Descriptive Psychology Research Articles

Two Cheers for Psychologic--and Three Reservations

My first cheer is for what Smedslund has done for the discipline of psychology by his lonely attempt to explicate and formalize the logical structure of ordinary language dealing with psychological topics. The proposition that a coherent structure of logically connected terms must underlie successful communication and the effective coordination of everyday social interaction seems irrefutable, and some version of this proposition has been held by numerous modem thinkers (to mention only a few-Harre & Secord, 1973; Ossorio, 1966, 1969/1978, 1971/1978; Ryle, 1949; Wittgenstein, 1953). The task that Smedslund, however, has taken on is the presentation of substantial body of this logic in an authoritative manner. Among the critics of conventional psychology, Smedslund and Ossorio stand out in their commitment to developing systematic, formal alternatives to the pseudoempiricism so common in our science. In this appreciation and critique of psychologic (PL), I draw on conceptual resources first developed explicitly in descriptive psychology by Ossorio (1985; see Shideler, 1988, for a readable brief introduction to descriptive psychology and its major concepts), because they provide clear alternatives to some of the crucial decisions that Smedslund has made, and I believe that it is extremely important to the task of reformulating the social practices of academic psychology to examine critically the alternatives proposed. A second reason for cheering PL is that Smedslund's identification of pseudoempiricality as a metatheoretical concept provides an explanation for the poverty of much psychological theorizing. In Persons (1966), Ossorio did a similar job for the major personality and learning theories of that period, and in Davis (1968) and Ossorio and Davis (1968), I raised similar questions about research on interpersonal attraction and dissonance theory. But granting two of Smedslund's major points-that a coherent structure of logically related terms can be shown to exist and that much modem psychological research is limited in both its depth and relevance by its pseudoempiricality-one may still wish to pursue the task of articulating the logical structure of psychological discourse in a much different way from the approach Smedslund has taken with PL. I offer three reasons for being wary of PL and refer interested readers to sources where they can follow up these briefly stated views. I am wary of PL chiefly because of the following three concerns: (a) Smedslund's choice of conceptual/representational devices for exhibiting the logical structures of everyday behavior, (b) the absence within PL of a systematic criterion for the adequacy of his formulation, and (c) the lack of a substantial body of empirical work that extends the frontiers of psychological knowledge. I deal with each of these concerns in turn.

Human systems analysis in the software engineering curriculum

Software is produced by people, for use by people, most frequently in an organization. As a result, any software engineering project includes related technical objects, concepts, and processes, and human and organizational objects, concepts, and processes. The relations are many and varied, ranging from the most technical to the most specifically human, such as point of view and emotional reaction. Software engineering education must therefore be almost impossibly eclectic. This paper presents a unique approach to the software engineering curriculum, human systems analysis that has been in use at Northern Illinois University for six years. It is designed to enable students to analyze the entire super-system, including the producing community, the software system, and user community, and then use that analysis in all phases of a software project. The curriculum addresses an important area of software engineering in a unique way, is highly unusual in both form and content, and is based on a unique theoretical foundation, Descriptive Psychology.

Connectionism as a Model of Language Learning: Parallels in Foreign Language Teaching

new paradigm for linguistics (43: p. 871) and psychology (47: p. 73) has already arrived. This new paradigm is variously named or parallel distributed processing. As latter name suggests, new discipline comes out of computing sciences, full of terms such as connection and parallel processing elements and under leadership of two specialists in field, James McClelland and David Rumelhart. For language teachers, questions arise: What is it and what relevance does it have for classroom teachers? A direct answer to first question is perhaps difficult for, as Sampson (p. 882) points out, consumers of last paradigm for linguistics were language teachers and literary students turned linguists. They are not likely to understand new paradigm since only computer specialist is fully trained in its intricacies. However, some of terms in are not so new. In fact, connectionism derives from behaviorist era, as Lachter and Bever (p. 234) suggest: The learning models in McClelland & Rumelhart are a complex variant on traditional--or at least Hullean s-r connections formed in time. In addition, like behaviorists, The connectionist focuses on overt behavior (19: p. 89). Most important, is a term which can be used of machines that learn. It provides for computer simulation through scanning of input and adjustment of weights in until desired output is achieved. In words of Fodor and Pylyshyn (p. 6), connectionist networks can be made to learn; this is achieved by modifying on connections as a function of certain kinds of feedback. This learnability is a startling discovery, which is probably reason that Classical transformational theoreticians, if not language teachers, are considering it worthy of attention. Regarding second question posed at beginning of this article, Chomskyan linguists presently argue against viability of as a description of human psychology or language. However, to understand their arguments, some mention of early tenets of Chomsky which so immensely impacted on language teaching, in spite of Chomsky's own apparent lack of interest in this applied domain, is necessary. Furthermore, a brief update on what Chomsky sometimes now refers to as the second major conceptual shift (10 as cited in 12: p. 173), development of principles and parameters of Universal Grammar, is also in order. At same time, language practitioners are cautioned by Chomsky (11: p. 180):

