Division Of Profits Research Articles

Perjanjian Bagi Hasil Ternak Babi Antara Kepala Desa dengan Masyarakat Menurut Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata di Desa Loborai Kecamatan Sabu Timur Kabapaten Sabu Raijua Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur

The purpose of this study is to analyze the pig production sharing agreement between the Village Head and the community according to the Civil Code in Loborai Village, East Sabu District, Sabu Raijua Regency, East Nusa Tenggara Province. In the process of this research, the author uses empirical research methods with the aim of research to find out and describe various matters related to the implementation of the pig production sharing agreement in Loborai Village, East Sabu District which will provide benefits in the form of rational thinking in an effort to answer various problems related to the pig production sharing agreement in Loborai Village, East Sabu District. The results of the research show that the form of pig profit-sharing agreement carried out by the village head with the community is carried out in written and unwritten (oral) forms. The written agreement is carried out by the community in the form of an agreement in the division of profit sharing for pigs. Whereas in the oral form, the village head and the community make an agreement to raise pigs and the results of the livestock if they breed and have results from the pigs will be shared with the community to maintain the results of the pigs that have been given. If there is a problem in the pig profit-sharing agreement between the village head and the community in raising pigs, for example, in this case the community is negligent so that the pigs die, then the village head as the owner does not sue but is resolved properly. However, another thing that is absolute to note is that the agreement made and carried out must be in good faith.

Economics as Seen by an Ethicist a Personalist Perspective

This paper is intended to reconstruct the personalist understanding of relations between person and economics. Beginning with the concept of economics as a science whose fundamental categories are the production, exchange and division of material goods and profit, and adopting the personalist perspective, the author explores the economic roots going deeper than income alone, defined in terms of financial gain. This reasoning seems particularly important as economics is extremely susceptible to unethical mechanisms leading to various forms of alienation.

Wybrane problemy społeczno-prawne stosunków pracy we Francji

The article deals with current problems ensuing from the organization and legal regulation of employment relations in France. The following questions have been discussed in this connection: reforms to affect the structure of an enterprise, the participation of employees in the management and the division of profits, employment policy, improvement of working conditions. The provisions of the law that regulate the above problems have been pointed out and presented against a broad, socio-economic background. The attitudes towards particular issues assumed by the three main parties to the French employment relations (the state, patronage, employees represented by trade unions) have been specified and differences in opinion pertaining to the concepts in this respect and postulated measures to this end — emphasized. In this manner the author attempted at drawing a panorama of clue problems arising in the sphere of and ensuing from employment relations in France, as well as steps postulated and undertaken with a view to solving the discussed problems.

Local wisdom in economic practice: An empowerment Fiqh analysis of the tesang tradition of the Buginese and Makassarese

This article explores the role of tesang, a local practice, as an approach to economic empowerment amongst the Buginese and Makassarese of South Sulawesi. Tesang not only promotes the division of profits between investors and laborers but also continued efforts to improve the local economy. This article’s analysis relies on data collected through observations and interviews as well as a review of the literature. This study emphasizes that tesang is not only an economic practice but also a co mmitment to maintaining Buginese and Makassarese society in a manner that reflects the teachings of Islam. This local wisdom-based approach to empowerment may be used to realize collective empowerment and success. As such, even though it does not follow any formal structure, tesang has a real and tangible effect on society. This study recommends that future research take an in-depth approach that recognizes tesang not only as a means of empowerment but also as a foundation for strong linkages through which society’s increasingly complex demands can be fulfilled.

Patent protection for complex technologies

We analyze patent protection with sequential and complementary innovation. We argue that in these cases the classic Nordhaus trade-off between innovation and static monopoly distortions is different from the case of isolated innovations. We parametrize the degree of innovation sequentiality and complementarity and show that the optimal level of patent protection increases with both. We also address the issue of the optimal division of profit among different innovators.

