Divine Will Research Articles

On Lincoln’s “Instrumentality” to End Slavery: Meditation on the Divine Will and the Emancipation Proclamation

On Lincoln’s “Instrumentality” to End Slavery: Meditation on the Divine Will and the Emancipation Proclamation

(DIS)Locating Meaning: Toward a Hermeneutical Response in Education to Religiously Inspired Extremism

AbstractA key epistemological assumption in the ideologies of many of the groups termed extremist is that there is an unmediated access to a Divine Will. Driven by this assumption, and facilitated by several other factors, a range of coercive actions (including violence) to force others into submission to the perceived Will of God are seen as justified by some of these groups. A consideration of how religion is discussed in various contexts, from seminaries and schools to media and policy discourses, shows that this assumption about unmediated access to Divine Will is widely shared and that most children grow up socialized into it. In this paper, Farid Panjwani argues that challenging this assumption through educational settings can help young people acquire critical capacities that may lead to a critique of extremist narratives, thereby decreasing their attractions. In this regard, the paper draws upon a range of theoretical ideas, for example, the hermeneutical tradition (in particular the work of Hans‐Georg Gadamer), as well as historical and textual examples, to make a case for a rethinking of religious education to develop more critical capacities among the students.

Properties of the Divine Will: Kant between Speculative and Moral Theology

Properties of the Divine Will: Kant between Speculative and Moral Theology

Malevolent Spirits, Noxious Vapours, and the Will of God

This article describes Islam’s theological approach towards disease transmission. Modern commentators, including many conservative Muslims, argue that Islam is theologically predisposed to deny disease transmission, particularly in the context of the plague, instead framing illness as non-communicable. Whether an individual contracts a disease, they claim, is a consequence of Divine Will, as the originator of that disease in the first place. No room exists for lesser causative factors, like contagion. However, a review of Islamic scripture and the pre- and early modern Muslim responses to it across regions as diverse as North Africa and Southeast Asia reveals a far richer and more complex understanding. While several ḥadīths do ostensibly deny contagion, Muslim jurists and medical practitioners have, far from reading these as denials of disease transmission in all its forms, positioned such statements alongside other ḥadīths acknowledging the reality of that phenomenon. Utilizing the theological principle of secondary causation, they have imparted congruence to these statements, creating a theological space in which disease can be passed from one host to another without compromising the integrity of the Divine Will. The recent COVID-19 pandemic foregrounds the importance of re-discovering and re-emphasizing these interpretations, especially as small yet persistent groups of Muslims refuse vaccination in the belief that God alone can protect them from illness. Such views arguably misunderstand Islamic teachings.

The Spreading of Caodaism to Taiwan: Man’s Will versus Divine Will

Caodaism officially came into existence in 1926 in Southern Vietnam and soon became a spiritual phenomenon, in the sense of spiritual and social influence. Despite being sandwiched between political forces and ruling governments, Caodaism steadily grew far beyond its national boundary. After 95 years, Caodaism eventually reached Taiwan when a new small Cao Đài Congregation, approved by top Cao Đài Dignitaries in Vietnam, was established in Zhongli District, Taoyuan City by a group identifying as ‘Vietnamese New Immigrants’ in Taiwan. This article traced this religious organization’s doctrine, philosophy, prophecy and relevant socio-cultural factors and found that (1) Caodaists see the successful spreading of Caodaism to Taiwan as having been prophesied long ago; (2) Caodaists believe that any human efforts by Cao Đài missionaries to spread Caodaism overseas without approval from Divinities could end up in failure; and (3) the similarities in social, cultural, and religious practices between the peoples of Vietnam and Taiwan lay a strong foundation for Caodaism to further develop in Taiwan.

