Let me start by welcoming such a thoughtful and meticulous criticism of The Exclusive Society, which touches not only on the book itself, but raises some important questions with regards to current criminological thinking.1 My first port of call will concern the central notion of a transition from an inclusive to an exclusive society and the associated binary notion of an included and an excluded population. With regards to such distinctions, I am portrayed as being excessively dualistic—accused of over-heightening the contrast whilst carrying an overly homogenized portrait of both the past and the present, and playing down continuities. I became interested in the phenomenon of exclusion many years ago, whilst writing The Drugtakers (1971). At that time, Levi-Strauss' redolent distinction between anthro pophagie and anthropoemic societies—ones which consumed deviants and ones that expelled them—attracted great interest in the burgeoning fields of sociology of deviance and anti-psychiatry (see, e.g. Cooper 1967). It fitted well with concerns about deviancy amplification (vicious circles of exclusion), moral panics, the stereotype of youth and the criminal, etc. There were many merits about such a discourse; the focus on the criminal justice system and other institutions of social control as exclusionary agents was of great relevance. (Is it not extraordinary how current official policy documents on Social Exclusion completely ignore this aspect?) But there were drawbacks: the dual ism between anthropophagie and anthropoemic societies was too sharp and there was no doubt that inclusive societies and inclusionary processes were seen as advantageous, whereas modernity was cast as anthropoemic and retrograde. Returning to this theme over 30 years later, I was much less sanguine about the either/or nature of inclusion/ exclusion and any attempt to valorize either type of society as progressive or retrograde. I was also much more sceptical as to the success of such processes of exclusion. And the literature provided fruitful cautions: David Cooper had stressed that both inclusionary and exclusionary institutions exist in any given society, whilst Stan Cohen, in Visions of Social Control (1985), noted that different sections of the population can be subject to predominant forces of inclusion or exclusion. Above all, I was guided by Zygmunt Bauman's discussion of Levi-Strauss' dichotomy in Life in Fragments (1995), where he argues that phagic (inclusivist) and emic (exclusivist) 'strategies' characterize all societies: