Destination-based Cash-flow Tax Research Articles

Breaking the Double Tax Paradigm

The success story of economic globalization is often linked to an increased freedom of capital movement, facilitated by the existence of more than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties, the primary purpose of which is to prevent double taxation. Even the most outspoken critics of the international tax regime subscribe to the notion that double taxation is detrimental to global growth, development and welfare. Yet, they argue that, all things considered, tax treaties might not be worth signing. Based on an extensive review of the available tax policy and economics literature, this article shows that there is not enough of a normative or empirical basis for thinking that double taxation will necessarily restrict capital flows, provided that the combined effective tax burden is kept at a reasonable level. At the same time, treaties seem to provide investors with a legal certainty that is key to cross-border business activity. This article posits that there should be more emphasis on the legal certainty aspect of tax treaties and less on their limited capacity to prevent double taxation. In fact, relaxing the double tax paradigm could help to significantly improve tax treaties, with a view to preserving their role in fostering international commerce and investment. In this respect, the authors propose a simplified tax treaty model that, by allowing an agreed overlap between home-state and host-state taxes, would diminish overall implementation costs while increasing legal certainty and reducing the risk of lengthy tax disputes, thus benefiting both taxpayers and tax administrations. The article further demonstrates that this approach is superior to the current Pillar One proposal and other popular systemic reform suggestions in the literature, specifically the destination-based cashflow tax (DBCFT) and global formulary apportionment.

Some Thoughts on the Relationship between the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and VAT

Some Thoughts on the Relationship between the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and VAT

Tax induced transfer pricing under universal adoption of the destination-based cash-flow tax

Tax induced transfer pricing under universal adoption of the destination-based cash-flow tax

Tax Induced Transfer Pricing Under Universal Adoption of the Destination-Based Cash-Flow Tax

Tax Induced Transfer Pricing Under Universal Adoption of the Destination-Based Cash-Flow Tax

Revenue Implications of Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation

We estimate the revenue implications of a destination-based cash-flow tax (DBCFT) for 80 countries. On a global average, DBCFT revenues under unchanged tax rates would remain similar to the existing corporate income tax (CIT) revenue, but with sizable redistribution of revenue across countries. Countries are more likely to gain revenue if they have trade deficits, are not reliant on the resource sector, and/or—perhaps surprisingly—are developing economies. DBCFT revenues tend to be more volatile than CIT revenues. Moreover, we consider the revenue losses resulting from spillovers in case of unilateral implementation of a DBCFT. Results suggest that these spillover effects are sizeable if the adopting country is large and globally integrated. These spillovers generate strong revenue-based incentives for many—but not all—other countries to follow the DBCFT adoption.

Is VAT Also a Corporate Tax? Untangling Tax Burdens and Benefits for Companies

The Great Financial Crisis has increased concerns about whether corporations are paying a ‘fair’ amount of tax in different countries. This begs the question of what a ‘fair’ amount of tax is. The question is complicated by the continuing lack of clarity about the economic incidence of corporate income tax. Recently, it has been argued that the location of the sales revenue (turnover) of a corporation is relevant in determining the fair allocation. Of course, in many countries there is already a tax based on sales, value-added tax (VAT), also called goods and services tax (GST). This paper explores an illustration, arising from a series of cases before the European Court of Justice, of how VAT can impose a burden on corporations. The illustration raises issues of principle for VAT, but also offers lessons about how we tax corporations, particularly given proposals such as for digital sales taxes in the EU and the idea of a destination-based cash-flow tax included in legislative proposals in the US in 2016. This article explores the puzzles raised by the illustration and shows how it can throw light not only on the nature of VAT but also on the incidence of corporate income tax.

Don't Blame It on WTO Law: An Analysis of the Alleged WTO Law Incompatibility of Destination-Based Taxes

The idea that corporations should be taxed in the jurisdiction where they make their sales or provide their services is getting more and more attention in the policy debate on international taxation. In 2016, U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed to introduce a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) in order to reform the United States’ corporate income tax (CIT). Moreover, in the last few years, more and more countries have considered the adoption of new rules to tax the digital economy in the country where the users and/or the consumers are located.These proposals differ from traditional direct taxes imposed on corporations. They borrow from the tax design of indirect taxes, such as sales taxes or value added taxes. Consequently, it is difficult to predict whether these sui generis destination-basedtaxes will fit in with superior legal provisions, in particular international tax and trade law. One recurring legal argument against destination-based taxes is that they are likely to violate the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO).Using the DBCFT as a case study, this Article will assess the different conflicts that could arise between new types of destination-based taxes and international trade law. Based on a critical approach informed by the analysis of the history and case law surroundingdestination-based taxes, this Article concludes that the likelihood that a DBCFT would be found incompatible with international trade law is much lower than past legal scholars have concluded. WTO law does not in itself prevent countries from adopting such taxes. Since this conclusion could be extended by analogy to other, new types of destination-basedtaxes, this Article could have important implications for policymakers who are willing to move towards taxation in the country of destination.

