Differences In Moral Judgment Research Articles

Motives matter more with age: Adult age differences in response to sociomoral violations.

Moral judgments and emotional reactions to sociomoral violations are heavily impacted by a perpetrator's intentions and desires, which pose a threat to social harmony. Given that older adults are more motivated to maintain interpersonal harmony relative to younger adults, older adults may be more reactive to malicious desires. In three studies, we investigated adult age differences in moral judgments and emotional reactions to sociomoral violations. In all studies, participants read scenarios in which a perpetrator either (a) desired to harm another but nothing happened, or (b) harmed another accidentally without malicious desire. Study 2 incorporated additional scenarios designed to evoke anger and disgust without explicitly implicating another person to evaluate whether age differences emerge only when sociomoral violations against another are salient. In Study 3, we examined the combined effects of malicious desires and harmful outcomes by including scenarios in which (a) harmful desires were coupled with harmful outcomes, and (b) benign desires were coupled with benign outcomes. Predominantly across the studies, older adults judged perpetrators who desired to harm another more harshly but judged perpetrators who accidentally harmed another more leniently than younger adults. Emotional reactions generally corresponded with the differences in judgments. Taken together, this work suggests that desires more strongly impact older relative to younger adults' judgments and emotional reactions in sociomoral contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Social class and moral judgment: a process dissociation perspective.

Do social classes differ in moral judgment? Previous research showed that upper-class actors have a greater inclination toward utilitarian judgments than lower-class actors and that this relationship is mediated by empathic concern. In this paper, we take a closer look at class-based differences in moral judgment and use the psychometric technique of process dissociation to measure utilitarian and deontological decision inclinations as independent and orthogonal concepts. We find that upper-class actors do indeed have a greater inclination toward decisions consistent with utilitarian principles, albeit only to a quite small extent. Class-related differences are more pronounced with respect to deontological judgments, in so far as upper-class actors are less inclined to judgments consistent with deontological principles than lower-class actors. In addition, it is shown that class-based differences in utilitarian judgments are mediated by cognitive styles and not so much by empathic concern or moral identity. None of these potential mediators explains class-based differences in the inclination toward deontological judgments.

Why moral psychology needs personality psychology.

People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.

Visualizing Self: Altruism is (Un)Affected by Field Versus Observer Representations of Self

PurposeThis study examines the impact of first-person versus third-person mental visualizations of self on prosocial behavior, building on research that links perspective-taking to differences in moral judgments, agency, and self-awareness. A first-person perspective of self typically enhances feelings of agency, personal responsibility, and empathy, which has been hypothesized to lead to greater helping. However, a third-person perspective of self may heighten self-awareness, potentially leading to a greater focus on reputation management and consequently, helping.MethodsIn two preregistered experiments we test the impact of perspective taking of self on altruistic behavior. Experiment One (n = 599) manipulates generalized perspective taking of self during memory recall and assesses its effect on the amount of time individuals engage in a charitable activity. Experiment Two (n = 271) extends this investigation to explore how targeted perspective taking of self while visualizing a future volunteer activity influences intention to volunteer and actual volunteering.ResultsAcross both experiments we found no evidence of an effect of perspective taking on altruistic behavior.ConclusionOur results contrast with previous research suggesting that differences in mental visualizations of self influence prosocial behaviors. These findings underscore the complexity of this research area and call for a deeper examination of the theoretical frameworks and methodology used in studies.

A Crime by Any Other Name: Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning When Judging the Tax Evasion of Cryptocurrency Traders.

Tax evasion is a major issue for authorities worldwide. Understanding the factors that influence individuals' intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, known as their tax morale, is important for improving tax compliance. This study investigated gender differences in judging tax evasion in the context of cryptocurrency trading. Specifically, a survey study explored whether different moral foundations, financial literacies, and political orientations among females vs. males might explain potential gender differences in judging tax evasion. In an online survey, 243 U.S. adults read a vignette about a friend evading taxes in a cryptocurrency trading context. In a correlational analysis, we found that females judged tax evasion harsher, as being more morally wrong than males. Of the psychographic factors, only individualizing moral foundation values (i.e., fairness and harm avoidance) explained the harsher moral judgment by females. That is, individualizing moral foundation values were at a higher level among females, which further predicted females' harsher judgment of tax evasion. While females also had, on average, lower financial literacy and knowledge of cryptocurrencies than males, these did not predict their harsher judgment of tax evasion. The findings contribute to research on gender differences in moral judgments and highlight that a given transgression, or a specific crime, may violate different moral values in men and women. The results demonstrate to policy makers that it is important to take into account gender differences, in campaigns promoting tax morale and compliance.

