Director Of National Intelligence Research Articles

Can Private Sector Intelligence Benefit from U.S. Intelligence Community Analytic Standards?

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI)’s 2007 establishment of analytic standards in Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 aided in the professionalization of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)’s analytical cadre, enshrining best practices across a diverse field of agencies and driving cultural shifts within and among U.S. IC agencies. Private sector intelligence analysis, although wide-ranging, finds itself in a growth period, driven by the recent pandemic; the increasing importance of environmental, social, and governance movements; and heightened geopolitical strife resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and concern over China’s aggressive foreign policies. To improve efficiency, objectivity, and value, private sector intelligence could benefit from adopting many of the standards set out in ICD 203, although absent a powerful referee like the DNI, training and enforcement of standards will remain a challenge.

Coming Together: Strengthening the Intelligence Community Through Cognitive Diversity

In the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, the word integrate, or a variation of the word, was depicted 51 times. Of the seven enterprise objectives set by the Director of National Intelligence, the first two focus on integration of mission and business management. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that cognitive diversity can both enable and inhibit cooperation, is dependent upon leadership style, and can lead to real-world implications that move from strategy to execution. If the Intelligence Community has a cognitively diverse workforce, then innovation is more likely to occur and remain sustainable. A qualitative methodology was used to address the question: How can cognitive diversity increase integration endeavors across the 18 agencies to achieve the Intelligence Community’s Vision and support the Mission? Findings substantiate the importance of cognitive diversity to problem solve, work through complexity, and improve decision-making during times of crisis.

Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

ABSTRACT The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) conducted a rigorous evaluation of the tradecraft underlying the 2008 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. AIS’s director and senior officials from several IC elements briefed the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) on the findings in order to demonstrate that the NIE manifested the Intelligence Community’s (IC’s) improved tradecraft capabilities. The PIAB’s response, however, was to criticize NIE’s substance and hence minimize the salience of its superior tradecraft. The result was a missed opportunity to bolster the IC’s reputation.

Система контролю та нагляду над спеціальними службами США (кінець ХХ – початок ХХІ ст.)

The experience of organizing and exercising control and supervision over the US Special Services under the conditions of challenges and threats to national security, defense and interests of the state at the end of the XX – beginning of the XXI century is analyzed and generalized. It has been established that the US Special Services are within the limits and possibilities clearly outlined by national legislation under the close supervision and control of government institutions and the public defined by it. Such conditions allow them to professionally perform the tasks assigned to them within the framework of the legislative field of the state, allied and international obligations, respect for human rights and freedoms. A specific feature of the functioning of the system of control and supervision over US Special Services is a clear division of areas of its implementation by independent branches of government with simultaneous supervision over them and Special Services by public organizations and independent institutions. Somewhat more in terms of the number and scope of surveillance and control measures over the Special Services from other branches of government belongs to its executive branch – the president and the government. Extremely large control powers have been vested in US law to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), that in effect and scope is the second official over Special Services after the country’s president. The role and place in the structure of the US Special Services of the Inspector General, who is appointed by the President, is unusual for Special Services of other countries, who subordinated and reports only to him. He is a member of DNI Directorate staff and conducts independent investigations, audit, inspections and special reviews of programs and activities of intelligence community (IC), the implementation of which is organized, lead and controlled by its head – the Director of National Intelligence. It draws attention, despite the constant terrorist threats and challenges to US security, the principled approach of independent institutions, organizations and the public to the concern for compliance with human rights and freedoms by Special Services in the performance of professional tasks both, within the country and abroad.

By the Numbers: Former U.S. Intelligence Officials Discuss Personal Opinion versus Professional Obligation

[P]art of the unwritten code of professional intelligence officers [is] to stay out of the media. —former Director of National Intelligence Lt. Gen. James ClapperTraditionally, former intelli...

Az irányítás és az elemzés-értékelés rendszere az amerikai Hírszerző Közösségben

Az amerikai Nemzeti Hírszerző Főigazgató az elvek, a módszerek és az eljárások, összességében a szervezeti kultúra egységesítésére szolgáló utasításaival erősíti a Hírszerző Közösség integrációját. A tanulmány a szakmai irányítás és az elemzés-értékelés rendszerére vonatkozó főigazgatói utasítások tartalmának vizsgálatával feltárja a nemzetbiztonság jelenkori amerikai megközelítését és összegzi a tanulságokat.

Bio-weapons and Bio-terrorism Attacks on Commercial Shipping in Nigeria: The Potential Trojan Horse of the 21st Century

Biological attacks by terrorists may seem more like a plot element in an action film than a realistic threat. The possibility of biological weapons attack could be very remote. Scholars are divergent in their opinions on the plausibility of a biological attack. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Intelligence Council stated in 2008 that bio-terrorism is a more likely threat than nuclear terrorism. Researches have revealed that of all weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons constitute the greatest worry. The most likely target for bio-terrorism is a major city or other densely crowded areas, such as transportation hubs like sea ports. This paper probes into Nigerian legislations especially the Nigerian Port Authority Act, the NIMASA Act, the Terrorism Act and the NAFDAC Act regarding biological weapons and bio-terrorism in maritime commerce parlance. It is observed in this paper that all these Acts lack preventive mechanisms in the case of the emergence of the scourge. It is argued that Nigeria is vulnerable to bio-terrorism owing to a dearth of detective measure in the boarder ports. The paper concludes that there is an urgent need to revamp the legal framework to tame the threat of bio-terrorism.

