Design Of P4P Programs Research Articles

Exploring frontliners' knowledge, participation and evaluation in the implementation of a pay-for-performance program (PMAQ) in primary health care in Brazil

PurposeThis paper employs implementation theory and the political literature on performance measurement to understand how frontline health workers know, participate and evaluate the Brazilian National Program for Improving Access and Quality of Primary Care (PMAQ, 2nd round).Design/methodology/approachThis paper develops an implementation theory-driven qualitative analysis. The research is developed in the city of Goiania (Brazil): a challenging organizational context in primary care (PHC). Interviews were carried out with 25 frontliners – managers, doctors, nurses and community health workers. Data were thematically and hierarchically analysed according to theoretical concepts such as policy knowledge, policy adherence, forms of accountability, alternative logics, organizational capacity and policy feedback.FindingsResults show the need to foster organizational capacity, knowledge, participation and policy feedback at the frontline. Successful implementation would require those adaptations to counteract policy challenges/failures or the emergence of alternative logics.Research limitations/implicationsThe study was conducted in only one setting, however, our sample includes different types of professionals working in units with different levels of organization capacity, located in distinct HDs, expressing well the implementation of PMAQ/P4P. Qualitative researches need to be developed for further exploring the same/other factors.Social implicationsFindings can be used to improve discussions/planning and design of P4P programs in the city and State of Goias.Originality/valueThe majority of analysis of PMAQ are of a quantitative or results-based nature. This article focuses on politically significant and unanswered questions regarding the implementation of PMAQ.

LINK BETWEEN PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT MECHANISMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE DIABETES MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE IN ONTARIO

Pay for performance (P4P) incentives for physicians are generally designed as additional payments that can be paired with any existing payment mechanism such as a salary, fee-for-services and capitation. However, the link between the physician response to performance incentives and the existing payment mechanisms is still not well understood. In this article, we study this link using the recent primary care physician payment reform in Ontario as a natural experiment and the Diabetes Management Incentive as a case study. Using a comprehensive administrative data strategy and a difference-in-differences matching strategy, we find that physicians in a blended capitation model are more responsive to the Diabetes Management Incentive than physicians in an enhanced fee-for-service model. We show that this result implies that the optimal size of P4P incentives vary negatively with the degree of supply-side cost-sharing. These results have important implications for the design of P4P programs and the cost of their implementation.

Healthcare organizations’ attitudes toward pay-for-performance in Korea

This study was conducted to assess views of healthcare organizations on pay-for-performance (P4P) in terms of its design, possible effects, and unintended consequences. This is a cross-sectional, self-administered, internet-based survey. Eligible healthcare organizations were 3605 organizations in Korea. Healthcare organizations of 522, including 31 tertiary teaching hospitals, 182 general hospitals, 158 hospitals, and 152 clinics, were participated in this survey. Rates of awareness and support of P4P, preferred P4P program design, and possible effects and unintended consequences resulting from the P4P program were identified. There were variations in the awareness and support from the type of healthcare organization. The preferred design was quite different from the current design of the P4P program. They believed that the P4P program would not have a significant economic impact on their organizations, but that the P4P program could stimulate positive changes in their practice behaviors. They also showed considerable concerns about unintended consequences. P4P implementing agency such as HIRA in Korea should make an effort to improve healthcare organizations’ understanding of the program. Also, HIRA could take into consideration of reflecting their reasonable opinions regarding its design components and unintended consequences.

Link between Pay for Performance Incentives and Physician Payment Mechanisms: Evidence from the Diabetes Management Incentive in Ontario

Pay for performance (P4P) incentives for physicians are generally designed as additional payments that can be paired with any existing payment mechanism such as salary, fee-for-service, and capitation. However, the link between the physician response to performance incentives and the existing payment mechanisms is still not well understood. In this paper, we study this link using the recent primary care reform in Ontario as a natural experiment and the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) as a case study. Using a comprehensive administrative data and a difference-indifferences matching strategy, we find that physicians in a blended capitation model are more responsive to the DMI than physicians in an enhanced fee-for-service model. We show that for a given payment mechanism this result implies that the optimal size of P4P incentives varies negatively with the degree of supply-side cost sharing. These results have important implications for the design of P4P programs and the cost of their implementation.

Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs

Pay for performance (P4P) is increasingly being used to stimulate healthcare providers to improve their performance. However, evidence on P4P effectiveness remains inconclusive. Flaws in program design may have contributed to this limited success. Based on a synthesis of relevant theoretical and empirical literature, this paper discusses key issues in P4P-program design. The analysis reveals that designing a fair and effective program is a complex undertaking. The following tentative conclusions are made: (1) performance is ideally defined broadly, provided that the set of measures remains comprehensible, (2) concerns that P4P encourages “selection” and “teaching to the test” should not be dismissed, (3) sophisticated risk adjustment is important, especially in outcome and resource use measures, (4) involving providers in program design is vital, (5) on balance, group incentives are preferred over individual incentives, (6) whether to use rewards or penalties is context-dependent, (7) payouts should be frequent and low-powered, (8) absolute targets are generally preferred over relative targets, (9) multiple targets are preferred over single targets, and (10) P4P should be a permanent component of provider compensation and is ideally “decoupled” form base payments. However, the design of P4P programs should be tailored to the specific setting of implementation, and empirical research is needed to confirm the conclusions.

Qualitative Insights Into How Pediatric Pay-for-Performance Programs Are Being Designed

Pediatric pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are proliferating, and little is known about them. The goal of this study is to better understand how these programs began, and how they are designed and implemented from the perspectives of those with experience running pediatric P4P programs. Cross-sectional semistructured interviews with named program directors and key supporting staff from 11 of 17 publicly described pediatric P4P programs that have been in operation for at least 1 year (commercial and Medicaid sponsored) regarding their program's beginning, design, top challenges and recommendations, impact, and considerations regarding the needs of children with chronic health conditions. Eleven programs have allocated approximately $221 million toward pediatric P4P efforts by means of both bonus and penalty incentives, potentially affecting 4.3 million children. They struggle with involving pediatricians, desiring more vetted pediatric performance measures and strategies for generally dealing with small sample sizes, and targeting the quality of care delivered to children with chronic health conditions, but they generally view these efforts to be effective. Those with experience running these early pediatric P4P programs show that pediatricians have not necessarily been involved in program design, face basic uncertainties of P4P program design, and generally do not target the care provided to children with chronic health conditions. They desire greater input from physicians who care for children and vetted pediatric measures, and they need help facing methodological challenges, such as small sample size and risk adjustment.