Differences In Theory Of Mind Research Articles

Brain structure variation and individual differences in theory of mind among older adults

The theory of mind (ToM) is not substantially influenced by aging, suggesting the emergence of various compensatory mechanisms. To identify brain regions subserving ToM in older adults, we investigated the associations of individual differences in brain structure with performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), a widely used measure of ToM, using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and tract-based spatial statistics (TBSS). In contrast to findings obtained from young adults, where multiple cortical regions are implicated in ToM, VBM analysis revealed a significant positive correlation between RMET score and gray matter (GM) volume only in the right middle temporal gyrus, a region implicated in social cognition. Alternatively, TBSS revealed significant positive correlations between RMET score and the fractional anisotropy (FA) values in widespread white matter (WM) tracts, including the bilateral uncinate fasciculus, a region previously linked to RMET performance in young adults. We speculate that individual differences in WM integrity are strong influences on ToM among older adults, whereas the impact of individual differences in GM volumes is relatively limited.

Where do differences in theory of mind development come from? An agent-based model of social interaction and theory of mind

IntroductionWhere do individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) development come from? This is an open-ended issue in developmental psychology. Correlational research suggests social interaction as a cause. However, causal experiments controlling children's extended, real-life social interactions are impractical and unethical, so the links between social interaction and ToM remain only indirectly demonstrated. To shed light on how social interaction, in different degrees and forms, may influence ToM development, we conducted computational experiments using agent-based modeling.MethodsTo begin with, we simulated agents (hypothetically, children) and assigned them to 10 groups, where each group was manipulated to allow a different amount of social interaction, from 1 to 10. Within each group, agents randomly roamed and encountered one another and then interacted. If these interactions continued long enough, agents' ToM probabilistically improved.ResultsAs expected, results showed that the amount of social interaction strongly influenced how fast agents developed ToM, where more social interaction led to more rapid development. Given this confirmation of the assumed link, we more focally explored how other factors—such as having a prior, established social network or agents' network centrality—could influence the social interaction-ToM link. Then, we tested our model against real-world data from 84 deaf children and showed that our modeling results could explain the social interaction-ToM link observed in deaf children.DiscussionThese demonstrations illustrate how individual differences in ToM development may emerge and offer an explanation specifying a crucial mechanism for how all humans achieve ToM—faster or with delay—through processes of social interaction.

Socio-demographic and political predictors of Theory of Mind in adulthood.

Individual differences in Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability to understand the mental states of others-are theorised to be predicted by socio-demographic and political factors. However, inconsistent findings on the relationships between various socio-demographic predictors and ToM, as well as a paucity of research on political predictors of ToM, have left a gap in the literature. Using a recently validated self-report measure of ToM in a large sample (N = 4202) we investigated the unique contributions of age, sex, socio-economic status, and political beliefs to ToM in adults. Except for age, all variables were correlated with ToM, but when accounting for the variance of other predictors in statistical analyses, political beliefs was no longer associated with ToM. Dominance analysis revealed that participant sex was the most important predictor of ToM. These findings help to address theoretical discrepancies in the existing literature and inform future methods and directions in social cognition research.

Linearly integrating speed and accuracy to measure individual differences in theory of mind: Evidence from autistic and neurotypical adults.

It has long been theorised that there is a direct link between individual differences in social cognition and behaviour. One of the most popular tests of this theory has involved examination of Theory of Mind (ToM) difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). However, evidence for associations between ToM and social behaviour is mixed, both when testing the ToM explanation of ASD and when investigating individual differences in ToM in the general population. We argue that this is due to methodological limitations of many ToM measures, such as a lack of variability in task performance, inappropriate non-ToM control tasks, and a failure to account for general mental ability. To overcome these issues, we designed a novel task, which probed individual differences in ToM fluency through mental state attribution in response to cartoons (Cartoons Theory of Mind [CarToM] task). This task, enabling the linear combination of speed and accuracy, was used to quantify ToM ability and its association with self-reported (a)typical social behaviour in adults with and without ASD. In a large sample (N = 237), we found that having an ASD diagnosis and higher autistic traits predicted lower ToM ability, even after accounting for performance on a well-matched non-ToM condition and general mental ability. Overall, our findings provide fresh support for the existence of a link between individual differences in social cognition (specifically, ToM) and behaviour (specifically, autism). This has implications for social-cognitive theory and research, allowing large-scale, online assessment of individual differences in ToM in clinical groups and the general population.