Полемика и популяризация: аспекты ранней рецепции Канта в России

The reception of Kant’s philosophy in Russia at the beginning of the 19th cen­tury was focused mainly on religious and ethical issues, although it did not ex­clude theoretical and cognitive questions. The search for textbooks that would adequately and at the same time comprehensibly introduce students and the edu­cated public to the basic ideas of the Kantian philosophical system led two professors at Kazan University, Alexander S. Loubkin and Petr S. Kondyrev, to the textbook on philosophy for beginners by Friedrich Wilhelm Daniel Snell, the German Kantian philosopher, pedagogue and populariser. The work they did in preparing the Russian edition of that textbook was not confined to translation, although the translation of the philosophical text itself required scrupulous termi­nological work, since there were as yet no equivalents for many philosophical terms in Russian. Each of the translators provided parts of the textbook with their own explanations and additions, with the parts on moral philosophy and philosophy of religion attracting the most interest and polemical objections. Loubkin’s criticism of Snell and thus in most cases of Kant concerns such key concepts and provisions of Kantian practical philosophy as practical reason, the end of moral acts, the distinction between thing and person, the categorical imperative, the feeling of respect for the moral law and others. The real stum­bling block for Loubkin was Kant’s solution to the problem of the relation be­tween religion and morality and his choice of a foundation for morality. Loubkin suggests that the moral is grounded in religion and proposes as the criterion of morality the correspondence of an act to the Divine Will.

Сomparative analysis of second and religious understanding of the essence of technology

This article is devoted to the comparative analysis of secular and religious understanding of the essence of technology. The author shows that secular and religious understanding of the technology essence has not only differences, but also many similarities. S.N. Bulgakov was taken as an apologist for the religious point of view, describing the technique through the Divine Will and Sophia. And as an example of secular perception, the works of P.K. Engelmeier were described, who defended the position of technology as a form of human spiritual activity in the design of matter through the reconstruction of natural resources in accordance with the goals of culture.

Metaphysics of movement

Relevance. Movement surrounds and accompanies us everywhere: planets move, time, river waters, the life of cities is accompanied by traffic along highways. Our own life is also inseparable from the phenomenon of movement, both at the micro and macro levels: whether it be the movement and division of atoms of matter and cells of the body, the movement and interaction of our bodies in space, or the movement of a person towards a specific goal, conditioned by intention and expressed in actions, which in themselves are also a movement of the will. Purpose: to describe and evaluate the nature of the phenomenon of movement both in the history of philosophy (from Zeno to Descartes and Bergson) and in the history of medicine (from Aristotle and Celsus to modern mechanisms that give a person a chance to return the possibility of movement as an aspect of full life). Methods: the research method is not only the analysis of the development of the phenomenon of movement in the history of philosophy and science, but also the analysis of the influence of modern technologies on the very understanding of the nature of movement not as a physiological, but as an ontological phenomenon. Results. The ancient idea of movement as a deception of the senses, describing the closed on itself the existence of an objectively motionless space or being the source and cause of eternally arising and disintegrating existence, was an attempt by thinkers to “catch the mind on being”, not just creating a picture of a single cosmos, but also comprehending him as part of the human world. The bodily movement and structure of a person was understood as part of the visible and speculative structure of being. The thought of the Middle Ages, which understood movement as the path of the world and man to God, perceived the phenomenon of movement as an expression of free will and, at the same time, the desire of the world to its completion, which is at the same time the moment of its transformation. The Renaissance epoch, which proclaimed man as an end in itself for existence, closely links the physical movement of man with the movement of the cosmos, and considers the visible nature to be the source of knowledge of the Divine Will. The New Time, which theoretically separated the mechanics of the bodily and the impulses of the soul and mind and declared man a “biological machine”, in fact does not break the relationship between the movement of the soul and the body, but, demonstrating the difference in the nature of these movements, anticipated the discovery of psychosomatics. Finally, modern times not only created a classification of “body techniques” inherent in various stages of human life and groups of people, describing the socio-cultural aspect of corporeality, but also perceived movement as an act of our existence and involvement in the existence of the world. Conclusion. Movement cannot be understood as a purely physiological act. In the process of growth, becoming, having barely learned to walk, we are faced with the need to perform actions, to “behave”, to be like a personal I and as a part of the moving world that collided with us. A world in which every step is an event and deed capable of defining “the landscape of our personal and universal being”.