On the Origins of the Political Economy

The scholars of the History of Economic Thought, irrespective of their ideological school, have always regarded Adam Smith as the founding father of the discipline of political economy. Particularly, the first seeds of the economics discipline were believed to be sowed by An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations (1776) by Adam Smith. However, a more profound analysis and evaluation of the historical sources could counteract this widely-held belief of Adam Smith as the founding father of the political economy. There has been a growing body of literature that has sparked a debate about Al-Muqaddimah (1377), the book of a fourteenth-century scholar called Ibn Khaldun who provided labor theory of value, theory of profits, prices and taxation together with a monetary theory. Some scholars went so far as to argue that Ibn Khaldun should be considered as the father of the political economy. Yet, there remains fundamental questions as to why Ibn Khaldun’s book Al-Muqaddimah, and thus his theories of economic principles were not picked up by the classical political economist. In other words, what made Al-Muqaddimah so obscure and unknown throughout the history that the classical political economists had to re-discover these principles? Were there any differences in the ways Ibn Khaldun and classical political economists wrote and presented their theories of division of labor and prices? Why did the origins of the political economy spring in the Western civilizations rather than the East? This paper will try to argue that as much as Ibn Khaldun put forward theories of division of labor, prices, profits and taxation in Al-Muqaddimah, it should not be considered as the origins of the modern political economy, because Ibn Khaldun seemed not to be concerned about changing the status quo he was living in, but rather attempted to provide a descriptive account in the society and time period he was living in. Thus, he became obscure and unknown to both Eastern and Western civilizations throughout the history, because he was not concerned with revolutionizing the human thought and philosophy. On the other hand, Adam Smith and his successors were products of the Scottish Enlightenment in which they attempted to change the way people viewed the political and societal system around them. In other words, the argument that Ibn Khaldun should be considered as the father of modern economics does not matter. The historical context and the goals of both Ibn Khaldun and the classical political economists matter. This issue is significant to address, because it not only provides with a deeper understanding of the origins of economic thought, but also enables us to question the standard textbook narrative.

Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks

We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially overlapping) diffusion paths. Sellers indirectly appropriate profits over intermediation chains from buyers in their equivalence classes. Links within the same class constitute bottlenecks for information diffusion and confer monopoly power. Links that bridge distinct classes are redundant for diffusion and generate competition among sellers. In dense networks, competition limits the scope of indirect appropriability and intellectual property rights foster innovation.

Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits

In two-sided matching markets where direct negotiations take place over the division of profits between the partners, the appropriate solution concept is the core. Only a minority of the experimentally observed bargaining results are within the core, and the number of core solutions further decreases with an increase in market complexity. For differently-sized matching markets, two adjustments to the core requirements are introduced. Projected cores from smaller markets (partial condition core) are confirmed in larger markets. The possibility of Pareto improvements from the perspective of individual players (individual condition core) does not vanish but may even increase with market size. In all the investigated experimental markets, a high percentage of equal profit splits between matching partners in face-to-face bargaining was found, especially in larger, decentralized matching markets.

Considerations on Inequality, Corporate Governance, and Financialization

Disjunctures between corporate governance, increasingly dominated by financial considerations, and social inequality have been among the motor forces of current world-wide “populist” voter revolts. This article looks for clues for the relation between economic inequality, corporate governance, and financialization by re-examining the work of Karl Marx and of Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means. Marx is widely considered, in Japan, to have pointed out that the division of profit into the wages of management and the profit of enterprise is considered as a path to the association. However, this general interpretation in Japan may not be sufficient for capturing capitalism’s contemporary reality. This presentation develops an alternative interpretation of this chapter by combining Marx’s explanation with the theory of the separation of ownership and management proposed by Berle and Means. We then explore causal relations among income inequality, corporate governance, and financialization.

Public Opinion on Partnership under the Indian Partnership ACT 1932

Partnership is considered as the relation between the persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting all . Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 deals about Partnership.In this papaper it is analysed that the division of profits is considered to be a essential element for the existence of partnership which also includes the sharing of profit and losses . A Partnership Agreement is defined as an arrangement that is agreed by all parties to the transaction and is a successful method of helping each of the partners to set up mutually acceptable goals, to share all the profits earned in the business equally. Partnership is a specific application of the principles of agency. Agreement of partnership need not be express , but can be inferred from the course of conduct of the parties to the agreement. Registration of the company is not mandatory it’s an option according to the Indian Partnership Act ,1932. Partnership is one of the oldest forms of business relationships and it is also a special kind of contract , which is created out of an agreement. An empirical study is done where the samples are collected by using probability sampling and random sampling method. Samples of approximately 1592 respondents are collected . Using the spss tool the value of the chi square is found and the output of the research is chi square is that there is no significant association between the there is no association between the awareness of the rights and duties of partners and age and there is no association between partners entitled to share all the profits earned in business equally and gender. It is concluded that Partnership is a good form of doing business by making partners and achieving big goals . Nowadays Partnerships are still preferred by professionals , small trading and business enterprises.

