Deterrence In Cyberspace Research Articles

SOME UNITED STATES OF AMERICA APPROACHES TO CYBER DETERRENCE

The intensive development of information and communication technologies and the digitalization of all spheres of public life create not only conditions for the progressive development of mankind but are also accompanied by the emergence of new threats in cybernetic space. In the context of unprecedented scientific and technological progress, information flows are rapidly growing, while the number of malicious cyber-attacks on the information infrastructure of countries is increasing. To prevent and combat cyber threats, some States turn to the theory and practice of the concept of deterrence. The article examines the approaches of the United States to deterrence in cyberspace. The authors analyzed the conceptual apparatus, while the cybernetic space and the information space are considered as a part and a whole. Based on the analysis of the provisions of the US guiding documents on strategic planning, the evolution of the views of the American administration on deterrence in cyberspace is being investigated. It is concluded that cyber support has become one of the priorities in US defense policy, it is based on the integrated use of all instruments of state power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal), the conduct of offensive cyber operations not only in wartime, but also in peacetime, the development of inter-domain cooperation with allies and partners, the use of new artificial intelligence and quantum computing technologies. The conceptual approaches of American scientists to conducting deterrence operations in cyberspace at various stages of the development of a military conflict and the use of public attribution of cyber-attacks are studied. The influence of cyber deterrence on international information security and national security of Russia is considered.

Assessing Attribution and Credible Deterrence in Cyberspace

This study examines the issues that states face in discerning actors within the realm of cyberspace, characterizing these challenges as akin to navigating the unregulated landscape. Lack of an effective attribution mechanism and a credible deterrence framework have significantly contributed to the volatility in cyber domain in contemporary times. This paper argues that states often accuse their adversaries of orchestrating cyber-attacks against them, yet they frequently fail to provide substantial evidence because actors behind attacks in cyberspace leverage the inherent anonymity of cyberspace to evade accountability, complicating the process of attribution even further. In addition, this study also underscores the importance of establishing an effective mechanism of deterrence in cyberspace to dissuade the attacking actors from engaging in malicious cyber activities. In line with this, this paper looks at the cyber space activities through novel perspective of no biasness, without subjectivity and tends to offer the answers of why attribution is problem, is there any possible solution to it in practice. Therefore, this study aims to highlight the ways to attribute the cyber-attacks and highlight the challenges to attribution, especially in the current scenario of states sponsoring indirectly cyber-attacks against many other states by outsourcing their aggressive designs in cyberspace to non-state actors.

Options for Signalling Cyber Deterrence Using Cyber Capabilities

The possibility of demonstrating power in cyberspace to create deterrence is a controversial topic. The desire of states to hide their true cyber capabilities leads to a reluctance to reveal their existing cyber power. However, the core idea of deterrence involves demonstrating power and signalling the will to use it so that the potential aggressor would find it less tempting to carry out aggression. Several studies attempt to solve the challenges related to cyber deterrence with a holistic approach, where deterrence in cyberspace is produced as part of a comprehensive deterrence using all instruments of state power, such as diplomatic, information, military, economic and legal capabilities. In turn, some studies argue that for credibility, cyber deterrence must include measures implemented specifically in cyberspace because cyberattacks can only be responded to in real-time with cyber capabilities. This paper argues that demonstrating cyber power is both necessary and profitable for the credibility of deterrence, although the nature of cyberspace and related technologies pose some limitations. This study examines the possibilities of demonstrating cyber power in concrete ways and aims to add a new perspective to academic debate. Cyber deterrence is investigated from the perspective of classical deterrence theory, including deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. By examining cyber deterrence literature using content analysis, deterrents that can be produced with cyber capabilities are defined, and examples of means to produce these effects are presented. According to the central observation of the study, a state can choose whether to demonstrate cyber power by revealing the victories achieved in real-life cyber battles, by demonstrating force in another state's cyberterritory or by disclosing selected capabilities in separate simulations without a real-life connection.

A New Interpretation of Integrated Deterrence: Physical and Virtual Strategies

The integrated deterrence strategy, backstopped by nuclear deterrent, calls for seamless collaboration in deterrence across warfighting domains, using all instruments of national power, and with allies and partners. Being a warfighting domain and being closely related to the information instrument of national power, the cyber domain should certainly be included, and cyber deterrence should play a significant role in the integrated deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, as cyber deterrence seems not to be as effective as it is expected at least currently, some scholars and practitioners doubt its mere existence, not mentioning the role that it can play in the integrated deterrence strategy. This paper argues that not having deterrence in cyberspace leaves a blank spot in the strategy since some critical functionality of deterrence in cyberspace cannot easily be replaced. By recognizing the unique strategic context of cyberspace, the paper maintains that deterrent effect can actually be achieved in unique ways in this space. To further explore the unique role that deterrence in cyberspace plays within the integrated deterrence strategy, this paper proposes a multi-level and multi-aspect architecture for integrated deterrence strategy. This novel architecture is able to cover varied levels of strategic environments both below and above the threshold of armed conflict. It is also able to correlate varied deterrent measures with varied strategic environments categorized via various aspects, such as diplomacy, information, military, economy, etc. This paper shows that the inclusion of deterrence in cyberspace can empower the strategy by making the strategy flexible enough in tackling various challenges. Eventually, the strategy can make its contribution in preventing war and maintaining peace.