“More Symbolic—More Political—Than Substantive”: An Interview with James R. Clapper on the U.S. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

ABSTRACTThis article considers the status and value of the U.S. Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list via an extended and annotated interview with James R. Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence during the administration of President Barack Obama from 2010–2017. In this interview,1 Clapper reflects on the role and effectiveness of blacklisting for U.S. national security strategy. The article frames the interview within debates in recent political science and law literatures on blacklisting to situate Clapper’s views. Drawing on recent controversies—including the fraught relationship between the U.S., Pakistan, the Taliban regime, and the Haqqani network—Clapper speaks to the a) symbolism and foreign policy drivers of FTO listing; b) implications of the FTO list for peace negotiations; and, c) the cohesion of terrorist groups and the effectiveness of FTO listings. In reporting the interview thus, the article offers a rare direct insight to the causal reasoning of an elite security official with respect to a process that has, since its inception in 1997, been shrouded in ambiguity and controversy.

A dangerous science: psychology in Al Qaeda’s words

Terrorist organizations’ use of psychology in analysing psychological issues in the everyday lives of their members and developing coping strategies has not been sufficiently investigated in the terrorism research. This qualitative study investigates Al Qaeda’s view of psychology, its analysis of psychological issues, and the utilization of coping strategies among terrorists. The study is based on 255 documents from the Bin Laden’s Bookshelf (Office of the Director of National Intelligence. [2015]. Bin Ladin’s Bookshelf. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf) and Harmony database documents (The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point [CTC]. [2012]. Harmony program. Retrieved from https://ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program). The results indicate that Al Qaeda perceived psychology as a dangerous and important science. Psychological issues identified in this study include three types of suicide, depression, anxiety, security stress, diversity stress, and enforced idleness. Terrorists used both religious and secular coping strategies to overcome psychological issues. These findings can contribute to future research and counterterrorism efforts in understanding both the survivability and vulnerability of terrorists.

United States Sanctions Russian Individuals and Entities After Accusing Russian Government of Interfering with U.S. Election Process; Congressional Committees and Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies Continue to Investigate President Trump's Connections to Russian Officials

On October 7, 2016, following months of tense interactions between the United States and Russia regarding hacks of high-profile U.S. political organizations, the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a joint statement formally accusing Russia of using cyberattacks to influence the U.S. election process. Reports suggest that Russia intended to use the hacks and subsequent information dump to help then-candidate Donald Trump win the presidential election. In response to the cyberattacks, the United States took steps against several Russian individuals and entities. The Obama administration also initiated an extensive review of Russian involvement in the election, which eventually reaffirmed key intelligence conclusions regarding the scope of Russian interference. Several congressional committees have also initiated investigations, all of which are still ongoing as of the date of publication.

Literacies for Surveillance: Social Network Sites and Background Investigations

In September 2013, civilian contractor Aaron Alexis entered the Washington Navy Yard and murdered twelve people before being fatally shot by police. This incident, together with an incident three months earlier involving Edward Snowden, caused the U.S. government to critically examine their background investigation (BI) process; because both Snowden and Alexis had supposedly slipped through the cracks of their investigations, there must be some flaw in the BI procedure. The U.S. Committee on Oversight and Reform concluded that rules forbidding “background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks” was one of the main factors contributing to defective BIs (Report, 2014). Since the report’s release, the Director of National Intelligence has been debating and trialing whether information from the Internet should be used to form a data double for BIs (Kopp, 2014; Rockwell, 2014). Using this conversation as a discussion catalyst, I argue that due to the nature of the data double, if the United States were to adopt the use of social networking sites (SNSs) for security clearance purposes, neglecting to take into account basic principles of SNSs into the process of BIs may lead to misinformation and unfavorable adjudication. Ultimately, being literate about the social practices involved in SNSs and surveillance would benefit not only investigators, but anyone, including academics, looking at individuals in online spaces.

Has the ODNI Improved U.S. Intelligence Analysis?

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and ordered him and his Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)...

A Conversation with James R. Clapper, Jr., The Director Of National Intelligence in the United States

In this previously unpublished interview, James R. Clapper, Jr., the current Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the United States, discusses his experiences as spymaster leading an Intelligence Community widely viewed as organizationally decentralized and criticized in the past for failing to work together harmoniously. Director Clapper argues that the Community has become much more structurally integrated, and that the Office of the DNI (ODNI) provides an opportunity for leadership that is more effective than outside critics have acknowledged. I conducted this interview in August 2014 at his office near Tyson's Corner in North Arlington, Virginia. It was a time of rising unrest in the world, with elite Russian troops carrying out forays across the border into Ukraine, a Middle East terrorist faction known as ISIS gathering momentum in a march from Syria toward Baghdad, and with recurring violence that continued to plague the relationship between the Hamas faction in Palestine and the state of Israel.