PENGARUH PROFITABILITAS, LIKUIDITAS, TINGKAT PERTUMBUHAN PERUSAHAAN DAN LEVERAGE TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN

Dividend policy is a decision on the division of profits from the company, will be distributed to shareholders or will be retained in the form of retained earnings to finance investment in the future. Study aimed to examine the effect of Profitability, Liquidity, and Leverage Growth rate of the Dividend Policy on Manufacturing Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2012 - 2014. Samples taken as many as 16 companies. The sampling method used in this research is purposive sampling. This study uses associative method, multiple linear regression analysis and the partial test (t test). Based on the results if the data was obtained that the profitability and liquidity of positive and significant effect on dividend policy, the growth rate negatively affect the company's dividend policy, leverage and no significant positive effect on dividend policy.

Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concern.

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.

Bargaining over shares of uncertain future profits

We address the following basic question: How should parties, with possibly different risk-attitudes and beliefs, who are contemplating creating a partnership, divide uncertain future profits? We assume that the formula for division of profits is a result of negotiations, and model it via the Nash-bargaining-like solution (NBLS). After characterizing the optimal contract, using calculus of variations, we assume a linear contract and find its optimal parameters for various cases of interest. We also consider the implications of an asymmetric NBLS.

Theoretical and Practical Prerequisites for Inter-Jurisdictional Division of TNC Profits by a Proportional Method

The paper deals with a problem of theoretical justification and development of an acceptable method for the proper distribution of profits arising in a TNC between jurisdictions. The solution suggests abandoning traditional methods of the distribution based on the “arm’s length” principle and the transfer pricing rules in favor of a consistent formula. The relevance of the problem stems from the theoretical and practical shortcomings of traditional methods of inter-jurisdictional distribution of TNC profits and their inability to adequately reflect the modern development of digital business models and financial technologies. The purpose of the research was the theoretical substantiation and development of a model and method of proportional division of the global tax base of a TNC between jurisdictions adequate to modern economic challenges in the context of transition to a worldwide-harmonized tax regulation of TNCs. The proposed model is proved by the theories of benefit and integration taxation and stipulates the transition from the bilateral tax regulation of TNCs based on tax treaties to their multilateral global regulation and the use of the proportional method of the global TNC tax base distribution, which ensures the establishment of tax control over profit changes from TNC synergies. The advantages of the above model and method and their practical value in the aspect of counteracting the tax base erosion and the de-offshorization of the economy are proved.

Government Take

One of the most fundamental aspects of any business relationship is the division of profits. The oil industry is no different in this respect, but the subject is burdened and confused by a jargonistic mass of terms and inconsistent definitions. The most common term associated with the subject is ‘Government Take’. Unfortunately, this term is only one of many that deal with the subject and it is used in numerous ways. Furthermore, there is no single, consistent definition for the term or the many other terms that are or appear to be related. As a result, parties to any discussion about fiscal architecture or analysis must establish common ground with respect to terminology, definitions and interpretation. This is because it is almost always the case that parties will come to the table with views based on a different sets of terms and definitions. This article outlines 45 examples from various sources. It reveals a stark lack of consistency.

The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information

In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.