Machine learning and deep learning systems for automated measurement of "advanced" theory of mind: Reliability and validity in children and adolescents.

Understanding individual differences in theory of mind (ToM; the ability to attribute mental states to others) in middle childhood and adolescence hinges on the availability of robust and scalable measures. Open-ended response tasks yield valid indicators of ToM but are labor intensive and difficult to compare across studies. We examined the reliability and validity of new machine learning and deep learning neural network automated scoring systems for measuring ToM in children and adolescents. Two large samples of British children and adolescents aged between 7 and 13 years (Sample 1: N = 1,135, Mage = 10.22 years, SD = 1.45; Sample 2: N = 1,020, Mage = 10.36 years, SD = 1.27) completed the silent film and strange stories tasks. Teachers rated Sample 2 children's social competence with peers. A single latent-factor explained variation in performance on both the silent film and strange stories task (in Sample 1 and 2) and test performance was sensitive to age-related differences and individual differences within each age-group. A deep learning neural network automated scoring system trained on Sample 1 exhibited interrater reliability and measurement invariance with manual ratings in Sample 2. Validity of ratings from the automated scoring system was supported by unique positive associations between ToM and teacher-rated social competence. The results demonstrate that reliable and valid measures of ToM can be obtained using the new freely available deep learning neural network automated scoring system to rate open-ended text responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Individual differences in theory of mind correlate with the occurrence of false memory: A study with the DRM task.

Although long-term memory and Theory of Mind (ToM) are closely related across the whole lifespan, little is known about the relationship between ToM and semantic memory. Clinical studies have documented the co-occurrence of ToM impairments and semantic memory abnormalities in individuals with autism or semantic dementia. However, to date, no study has directly investigated the existence of a relationship between ToM and semantic memory in the typical population. We addressed this gap on a sample of 103 healthy adults (M age = 22.96 years; age range = 19-35 years). Participants completed a classical false memory task tapping on semantic processes, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, and two ToM tasks, the Triangles and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. They also completed the vocabulary scale from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Results showed that participants' semantic performance in the DRM task was significantly related to that in the Triangles task. Specifically, the higher participants' ToM in the Triangles task, the higher participants' reliance on semantic memory while making false memories in the DRM task. Our findings are consistent with the Fuzzy Trace Theory and the Weak Central Coherence account and suggest that a (partially) common cognitive process responsible for global versus detailed-focus information processing could underlie these two abilities.

Reading emotions in Dogs’ eyes and Dogs’ faces

Our primary goal was to investigate human ability to recognize basic emotions from only the eyes of dogs in comparison to the whole face. Simultaneously, we replicated and extended previous research (Bloom et al., 2021), while validating American canine emotional facial expression photographs cross-culturally to Brazil. Participants (N = 120) viewed behaviorally-anchored photographs of three breeds. Half the participants in each condition (faces or eyes-only) viewed two-word forced choice items while the other half viewed four-word forced choice items. Participants identified target emotions from images of both dogs’ faces and eyes-only at a higher rate than chance. Fear was accurately recognized more than the other emotions. When dogs are afraid, they open their eyes and expose the sclera, a conspicuous signal. Emotion identification accuracy was highest for the Rhodesian Ridgeback, who is similar in morphology to common Brazilian stray dogs (Vira-Latas Carmelo). We conjectured that Brazilians were more accustomed to seeing dogs with the Rhodesian Ridgeback morphology than the erect-eared breeds, thus increasing accuracy for this breed. Further studies with additional dog morphologies are desirable. In addition to research interest, our Canine Eyes task has the potential to become a test of individual differences in Theory of Mind with clinical applications.

Sex differences in theory of mind: The on-average female advantage on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test.

This commentary is on the original article by Dorris et al. on pages 1524–1531 of this issue.

