Dialectic Of Philosophy Research Articles

Dialectics and the Relationship between Philosophy and Religion in an Islamic Perspective

. Islamic philosophy and religion have undergone long phases of ups and downs, becoming a dialectic of science. Religion and philosophy in the academic world view are two entities that cannot be separated when studied academically to find the truth. Ibn Rushd asserted that the religion of sharia and the philosophy of wisdom do not conflict. Indeed, there was tension between theologians, especially al-Ghazâlî in Tahâfut al-Falasifah, and Islamic philosophers, especially peripatetic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina. This tension is reflected in Ibn Rushd's statement that "reproach from friends hurts more than reproach from enemies, because according to him, religion and philosophy are actually brothers." The research in this article uses descriptive qualitative research methods with a Library Research approach, visualizing and analyzing the phenomena in this research study. The data sources in this research come from various information, journals, and writings resulting from research on the dialectics of Islamic philosophy and religion. The focus of discussion in this article has three focuses of discussion starting from measuring the relationship between Islamic philosophy and religion, characteristics of philosophy and religion in Islam, and dialectics of philosophy and Islamic religious teachings. Philosophy and religion are two entities that cannot be separated and will continue to be discussed and studied because they are academic studies, in search of scientific and rational truth.

Transformation and Annihilation: Emmanuel Falque and Søren Kierkegaard on the Dialectic of Philosophy and Theology

AbstractIn his recent work Hors phénomène, Emmanuel Falque identifies the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard as both a progenitor and exemplifier of his account of the way philosophy becomes more rigorously itself through an encounter with theology. However, this article challenges the affinity Falque claims to share with Kierkegaard. It argues instead that there is a fundamental philosophical discrepancy underlying their respective treatments of the encounter between philosophy and theology: the nature of the dialectic and their respective positions in it. By exploring Falque's and Kierkegaard's diverging uses of the metaphor of ‘crossing the Rubicon’, the article demonstrates that where Kierkegaard stresses the military sense of the metaphor, depicting the relationship between the two disciplines as that between two armies seeking the annihilation of the other, Falque precisely abstracts from this military sense, letting the expression instead become a metaphor for a mutually beneficial transformative encounter. However, when considered more profoundly, we argue that this annihilation is itself a Christian experience out of which Falque's transformation is born. Ultimately, we conclude that Falque and Kierkegaard are both trying to conceive of the relationship between philosophy and theology according to a somewhat similar structure, namely, the quantitative intensification of one discipline by way of its qualitative differentiation from the other.

FOTOĞRAFLAR ÜZERİNDEN BİR YABANCILAŞMA ANALİZİ

Socrates' concept of daimon, Kant's internal court in the universal moral law, Maslow's self-realization step in the hierarchy of needs, Horney's theory of neurosis, the common point of all these thinking systems; It means that people will be liberated by realizing themselves by developing their birth potential, and they will build a productive, self-confident and happy identity. Otherwise, the individual who cannot realize himself will be dependent on the sociocultural society to which he is adapted, turn to temporary power centers, lose his self-esteem by moving away from his inner voice, and develop neurotic tendencies by alienating himself as a result of his self-conflict. According to Jung's analytical psychology, the characteristics that we have acquired through adaptation to the environment and culture, namely personas; By losing our relationship with our personality, it turns into masks that cause us to become alienated. The reputation that the individual tries to gain through consumption patterns or the profiles he creates in the virtual world is nothing but masks behind which he hides. In this study, using the descriptive method, the concept of alienation was tried to be defined in the dialectic of philosophy, sociology and psychology disciplines, and it was described through the art of photography, which is a universal language that does not get caught in language barriers through the mask metaphor.

Hegel’s Absolutes and Revolution: An Expanded Review of Eugene Gogol’s Toward a Dialectic of Philosophy and Organization

Hegel’s Absolutes and Revolution: An Expanded Review of Eugene Gogol’s <i>Toward a Dialectic of Philosophy and Organization</i>

Philosophy of Language and the African American Experience: Are There Metaphilosophical Implications?

When I first read George Yancy's Geneva Smitherman: The Social Ontology of African-American the Power of Nommo, and the Dynamics of Resistance and Identity Through Language, my initial reaction was amaze ment over the submission of his article to such a strikingly different venue than what is normally the case for philosophical works of this kind and orientation. Intellectual tradition in this country and the academic powers that be would have generally dictated such an essay appear in African American Studies jour nals, where the intended audience are those who have an appreciation for and share similarities with Yancy's core background assumptions. Moreover, this becomes especially evident when we inspect Yancy's culturally anchored method and overall philosophical direction as embodied within an African American ethos. In his affirmation of African American language as a site for philosophy of language, Yancy boldly throws intellectual tradition, professional custom, and personal caution to the wind and these gestures have tremendous historical significance for African American philosophy specifically and professional phi losophy more generally. For instance, I know from my own research that it was not until Carlton Lee wrote his dissertation in 1951?titled Patterns of Leader ship in Race Relations: A Study in Leadership Among American Negroes?that an African American would dare to write a doctoral dissertation on Black people and then reasonably expect to receive the coveted degree in philosophy. Lee earned his doctorate at the highly acclaimed University of Chicago, where John Dewey, among others, established a formidable reputation for its philosophy department (McClendon 1981). I am also cognizant that up until the late 1970s, and on into the early 1980s, there were heated debates about the legitimacy of a Black philosophy. The venerable William R. Jones eloquently wrote in the pages of Philosophical Forum about the dialectics of philosophy as particularity and universality and forged new turf for the philosophy of the Black experience as a legitimate way to pursue academic philosophy (Jones 1977-1978).

