Distant Water Fishing Nations Research Articles

David against Goliath? The rise of coastal states at the Indian Ocean Tuna commission

Tuna regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) have long suffered from the domination of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in decision-making processes. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is no exception. In recent years, coastal states of the Indian Ocean (IO) have tried to change this dynamic - led by countries like the Maldives, Kenya, South Africa, and Australia - to deliver greater benefits to the region, including East Africa. These countries are gathered under the informal group of G16 and have increasingly improved their involvement in the IOTC. Here, we ask how the rise of the G16 benefited coastal States through participation and collective understanding in the Indian Ocean. To do this, we analyzed proposals submitted by the G16 for conservation and management measures and the participant lists of the Commission meetings in the past ten years. Our results show that, individually and collectively, the G16 has played a significant role in shaping the IOTC’s rules. The coastal States have established a good representation, with only a handful of Members absent in some years. Unveiling the efforts of coastal countries is essential to guide further capacity building in the region in terms of negotiations. We also call for international oversight of the actions of DWFNs, such as the EU, whose efforts often differ markedly from their claims of being sustainability champions. The G16’s work is essential to keep the coastal States of the Indian Ocean in the driver’s seat for managing Indian Ocean fisheries to benefit future generations.

Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss

One of the greatest threats to the conservation of transboundary stocks is the failure of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to equitably allocate future fishing opportunities. Across RFMOs, catch history remains the principal criterion for catch allocations, despite being recognized as a critical barrier to governance stability. This paper examines if and how subsidies have driven catch histories, thereby perpetuating the legacy of unfair resource competition between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal States, and how this affects ongoing allocation negotiations in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Using limited publicly available data on subsidies to Indian Ocean tuna fleets, we show that subsidies have inflated catch histories of many DWFN's. As long as historical catch remains the key allocation criterion, future fishing opportunities will continue to be skewed in favor of DWFNs, in turn marginalizing half of the IOTC member States, which collectively account for a paltry 4% of the current catch. Without better transparency in past subsidies data, accounting for this distortion will be difficult. We provide alternative allocation options for consideration, with our analysis showing that re-attributing DWFN catch to the coastal State in whose waters it was caught may begin to alleviate this historical injustice.

Distant water industrial fishing in developing countries: A case study of Madagascar

As industrial vessels continue to expand in both extractive capacity and spatial range, concerns have grown over foreign industrial fishing occurring within the marine territories of developing countries, both legally and illegally. Madagascar's status as a “least developed country”, coupled with its high marine biodiversity, makes its waters particularly susceptible to fishing by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). However, given constraints in management and research, it is unclear how foreign industrial fishing, both legal via foreign agreements and illegal, may impact local marine resources that many coastal communities depend on for food security, cultural meaning and livelihoods. We used satellite-derived fishing effort data from 2012 to 2020, via Global Fishing Watch, to analyze industrial fishing effort occurring within Madagascar's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). We documented 907,643 h of industrial fishing within the Madagascar EEZ across 277 vessels from 17 different countries. We found that Taiwanease vessels (39.8%) using drifting longlines and Malagasy (17.2% shrimp trawlers were the most prevalent. Fishing effort was highly seasonal (68% of effort between October and February) and increased with higher global fish prices and the Indian Ocean Dipole, which is a measure of regional water temperature cycles. We also found a number of instances (17.6% of the fishing effort for 170,726 total hours) of foreign fishing vessels operating close to shore and within a number of marine protected areas. These results highlight the need for increased transparency surrounding foreign fishing agreements and unauthorized fishing within the waters of developing countries. Increases in industrial fishing effort and encroachment into near-shore areas has the potential to severely threaten current sustainable fisheries management initiatives by conservation organizations and coastal communities.

Survival of the Richest, not the Fittest: How attempts to improve governance impact African small-scale marine fisheries

The sustainable use of fisheries resources is a priority of the African Union in developing the Blue Economy (BE). Growing global demand for seafood has attracted diverse actors to African waters, including Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) fleets. Complex fisheries governance challenges, unsustainable rates of fishing and rising fisheries-related crimes have ensued. To reverse these impacts, some African states are deploying various fisheries governance mechanisms. Drawing on extensive expert experiences, the review of literature, fisheries databases, international and regional agency reports, NGO and government reports and case studies from West and East Africa, we demonstrate two critical findings. First, fisheries governance mechanisms in Africa act largely to constrain small-scale fisheries (SSF) while failing to contain the industrial fisheries sector, resulting in the marginalisation of the SSF. Secondly, despite a higher incidence of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in industrial fisheries than the SSF, fisheries governance mechanisms continue to advance the 'Survival of the Richest' – the industrial sector, to the detriment of the 'Fittest' – the SSF. The SSF supports millions of jobs and is better adapted to meet the continents' nutrition and socio-economic security. For the fisheries sector to contribute to the sustainable development of Africans, states must redirect governance towards regulating the industrial sector, emphasising equitable access for the SSF whilst prioritising ecological sustainability.