The Concept of Comprehensive Security as a Tool for Cyber Deterrence

Cyber deterrence is often studied from the point of view of deterrence by punishment or offensive cyber strategies. A vast amount of studies claim that deterrence in cyberspace can never be successful with cyber means alone due to technical challenges and the problem of attribution. Some scholars argue that cyber resilience is an essential part of cyber deterrence, since not every cyberattack can be countered. These reviews are usually technical and concentrate on investigating the balance of offensive and defensive cyber strategies. The technical view leaves gaps in the physical and cyber-persona layers of cyberspace. This paper examines resilience from a societal perspective and reflects on the findings of cyber deterrence theories. The Concept of Comprehensive Security (CCS) is a Finnish model for building and sustaining resilience in society. Preparation for disruptive situations is carried out with the operating principle of overall safety, where society´s vital functions are protected in collaboration between the authorities, the business world, organisations, and citizens. The growing importance of cyber security has led to emphasising the importance of cyber resilience in the Concept of Comprehensive Security. This study investigates the possibilities to utilize the CCS as a tool for cyber deterrence and aims to create a new perspective on the international academic discussion of cyber deterrence. The research method is content analysis. The investigated material consists of Finnish CCS documents, as well as academic cyber deterrence and cyber resilience literature. The characteristics of the CCS are compared to the factors found in the cyber deterrence material to answer the research question. The key observation presented in this study is that a comprehensive approach to building resilience in the society is essential for the credibility of cyber deterrence. Resilience in cyberspace should be viewed from the perspective of every layer, including logical, physical and cyber-persona layers.

Deterrence and the Problem of Attribution in Cyberspace: An Analysis of Vulnerabilities and Options for Pakistan

This study examines the concept of deterrence and the problem of attribution in cyberspace. Unlike conventional deterrence, deterrence in cyberspace is perplexing, and the problem of attribution makes it even more complex. However, the advancement of technology and its sophistication have made deterrence in cyberspace, as well as attribution, relevant. States in the context of cyber rivalry employ different strategies to deter their rivals in cyberspace, such as threat of punishment, denial by defense, entanglement, etc. This study further argues that the threat of punishment is relatively less effective as compared to denial by defense and entanglement because robust infrastructure and a resilient system would imbalance the cost-benefit equation, making the attack futile and costly. Furthermore, this study suggests that investing in and advancing scientific capabilities, as well as strengthening infrastructure and defense capabilities, would help improve attribution forensics while improving the deterrence capability of states in general, and Pakistan in particular. This would make the attacking states realize that the costs of attacks would exceed the benefits.

Deterrence by denial in cyberspace

ABSTRACT Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence by punishment are mismatched to deterrence challenges in cyberspace. Instead, we advocate for a deterrence by denial approach, but one that is oriented around counter-cyber operations rather than simply improving defenses. While there has been some scholarship and work by practitioners that implicitly rests on a deterrence by denial logic, they suffer from a lack of systematic assessment of how traditional denial concepts, especially those developed in the conventional deterrence literature, could be extended to cyberspace. Therefore, in this article, we review different deterrence concepts in theory and practice, articulate a logic of cyber deterrence by denial, and provide policy recommendations for the United States.

Whoever Comes to Us With a Cyber Sword: Russian and U.S. Approaches to Deterrence in Cyberspace

Developed in recent decades, the understanding of cyberspace as an environment in which a state can face serious threats to its security has contributed to a search for ways to prevent such threats. In the military and political spheres, the concept of deterrence has become one of the ways to solve this problem. During the Cold war, the policy of deterrence became central to the strategic thought in the leading countries, but the direct transfer of conventional approaches to a new reality turns out to be problematic. On the one hand, this opens up a debate about the ways to attain deterrence in cyberspace via traditional and new mechanisms. However, theoretical discussions on cyberspace deterrence highlight the limitations of this concept. At the same time, despite some uncertainties that stem from such a transfer, in practice, the leading states use the concept of deterrence in the context of their activities related to cyberspace, although they implement it differently. In this regard, the article suggests focusing on states’ interpretation of deterrence when designing and implementing their policies in this area, rather than on the problems of applying the concept of deterrence. Such a constructivist approach allows to reveal the peculiarities of the understanding of deterrence without considering them predetermined and identify common aspects of views. Using Russia and the United States as examples, we studied specific features of the application of the deterrence concept in respect to cyberspace in official documents and in the course of the practical implementation of their provisions. The analysis shows that countries interpret the concept of cyberspace deterrence in diff erent ways, with an emphasis on specific deterrence strategies. At the same time, Russia and the United States influenced each other while developing views on deterrence.

Deterrence in Cyberspace: An Interdisciplinary Review of the Empirical Literature

Deterrence in Cyberspace: An Interdisciplinary Review of the Empirical Literature

Deterrence in Cyberspace: a Silver Bullet or a Sacred Cow?

This commentary briefly reviews the challenges associated with the concept of cyber deterrence. It considers the concept of deterrence more broadly before identifying the specific issues that make both deterrence by denial and by punishment particularly difficult in cyberspace. However, overall, it argues that the concept is valid and indeed essential in contributing to delivering strategic stability.