Metaphysics of movement

Relevance. Movement surrounds and accompanies us everywhere: planets move, time, river waters, the life of cities is accompanied by traffic along highways. Our own life is also inseparable from the phenomenon of movement, both at the micro and macro levels: whether it be the movement and division of atoms of matter and cells of the body, the movement and interaction of our bodies in space, or the movement of a person towards a specific goal, conditioned by intention and expressed in actions, which in themselves are also a movement of the will. Purpose: to describe and evaluate the nature of the phenomenon of movement both in the history of philosophy (from Zeno to Descartes and Bergson) and in the history of medicine (from Aristotle and Celsus to modern mechanisms that give a person a chance to return the possibility of movement as an aspect of full life). Methods: the research method is not only the analysis of the development of the phenomenon of movement in the history of philosophy and science, but also the analysis of the influence of modern technologies on the very understanding of the nature of movement not as a physiological, but as an ontological phenomenon. Results. The ancient idea of movement as a deception of the senses, describing the closed on itself the existence of an objectively motionless space or being the source and cause of eternally arising and disintegrating existence, was an attempt by thinkers to “catch the mind on being”, not just creating a picture of a single cosmos, but also comprehending him as part of the human world. The bodily movement and structure of a person was understood as part of the visible and speculative structure of being. The thought of the Middle Ages, which understood movement as the path of the world and man to God, perceived the phenomenon of movement as an expression of free will and, at the same time, the desire of the world to its completion, which is at the same time the moment of its transformation. The Renaissance epoch, which proclaimed man as an end in itself for existence, closely links the physical movement of man with the movement of the cosmos, and considers the visible nature to be the source of knowledge of the Divine Will. The New Time, which theoretically separated the mechanics of the bodily and the impulses of the soul and mind and declared man a “biological machine”, in fact does not break the relationship between the movement of the soul and the body, but, demonstrating the difference in the nature of these movements, anticipated the discovery of psychosomatics. Finally, modern times not only created a classification of “body techniques” inherent in various stages of human life and groups of people, describing the socio-cultural aspect of corporeality, but also perceived movement as an act of our existence and involvement in the existence of the world. Conclusion. Movement cannot be understood as a purely physiological act. In the process of growth, becoming, having barely learned to walk, we are faced with the need to perform actions, to “behave”, to be like a personal I and as a part of the moving world that collided with us. A world in which every step is an event and deed capable of defining “the landscape of our personal and universal being”.

Contradiction and Paradox in the Mystical Hermeneutics of Ibn ‘Arabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam: The Chapters of Ya‘qūb, Hūd, Ṣāliḥ and Luqmān

This article examines four chapters of Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī’s (d. 638/1240) Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. Although the contradiction and paradox between ostensible reality and the divine reality that underpins it, or the outer reality (ẓāhir) of the divine Wish (mashī’a) and the inner reality (bāṭin) intimated by the divine Will (irāda), forms the subject of Ibn ‘Arabī’s mystical reflections in many other chapters of this work, it is most conspicuously and succinctly highlighted in the chapters of Ya‘qūb, Hūd, Ṣāliḥ and Luqmān. In the chapter of Ya‘qūb, the Andalusian mystagogue overtly addresses the contradiction between the divine Will of God that is always carried out, and His divine Wish, which may not be. In the other three chapters that this article considers, Ibn ‘Arabī approaches the issue from different vantage points and investigates the results of it in different ways. His commitment to these two simultaneous versions of reality, these ‘two religions’ as he dubs them, resolves many of the perceived inconsistencies in his works.

Delivering Competent Knowing and Living in the Narrative Space Framed by “Inscriptive Connectivities”

Advancing modernity fatally weakened direct ways of intervening in the social, whether by the Divine Will or barricades. Nietzsche’s technique of inscription has been gradually adapted to reach the present as hazardous sub-brands of “digitally enhanced” inscriptive connectivity born out of an unlikely alliance of emergent tools of networked communication and technophobia of much of the humanities. Even some specialist topics enter the public space as “narratives”, no longer grounded in open allegiances to a system of thought or worldview. Instead authors prefer a travelogue format which hides intended connections. What then is the genealogy of this way of structuring narratives? In particular, what might serve as a tutorial door opening not only to the hidden content of such narratives but also to turning them into useful tools of learning and competence building free of top-down impositions and rota learning familiar from the curriculum delivery demanded by much of the educational Establishment? It will be shown how to guide the reader in an interactive, bottom up manner so that he or she can, gradually, and at the level of ability and resources peculiar to the case in hand, proceed through ascending stages of reading and engaging with the text, and systematically dispel the baggage of layers of loss and uncertainty preventing confident, critical approaches to communication, work, and citizenship.