Preliminary evidence for a Theory of Mind impairment in patients with Anxiety Disorders

IntroductionTheory of Mind is defined as the ability to understand mental states of other people, and is notoriously impaired in patients with Autism Spectrum Disorder. A growing body of evidence suggests an impairment of Theory of Mind in several other psychopathological disorders. However, only few studies have assessed Theory of Mind in patients with Anxiety Disorders (AD), addressing only patients with Social Anxiety Disorder.ObjectivesWe aimed to investigate the differences in Theory of Mind between patients with AD and Healthy Controls (HC).MethodsWe enrolled 35 patients admitted in the Psychiatric Unit of Careggi with diagnosis of AD and 31 HC. We administered them: Zung Anxiety Scale (ZSAS), Empathy Quotient (EQ), Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMET), and Faux Pas test (FP). A t-test for independent samples was performed to assess between-group differences.ResultsZung total scores proved to be significantly higher in patients (t(60)=4.375, p<0.001), while Empathy Quotient total scores (t(61)=-3.325, p=0.002), detection of faux pas in Faux Pas test (t(61)=-4.957, p<0.001), RMET total scores (t(63)=-2.269, p=0.031) were significantly higher in healthy controls.ConclusionsSuch preliminary data suggest impairment of Theory of Mind and Empathy in patients with AD as compared to HC. This could be linked to the development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms in patients with AD, making Theory of Mind a potential target in psychotherapy of AD.DisclosureNo significant relationships.

Self-categorization and autism: Exploring the relationship between autistic traits and group homogeneity.

The Integrated Self-Categorization model of Autism (ISCA; Bertschy et al., 2019; Skorich & Haslam, 2021) argues that the theory of mind differences seen in autism arises from Enhanced Perceptual Functioning/Weak Central Coherence, via a dysfunctional self-categorization mechanism. The ISCA model also makes the novel prediction that phenomena that arise from self-categorization should also be affected in autistic people. In this article, we report three studies exploring this prediction in the context of one such phenomenon: Group homogeneity. We first measure participants' autistic traits, then ask them to make homogeneity judgments of their ingroup alone or their outgroup alone (in Study 1, and in the Alone conditions of Studies 2a and 2b); or of their ingroup in comparison to their outgroup or their outgroup in comparison to their ingroup (in the Compare conditions of Studies 2a and 2b). As predicted, we find that: the degree of autistic traits negatively predicts ratings of group homogeneity; this relationship is mediated by social identification/self-categorization; and typical comparison-related homogeneity effects are strengthened at higher relative to lower levels of autistic traits. These studies provide convergent evidence for the ISCA model and suggest important avenues for well-being and social skills interventions for autistic people. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Comparative studies of mind reading: Similarities and differences in theory of mind between non-human primates and humans and corresponding explanations

Comparative studies of mind reading: Similarities and differences in theory of mind between non-human primates and humans and corresponding explanations

Social cognition and trust: Exploring the role of theory of mind and hostile attribution bias in children’s skepticism of inaccurate informants

A growing body of research has examined the role of individual differences in children’s selective trust. The current study was designed to explore how individual differences in theory of mind and hostile attribution bias affect children’s trust. Four- and five-year-old children took part in a standard selective trust paradigm in which they had the choice between a previously inaccurate informant and an unfamiliar informant. They were also asked to interpret why the previously inaccurate informant had provided incorrect information in the past. Finally, children completed a hostile attribution bias task and a theory of mind task. Children with better theory of mind ability were more likely to defer to the unfamiliar informant on the selective trust task. Children with greater hostile attribution bias were more likely to interpret previous inaccuracy as a result of “being tricky” rather than having “made a mistake.” However, these interpretations did not influence children’s choices on the selective trust task. Therefore, although there is reason to believe that establishing selective trust involves both cognitive and social processes, the current study raises questions about the nature of this relationship and how children draw on different sociocognitive skills when establishing epistemic trust.

Alternative perspectives: Relations between belief reasoning and ambiguous figure perception in bilingual children

AbstractRepresentational theory of mind—the ability to represent others' mental states and understand that these beliefs can be different from one's own and reality—emerges in early childhood alongside other meta‐representational abilities, such as understanding that an image can be perceived in multiple ways. Limited research has suggested that individual differences in theory of mind and pictorial meta‐representation are correlated—pointing to domain‐general meta‐representation—but these links might be due to associated abilities such as inhibitory control. To assess this possibility, the present study examines the relationship between belief reasoning and ambiguous figure perception in a low‐income sample of bilingual children (aged 4.5–8.5 years), as bilingualism has been linked to meta‐representational skills and executive function. Partialing out age and inhibitory control, belief reasoning and ambiguous figure perception were significantly correlated, suggesting that performance on these tasks involves a general meta‐representational capacity apart from common executive function demands.

