected through Responsibility to Protect

This article argues that the increasingly frequent and robust implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle reflects not only the operation of the functionally narrow doctrine of humanitarian intervention, but also the emergence of a new paradigm of global security, namely sovereignty-building. RtoP protects populations from mass atrocity crimes, supports and builds responsible sovereigns committed to protecting their populations, and restrains ‘irresponsible’ sovereigns. These functions of RtoP perfectly capture the sovereignty-building paradigm. This article will draw upon the philosophical literature on sovereignty, the analysis of the norm development of RtoP, and empirical evidence of the UN Security Council's deliberations on the situation in Libya in 2011 to argue that the image of responsible sovereignty featured in RtoP is composed of three aspects: popular, spontaneous and indivisible sovereignty. That image is projected on states in the implementation of RtoP, and constitutes the teleological objective of the emerging paradigm of sovereignty-building, which can be distinguished from the traditional doctrines of state-building and humanitarian intervention.

Prudence and principle in international society: reflections on Vincent's approach to human rights

John Vincent's Human rights and International Relations argued for embedding the right to be free from starvation in the international society of states. Principle and prudence were combined in a distinctive English School analysis of the universal human rights culture. Vincent argued that the entitlement to be free from the tyranny of starvation and malnutrition was one principle on which most societies could agree despite their profound ideological differences. Other conceptions of human rights, including western liberal doctrines of individual freedom, had the potential to create major divisions within international society, particularly when linked with a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. More recent approaches to world poverty raise large questions about whether Vincent succeeded in attempting to marry prudence in preserving an international order that remains anchored in state sovereignty with a principled commitment to ending starvation. Important issues also arise about how to build on his reflections on the prospects for a global ‘civilizing process’ that bridges cultural and political differences in the first universal society of states.

The Evolving Discourse on Human Protection

This special issue of Criminal Justice Ethics examines a critical world order issue—the evolving discourse on human protection, and in particular the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (HI) and ...

Bernard Kouchner

When Bernard Kouchner was expelled from France's Socialist party last year for accepting President Nicolas Sarkozy1 s invitation to become foreign minister, it was as if history was repeating itself.Like many of Europe's top politicians, Kouchner flirted with extreme left in 1960s. As a young communist and medical student in France, he railed against American imperialism and French colonialism in Algeria, and marched along front lines during watershed student protests of May 1968. But Kouchner never let ideology displace his tried and true principles and soon found himself unwelcome in a Communist party that supported oppressive dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere.Almost 40 years later, Kouchner faced a similar situation with Socialists. He had long been a critic of party, not just because of French left's predictable and monotonous anti- Americanism, but for its unwillingness to adapt to modern economic realities. Although Kouchner has said that post of foreign minister was only one he would have accepted, his decision to join Prime Minister Francois Fillon's cabinet infuriated Socialists' chair Francois Hollande, who promptly booted Kouchner from party.To his credit, Kouchner has never been afraid to speak his mind. That quality occasionally backfires - a notable example being his statement that France must prepare for war with Iran. Boutros Boutros- Ghali called him an unguided missile. In France he has been labeled gauche caviar, a French term similar to champagne socialist epithet used to describe leftwingers whose lifestyles are deemed too sophisticated for their political positions. But sabre-rattling and posh tastes aside, Kouchner' s willingness to take on despotic regimes and their enablers worldwide has made him a pioneer in field of humanitarian aid and doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and has also saved countless lives.He championed a foreign policy based on protecting human rights long before he took office in magnificent headquarters of foreign ministry, located along Quai d'Orsay. can't stand fact that a man is assassinated, that a woman is abused, that a child is beaten up, Kouchner wrote in his 1995 memoir, What I Believe. This explains why he was one of very few French politicians to back US invasion of Iraq. His reasoning - that removing Saddam Hussein and other dictators from power was necessary to protect civilians - was at least more plausible and sincere than unsuccessful weapons of mass destruction theory. While White House ignored Jacques Chirac and his foreign ministers after Iraq war, Washington has been keen to embrace Kouchner and Sarkozy as friends of America, especially after it was rumoured that ex- Socialist Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, one of harshest critics of US plan for Iraq, would be returning to post.Indeed Sarkozy selected Kouchner not for his foreign policy credentials or his record of promoting human rights, but for his commitment to a strategic rapprochement with Washington. Kouchner was quickly cast as proAmerican by an American media grateful that new minister came without an axe to grind stateside. But he is hardly a sycophant, insisting that he is at odds with Bush administration negotiating with Hamas and Hezbollah, and condemning failures of Washington's Iraq strategy. Never one to mince words, in March Kouchner told Forum for New Diplomacy in Paris that the magic is over for American foreign policy.Some commentators have attributed his forthright and blunt approach to diplomacy to his very un- French educational background. Neither he nor Sarkozy were groomed at prestigious Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (better known as Sciences Po/1 or Ecole Nationale d'Administration, traditional breeding ground for France's political and diplomatic elite. Chirac, Francois Mitterrand, and past foreign ministers Dominique de Villepin, Vedrine, and Alain Juppe are all alumni of one or both schools. …

The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice

AbstractThis discussion focuses on the content of the responsibility to protect the norm. It specifically addresses the historical roots and development of the norm by describing its fundamental differences from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The legal heart of the responsibility to protect concept and questions of when and how the norm is engaged are also examined. Finally, the discussion explores the role that the UN institutions can play in interpreting and applying the norm, as well as the mechanisms of cooperation in protection available to the international community.