Coerce, Consent, and Coax: A Review of U.S. Congressional Efforts to Improve Federal Counterterrorism Information Sharing

ABSTRACTGovernment Accountability Office reports and secondary sources reveal that the U.S. Congress has employed three distinct legislative approaches to address the federal counterterrorism information-sharing impasse: coerce, consent, and coax. One main example illustrates each approach: the Homeland Security Information Network project exemplifies the coerce approach; Intellipedia illustrates the consent approach; the office of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment exemplifies the coax approach. Secondary examples are utilized including those of regional Fusion Centers, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center. The merits and challenges of the three approaches are discussed and compared. The conclusion proposes ideas for using the approach most appropriate to specific counterterrorism challenges.

Operational Levels of Cyber Intelligence

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsTroy MatternTroy Mattern, Deputy Head of Cyber Security at the Zurich Insurance Company Ltd., is also Chairman of the Cyber Intelligence Task Force of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA). Previously the European Response Lead at Zurich Insurance, and Technical Director for Cyber Intelligence at the Software Engineering Institute, he is a graduate of the University of Arizona and the American Military University. A retired U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer, Mr. Mattern has also served as Military Executive Assistant to the Deputy Commander of the United States Cyber Command in the U.S. Department of Defense.John FelkerJohn Felker is Director of Cyber and Intelligence Strategy for Hewlett-Packard (HP) Enterprise Services. His primary focus is developing business strategy in the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community. He is also co-chair of the Cyber Intelligence Task Force. Previously Vice President for Cyber Security Programs at SCI Consulting, during his thirty-year career with the U.S. Coast Guard, he served as Deputy Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command, and as Commander of the Coast Guard Cryptologic Group. A graduate of Ithaca College, he received his M.A. in Public Administration from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.Randy BorumDr. Randy Borum, Professor and Coordinator of Strategy and Information Analysis in the School of Information at the University of South Florida, previously taught at the Duke University School of Medicine. He has served on the U.S. Director of National Intelligence's Intelligence Science Board, on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics, and on the National Academy of Science's Steering Committee for Sociocultural Data to Accomplish Department of Defense Missions. He has also worked as a consultant for the U.S. Secret Service. A graduate of James Madison University, with a Ph.D. from the Florida Institute of Technology at Melbourne, Dr. Borum has written extensively on security matters.George BamfordGeorge Bamford, Deputy Director of the Border Security Division in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the United States Department of Homeland Security, was earlier Chief of its Cyber Threat Analysis Branch. He is also a Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve, and Team Chief for Operations and Intelligence at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-3) National Military Command Center. He was previously a Senior Information Technology Program Manager at the U.S. Department of Defense, and Director of the Acquisition and Program Management Support division of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Mr. Bamford is a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, with an MBA from the George Washington University School of Business and an MPA from the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. This article is adapted, in part, from the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) White Paper “Operational Levels of Cyber Intelligence,” developed by INSA's Cyber Intelligence Task Force in September 2013.1

The Paradox of Open Source: An Interview with Douglas J. Naquin

The Associated Press (AP) reported on 8 November 2005 that, as part of post-11 September 2001 (9/11) United States intelligence reform efforts, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) had estab...

Counterterrorism, Dignity, and the Rule of Law

Counterterrorism, Dignity, and the Rule of Law

The last American diplomat: John D. Negroponte and the changing face of American diplomacy

Can John D. Negroponte be described as 'The Last American Diplomat'? In a career spanning 50 years of unprecedented American global power, he was the last of a dying breed of patrician diplomats - devoted to public service, a self-effacing and ultimate insider, whose prime duty was to advise, guide and warn. Negroponte served as US ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, the Philippines and Iraq; he was US Permanent Representative to the UN, Director of National Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of State to George W. Bush. His was a high-flying and seemingly conventional career but one full of surprises. He opposed Kissinger in Vietnam, argued against direct military action against Marxists in Central America and warned that the Iraq War could be another 'Vietnam'. George W. Liebmann's incisive account of Negroponte's life and career is based on personal and shared experience, as well as thorough research and interviews with Negroponte and other leading actors. It will provide fascinating reading for students and researchers interested in the inside-story of American diplomacy, revealing personal and policy struggles, and the underlying fissures present even in the world's last remaining superpower.

Teaching Bayesian Statistics To Intelligence Analysts: Lessons Learned

Teaching Bayesian Statistics To Intelligence Analysts: Lessons Learned

Language Learning in the United States of America

The USA has a great need for individuals with highly developed competencies in world languages. In fact, the need for individuals with proficiency in languages other than English has never been higher (Brecht & Rivers, 2000). According to Brecht and Ingold (2002), more than 70 government agencies reported a need for individuals with a language expertise other than English. To address these needs, under the direction of the President of the USA, the Secretaries of State, Education, and Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) have developed a national plan to expand US foreign language education beginning in early childhood (kindergarten) and continuing throughout formal schooling and into the workforce with new programmes and resources.