Analysis of character shaping and mood intervention under higher education

BackgroundCollege education plays an important role in moral development and values, but some students may face mood disorders. Interventions in educational psychology can help students overcome obstacles and achieve well-rounded development.Subjects and MethodsStudents at one university were selected for the study, and data were collected using questionnaires and tools such as the Stanford Acute Stress Response Questionnaire (SASRQ) and 3-Minute Disorder Assessment Scale (3D-CAM). The experiment focused on students’ moral judgment, behavior, sense of burnout, sense of self-responsibility and emotional state. The data were processed by State statistical software.ResultsThe results show that there are some differences in moral judgment and behavior of the students. Some students show burnout, lack of self-responsibility and emotional instability. Specific data are as follows: The mean score of moral judgment was 3.82 (SD =0.56), the mean score of behavioral performance was 4.05 (SD =0.61), the mean score of burnout was 2.94 (SD =0.72), the mean score of self-responsibility was 3.17 (SD =0.68), and the mean score of emotional state was 2.75 (SD =0.59).ConclusionsThe application of educational psychology in college education can take intervention measures. Developing educational programs and activities aims at character development to enhance moral judgment and behavior. For students with mood disorders, psychological counseling and support are provided to help overcome burnout, enhance the sense of self-responsibility, and adjust emotions. The Stanford Acute Stress Response Questionnaire (SASRQ) and 3-Minute Disorder Assessment Scale (3D-CAM) can assess mood disorders and psychological states and provide a basis for intervention.

Age-Related Differences in Moral Judgment: The Role of Probability Judgments.

Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age-related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults' increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents' omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution.

Exploring cultural and gender differences in moral judgment: A cross-cultural study based on the CNI model.

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04662-6.

Cultural Differences in Moral Judgement

Morality can be explained as an innate sense of morality, a basic sense of fairness and a basic sense of justice. Moral judgments refer to people's positive or negative evaluations of what they see and hear and the actions of others. Moral judgments are affected by different factors. Cultural differences are one of the factors that can influence moral judgments. This article summarized and analyzed recent research regarding the impact of different cultures on moral judgments. The influence of culture on moral judgment was discussed from three aspects: cross-cultural similarity, differences across cultures, and developmental perspective. In the part of cross-cultural similarity, the influence of different genders and ages in different cultures on moral judgments was discussed. In the part of differences across cultures, the article compared the differences in moral judgments of participants from Eastern and Western cultures. The differences between collectivists and individualists in their moral judgments were also discussed. In the part of developmental perspective, how different cultures shape people's moral values and standards of moral judgment were analyzed and discussed. Through the analysis of recent research, it can be concluded that across all cultures, women and the elderly rely more on emotion when making moral judgments, while men rely more on reasoning. Besides, both collectivists and individualists were willing to punish violators when faced with immorality. Both collectivists and individualists were harsher when criminals were members of their own race. Individualists, after reflection, would reduce their dislike of offenders, but collectivists would not be affected by reflection. There are some limitations of recent studies. These include a lack of longitudinal comparisons and experimental procedures using assumed scenarios. The addition of follow-up experiments and simulated behavioral scenarios in future studies can solve these problems. At present, there is a lack of research regarding the influence of cultural differences on moral judgment in the research field. This paper fills this gap by analyzing the standards of moral judgment shaped by different cultures.

Investigating the effectiveness of introducing virtual reality to elementary school students' moral education

This study was conducted to investigate whether a virtual reality (VR)-based morality education program is effective in cultivating morality among elementary school students. After conducting VR-based activities and classroom discussions, 162 elementary school students in South Korea were surveyed. According to Rest's theory, we measured moral sensitivity and moral judgment for the evaluation of moral development of students. The use of this model resulted in a significant improvement in moral sensitivity but no significant difference in moral judgment. This study revealed that, although moral sensitivity can be improved relatively easily through our educational program with VR, a separate educational effort is required to improve moral judgment. In addition, this study is meaningful in that it sheds light on the potential of VR, which is closely related to the technology used in the metaverse.

Preconceito e Normas Igualitárias: Análises a Partir do Julgamento Moral

Abstract Based on the social psychology of development, this study investigated whether differences in moral reasoning would imply differences in prejudice, conforming with an egalitarian norm and in the use of moral justifications for the suppression of prejudice. A total of 555 Brazilians participated in this study, the final sample being composed of 500 Brazilians, who answered an online questionnaire with measurements used to assess the variables of interest in the research. Based on descriptive and inferential statistical analyses, the results indicated a relationship between differences in moral judgment and differences in the level of prejudice, in accordance with the egalitarian norm and the use of moral justifications. The results are discussed from the perspective of social psychology and moral development.