New Rabbits, Old Hats

Diplomacy is part art, part science, and is perhaps best understood as a nonviolent approach to the management of international relations.1 In the diplomatic context, results are obtained from the successful pursuit of national interests, the advocacy of policy, and the projection of values globally. In short, diplomats seek to advance or defend their country's political and economic place in the world. That is the purpose, the essence of diplomacy.In practice, results and resources combine in an intimate dialectic: they represent two sides of the same coin. Resources, when skilfully managed, usually produce results, and results, when recognized in exercises such as the bringing down of national budgets, tend to produce additional resources. Lately, we have found both to be in rather short supply. In fact, we seem caught between a mandate that is constant and an operating environment-characterized increasingly by crosscutting transnational forces and non-state actors-that has changed radically. We have arrived at a moment of disjuncture, and are struggling with variations on a central theme: how best to align structures, doctrines, and techniques with the new rule set?Foreign ministries almost everywhere have responded in a broadly similar fashion, by working smarter, by reconciling priorities with resources, by identifying clients and establishing standards of service, and by focusing on the core business. Innovation and entrepreneurship, as manifest, for instance, through partnership with civil society and an increasing reliance on the internet and other new media, are becoming more common, even if not yet universally in evidence.2 ;CAN PRACTITIONERS OF THE WORLD'S SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION LEARN A FEW NEW TRICKS?In this article, I illustrate some of these trends by looking more closely at Canada's case. In our country, severe budgetary cuts to all international policy institutions-the military, development assistance, and the foreign ministry-in the 19903 forced a fundamental rethink of the kinds of results that might realistically be achieved. At the end of the day, the long-standing centrality of large, global order objectives such as poverty eradication, conflict resolution, non-proliferation, and environmental advocacy gave way to a more short-term, team-centred, project-based approach. This new dispensation was well suited to brief bursts of concentrated energy and provided a tangible focus for such resources as were available.This was niche diplomacy, and it was extremely cost-effective. The results, rather than being measured in small increments over decades, were palpable and highly media friendly: a treaty to ban landmines; an International Criminal Court; an initiative to control small arms, highlighting the plight of child soldiers/children in conflict; a look at the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (which has recently resurfaced under the auspices of the responsibility to protect initiative, or R2P). Each project had a clearly defined start and finish, and made the political leadership look good; when maximum gains had been extracted, the minister could simply declare victory and move on.The foreign minister during this period of renewed international activism, Lloyd Axworthy, connected the dots joining the projects, and in so doing, elevated this approach to the level of an art form. By making a virtue of necessity, he produced the string of results adduced above within an extremely limited resource envelope. Toward the end of his tenure, in a stunning retrofit that produced the appearance of near perfect policy coherence, he tied it all together under the rubric of the human security agenda-but that's another story.3I should also add as a prefatory note that that we may finally have turned the corner on resources. After years and years of reductions, the February 2005 federal budget contains new money-not a windfall, but a significant investment of $641 million over five years-for additional positions abroad, for public diplomacy, for personnel safety, and for international peace and security support. …

FROM RIGHTS TO RESPONSIBILITIES

This article aims to explore possible avenues that the international community can use in order to justify forcible intervention in sovereign states in cases where gross and systematic violations of the human rights of the he population take place, but where the legal authority for such intervention is not forthcoming from the Uni ted Nations Security Council. Two possible justifications are identified: the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which despite being controversial, enjoys a measure of acceptance due to the practice of states in this regard, and the notion of an international responsibility to protect vulnerable populations and individuals. The latter option, despite a vague and uncertain legal basis, offers several advantages: it focuses on the suffering of human beings and not on the rights of states, it enumerates clear and definable thresholds for intervention by the international community and acknowledges that intervention is only one step in the process of achieving peace, to be preceded by preventive action and followed by post-conflict reconstruction. It is submit ted that elements of the notion of an international “responsibility to protect” are to be found in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and especially the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. Furthermore, the principles underlying this notion, as developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty may serve as guidelines in decisions by the Assembly to authorise interventions in AU members.

Progress or return? Collective security, humanitarian intervention and the Kosovo conflict

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention ('new internationalism') prounced to justify NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict was internationalist, multilateralist and interventionist in outlook, encompassed a larger vision consistent with liberal norms and morality and required the satisfaction of extensive conditions before being implemented. However, on closer examination the doctrine does not emerge as something entirely new, legal or humanitarian. It will certainly not cause the demise of nationalism and the nation‐state and will probably strive without success to retain consistency in its application in other parts of the world. New internationalism has also contributed to the further erosion of Westphalian structures. Attempts to harmonize new internationalism with the regional security arrangements that are foreseen in the UN Charter would allow the doctrine's application to a more limited regional scope, actions thus only being pursued by regional states or organisations (e.g. NATO). As a result, it might become easier to avoid deadlock at the Security Council, garner international support for humanitarian interventions and avoid criticisms of neo‐imperialism or selective application.