International Soft Laws against IUU Fishing for Sustainable Marine Resources: Adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance and Challenges for Taiwan

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has become a key issue of increasing concern in the world. Led by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), recent developments focused on the role of port states as the principal actor against IUU fishing. However, the FAO adopted the Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance (the Guidelines) in 2013, implying that the principal role against IUU fishing still corresponds to flag states. As one of the leading distant-water fishing nations, Taiwan has adopted many domestic regulations in accordance with these international instruments voluntarily, regardless of its statehood debate. Although the adoption of the Guidelines is “a real breakthrough” against IUU fishing, the instrument is “soft law” in nature, meaning the implementation of the Guidelines may depend on the political will of states, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the Guidelines are thus highly questionable. Furthermore, the consensus among states to adopt a legally binding agreement on flag state performance in the near future, akin to the development of the Port States Measures Agreement that successfully evolved from a “soft law” to a “hard law” basis, is not yet clear.

Tuna Fisheries and Trade within COMESA

Tuna is an important marine resource caught in most oceans. Certain tuna species in some of the existing stocks are already overfished, while others are fully exploited. Various mechanisms such as those stemming from the UNCLOS are in place and efforts to streamline management of the tuna fishery are ongoing. Within the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) where the tuna stock is reported as moderately exploited, fishing fleets of Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) are active. Here, they have deployed better technology, catching and trading more tuna than countries operating a less technical operation. Many of the COMESA members operating in this fishery can be described as having a less technical operation. As a consequence, some COMESA countries operating within the same fishery have little or no exports reported in their trading books. This is despite tuna being among the leading tradable marine fish, representing 8% of the value of internationally traded fish products. This paper first reviews relevant literature relating to the tuna fishery within the WIO region. Next, the paper employs an augmented gravity model in an attempt to determine whether membership in COMESA is likely to imply more internal tuna trade. Data on the export of unprocessed tuna (fresh, chilled and frozen) from various data portals is used for this purpose. The study period considered stretches from 2001 to 2012 and examines exports from 19 countries operating in the WIO. Like the bulk of gravity models in trade literature, our approach employs a number of estimation approaches including the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator as well as the usual OLS. Results show no evidence that COMESA membership means improvements in tuna exports. The analysis suggests several areas that COMESA may take to improve trade among members operating in the WIO tuna fishery. Among them include suggestions for increased investment from locals in the fishery. In addition, suggestions are provided on agreements between fisheries authorities and trade partners, recommendations which may strengthen the bargaining position of COMESA countries and introduce economically viable management decisions and consequently, better trade outcomes.

Fishing access agreements and harvesting decisions of host and distant water fishing nations

The declaration of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) granted coastal states sovereign rights over the marine resources in their EEZs and enabled developing coastal states to legally charge access fees to distant water fishing (DWF) nations for access to the resources in these waters. Despite the potential for economic gains, however, the ability of coastal states to benefit from the granting of sovereign rights and to ensure the sustainable use of their fisheries resources depends on how domestic fishing effort responds to the harvesting decisions of the DWF nations. We develop a stylized bioeconomic model to explore the change in fishing behavior of host and DWF nations when the two nations enter into an access agreement with varying levels of access fee. We further conduct an econometric analysis of changes in Pacific island nations’ harvesting behavior in response to the harvest decisions of DWF nations using data from the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery. Our model results show that there is a range of variable access payment levels over which the host nation substitutes benefits from its domestic fishing activity with access payments from the DWF nation and that setting fees in this range can create a trap whereby host nations are forced to trade-off receiving a fair return to their fishery resources through access fees and retaining their own active fleet capacity. Our empirical analysis further shows a gradual shift in the way in which Pacific island host nations responded to the harvest decision of DWF nations as a result of the creation of the 200-nautical-mile EEZ.