Solving Transfer Pricing Involving Collaborative and Non-cooperative Equilibria in Nash and Stackelberg Games: Centralized–Decentralized Decision Making

The classical transfer pricing model considers a cooperative approach taking into account that each division purchases goods from an upstream division in the supply chain. However, divisions of a firm can be decentralized and not necessarily act cooperatively. A conflict in decentralization arises. A lack of coordination between the divisions and central management occurs if the divisions have full autonomy: managers might engage in actions that would benefit their divisions to the detriment of maximizing the well-being of the entire firm. This paper presents a model for transfer pricing that is able to maintain divisional decentralization by computing the Nash equilibrium and at the same time encourage divisions to achieve central management optimal results by computing the strong Nash equilibrium. The resulting strong Nash/Nash equilibrium point involves the computation of a cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. The model is able to provide a measure of the divisional profit maximization of the firm. In addition, we consider a bi-level structure of the company’s supply chain and solve the problem employing a Stackelberg equilibrium approach. For solving the problem we represent the transfer pricing game in terms of a coupled nonlinear programming equations implementing the penalty approach. A regularization method is employed to ensure the convergence of the utility-functions to a unique equilibrium point. For computing the equilibrium point we employ a minimization of the Euclidean distance. Next, we transform the penalty problem into a new system of equations in the Euclidean distance format. For minimizing the Euclidean distance we use a gradient method approach. A numerical example validates the effectiveness and usefulness of the proposed model for transfer pricing.

Koperasi dalam Perspektif Hukum Islam (Telaah Kritis Pemikiran Hukum Islam Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani)

Cooperatives, originally emerging from the West, have grown in Muslim-majority countries, such as Indonesia. Modern Muslim scholars differ on the permissibility of cooperatives in Islamic law. Among the scholars who disallowed it is Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani, who firmly declares that cooperative is not legal according Islamic law. The reason given by al-Nabhani is that within the cooperative there is no element of body as the subject of law, and also the distribution of profit in the cooperative is based on services that are not justified. But if it is analyzed carefully, it can be seen that in cooperatives there are already elements of the body in the form of board, and also the division of profit based on the service is essentially the division of profit based on work, so it is not contrary to the rules of Shari'a. This paper concludes that the cooperative is incorporated into the various contracts that have been discussed by the classical scholars, so the legal status of the cooperative is allowed according to Islamic law because there is no proposition forbids it.

The Analysis of Pre and Post Negotiation of Framing and Partner’s Objective on Transfer Prices

Transfer price negotiations are important to managers as they influence both their own and other divisional profits. These transfer prices are affected by both economic factors (market prices) and behavioral factors including fairness on judgments about negotiated transfer prices. In the current study, we examine whether the impact of accounting information on managers’ transfer price expectations are affected by the way accounting information is framed (either as potential gains or potential losses) and the managers’ perception of the other negotiation partners’ objective (whether their partner’s objective involves high or lowconcern-for-others). These expectations are important as they directly affect the costs and outcomes of negotiations. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted to test the proposed hypotheses, using a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The participants of an experiment were 216 undergraduate accounting students from Faculty of Economics and Business, Soegijapranata Catholic University, Semarang. The results of this study that compared to the mainframe, a loss frame exacerbates managers’ self-serving bias and increases the transfer price expectation gap between buyers and sellers. Further, we found that the negotiation partner’s objective had a significant impact on sellers’ transfer price judgments. This finding also found that the degree of concern for the other party has a significant impact on the judgment, in particular, the transfer price for the seller division.

THE ANALYSIS OF PRE AND POST NEGOTIATION OF FRAMING AND PARTNER’S OBJECTIVE ON TRANSFER PRICES

Transfer price negotiations are important to managers as they influence both their own and other divisional profits. These transfer prices are affected by both economic factors (market prices) and behavioral factors including fairness on judgments about negotiated transfer prices. In the current study, we examine whether the impact of accounting information on managers’ transfer price expectations are affected by the way accounting information is framed (either as potential gains or potential losses) and the managers’ perception of the other negotiation partners’ objective (whether their partner’s objective involves high or lowconcern-for-others). These expectations are important as they directly affect the costs and outcomes of negotiations. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted to test the proposed hypotheses, using a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The participants of an experiment were 216 undergraduate accounting students from Faculty of Economics and Business, Soegijapranata Catholic University, Semarang. The results of this study that compared to the mainframe, a loss frame exacerbates managers’ self-serving bias and increases the transfer price expectation gap between buyers and sellers. Further, we found that the negotiation partner’s objective had a significant impact on sellers’ transfer price judgments. This finding also found that the degree of concern for the other party has a significant impact on the judgment, in particular, the transfer price for the seller division.