Developing Safety Indicators Research Articles

A Framework Based on a Systems Approach to Developing Safety Indicators in Fish Farming

The fish farming industry is one of the industries in Norway with the highest occupational fatality and injury rate. Despite the serious health, safety, and environmental issues in the industry, little is done to measure changes in safety over time beyond the traditional Lost Time Injury (LTI) registrations. In this article the objective is twofold; (i) to propose a framework for developing safety indicators based on Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), and (ii) to apply the framework to find indicators relevant for hazards in operations where subcontractors participate. STPA uses a hierarchical portrayal of the system in focus, in contrast to sequential models, and views safety as a control problem. It is believed that a systemic approach to indicator development better captures the complex safety challenges in aquaculture. Thirteen indicators are identified within areas such as maintenance, training, and planning. The indicators identified may function as a basis for decisions and actions that must be undertaken to ensure safe operations.

Safety performance monitoring of autonomous marine systems

The marine environment is vast, harsh, and challenging. Unanticipated faults and events might lead to loss of vessels, transported goods, collected scientific data, and business reputation. Hence, systems have to be in place that monitor the safety performance of operation and indicate if it drifts into an intolerable safety level. This article proposes a process for developing safety indicators for the operation of autonomous marine systems (AMS). The condition of safety barriers and resilience engineering form the basis for the development of safety indicators, synthesizing and further adjusting the dual assurance and the resilience based early warning indicator (REWI) approaches. The article locates the process for developing safety indicators in the system life cycle emphasizing a timely implementation of the safety indicators. The resulting safety indicators reflect safety in AMS operation and can assist in planning of operations, in daily operational decision-making, and identification of improvements. Operation of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) exemplifies the process for developing safety indicators and their implementation. The case study shows that the proposed process leads to a comprehensive set of safety indicators. It is expected that application of the resulting safety indicators consequently will contribute to safer operation of current and future AMS.

Developing safety indicators for preventing offshore oil and gas deepwater drilling blowouts

An important question with respect to the Macondo blowout is whether the accident is a symptom of systemic safety problems in the deepwater drilling industry. An answer to such a question is hard to obtain unless the risk level of the oil and gas (O&G) industry is monitored and evaluated over time. This article presents information and indicators from the Risk Level Project (RNNP) in the Norwegian O&G industry related to safety climate, barriers and undesired incidents, and discusses the relevance for deepwater drilling. The main focus of the major hazard indicators in RNNP is on production installations, whereas only a limited number of incident indicators and barrier indicators are related to mobile drilling units. The number of kicks is an important indicator for the whole drilling industry, because it is an incident with the potential to cause a blowout. Currently, the development and monitoring of safety indicators in the O&G industry seems to be limited to a short list of “accepted” indicators, but there is a need for more extensive monitoring and understanding. This article suggests areas of extensions of the indicators in RNNP for drilling based on experience from the Macondo blowout. The areas are related to schedule and cost, well planning, operational aspects, well incidents, operators’ well response, operational aspects and status of safety critical equipment. Indicators are suggested for some of the areas. For other areas, more research is needed to identify the indicators and their relevance and validity.

Developing Safety Indicators for New Zealand Airspace

The New Zealand (NZ) government actively sets safety targets for its airspace, and the level of safety traditionally has been measured by accident rates. However, numerous problems have arisen from the use of this indicator. With the Heinrich pyramid of common causation of accidents and incidents, focus has turned to the use of incident data–-particularly loss-of-separation (LoS) incidents between aircraft in airspace–-for safety indicators. This paper uses LoS data from New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom to develop safety indicators specific to a particular airspace. A survey of previous research on factors affecting LoS incidents led to the selection of seven variables: airspace environment, altitude, traffic profile of the pair of aircraft in conflict, presence of one aircraft in altitude transition, geometrical configuration, causal agent (i.e., last human instigator of the incident), and degree of severity or risk of collision (i.e., level of risk reached during the LoS incident). A high-level data analysis is followed by log-linear categorical analysis to determine significant interactions between variables, and, on the basis of these interactions, specific safety indicators are obtained for NZ airspace. Significant interactions include type of airspace and aircraft in altitude transition, type of airspace and conflict geometry, aircraft in altitude transition and conflict geometry, and causal agent and severity. The results can be used to develop refined country-specific safety indicators and allow for targeted methods of improving safety.

Developing Safety Indicators for New Zealand Airspace: Analysis of Loss-of-Separation Incidents

The New Zealand (NZ) government actively sets safety targets for its airspace, and the level of safety traditionally has been measured by accident rates. However, numerous problems have arisen from the use of this indicator. With the Heinrich pyramid of common causation of accidents and incidents, focus has turned to the use of incident data—particularly loss-of-separation (LoS) incidents between aircraft in airspace—for safety indicators. This paper uses LoS data from New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom to develop safety indicators specific to a particular airspace. A survey of previous research on factors affecting LoS incidents led to the selection of seven variables: airspace environment, altitude, traffic profile of the pair of aircraft in conflict, presence of one aircraft in altitude transition, geometrical configuration, causal agent (i.e., last human instigator of the incident), and degree of severity or risk of collision (i.e., level of risk reached during the LoS incident). A high-le...

Use of Living PSA and Safety Indicators to Support Operational Safety Management

The fundamental principle in the safety technology of nuclear power is embodied in the strategy of defence in depth. Completed with PSA logic model and structure, it provides an appropriate framework for an identification and structuring of the safety performance areas. The following performance areas have been defined: Safety Management, Control of Operation, Safety Functions and Physical Barriers. Safety management includes that also approaches such as PSA and safety indicators are used for continuous monitoring and control the safety of a nuclear power plant. Their use would thus supplement the use of Technical Specifications. VTT has developed safety indicators and living PSA which are illustrated in this paper. It is recommended that living PSA and safety indicators become parts of the plant technical documentation and information system.