The Role of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations in the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock

Fish naturally migrate a lot during their life cycle depending on availability of food and water temperature. Some species migrate between the EEZs of two or more States; these are referred to as ‘shared stock’ and are outside the scope of this essay. Some other species migrate between the EEZs of two or more States and areas beyond and adjacent to the EEZs. These species are called ‘Straddling Fish Stock (SFS)’. There is yet another specie of fish which migrates over long distances and may be found within numerous EEZs and the high sea; these are referred to as ‘Highly Migratory Fish Stock (HMFS)’. Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN), having been displaced from areas of high seas that were now incorporated into EEZs, fished for SFS/HMFS just outside the EEZs of coastal states. This posed serious problems for coastal states as their efforts to conserve and manage SFS/HMFS within their EEZs were undermined by the activities of DWFN on the high seas. Consequently, conflicts broke out between coastal states which tried to extend their conservation and management measures of these stocks to the high seas and DWFN which insisted that fishing on the high seas is open to all and cannot be regulated by coastal states. In a bid to balance the interests of coastal states and DWFN, UNCLOS III established the duty of States fishing for SFS/HMFS to cooperate, directly or through appropriate sub-regional or regional organizations, to agree upon measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks.3 This led to the establishment of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and other arrangements geared towards the conservation and management of SFS/HMFS. This essay shall attempt to critically assess the role of RFMOs in the conservation and management of SFS and HMFS. The first part of this essay will give a brief overview of RFMOs; the second part will discuss the role of RFMOs under UNCLOS III and the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA); while the third part will discuss the effectiveness of RFMOs focusing on challenges faced by them.

Application of a vessel monitoring system to advance sustainable fisheries management—Benefits received in Taiwan

Vessel monitoring systems (VMS) are considered important instruments for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) to reverse the current depressed state of the world’s fisheries, and have been mandated worldwide by fishery management agencies. The essential function of the system is to provide near-real time vessel position; the potential applications could, however, be more than that. This study explores the additional benefits, with practical examples, that Taiwan has received from implementing the system: in improving the quantity and quality of logbooks recovered, obtaining access to fishery-independent fishing effort estimates and prompt catch/effort reporting, enabling the possibility of regional management and understanding of both fleet dynamics and vessel behavior, and increasing efficiency of vessel safety protection. For other distant-water fishing nations, Taiwan’s experiences serve to demonstrate how the application of VMS technology can advance sustainable fisheries management.

Recent Developments in Pacific Tuna Fisheries: The Palau Arrangement and the Vessel Day Scheme

The Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) under the Palau Arrangement is the largest and most complex fishery management arrangement ever to be put in place, at least in terms of the value of the fishery, the area covered and the multi-national nature of the fishery. Its significance to the conservation of the world's last remaining healthy tuna stocks cannot be underestimated. It also represents a paradigm shift in the way in which Pacific Island States have often viewed their tuna resources. For a long time, the major beneficiaries from their tuna stocks have been vessels from distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs). The change from capacity limits to effort controls was not without resistance. DWFNs did not want to see effort controls replace capacity limits, which they believed rightfully belonged to them. This article discusses the VDS, highlights its key features and explores a number of options which may be applied by the Pacific Island States in its implementation. The article also examines some of the issues that could potentially have an impact on the implementation of the scheme. The article concludes that the VDS puts power firmly in the hands of Pacific Island States. The onus however is on the Pacific Island States to ensure that they achieve the efficacy desired by the planners of the VDS.

Overview, roles, and performance of the North East Atlantic fisheries commission (NEAFC)

Abstract According to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks are to be managed by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), consisting of coastal states and relevant Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs). In the North East Atlantic there are several straddling stocks, including herring, mackerel, blue whiting, redfish and numerous deep sea stocks that are exploited both within coastal states’ 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones and on the high seas. Management of such stocks poses special management problems. In this area, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) represents the relevant RFMO. So far the literature has devoted little attention to RFMOs in general and to NEAFC in particular. The purpose of this report is, first, to provide an overview of the organisation, structure, and objectives of NEAFC and, second, to consider its performance with regard to resource management.

RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we examine a game theoretic setting in which four countries have established a regional organization for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks as recommended by the United Nations Agreement. These countries consist of two coastal states and two distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. We are specifically interested in the effect of possible coalition restrictions on these shares. According to our results the distant water fishing nations, by individually refusing to join with the coastal states, can considerably improve their negotiation position if their harvesting costs are relatively high and similar. The results show that the DWFNs may have economic reasons for negotiating as a group against coastal states. However, if the coastal states are clearly more efficient than the DWFNs then coalition restrictions may be prevented by coastal states.

Who Can Fish What and Where: Chile's Tradeoffs in High Seas Fishing of Straddling Stocks

Chile has not yet ratified the U.N. 1995 Agreement on straddling/highly migratory fish stocks. This paper discusses key economic issues at stake from the viewpoint of a coastal state with important stakes in a straddling stock. The Chilean jack mackerel stock, one of Chile's most important fish resources, is in this category. This stock is currently caught on adjacent high-seas only by a Chilean-flag fleet, and currently there is no evidence of imminent competition from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). We argue that ratification of the Agreement could imply negative effects on: (i) coastal states ' sovereignty upon management measures within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and (ii) national fishing companies' competitiveness. Despite this, the net cost/benefit balance depends on how binding the threat of DWFNs' fishing competition is expected to be. If the Agreement does go into force, coastal states with important stakes in straddling fish stocks will feel increased pressure to ratify as well. Fo...