Unilateral tax reform: Border adjusted taxes, cash flow taxes, and transfer pricing

We study the economic effects of unilateral adoption of corporate tax policies that include the choice between destination-based and source-based taxation and between cash flow and income taxes. We utilize a heterogeneous firm model in which monopolistically competitive North firms choose whether to outsource an intermediate good to an unrelated South firm or to produce in a subsidiary in the South. Standard pass through arguments no longer apply because of the income shifting behavior of multinationals and endogenous choice of organizational form. The high tax North country will prefer a destination-based tax over a source-based tax if it adopts a cash flow tax, but whether the cash flow tax is preferred to an income tax will depend on the volume of trade in the differentiated products sector. If the high tax country adopts a destination-based cash flow tax, the low tax country will prefer a destination-based income tax to capture rents from the foreign subsidiaries.

A destination-based allowance for corporate equity

Following renewed academic and policy interest in the destination-based principle for taxing profits—particularly through a destination-based cash-flow tax (DBCFT)—this paper studies other forms of efficient destination-based taxes. Specifically, it analyzes the Destination-Based Allowance for Corporate Equity (DBACE) and Allowance for Corporate Capital (DBACC). It describes adjustments that are required to turn an origin into a destination-based version of these taxes. These include adjustments to capital and equity, which are additional to the border adjustments needed under a DBCFT. The paper finds that the DBACC and DBACE reduce profit shifting and tax competition, but cannot fully eliminate them, with the DBACE more sensitive than the DBACC. Overall, given the potential major political cost of switching from an origin to a destination-based tax system, we conclude that advantages of the DBCFT are likely to outweigh the transitional advantages of the DBACE/DBACC.

Residual Profit Allocation by Income

This paper is a draft chapter of a forthcoming book on the taxation of international business profit by the authors of this paper, to be published by Oxford University Press. The group has been meeting regularly for five years, to identify and discuss the key problems of the existing international tax system, and to develop potential options for reform. The book will study two proposals for reform in depth. One is the destination-based cash flow tax – a draft chapter on this proposal has already been released. The second proposal – for a form of residual profit allocation - is presented here. This paper is largely self-standing and can be read without necessarily reading the rest of the book, although it does refer in places to arguments set out in other draft chapters.

Corporate Tax Reform

This paper uses a multi-region, forward-looking, DSGE model to estimate the macroeconomic impact of a tax reform that replaces a corporate income tax (CIT) with a destination-based cash-flow tax (DBCFT). Two key channels are at play. The first channel is the shift from an income tax to a cash-flow tax. This channel induces the corporate sector to invest more, boosting long-run potential output, GDP and consumption, but crowding out consumption in the short run as households save to build up the capital stock. The second channel is the shift from a taxable base that comprises domestic and foreign revenues, to one where only domestic revenues enter. This leads to an appreciation of the currency to offset the competitiveness boost afforded by the tax and maintain domestic investment-saving equilibrium. The paper demonstrates that spillover effects from the tax reform are positive in the long run as other countries’ exports benefit from additional investment in the country undertaking the reform and other countries’ domestic demand benefits from improved terms of trade. The paper also shows that there are substantial benefits when all countries undertake the reform. Finally, the paper demonstrates that in the presence of financial frictions, corporate debt declines under the tax reform as firms are no longer able to deduct interest expenses from their profits. In this case, the tax shifting results in an increase in the corporate risk premia, a near-term decline in output, and a smaller long-run increase in GDP.

Revenue Implications of Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation

We estimate the revenue implications of a Destination Based Cash Flow Tax (DBCFT) for 80 countries. On a global average, DBCFT revenues under unchanged tax rates would remain similar to the existing corporate income tax (CIT) revenue, but with sizable redistribution of revenue across countries. Countries are more likely to gain revenue if they have trade deficits, are not reliant on the resource sector, and/or—perhaps surprisingly—are developing economies. DBCFT revenues tend to be more volatile than CIT revenues. Moreover, we consider the revenue losses resulting from spillovers in case of unilateral implementation of a DBCFT. Results suggest that these spillover effects are sizeable if the adopting country is large and globally integrated. These spillovers generate strong revenue-based incentives for many—but not all—other countries to follow the DBCFT adoption.

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Revenue Implications of Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation

We estimate the revenue implications of a Destination Based Cash Flow Tax (DBCFT) for 80 countries. On a global average, DBCFT revenues under unchanged tax rates would remain similar to the existing corporate income tax (CIT) revenue, but with sizable redistribution of revenue across countries. Countries are more likely to gain revenue if they have trade deficits, are not reliant on the resource sector, and/or—perhaps surprisingly—are developing economies. DBCFT revenues tend to be more volatile than CIT revenues. Moreover, we consider the revenue losses resulting from spillovers in case of unilateral implementation of a DBCFT. Results suggest that these spillover effects are sizeable if the adopting country is large and globally integrated. These spillovers generate strong revenue-based incentives for many—but not all—other countries to follow the DBCFT adoption.