Philosophical reasoning: a study in the methodology of philosophizing

Preface. Introduction. Part I: The Task of Philosophy:. The Erotetic Nature of Philosophy: Philosophy as a Cognitive Enterprise. The Need for Philosophy: Humans as Homo Quaerens. Rationality is the Instrument of Philosophy. Philosophy as Truth Estimation. The Data of Philosophy. Metaphilosophical Issues. Part II: Philosophizing as an Erotetic Enterprise: The Dialectic of Question and Answer:. Questions and their Presuppositions: Issues Regarding the Legitimacy of Questions. Question Dynamics: Kant's Principle of Question Propagation and the Dialectical Exfoliation of Questions. Philosophy as a Venture in Erotetic Dialectic. Philosophical Assessment. Part III: What's on the Agenda?:. Unexamined Issues and Agenda Formation. The Recent Scene. Metaphilosophy a Part of Philosophy Itself. The Political Dimension: A Struggle for Ownership. The Systemic Dimension. Part IV: Philosophical Discourse:. The Narrative Dimension of Philosophy. The Method of Philosophy: Truth-Estimative Conjecture. Ongoing Explanation. Historical Unity of Philosophy. The Data of Philosophy. Part V: Interpreting Philosophical Texts:. Setting the Stage: Deconstructionism. Exegetical Interpretation. Why Philosophical Texts Need Interpretation. The Principle of Contextuality-Context Coherence as an Interpretative Standard. The First Law. The Second Law. The Third Law. The Fourth Law. Part VI: Rhetoric And Rational Argumentation:. Rhetoric Versus Argumentation: The General Situation. An Uneasy Union. The Special Case of Philosophy. Philosophy's Data: The Source of Plausibility. Part VII: Philosophical Aporetics:. The Pervasiveness of Apories. Aporetic Antinomies Structure the Issues. Part VIII: The Economic Dimension of Philosophical Inquiry:. Plausibility as a Guide to Issues of Precedence and Priority. Cost Effectiveness as a Salient Aspect of Rationality. Unacceptable Price Argumentation in Philosophy. Part IX: The Impact of Distinctions:. The Role of Distinctions. Dialectic Development via Distinctions. Developmental Dialectics. Part X: Inference to the Best Explanation and its Problems:. Difficulties with Inference to the Best Explanation. Best Systematization as a Viable Alternative. Part XI: The Coherentist Criteriology of Truth as a Philosophical Method:. Coherentism in Philosophy. How Context Helps via Local Appropriateness. Philosophical Coherentism is Self Sustaining. Part XII: Why Philosophizing Must Be Systematic: The Holistic Nature of Philosophy:. Externalities and Negative Side Effects. Systematic Interconnectedness as a Consequence of Aporetic Complexity. Local Minimalism versus Global Optimalism. Why Not Simply Live With Inconsistency? The Imperative of Cognitive Rationality. The Methodological Rationale of Systematicity in Philosophy. Part XIII: Systematization as an Instrument of Inquiry:. Hierarchical Systematization: The Euclidean Model of Knowledge. Systematicity and the Impetus to Coherence: The Network Model. On the Advantages of a Network Model. The Pivotal Role of Data for a Coherentist Truth-Criteriology. Coherentism's Exploitation of the Parameters of Systematicity. Systematization as Truth Criterion: The Hegelian Inversion. Part XIV: Developmental Dialectics and Complexity:. Spencer's Law: The Dynamics of Cognitive Complexity. The Methodological Status of Simplicity-Preference: Systematicity, Economy, and the Principle of Least Effort. Perennial Philosophy. Rational Dialectic in Philosophy. Part XV: Counterfactual Reasoning as a Philosophical Instrument:. Historical Stagesetting. Belief-Contravening Supposition: How Apories Arise in Hypothetical Contexts. The Centrality of Precedence (Right of Way). Logic as Such Does Not Resolve Matters. Reductio Ad Absurdum Argumentation. Evidential Contexts. The Situation in Philosophy. An Overview. Dispensing with Possible Worlds. Part XVI: Validating First Principles:. First Principles. Historical Postscript. Part XVII: God's Place in Philosophy (Non in Philosophia Recurrere est ad Deum):. Two Opposed Intuitions. Theistic vs. Naturalistic Questions. The Closure of the Secular Realm. Internal vs. External. Philosophy and Theology. Explanatory Economy in Philosophy. Conclusion. Part XVIII: Philosophy at the Turn of the Century: A Return to Systems?:. The Heritage of the 19th Century. The Revolt Against System (System-Dismissive Antisystems). The Shipwreck of Inter-Bellum Negativism. The Burned Bridges. The Rise of Particularism. A Vision of Wholeness. The New Order: A Revival of Systematic Philosophy. The Contemporary Situation.

