Doctrine Of Concepts Research Articles

The concept of freedom in Hegel’s ​ Logic

Although it is fully developed in ​ Philosophy of the Spirit, more precisely in the ​ Philosophy of Right, the concept of freedom is rooted in the ​ Science of Logic, namely, in the very core of the Hegelian system. And it could be no different, since Logic finds its high point in the Doctrine of Concept and Concept is conceived as the “realm of subjectivity or of freedom” (GW, v.11, p.409). Disagreeing with the contemporary attempts at thematizing the concept of freedom disconnected from Hegel’s metaphysics, as in Honneth (2001, p.12,; 2013, p.17), or in Pippin (2008), the resent article seeks to examine the meaning taken on in the heart of the Hegelian system, to evaluate its potentials and its limits.

Logica do conceito e as bases do conceito de intersubjetividade

O artigo pretende demonstrar que encontramos na Ciência da Lógica as bases lógicas do conceito de intersubjetividade. Na correlação entre a Doutrina do Conceito e a Filosofia do Espírito, a estrutura lógica do conceito desdobra-se na estrutura prática da Filosofia do Real, nas realidades do Estado e da História. Por este viés, o artigo parte da dialética do conceito nas conhecidas categorias de universalidade, particularidade e singularidade, reconstrói este círculo dialético e abre para a teoria do juízo e do silogismo. A dialética do conceito, juízo e silogismo não aponta para uma subjetividade absoluta e indiferenciada, mas a rede de subjetividades resulta num sistema formal de intersubjetividade. As bases da Doutrina do Conceito permitem alargar esta abordagem para a Filosofia do Espírito, nas macrorrelações sociais e históricas e na formação da intersubjetividade sistêmica entre os povos.

Autoconsciência e conceito no pensamento tardio de Fichte e na Lógica de Hegel

In summer term 1812 Fichte lectured on “the relation of logic with real philosophy” in order to introduce the point of view of the Science of Knowledge. A few months before the beginning of Fichte’s lectures, the first book of Hegel’s Science of Logic had been published. Independently of the controversial question if Fichte’s ‘Transcendental Logic’ from 1812 was intended to be a critical reply to the Hegelian project of a speculative logic, no doubt the lecture from summer 1812 is an important source for understanding the systematical relation between the late Fichte’s conception of transcendental logic and the Hegelian project of a speculative logic. The principal thesis of this paper is that both the convergences and differences between the two philosophical projects can be identified by considering the conceptions of the concept and of self-consciousness that are contained in Fichte’s lecture and in the third part of Hegel’s Lógic, the Doctrine of Concept. The comparison between these conceptions shows that the late Fichte and Hegel converge insofar as they criticize the logical conception of concepts and the idea that self-consciousness is a fundamental principle of philosophy. However, whereas Fichte defends a genetic theory of conceptual content and of self-consciousness that is based on the conception of an absolutely spontaneous and ‘image’-producing thinking, Hegel searches for a structural explanation that is based on the speculative conception of the concept as the fundamental structure of reality, understanding concepts in the logical sense as a result of the ‘separation’ of the original unity of the concept and self-consciousness as its conscious concretization.

Некоторые заметки о понятии и назначении теории схематизма Канта в «Критике чистого разума»

The article introduces Kant’s doctrine of schematism (Critique of Pure Reason A 137-A 147; B 176-B 187). The inclusion of the chapter on schematism in the ‘Doctrine of the Principles’ rather than the ‘Doctrine of Concepts’ is taken as a clue to distinguishing the Doctrine of Schematism from the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. This provides clarity on the function of schematism. The author conceives of schematism as something entirely new to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, namely, as preparation for the use of categories as predicates in sentences known as the ‘Principles of Understanding’ referring to phaenomena (appearances in time and space) rather than the undetermined concept of objects in general. To support this interpretation, the author addresses main concepts of the schematism theory (for instance, those of schema, imagination, homogeneity, and time-determination) and describes the function of schematism. Imagination is presented as an instance of the function usually called “understanding” when directed towards appearances given in time and space. Understanding becomes imagination when it obeys not only the laws of logics, but also the laws of time. Homogeneity (a concept that plays an important role in the theory of schematism) is explained with reference to Tetens’s Philosophical Essays on Human Nature (1777). The explanations of concepts provided in the article are not exhaustive. They are discussed in more detail in the author’s earlier publications referred to in the footnotes. The article also discusses earlier and contemporary literature on schematism.

Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental Analytic

In theCritique of Fure ReasonKant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual (or imaginative) field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logical function of the understanding in judgements, introduced in the first chapter of the analytic of concepts: Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding; in another respect, they are grounded in transcendental unity of apperception, which is introduced in the second chapter: Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Transcendental Deduction. I shall be concerned with the latter and its contribution to the overall strategy of argument in the analytic. Within the Analytic, Kant distinguishes between an Analytic of Concepts and an Analytic of Principles (also called ‘transcendental doctrine of judgement’ [A137/B176]). This corresponds to a traditional distinction between a doctrine of concepts (or understanding) and judgement. It is arguable that Kant's theory of concepts undermines this distinction. However, I shall not deal with that general issue, but with a more specific issue related to the first two chapters of the Analytic of Principles: the Schematism and the System of Principles. (The third chapter, on phenomena and noumena, is basically an appendix.)

VII. Description of an Extra-uterine Fœtus

Much light has been thrown upon many of the most important and intricate functions of the animal machine, by accurate inquiries into the processes of nature under extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine of conception, lately advanced, owes its support, in no small degree, to observations made on cases, in which, from adventitious causes, Nature has been led out of her ordinary tract. The following case appears to be of such a description; and, as tending further to elucidate the subject, may probably be not unacceptable to the learned members of this Society.