Gender Differences in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in an Offending and a Matched Non-Offending Population

Previous research suggests that a lack of pro-social skills is characteristic of an offending personality. Two hundred male and female offenders and matched controls completed measures to assess: Theory of Mind, empathic understanding, and moral reasoning. Significant differences between the offenders and the control group, as well as between the male and female participants, were detected in theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning with offenders scoring lower than the control group, and with males scoring lower than females on most tests. The ability to assess Theory of Mind, empathic understanding, and moral reasoning, and subsequently to identify reduced ability, is not only useful for researchers but will also allow practitioners to tailor existing (or develop new) interventions specific to the needs of individuals. This could be particularly useful in terms of recidivism when applied to those involved in anti-social or offending behavior.

Sty in the Mind's Eye: A Meta-Analytic Investigation of the Nomological Network and Internal Consistency of the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes" Test.

The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) is the most popular adult measure of individual differences in theory of mind. We present a meta-analytic investigation of the test's psychometric properties (k = 119 effect sizes, 61 studies, ntotal = 8,611 persons). Using random effects models, we found the internal consistency of the test was acceptable (α = .73). However, the RMET was more strongly related with emotion perception (r = .33, ρ = .48) relative to alternative theory of mind measures (r = .29, ρ = .39), and weakly to moderately related with vocabulary (r = .25, ρ = .32), cognitive empathy (r = .14, ρ = .20), and affective empathy (r = .13, ρ = .19). Overall, we conclude that the RMET operates rather as emotion perception measure than as theory of mind measure, challenging the interpretation of RMET results.

The trend of association between autism traits in mothers and severity of autism symptomatology in children

PurposeAutism spectrum disorders (ASD) are heterogeneous disorders, and heterogeneity lies both at genetic and phenotypic levels. To better understand the etiology and pathway that may contribute to autism symptomatology, it is important to study milder expressions of autism characteristics – autistic traits or milder expressions of autism phenotype, especially in intergenerational context. This study aims to see the trend of association, if any, between child autism symptom and mothers’ autism phenotype as well as mothers’ theory of mind and to see if mothers’ theory of mind was associated with their own autistic traits.Design/methodology/approachData were collected from 96 mothers of children with varying symptom severity of autism (mild, moderate and severe) using Autism Spectrum Quotient and faux pas recognition test. Analysis of variance, trend analysis and t-test were done.FindingsResults showed a linear trend of relationship between mothers’ autism phenotype and child symptom severity. However, the groups did not have significant differences in theory of mind. Only a few components of theory of mind were found to be associated with autistic traits. These findings question the prevailing idea that theory of mind can be a reliable endophenotype of autism.Research limitations/implicationsThere has been a lack of research assessing the possible link between parents’ autism phenotype and symptom severity of ASD children. This study is a preliminary step towards that direction. This study indicates a probability of shared genetic liability between mothers and offspring, which would have important consequences for understanding the mechanisms that lead to autism.Practical implicationsThis study offers implications for treatment planning of those with clinical ASD. An awareness of parental factors is critical for any holistic intervention plan when a family seeks treatment for their child. This study suggests that while individualising interventions, clinicians may consider possible presence of high levels of autistic traits and related cognitive features present in the probands’ parents.Originality/valueThere has been lack of research assessing the possible link between parents’ autism phenotype and symptom severity of ASD children. This study, even though preliminary, is a step towards that direction. This study suggests that autism traits might be influenced by common genetic variation and indicates a probability of shared genetic liability between mothers and offspring, which would have important consequences for understanding the mechanisms that lead to autism.

Sources of individual differences in theory of mind: Longitudinal investigation of theory of mind, working memory and theory of mind

Arastirmanin amaci 6 ay onceki bilissel becerilerin ilerideki zihin kurami (ZK) performansinin ne kadarini acikladigina ve 6 ayda ZKda meydana gelen gelisimin kaynaginin ne olduguna odaklanarak ZK kazanimindaki bireysel farklari incelemektir. Calisma 3-5 yas arasi toplam 70 cocuk uzerinde yurutulmustur. Dil becerilerinin olcumunde Turkce Ifade Edici ve Alici Dil Testi, calisma belleginin olcumunde Bay Patates Gorevi, yonetici islevlerin olcumunde Hazzin Ertelenmesi Gorevi ile Boyut Degistirerek Kart Esleme Gorevi kullanilmistir. ZK gelisiminin incelenmesinde ise Zihin Kurami Olcegi kullanilmistir. Katilimcilara 6 ay ara ile 2 kez ZK Olcegi uygulanmistir. Ilk ZK oturumundan hemen once ve son ZK oturumundan hemen sonra bilissel beceriler ile ilgili olcumler yapilmistir. Onceki dil, calisma bellegi ve yonetici islevler puanlarinin birlikte, 6 ay sonraki ZK puaninin % 30’unu acikladigi bulunmustur. Ayrica cocuklar arasindaki ZK gelisimine iliskin bireysel farklarin kaynaginin, ifade edici dilde gosterdikleri gelisim ve zihinle ilgili mevcut kavramsal zeminleri oldugu bulunmustur.