Hegel, Wittgenstein, and the Dialectic of Philosophy and Anthropology

The early Hegel and late Wittgenstein alike suggest that the idealism-realism contrast is better understood as a contrast between normative and naturalistic accounts of actions. Building upon parallels between Hegel's account of the inverted world and what Kripke called Wittgenstein's skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox, I suggest that Wittgensteinian rule following may involve not only first personal commitments, as Lear argues, but also something like the specifically historical agency Hegel called Geist, and that, in turn, Hegel's Absolute may be seen to represent not this agency itself but the normative rule governing our accounts of what it is to be a rule-following agent. This construal suggests that Brandom's pragmatic reading of Hegel, claiming that practical adjudication of norms may be pusued independently of historical self-accounting, artificially delimits the practical sphere of such adjudication, and thus undermines rather than promotes the pragmatism he pursues.

Why Heidegger’s Hermeneutics is not a “Diahermeneutics”

ProQuest Information and Learning: Foreign Text Omitted Are hermeneutics and dialectic to be seen as mutually exclusive opposites and is it really so completely wrong to speak of a dialectic in Heidegger, though admittedly one of a different sort from the usual one? Marly Biemel1 In the winter semester course of 1919/20, Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie,2 Heidegger's struggle to define a phenomenological method capable of serving as a science of life in and for itself (Ursprungswissenschaft) repeatedly confronts this method with dialectic. The course thus raises the question of the relationship between phenomenology and dialectic. A claim that Heidegger is reported to have made towards the end of the course appears to provide an answer: "Dialectic in philosophy, as the form of expression [Ausdruck], is not dialectic in the sense of a synthetic combining of concepts, but philosophical dialectic is 'diahermeneutics"' (GA58, 262-63). According to this passage, the kind of dialectic that is a purely formal ordering of concepts into some kind of conceptual system has nothing to do with phenomenology or genuine philosophy. But the dialectic that consists of ways of expressing life at its most original or ultimate (der Usprung) is genuinely philosophical, is at least a kind of hermeneutics. What the passage leaves unclear, however, is whether the converse is true: is philosophy essentially dialectical, is hermeneutics essentially diahermeneutics? Or is it the case that instead dialectic is at best something subordinate to, and distinct from, philosophical hermeneutics? This last alternative is the one that is explicitly defended at various points in this course and that will eventually prevail with Heidegger, to the extent that in later courses he will not use the word "diahermeneutics" again and will instead oppose phenomenology to dialectic as to its worse adversary. Dialectic, as we will see claimed in the 1919/20 course, is confined to expression (Ausdruck): it can consider the different ways in which life is expressed, it can oppose one expression to another, it can expose the inadequacies of an expression and thereby destroy it. However, its only contact with life in and of itself is through the mediation of expressions and concepts and is therefore indirect. If Heidegger in this course contrasts phenomenology to a dialectic in some ways akin to it and if he ultimately completely severs the two to the extent of dismissing dialectic as a "philosophical embarrassment" in Being and Time,' it is because he understands phenomenology as involving some kind of direct intuition (Anschauung) of how the things themselves give themselves. What I aim to show in this essay, though necessarily in an only preliminary and cursory way, is the following: 1) that in the 1919/20 course Heidegger undercuts his critique of dialectic by undermining the distinction between Ausdruck and Anschauung and demonstrating the impossibility of any givenness beyond mediation in a way that justifies a conception of philosophical hermeneutics as essentially and inescapably dialectical; 2) that Heidegger's complete disassociation of phenomenology from any kind of dialectic in later courses reveals the persistence of a still problematic and unjustified commitment to the possibility of immediate intuition in the sense of a direct access to the things themselves; and 3) that Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics as a "seeing the things themselves for oneself" helps to explain the non-dialogical character of his hermeneutics, i.e., its indifference to communication and ethical praxis. As already indicated, Heidegger's main criticism of dialectic in 1919/20 is that it fails to maintain a distinction between Anschauung, through which a phenomenon is first given, and Ausdruck, through which it is subsequently expressed in concepts. This criticism is stated most succinctly in the following passage: Dialectic is blind towards givenness (die Gegebenheit). …