The UN fish stocks agreement—a new era for international cooperation to conserve tuna in the central western pacific

The new UN Fish Stocks Agreement has profound implications for the management of tuna resources in the central western Pacific. The agreement mandates cooperation between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal states and requires the development of a conservation regime for the tuna resources. The article argues that the island countries will be required to improve management and conservation of tuna within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and to determine an appropriate framework for cooperation between themselves and DWFNs. The outcome of this process will depend on the level of trust between all sides engendered through the negotiation process.

Joint ventures and technology transfer: the Solomon Islands pole-and-line fishery

Joint ventures are a popular way of facilitating the transfer of technology from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to developing resource-owning countries. In addition to being exploited by a joint venture, the Solomon Islands Fishing Zone is also exploited by a DWFN fleet and a domestic fleet. A stochastic frontier approach is used to compare changes in technology and technical inefficiency among the three fleets in the period 1988–1994. It is found that the level of productivity of the joint venture fleet is higher than that of the domestic fleet, reflecting some past gains from the joint venture. However, the rate of increase of productivity is higher for the domestic fleet, suggesting that the Solomon Islands are not receiving any on-going benefits of technology transfer in return for concessional access to their waters.

Drift-net fishing in the South Pacific: From controversy to management

The South Pacific albacore tuna ( Thunnus alalunga) fishery is one of the region's oldest commercial fisheries. Fleets from major distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs) deploy long-line, troll and drift-net vessels in the fishery. While addressing issues of biology and distribution of stocks, the article traces the development of the albacore fishery leading to the controversy surrounding the deployment of drift-net fleets in the region. Regional and international attempts to ban drift-net fishing in the South Pacific and to develop a management regime for albacore are outlined. The paper also considers the two draft proposals for the management regime tabled by Japan and South Pacific countries and territories as well the status of negotiations for the conclusion of a regime.

Access agreements in the South Pacific: Kiribati and the distant water fishing nations 1979–1986

This article highlights the typical problems experienced by the small island states of the South Pacific in negotiating access agreements with the major distant water fishing nations (DWFNs), notably the USA, Japan, South Korea and the USSR. The article is a post mortem of the Republic of Kiribati's experience with the DWFNs during the period from 1979 to 1986.

The New Approach to Foreign Fisheries Allocation: An Economic Appraisal

This article addresses how the United States could most effectively use fees and other market mechanisms in allocating fisheries resources among foreign nations. Such an examination of market-oriented allocation is made timely by an evident shift in U.S. fisheries policy away from recognition of historic foreign fishing rights and toward the exchange of fishery resources for economic or other benefits to the United States. However novel such an idea may be in fisheries, it is a common approach to allocating other natural resources among foreign and domestic producers. Hence, an already existent economic literature analyzes many of the questions faced by those contemplating a similarly exchanged-based allocation policy for fisheries. Sections II and III describe current U.S. policy toward allocation of surplus fisheries resources, and some of the factors that determine the value of those surpluses to distant-water fishing nations. Sections IV and V then indicate in general how the U.S. might use competitive allocation systems to extract a portion of that value in the form of revenue or support for other economic, social, and political objectives; relates specific allocation measures to the efficiency of distant water fishing operations, and indicates how the monopsony power of some distant-water nations' fishing may constrain U.S. efforts to capture economic rent.

Joint ventures in fisheries between distant-water and developed coastal nations: An economic view

Abstract With extension of national jurisdiction over coastal living resources, new dimensions and objectives should be added to international cooperation in fisheries concepts. For distant-water fishing nations, joint exploitation of these resources is today considered not only as a way of producing additional income opportunities, but first of all as at least a partial solution to neutralization of harvesting limitations imposed on them in traditionally exploited fishing grounds. Japan is leading in number of joint ventures run by this country abroad. They are supplying fish products to the Japanese consumption market. Many other distant-water fishing nations, including Eastern Europe, began to build their cooperational links with coastal states in recent years when it became clear that this can alleviate harvesting restrictions and increase employment opportunities for their fishing fleets. For the developed coastal states, joint ventures with foreign partners could be seen as a way to develop these coastal resources, which temporarily can not be utilized by local fishermen, mainly for economic reasons. Joint ventures developing such resources will be attractive for both sides if they could produce additional volumes of fish for the foreign markets and offer an economically more effective way of resource utilization than would be possible in non-cooperative activities. Cooperation in fisheries between foreign distant-water and developed nations can find a good future in the development of lower market values species in coastal nations which, in the case of the United States, Canada or Australia, represent a very large fishing potential. The benefits and constraints for each joint venture operation should be considered on a case-by-case basis.