Laws of Nature and the Divine Will in Berkeley’s Siris

Laws of Nature and the Divine Will in Berkeley’s Siris

THE CONSTRUCTION OF MURTADHA MUTAHHARI’S THOUGHT REGARDING DIVINE WILL AND HUMAN’S WILLING

This article discusses the thoughts of Mutahhari Mutahhari about Divine Will and Human Will, Research Objectives, To know and understand how the construction of the Divine will and human will in the view of Mutahhari Murtadha. This type of research is a descriptive qualitative research. The approach used is a philosophical approach, but the philosophical approach used in this thesis is the Islamic philosophical approach (disposition). The data source is divided into two, namely primary data sourced from Motahhari's works and secondary data which are related to Motahhari's thoughts. Data processing and analysis techniques are done by using the process of arranging data sequences, organizing them in a pattern, category and basic description units, and the data analysis used in this study is qualitative analysis, this method is intended that the analysis departs from the data and leads to conclusions General research results show that there is a link between the Divine will and the human will, where both (Divine will and Human will) are not in conflict. The Divine Will in this case the Divine destiny does not confine man and destroys it even it is Divine destiny that makes man free and independent in choosing what he wants.

The Analysis of the Relationship between God, Religion and Politics in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and De Cive

The Analysis of the Relationship between God, Religion and Politics in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and De Cive

Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought by Richard A. Muller

Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought by Richard A. Muller

A Milanese Quartet

A Milanese Quartet FRED LICHT Milan, so often thought of as the heartless capital of grinding industry and heedless hedonism, is nevertheless home to at least four of the highest achievements of western art. Considered as a quartet, they represent both the greatness and the equivocal nature of human endeavor. Two of them, Raphael’s Sposalizio and Bramante’s Church of Santa Maria presso San Satiro, deal with the harmonious congruence of human aspirations and human achievement attained by the grace of Providence. The limitations of human experience are accepted not as a curse but as a blessing because they are imposed by Divine Will. For Raphael as for Bramante, the artist’s obligation is to penetrate to the uttermost limits that circumscribe human existence. Having reached those limits he transmits to us the assurance that supreme fulfillment and serenity lie within and not beyond our grasp. The other two works, Leonardo’s Last Supper and Michelangelo’s Pietà Rondanini, conceive of the limits so gratefully acknowledged by Raphael and Bramante as nothing but the tragic starting point for their art. We can assume that all four artists had read Eccclesiastes and knew that “All is Vanity!” and consequently knew of the inevitable ruination that befalls everything terrestrial. Bramante and Raphael never mentioned the knowledge they had acquired from Ecclesiastes. Leonardo and Michelangelo made their recognition of Vanitas the very essence of their art. i. of this quartet, Raphael’s Marriage of the Virgin is by far the least popular today (fig. 1). The most obvious factor that arion 27.2 fall 2019 tends to make us wary of Raphael’s early work is its criminal overuse by religious as well as profane publicity. It has been massively reproduced in edulcorated colors, fragmented to yield sentimental details, visually bowdlerized. We cannot help but be heartily sick of Raphael Madonne on those hideous little catechism-class handouts and on expensive as well as cheap bonbonnières. We have become wary of seductive paintings and Raphael’s Sposalizio is eminently seductive. We may have sloughed off nearly all the Victorian hypocrisies and strictures, but in art we continue to be stoutly puritanical. We are more than a little convinced that seduction must necessarily be the result of a false or calculating appeal for our sympathies which we should resist. And there can be no doubt about it, Raphael, especially during his youth and early maturity, seduces and intends to seduce. Since we have little reason for self-esteem, we dismiss out of hand the possibility that Raphael might genuinely love us sight unseen. Indeed, who are we that he should want to seduce us? The love he bears us is a nuisance because it is hard to deserve or live up to such affection. So it is natural to suspect him of ulterior motives that might demean or disappoint us were we to fall victim to his seduction. Yet love is one of Raphael’s great gifts. If we feel unworthy of what he offers us, if we have been conditioned to distrust anyone who courts us without an obvious motive, then that’s our loss, not his. Perhaps if we look a little more closely at this particular seducer’s methods, we will find that they are practiced in good faith. He loves us because he sees the world sub specie amoris. The particular task he sets himself is not an easy one. The narrative, the wedding of the Virgin, is both intimate in spirit and minuscule in action. It hardly seems suitable for an altar that has to have an immediate effect on the faithful who approach it. It is a story that has been illustrated by many artists before Raphael—Perugino’s painting of the same subject is rightly and frequently cited—but it was Raphael who gave it its ideal and definitive representation. Just as paint20 a milanese quartet ings of the Last Supper painted after Leonardo’s version always strike us as a bit of a failure even when attempted by such giants as Tintoretto, Rubens or Tiepolo, so is it impossible to think of any Sposalizio after Raphael’s without an edge of disappointment. In fact...

