Differences In Strategic Behavior Research Articles

Strategic Behavior of E-Commerce Businesses in Online Industry of Electronics from a Customer Perspective

The issue of online shopping behavior is gaining importance with the continued development of e-commerce. E-commerce businesses that aim to be successful in the online market in the long run must consider the factors of online shopping behavior when creating and implementing their e-commerce strategy. This paper is focused on the strategic behavior of e-commerce from a perspective of the online customer. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the strategic position of e-commerce businesses that focus on online sales of electronics, based on their strategic behavior from the customer’s perspective. The first objective is to identify the current factors of online shopping behavior in the industry of online electronics. The second obejctive is to identify the current economic performance and financial strategy of e-commerce businesses and their relevance to strategic behavior in e-commerce. The third objective is to identify the possible differences in strategic behavior of e-commerce SMEs and e-commerce large businesses. The research methods employed were: situation analysis, benchmarking, quantitative research, selected methods of financial analysis. The selected methods of statistical induction were chosen to verify the research hypotheses. A research sample of 89 e-commerce businesses selling online electronics was selected for this research. It was found that most e-commerce businesses apply a balanced e-strategy based on the assessed factors of online shopping behavior that does not correspond to the progressive growth of e-commerce. Fifteen factors were identified that influence customers when choosing and buying electronics online. It was also found that the strategic behavior of e-commerce businesses is influenced by factors of online shopping behavior. Finally, it was found that the current balanced e-strategy of e-commerce businesses does not correspond with conservative financial strategy.

Gender Differences in Strategic Behavior in a Triadic Persecution Motor Game Identified Through an Observational Methodology.

The main objective of the work is to address the effective behavior of girls and boys through Triadic Motor Games (TMG). A chasing game “The Maze” was applied on two class groups with a total of 42 players, 18 girls, and 24 boys, who were 12- and 13-year-old secondary school students. An observational methodology was adopted, with a nomothetic, punctual, and multidimensional design. We used a mixed registry system that two expert observers later applied through an observational methodology, obtaining sufficient record-quality levels. THEME was applied to detect temporary regularities, while cross-tabulations and growth trees were applied with the SPSS v.24 tool to reveal whether girls and boys played in similar or distinct ways. The fact that the specific decision groups within the physical education class are different for girls and boys (p < 0.005) is worth reflecting on. The game’s TMG complexity was addressed through roles and subroles, giving rise to a certain motor asymmetry in relation to gender, which is an expression of behaviors lacking in playful neutrality. Through a mixed-methods approach, a study was built using observational methodology that reveals more varied motor solutions in girls, while male behavior showed greater specialization of roles and subroles, and the linkage of these solutions with the favorable modification of the marker. Identifying relevant variables when playing TMG allows a better understanding of girls and boys by analyzing their relationships, which are sometimes paradoxical, in a practical context.

Pay-As-Bid vs. First-Price Auctions: Similarities and Differences in Strategic Behavior

Pay-as-bid auctions extend the rules of the well-known first-price auction to the sale of multiple units of the same good. According to a common understanding of the recent literature, strategic incentives in pay-as-bid auctions differ from those in the first-price auctions when bidders have multi-unit demand. I show that each of N symmetrically informed bidders shades his bid for 1 of N shares of a perfectly divisible good in a pay-as-bid auction as if he competed with (N-1)N bidders for one indivisible good in a first-price auction. This analogy carries over to environments where bidders have pri- vate information if equilibrium demand schedules are additively separable in the type but breaks otherwise. Whether bidding in pay-as-bid auctions is more complex than in first-price auctions thus depends on the type of uncertainty bidders face.

Strategy use fully mediates the relationship between working memory capacity and performance on Raven's matrices.