Anticipatory Stress Increases Deontological Inclinations: The Mediating Role of Emotional Valence.

Previous studies have explored the differences in moral judgments under normal situations and acute stress using the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). The present study examined whether anticipatory stress (i.e., induced by an anticipated speech) could elicit similar effects and further explored the mediation of emotional responses between acute stress and moral judgments with a process-dissociation approach. Fifty-three undergraduate students (20 males and 33 females) were randomly assigned to the stress and control groups. In the first stage, they were instructed to prepare a public speech (the stress group) or just recall events during the previous vacation (the control group). In the second stage, they reported emotional valence and arousal for each moral dilemma in a set of 12 moral dilemmas, followed by judgments on moral acceptability of the agent's action. The manipulation check confirmed that anticipatory stress was reliably induced, as indicated in both self-reported and physiological data. The traditional dilemma analysis revealed that participants in the stress group would make fewer utilitarian judgments than those in the control group. The process dissociation (PD) analyses further revealed that the stress group exhibited higher deontological inclinations than the control group, but no significant differences in utilitarian inclinations. Emotional valence played a mediating role in the association between stress and deontological inclinations. To sum up, our study extended the investigation of the relationship between acute stress and moral judgment to anticipatory stress, clarified its distinct impact on deontological and utilitarian inclinations, and revealed the mediating effect of emotional valence.

Differences in moral judgment predict behavior in a Covid triage game scenario

Moral beliefs influence decisions across many contexts, but researchers typically test how these beliefs translate into moral judgments in hypothetical dilemmas. While this is important, in this study (N = 248), we sought to extend these findings by exploring whether moral judgment (specifically utilitarian or deontological processing) predicted behavior in a commons dilemma game against other players (programmed bots) across multiple rounds in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Importantly, participants had to weigh short-term needs against long-term dangers of exhausting the community pool (i.e., a tragedy of the commons). As hypothesized, increased utilitarian processing predicted reduced resource extraction from the community pool. In addition to showing that differences in moral judgment predict behavior in a game situation that simulates a somewhat ecologically valid dilemma, these results also replicate previous research connecting morality to opinions about Covid-19 vaccine requirements.

Adam Smith’s relevance for contemporary moral cognition

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to show the relevance of Adam Smith’s moral philosophy for contemporary trends in moral cognition. According to these accounts, research on moral judgment should start focusing more on its diachronic dimension, as opposed to its synchronic one, so that it can properly account for the constitutive and developmental integration of automatic and controlled processes, of emotions and reasons (§1). Smith’s reflective sentimentalism – appropriately interpreted (§2) – can provide the theoretical and philosophical framework for these accounts. On the one hand, Smith’s account makes the collaboration and integration of emotions and reason necessary for an appropriate normative moral judgment in typically developed individuals: developing a moral conscience requires both automatic and controlled processes (§3). Furthermore, since Smith was very aware of the limits and flaws of sympathy and of the impartial spectator’s possibility of error, his theory is capable of explaining the many ways in which typical individuals can misjudge, individual differences in moral judgments, and some of the ways in which the development of a full-blown moral conscience can go wrong (§4).

Omission bias in children’s and adults’ moral judgments of lies

This study examined whether omission bias occurs in moral judgments of lies. Omission bias is the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 8 and 9 years (third graders) and 11 and 12 years (sixth graders), as well as adults, made moral judgments about lies of commission and omission to conceal transgressions. Descriptions of four scenarios varied in terms of whether the protagonists lied to benefit themselves or others and whether the transgression was deliberate or accidental. The results showed that both age groups of children, as well as adults, judged that lies of commission were morally worse than lies of omission in all four scenarios, indicating that omission bias clearly occurs in moral judgments of lies. However, there were age differences in the magnitude of omission bias. Third and sixth graders generally showed omission bias of the same magnitude for all scenarios, whereas omission bias in adults was stronger for the scenarios that benefited self rather than others and for scenarios in which deliberate transgressions, rather than accidental ones, were concealed. These results reveal differences in moral judgments of lies between middle childhood and adulthood.

