432 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE has been larger, more widely distributed, and less oriented to appli cations, but in both Germany and France funding has shifted from the promotion of science to the promotion of industry and particular industrial regions. In science, instances of successful bilateral cooper ation (on the order of the physical research at Grenoble) have been rare. Cooperation has been minimal in armaments, as Ulrich Albert points out, and unimpressive in nuclear power, as Joachim Radkau notes in considering the failure of the high-flying EURATOM concept of the 1960s. In the auto industry, the joint ventures described by Patrick Fridenson were mostly failures, and Gottfried Plumpe notes that cooperation in the chemical industry was mostly restricted to the establishment of subsidiary companies. A final set of papers is concerned with historians and their tools: Maurice Hamon presents an overview of French industrial archives, and Otto Mayr upholds the necessity of presenting history in techno logical museums. The volume concludes with bibliographical sugges tions and a useful directory of French-German organizations, but there are no general observations on bilateral relations between the two continental industrial powers. The history of American-German relations in technology, science, and industry is of similar importance to the Franco-German relationship, yet tbis subject has not been addressed in any systematic fashion. Where could such an address take place? Maybe again at the Deutsches Museum? Hans-Liudger Dienel Mr. Dienel is with the Deutsches Museum. He has submitted a Ph.D. dissertation comparing the interplay of academia and industry in the development of refrigeration technology in Germany and the United States, 1870-1930. In 1990 he organized a session on national technological styles for the SHOT meeting in Cleveland. Daniel Willard and Progressive Management on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. By David M. Vrooman. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991. Pp. xvi + 218; illustrations, notes, index. $40.00. In this book, David Vrooman interprets employee welfare pro grams at the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad as the product of the personal character of Daniel Willard, who served as president of the line from 1910 until 1942. Characterizing corporate welfare work as “a humanistic movement with liberalJudeo-Christian roots” that “had as its goal the full development of the individual and collective human potential (nothing less than that) of a firm’s employees through disciplined, energetic, socially oriented clean living” (pp. 18—19), Vrooman argues that the B&O pursued it more vigorously and more successfully than other railroads. He attributes this to Willard’s “bedrock respect for the intrinsic value and dignity of his employees” (p. 7). “Daniel Willard was the embodiment of the principle that TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 433 managerial effectiveness is, in its origin, a function not so much of technique as of character” (p. x). Convinced that Willard’s welfare programs contributed substantially to the fortunes of the B&O, Vrooman determines that other firms spurned them only because they lacked “a leader like Daniel Willard” (p. xv). “Better than any other man in his industry and in his time, and arguably as well as anyone in any industry and in any time,” Vrooman concludes, “he showed how to lead a company” (p. 183). This is a heavy burden to load on any subject, and the body of this study shows the strain. Rather thanjust describe welfare programs at the B&O, Vrooman struggles throughout to portray and analyze them in a fashion that justifies his assessment of Willard. The record, unfortunately, does not readily yield to such an analysis. Most of the welfare programs pursued by the B&O could be found on many other lines. The single exception was the B&O’s Cooperative Plan, which beginning in 1923 provided a forum for managers and workers to exchange ideas about the workplace. This plan attracted considerable publicity at the time, and Vrooman devotes two of his four main chapters to it. Impetus for the Cooperative Plan came not from Willard, however, but from the labor leader Otto Beyer. Willard agreed to try it in the B&O’s most militant shops following the 1922 rail strike. Though employees at additional shops soon joined in, the plan had little impact on other types of workers, in part because Willard showed no enthusiasm for...
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