Working memory capacity consistently correlates with fluid intelligence. It has been suggested that this relationship is partly attributable to strategy use: Participants with high working memory capacity would use more effective strategies, in turn leading to higher performance on fluid intelligence tasks. However, this idea has never been directly investigated. In 2 experiments, we tested this hypothesis by directly manipulating strategy use in a combined experimental-correlational approach (Experiment 1; N = 250) and by measuring strategy use with a self-report questionnaire (Experiment 2; N = 93). Inducing all participants to use an effective strategy in Raven's matrices decreased the correlation between working memory capacity and performance; the strategy use measure fully mediated the relationship between working memory capacity and performance on the matrices task. These findings indicate that individual differences in strategic behavior drive the predictive utility of working memory. We interpret the results within a theoretical framework integrating the multiple mediators of the relationship between working memory capacity and high-level cognition.

Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game: Are there brains in games?

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.

Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Are There Brains in Games?

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, there are only a few studies of cognitive load in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behave more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibit more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects are better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.

Cultural differences in strategic behavior: A study in computational estimation.

Imbo and LeFevre (2009) observed that Asians (responding in their 2nd language) selected strategies less adaptively than did non-Asians (responding in their 1st language). In the present research, we tested whether adaptive strategy selection is (a) really more resource demanding for Asians than for non-Asians or (b) more resource demanding for participants answering in a nonpreferred language. Three groups of participants were tested on a computational estimation task (e.g., 42 × 57 ≈ ?) in no-load and load conditions: 40 Belgian-educated adults who answered in their first language (Dutch), 40 Chinese-educated adults who answered in their first language (Chinese), and 40 Chinese-educated adults who answered in their second language (English). Although the Chinese were faster and more accurate than the Belgians, they selected strategies less adaptively. That is, the Chinese were less likely to choose the strategy that produced the best estimate; this was especially so when their working memory was loaded. Further, we also observed that the Chinese who answered in English were slower than the Chinese who answered in Chinese; this difference was larger for difficult strategies and under working memory load. These results are interpreted in terms of the encoding complex model, whereas the explanation for the adaptivity results is based on cultural differences in educational history.

What's in a name?: An analysis of the strategic behavior of family firms

Family firms play a significant role in the U.S. economy. Not all family firms, however, use their family name as part of their firm name. For example, while Dell Inc. and Gap Inc. are both family firms, Dell Inc.'s name includes the name of the founding Dell family, but Gap Inc.'s name does not include the name of the founding Fisher family. This research explores differences in strategic behavior between family firms that use their family name as part of their firm name (termed family-named firms, or FN firms) and those that do not (termed non-family-named firms, or NFN firms). The authors also investigate whether FN firms perform better than NFN firms, and whether or not their superior performance is mediated by differences in their strategic behavior. Findings based on a multi-industry sample of 130 publicly listed U.S. family firms over a five-year period (2002–2006) show that, compared to NFN firms, FN firms have significantly higher levels of corporate citizenship and representation of their customers' voice (i.e., presence of a chief marketing officer) in the top management team. FN firms also have a higher strategic emphasis (i.e., a greater emphasis on value appropriation relative to value creation) compared to NFN firms. Furthermore, FN firms perform better (i.e., have a higher ROA) than NFN firms, and their superior performance is partially mediated by their higher corporate citizenship levels and higher strategic emphasis. The authors highlight the significance of these findings for both theory and practice.

Age differences in strategic behavior during a computation-based skill acquisition task.

The authors evaluated mechanistic and metacognitive accounts of age differences in strategy transitions during skill acquisition. Old and young participants were trained on a task involving a shift from performing a novel arithmetic algorithm to responding via associative recognition of equation-solution pairings. The strategy shift was manipulated by task instructions that either (a) equally focused on speed and accuracy, (b) encouraged retrieval use as a method toward fast responding, or (c) offered monetary incentives for fast retrieval-based performance. Monetary incentives produced a more rapid shift to retrieval relative to standard instructions; older adults showed a greater incentives effect on retrieval use than younger adults. Monetary incentives encouraged retrieval use and response time improvements despite accuracy costs (a speed-accuracy tradeoff). The pattern of results suggested a role of metacognitive and volitional factors in retrieval shift, indicating that an associative learning deficit cannot fully account for older adults' delayed strategy shift.