Individual differences in moral judgment predict attitudes towards mandatory vaccinations

Skepticism about the efficacy and risks related to Covid-19 vaccinations has become a politicized issue. In response, some politicians have proposed policies (such as imposing vaccine passports) aimed at increasing public vaccination rates. The response has been mixed. In the current study (N = 266), we examined the role of conservatism and moral judgments in accounting for these differences. Results from data collected between January and March 2021 showed that increased levels of conservatism and deontological processing (i.e., having a stronger D-process) were associated with less agreement to a government-imposed Covid-19 vaccine mandate. However, participants who made utilitarian responses to traditional switch and footbridge dilemmas reported greater agreement towards the same mandate. These results are consistent with prior findings showing political divides surrounding Covid-19 and indicate that individual differences in moral judgment predict opinion about a significant and current real-world issue.

The Implications of Diverse Human Moral Foundations for the Ethicality of Artificial Intelligence

Organizations are making massive investments in artificial intelligence (AI), and recent demonstrations and achievements highlight the immense potential for AI to improve organizational and human welfare. But realizing the potential of AI necessitates a better understanding of the various ethical issues involved with deciding to use AI, developing and maintaining it, and allowing it to make decisions that have moral consequences. People want organizations using AI and the AI systems themselves to behave “ethically”. But “behaving ethically” means different things to different people. How should organizations using AI—and the AI itself—handle ethical dilemmas where humans cannot agree on the right course of action? Though a variety of ethical frameworks have been suggested, these approaches do not adequately answer how people make ethical evaluations of AI systems or how to incorporate the fundamental disagreements that people have regarding what is and is not ethical behavior. Drawing on moral foundations theory, we theorize that a person will perceive an organization’s use of AI and AI decisions as ethical to the extent that those decisions resonate with the person’s moral foundations. Since people hold diverse moral foundations, this highlights the crucial need to address individual moral differences in the development, application, and evaluation of AI systems. Our approach addresses several unresolved issues existing in the current state of the ethical AI literature. It suggests potential solutions to handling conflict in moral judgment and highlights future directions to augment ethical AI frameworks by incorporating individual differences in moral judgment.

Physical Presence during Moral Action in Immersive Virtual Reality.

Research on morality has focused on differences in moral judgment and action. In this study, we investigated self-reported moral reasoning after a hypothetical moral dilemma was presented on paper, and moral reasoning after that very same dilemma was experienced in immersive virtual reality (IVR). We asked open-ended questions and used content analysis to determine moral reasoning in a sample of 107 participants. We found that participants referred significantly more often to abstract principles and consequences for themselves (i.e., it is against the law) after the paper-based moral dilemma compared to the IVR dilemma. In IVR participants significantly more often referred to the consequences for the people involved in the dilemma (i.e., not wanting to hurt that particular person). This supports the separate process theory, suggesting that decision and action might be different moral concepts with different foci regarding moral reasoning. Using simulated moral scenarios thus seems essential as it illustrates possible mechanisms of empathy and altruism being more relevant for moral actions especially given the physical presence of virtual humans in IVR.

Iranian and American Moral Judgments for Everyday Dilemmas Are Mostly Similar.

Moral judgment is a complex cognitive process that partly depends upon social and individual cultural values. There have been various efforts to categorize different aspects of moral judgment, but most studies depend upon rare dilemmas. We recruited 25 subjects from Tehran, Iran, to rate 150 everyday moral scenarios developed by Knutson et al. Using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), we observed that the same moral dimensions (except socialness dimension) were driven by the same moral cognitive factors (norm violation, intention, and social affect) in Iranian vs. American studies. However, there were minor differences in the factor loadings between the two cultures. Furthermore, based on the EFA results, we developed a short form of the questionnaire by removing eleven of the fifteen scenarios from each of the ten categories. These results could be used in further studies to better understand the similarities and differences in moral judgment in everyday interactions across different cultures.

Judgments of blame and forgiveness: A comparison of young adults, older adults, and older adults with dementia

IntroductionAlzheimer's disease may modify moral judgment. ObjectiveIn two studies, we assessed the impact of dementia on blame and forgiveness. Study 1 compared the ways in which young adults, older adults, and older adults with dementia cognitively integrated two factors. Study 2 assessed the number of different factors that older adults with dementia were able to integrate during these moral judgments. MethodThe participants recorded their moral judgements in a blame task and in a forgiveness task. In study 1, the two questionnaires contained scenarios built from the combination of two factors. In study 2, the participants were confronted with the same tasks under three different conditions with scenarios that combined three, four or five factors. ResultsThe data from study 1 showed that the older adults with dementia did not combine the two factors in the same way as young adults did: the combination depended on the type of moral judgment. Study 2 revealed differences in moral judgment between older adults with dementia and adults without dementia in all tasks (i.e. with three, four or five factors combined). ConclusionDementia has an impact on moral judgments. Moral judgment among people with dementia is both task- and condition-dependant.