Direct Election Of President Research Articles

Direct Election of President and Vice President In Pancasila Perspective

AbstractAfter the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the Election of President and Vice President was not conducted by the People's Consultative Assembly but voted directly by the people. Amendment to the provision for the election of President and Vice President have invited debate, partly because they are deemed incompatible with Pancasila. This study examines the appropriateness of the presidential and vice-presidential election based on Pancasila. The research method uses normative juridical, using secondary data obtained through literature study and qualitative analysis. The result and discussion of this research are that the implementation of the election of President and Vice President based is in accordance with Pancasila, especially with the fourth principle.Keywords: Democracy, Direct Election, and Pancasila AbstrakSetelah amandemen Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, Pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden tidak dilakukan oleh Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat tetapi dilaksanakan langsung oleh rakyat. Amandemen terhadap ketentuan untuk pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden telah mengundang perdebatan, sebagian karena mereka dianggap tidak sesuai dengan Pancasila. Studi ini mengkaji kelayakan ketentuan pemilihan presiden dan wakil presiden berdasarkan Pancasila. Metode penelitian menggunakan metode yuridis normatif, menggunakan data sekunder yang diperoleh melalui studi literatur dan dianalisis secara kualitatif. Hasil dan pembahasan penelitian ini adalah bahwa pelaksanaan pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden berdasarkan Pancasila sudah sesuai dengan Pancasila, terutama dengan prinsip keempatKata Kunci: Demokrasi, Pemilihan Langsung, Presiden dan Wakil Presiden, Pancasila. АннотацияПосле внесения поправки в Конституцию Республики Индонезия 1945 года выборы президента и вице-президента не проводились Народной Консультативной Ассамблеей, а проводились непосредственно всенародными выборами в Индонезии. Поправки к положениям о выборах президента и вице-президента вызвали дебаты, отчасти потому, что они считаются несовместимыми с Панчасилой. В этом исследовании рассматривается соответствие принятия положений о президентских и вице-президентских выборах на основе Панчасилы. Метод исследования – нормативно-юридический, используя вторичные данные, полученные в результате изучения литературы и проанализируемые качественным методом. Результаты и обсуждение этого исследования заключаются в том, что осуществление выборов президента и вице-президента на основе Панчасилы соответствует Панчасиле, особенно четвёртому принципу.Ключевые слова: Демократия, Прямые Выборы, Президент и Вице-Президент, Панчасила.

Direct Vs Indirect Election to Grama Panchayat President: Reflections and Implications

This discussion paper is a qualitative analysis built on opinions. Though there is no one-to-one link between performance and service delivery of grama panchayats (GPs) and method of election to GP president, the paper talks about opinions, which support direct election. There is a discussion going on at the policy level in States like Karnataka whether to go in for direct election of the president of the gram panchayat or not. Although the overall preference of stakeholders and people is for direct election, the empirical data and the opinions of those with whom we interacted fail to clearly bring out the justification for direct or indirect election of GP president. The reasons are many: the differences in structure and size of the panchayats across selected States, linkages with higher level of PRIs, their financing mechanism and devolution of powers. In the absence of counterfactuals with similar panchayati raj system in States with direct election it is difficult to say which system is better than the other. Though the differences are not very significant, resource mobilisation, efficiency in delivery of services and utilisation of funds appear to be better in States with direct election. And, quick decisions, higher social auditing, higher social equity, satisfaction with election system and low incidence of no-confidence motion, dominance of caste are also the features noted in States with direct election. On the other hand, cooperation and collective decision, weightage to the institution rather than the individual, competition among members for getting benefits to their wards are some of the merits of indirect election. After weighing the merits of both the systems, direct election clearly stands out as a preferred system.

Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945

Abstract: The article discuss the changes of indonesian political system in indonesia after the amendment of Indonesian Constitution of 1945 with the focus of the amendments of legislative, eecutive and judicative bodies. Legislative amendments is located in the emergence of a new body called DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah of Regional Representative Assembly) as a part of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consulatation Assembly) alongside DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representative). Such amendment is basically a modifictaion of bicameral system as that of the United States’ political system. Executive body amendments lies on direct election of president, limitation of presidential tenure up to two tenures of five years, and likeliness of presidential impeachment in case of breaking law and constitution. Amendment on judicative body is obviously apparent in the creation of Constitutional Court alongside the Supreme Court and Judicial comission which is in charge of safeguarding the judgeship profession.Kata Kunci: Amandemen, UUD, dan System Ketatanegaraan

Constitutional stability

Political scientists in the pluralist tradition disagree sharply with public and social choice theorists about the importance of institutions and with William Riker in particular, who argues inLiberalism against Populism that the liberal institutions of indirect democracy ought to be preferred to those of populism. This essay reconsiders this dispute in light of two ideas unavailable to Riker at the time. The first, offered by Russell Hardin, is that if we conceptualize constitutions as coordinating devices rather than as social contracts, then we can develop a more satisfying view of the way in which constitutions become self-enforcing. The second idea derives from the various applications of concepts such as the uncovered set. Briefly, although institutions such as the direct election of president are subject to the usual instabilities that concern social choice theorists, those instabilities do not imply that “anything can happen” —instead, final outcomes will be constrained, where the severity of those constraints depends on institutional details. We maintain that these ideas strengthen Riker's argument about the importance of such constitutional devices as the separation of powers, bicameralism, the executive veto, and scheduled elections, as well as the view that federalism is an important component of the institutions that stabilize the American political system. We conclude with the proposition that the American Civil War should not be regarded as a constitutional failure, but rather as a success.