Sustaining Superior Performance through an Entrepreneurial Boom and Bust: Inter-Firm Differences in the E-Consulting Industry (1997-2001) and the Investment Management Industry (1927-1931)

This study explores the effect of strategic choices and resource combinations on new-venture survival during an Entrepreneurial Boom and Bust (EBB) period. An EBB is a period of rapid expansion of an industry in terms of number of players, fueled by expectations of high returns occasioning a considerable infusion of resources, followed by a sudden change in industry prospects and consequent reallocation of those resources. The result is that in an EBB a large proportion of new business organizations fail shortly after being formed. Although considerable research has been conducted at the industry level as to why the boom-and-bust phenomenon exists, we do not yet understand the mechanisms by which some firms deal successfully with this acute environmental shift while others fail. An in-depth study of 104 e-consulting firms from 1997 to 2001 and 85 investment management firms from 1927 to 1931, combining range of data sources and analytical tools-archival and interview-based data, cluster analysis, multilogit models, probit regression models - yields insights on new-venture strategies at industry inception and the effects of the strategies and initial endowments on venture success. First, the study identifies a typology of new-venture entry strategies. In the e-consulting industry, it finds that firms followed four strategy archetypes - Conservative Growers, Focused Consultants, Expansionists, and Aggressive Acquirers. Further, differences in strategic behavior reflect differences in resource endowments, and these differences are systematically associated with differences in performance. Whereas Conservative Growers and Focused Consultants were most successful in weathering the contraction phase, Expansionists and Aggressive Acquirers were the most susceptible to failure. A parallel analysis of the investment management industry during the 1920s yields strikingly similar results; the few differences may reflect structural differences between the two industries. Second, the study shows that resource configuration and strategic patterns in both the expansion and decline phase of the industry influence a firm's ability to adapt to the sudden environmental change. Strategies that offer a wide range of services ensure a better chance for survival; moreover, industry knowledge rather than entrepreneurial experience is crucial to the survival of a firm in such turbulent times.

Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior

We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games. We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are “mice,” behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our experimental design shows that the standard ultimatum game can mask significant inter- and intra-gender differences in strategic behavior. These behavioral patterns in strategic environments are shown to be correlated with preferences for altruism in non-strategic settings. Such gender differences could well manifest themselves in real-world large-stakes transactions, such as salary negotiations.

Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance: A Coevolutionary View

This paper suggests a coevolutionary analysis of the relationship between heterogeneity and firm performance advocating a more dynamic view of the development of strategic heterogeneity. Drawing on previous enquiries in behavioral and evolutionary economics of heterogeneity and performance, it proposes a conceptual framework that explains how the coevolution of strategic heterogeneity and firm performance occurs over time. Moving from some basic definitional and measurement problems of heterogeneity, we argue that heterogeneity and performance coevolve with each other through strategic (temporal and spatial) interrelatedness, circular causality and feedforward processes. Looking beyond the static vision proposed by early studies in the resource-based view of heterogeneity, the study detects two main levels of heterogeneity sources within firms and between firms: (a) the first heterogeneity level heeds to the persistence of differences in strategic behavior and performance among competitors within an industry; (b) the second heterogeneity level applies to strategic diversity within the same firm and, more precisely, to the in-house variations (i.e., resource and capability endowments and/or structural forms and profiling) that a specific firm displays between a given time t0 and the subsequent time t1. We characterize and advance taxonomy of eighteen situations that may epitomize the causal relationships between heterogeneity and performance and eventually draw a few theoretical fallouts for prospective research in strategy.

How do Participants in Research Joint Ventures Diversify

This paper investigates the incentives to participate in research joint ventures from the perspective of overall business diversification behavior. It presents evidence that: (a) RJVs tend to put together industrial activities differently than single firms; and, (b) the diversification decisions of RJV participants are triggered partly differently than the analogous decisions of firms that have not participated in the examined large set of RJVs. The results indicate that RJVs facilitate “experimentation.” They also indicate that the policy debate on inter-firm cooperation in R & D must consider the likely differences in strategic behavior between frequent RJV participants and other firms.