A Milanese Quartet

A Milanese Quartet FRED LICHT Milan, so often thought of as the heartless capital of grinding industry and heedless hedonism, is nevertheless home to at least four of the highest achievements of western art. Considered as a quartet, they represent both the greatness and the equivocal nature of human endeavor. Two of them, Raphael’s Sposalizio and Bramante’s Church of Santa Maria presso San Satiro, deal with the harmonious congruence of human aspirations and human achievement attained by the grace of Providence. The limitations of human experience are accepted not as a curse but as a blessing because they are imposed by Divine Will. For Raphael as for Bramante, the artist’s obligation is to penetrate to the uttermost limits that circumscribe human existence. Having reached those limits he transmits to us the assurance that supreme fulfillment and serenity lie within and not beyond our grasp. The other two works, Leonardo’s Last Supper and Michelangelo’s Pietà Rondanini, conceive of the limits so gratefully acknowledged by Raphael and Bramante as nothing but the tragic starting point for their art. We can assume that all four artists had read Eccclesiastes and knew that “All is Vanity!” and consequently knew of the inevitable ruination that befalls everything terrestrial. Bramante and Raphael never mentioned the knowledge they had acquired from Ecclesiastes. Leonardo and Michelangelo made their recognition of Vanitas the very essence of their art. i. of this quartet, Raphael’s Marriage of the Virgin is by far the least popular today (fig. 1). The most obvious factor that arion 27.2 fall 2019 tends to make us wary of Raphael’s early work is its criminal overuse by religious as well as profane publicity. It has been massively reproduced in edulcorated colors, fragmented to yield sentimental details, visually bowdlerized. We cannot help but be heartily sick of Raphael Madonne on those hideous little catechism-class handouts and on expensive as well as cheap bonbonnières. We have become wary of seductive paintings and Raphael’s Sposalizio is eminently seductive. We may have sloughed off nearly all the Victorian hypocrisies and strictures, but in art we continue to be stoutly puritanical. We are more than a little convinced that seduction must necessarily be the result of a false or calculating appeal for our sympathies which we should resist. And there can be no doubt about it, Raphael, especially during his youth and early maturity, seduces and intends to seduce. Since we have little reason for self-esteem, we dismiss out of hand the possibility that Raphael might genuinely love us sight unseen. Indeed, who are we that he should want to seduce us? The love he bears us is a nuisance because it is hard to deserve or live up to such affection. So it is natural to suspect him of ulterior motives that might demean or disappoint us were we to fall victim to his seduction. Yet love is one of Raphael’s great gifts. If we feel unworthy of what he offers us, if we have been conditioned to distrust anyone who courts us without an obvious motive, then that’s our loss, not his. Perhaps if we look a little more closely at this particular seducer’s methods, we will find that they are practiced in good faith. He loves us because he sees the world sub specie amoris. The particular task he sets himself is not an easy one. The narrative, the wedding of the Virgin, is both intimate in spirit and minuscule in action. It hardly seems suitable for an altar that has to have an immediate effect on the faithful who approach it. It is a story that has been illustrated by many artists before Raphael—Perugino’s painting of the same subject is rightly and frequently cited—but it was Raphael who gave it its ideal and definitive representation. Just as paint20 a milanese quartet ings of the Last Supper painted after Leonardo’s version always strike us as a bit of a failure even when attempted by such giants as Tintoretto, Rubens or Tiepolo, so is it impossible to think of any Sposalizio after Raphael’s without an edge of disappointment. In fact...

Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism

AbstractThe aim of this article is to show that the claim of Richard Muller in his recent book Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought, that the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists in their view of freedom but held to the indeterminate freedom of the will, is false. The argument takes the reader through Turretin’s claim in his Institutes that freedom does not consist in indifference but in rational spontaneity. It assesses Muller’s argument that indeterminate freedom incorporates choices between two or more contraries and of none by showing that Edwards respected the same distinctions, and that Turretin and Edwards were agreed that God, the human nature of Christ, and the redeemed in heaven did not act from indifference. The article ends with remarks on Muller’s interpretation of Turretin’s position, that it involves ‘multiple potencies,’ arguing that this proposal meets serious difficulties.

اراده و اختیار در نظرگاه غزالی و اسپینوزا

اراده و اختیار در نظرگاه غزالی و اسپینوزا

:Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought

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