Understanding how minds vary relates to skill in inferring mental states, personality, and intelligence.

Using a "theory of mind" allows us to explain and predict others' behavior in terms of their mental states, yet individual differences in the accuracy of mental state inferences are not well understood. We hypothesized that the accuracy of mental state inferences can be explained by the ability to characterize the mind giving rise to the mental state. Under this proposal, individuals differentiate between minds by representing them in "Mind-space"-a multidimensional space where dimensions reflect any characteristic of minds that allows them to be individuated. Individual differences in the representation of minds and the accuracy of mental state inferences are explained by one's model of how minds can vary (Mind-space) and ability to locate an individual mind within this space. We measured the accuracy of participants' model of the covariance between dimensions in Mind-space that represent personality traits, and we found this was associated with the accuracy of mental state inference (Experiment 1). Mind-space accuracy also predicted the ability to locate others within Mind-space on dimensions of personality and intelligence (Experiment 2). Direct evidence for the representation of minds in mental state inference was obtained by showing that the location of others in Mind-space affects the probability of particular mental states being ascribed to them (Experiment 3). This latter effect extended to mental states dependent upon representation of trait covariation (Experiment 4). Results support the claim that mental state inference varies according to location in Mind-space, and therefore that adopting the Mind-space framework can explain some of the individual differences in theory of mind. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Differences in theory of mind between early and chronic stages in schizophrenia

The evolution of social cognition throughout the course of schizophrenia is unclear not being possible to state whether it remains stable from early stages to chronicity, or it changes as the disease develops. For this purpose, 90 patients with schizophrenia and 139 healthy controls have been compared establishing 4 different groups paired by age and gender: first episode of psychosis patients (FEP), young healthy controls (YHC), chronic patients with schizophrenia (CS) and adult healthy controls (AHC). Performance in Theory of Mind (ToM) has been assessed using The Hinting Task and The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). In the Hinting Task, when comparing patients with their respective control group, differences found between CS patients and their corresponding controls (p < .001) are much bigger (almost twice) than differences between FEP patients and young controls (p = .001). In fact, young and adult healthy controls did not significantly differ in their scores, while the CS group showed significant worse performance than the FEP group. In the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET), patients globally performed worse than controls (p < .001). However, the Cohort × Diagnosis interaction was not significant (p = .27). In this task, there were no differences between CS and FEP scores. In conclusion, data suggest poor performance in all phases of the disease with a probable worsening related to chronicity especially in the aspects of social cognition measured by the Hinting Task.

The relationship between executive functions and fluid intelligence in multiple sclerosis.

Deficits in cognitive functions dependent upon the integrity of the prefrontal cortex have been described in Multiple Sclerosis (MS). In a series of studies we have shown that fluid intelligence (g) is a substantial contributor to frontal deficits and that, for some classical "executive" tasks, frontal deficits were entirely explained by g. However, for another group of frontal tasks deficits remained once g was introduced as a covariate. This second set of tests included multitasking and theory of mind tasks. In the present study, we aimed at determining the role of fluid intelligence in frontal deficits seen in patients with MS. A group of patients with Relapsing Remitting MS (n = 36) and a group of control subjects (n = 42) were assessed with a battery of classical executive tests (which included the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Verbal Fluency, and Trail Making Test B), a multitasking test, a theory of mind test and a fluid intelligence test. MS patients showed significant deficits in the fluid intelligence task. We found differences between patients and control subjects in all tests except for the multitasking test. The differences in the classical executive tests became non-significant once fluid intelligence was introduced as a covariate, but differences in theory of mind remained. The present results suggest that fluid intelligence can be affected in MS and that this impairment can play a role in the executive deficits described in MS.