Revenue Implications of Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation

We estimate the revenue implications of a Destination Based Cash Flow Tax (DBCFT) for 80 countries. On a global average, DBCFT revenues under unchanged tax rates would remain similar to the existing corporate income tax (CIT) revenue, but with sizable redistribution of revenue across countries. Countries are more likely to gain revenue if they have trade deficits, are not reliant on the resource sector, and/or-perhaps surprisingly-are developing economies. DBCFT revenues tend to be more volatile than CIT revenues. Moreover, we consider the revenue losses resulting from spillovers in case of unilateral implementation of a DBCFT. Results suggest that these spillover effects are sizeable if the adopting country is large and globally integrated. These spillovers generate strong revenue-based incentives for many-but not all-other countries to follow the DBCFT adoption.

Don’t Blame It on WTO Law: An Analysis of the Alleged WTO Law Incompatibility of Destination-Based Taxes

The idea that corporations should be taxed in the jurisdiction where they make their sales or provide their services is getting more and more attention in the policy debate on international taxation. In 2016, U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed to introduce a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) in order to reform America’s corporate income tax (CIT). Moreover, in the last few years, more and more countries have considered the adoption of new rules to tax the digital economy in the country where the users and/or the consumers are located. These proposals differ from traditional direct taxes imposed on corporations. They borrow from the tax design of indirect taxes, such as sales taxes or value added taxes. Consequently, it is difficult to predict whether these sui generis destination-based taxes will fit in with superior legal provisions, in particular international tax and trade law. One recurring legal argument against destination-based taxes is that they are likely to violate the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Using the DBCFT as a case study, this Article will assess the different conflicts that could arise between new types of destination-based taxes and international trade law. Based on a critical approach informed by the analysis of the history and case-law surrounding destination-based taxes, this Article concludes that the likelihood for a DBCFT to be found incompatible with international trade law is much lower than past legal scholars have concluded. WTO law does not in itself prevent countries from adopting such taxes. Since this conclusion could be extended by analogy to other, new types of destination-based taxes, this Article could have important implications for policy-makers who are willing to move towards taxation in the country of destination.

Corporate Tax Reform: From Income to Cash Flow Taxes

This paper uses a multi-region, forward-looking, DSGE model to estimate the macroeconomic impact of a tax reform that replaces a corporate income tax (CIT) with a destination-based cash-flow tax (DBCFT). Two key channels are at play. The first channel is the shift from an income tax to a cash-flow tax. This channel induces the corporate sector to invest more, boosting long-run potential output, GDP and consumption, but crowding out consumption in the short run as households save to build up the capital stock. The second channel is the shift from a taxable base that comprises domestic and foreign revenues, to one where only domestic revenues enter. This leads to an appreciation of the currency to offset the competitiveness boost afforded by the tax and maintain domestic investment-saving equilibrium. The paper demonstrates that spillover effects from the tax reform are positive in the long run as other countries' exports benefit from additional investment in the country undertaking the reform and other countries' domestic demand benefits from improved terms of trade. The paper also shows that there are substantial benefits when all countries undertake the reform. Finally, the paper demonstrates that in the presence of financial frictions, corporate debt declines under the tax reform as firms are no longer able to deduct interest expenses from their profits. In this case, the tax shifting results in an increase in the corporate risk premia, a near-term decline in output, and a smaller long-run increase in GDP.

BAT Signals from Asset Markets: Estimating the U.S. Dollar Response to a Destination-Based Cash-Flow Tax

In early 2017, there was substantial discussion about changing the U.S. corporate tax system to a destination-based cash-flow tax (DBCFT). The DBCFT proposal, also often referred to as a border-adjusted tax (BAT), would exclude exports from taxable revenues and exclude imports from allowable deductions.

The Known Unknowns of the Business Tax Reforms Proposed in the House Republican Blueprint

This set of slides raises important issues and questions concerning the potential effects of a border-adjusted destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) as proposed in the 2016 House Blueprint “A Better Way.” This will form the basis for an article forthcoming in the Columbia Tax Journal. Citations have been omitted here.

Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting

We model the effects of cash-flow taxes, differing according to the location of the tax, on the behavior of a multinational producing and selling in two countries with three sources of economic rent: a fixed basic-production factor (located with initial production), mobile managerial skill, and a fixed final production factor (located with consumption). In general, governments face trade-offs in choosing between alternative taxes. A source-based cash-flow tax creates welfare-impairing production and consumption distortions, but falls partially on firm owners who may be nonresident. By contrast, a destination-based cash-flow tax does not distort behavior, but falls only on domestic residents. (JEL F23, H25, H87)