The quality of life scale: A preliminary study with chronic pain patients

Abstract In order to examine the impact of chronic pain on a patient's perceived life quality, a self-report instrument measuring quality of life was developed and administered to a sample (N=393) of chronic pain patients. The Quality of Life Scale (QOLS) defined quality of life as the degree to which a patient perceives several key psychosocial life areas as satisfying or fulfilling. A psychometric analysis of the QOLS showed it to be internally consistent, highly reliable across time, and representative of a single construct. Preliminary validity investigations determined that the QOLS shared variance with measures of psychological distress, pain-related disability, and pain description. These correlations were consistent with the definition of the construct. Although this initial study is promising, further research on the QOLS is needed.

A cognitive system for astronomical image interpretation

The classification of galaxies by morphological type is an important problem of astrophysics. In this paper we propose a new methodology for automating this problem. We present a dynamic network which merges three separate technologies: statistical model fitting, from astronomy; syntactic descriptors, from pattern recognition; and synthetic human judgment, from descriptive psychology.

Descriptive psychology as disciplined phenomenology.

Descriptive psychology as disciplined phenomenology.

Stable Factors in Chronic Pain

In an effort to identify components of the chronic pain experience, a sample of 444 chronic pain patients who had completed a battery of self-report measures was divided into two groups. The data from each group were analyzed using principal components analysis. Four factors emerged for one group of patients, which accounted for 57.6% of the variance and represented the dimensions of psychological distress, pain-related disability, pain description, and pain history. In the other group, five factors emerged that accounted for 64.2% of the variance. These factors represented psychological distress, disability, pain intensity, pain sensation, and pain history. The similarity of these factors across groups suggests that they represent stable dimensions of the patient's pain experience. Research implications and methodological considerations are discussed.

An Exploration of the Role of Description in Psychology as a Descriptive Science

From a phenomenological point of view psychology as a human science is a descriptive science. Psychology as a descriptive science and psychology as an explanatory science are two distinct types of science and should not be viewed as two phases of science. The major arguments of Amedeo Giorgi's theoretical justification of descriptive science are presented. His arguments are the grounds on which two leading questions are explicated: What is description and what is the role of description in qualitative research? In reflecting on the context of gathering, creating and analysing descriptions, a distinction between description1 (concrete life-world descriptions) and description2 (psychological description of a phenomenon) is made. Descriptions are placed in the context of the researcher's interest; the researcher's request for a description by a subject; the subject as a narrator; the meaning of a description as a text; the researcher as a reader of descriptions and the researcher as author of description2. The conclusion consists of what might be ‘good’ descriptions.

Hyperactivity of associations in psychosis.

Disordered associative processes have long been regarded as central to the psychological description of psychotic states such as acute schizophrenia. Previous work is briefly summarised concerning the idea that hyperactive associative processes of thought underlie many of the symptoms of psychosis. The idea is developed further, with respect to several features of the psychotic state. Schneiderian symptoms are seen as a consequence of hyperactive associations of thought, combined with perceptual hypersensitivity characteristic of many psychotic individuals. Anxiety in psychotic states is seen as arising from the great ambiguity of mental images when associations are loosened. A vicious circle between high anxiety and hyperactive associations is postulated. The slow and variable response to neuroleptic treatment is seen as being determined in part by the dynamics of change of the memories acquired during a period of hyperactive associations.

The primacy of place: An investigation in Brentanian ontology

What follows is an investigation of the ontology of Franz Brentano with special reference to Brentano's later and superficially somewhat peculiar doctrine to the effect that the substances of the material world are threedimensional places. Taken as a whole, Brentano's philosophy is marked by three, not obviously compatible, traits. In the first place, his work is rooted in the metaphysics of Aristotle, above all in Aristotle's substanceaccident ontology and in the Aristotelian theory of categories. In the second place, Brentano embraced a Cartesian epistemology. He saw the source of all knowledge as residing in our direct awareness of our own mental phenomena and in our capacity to grasp evident incompatibilities in the realm of concepts.) Thirdly, he regarded the existence of an external world as at most probable, and denied outright the existence of a world similar to the world that is given in experience. Finally, and in some sense linking together these opposing strands, he propagated an idea of what he called "descriptive psychology", a discipline which would on the one hand yield exact knowledge of the structures and categories of mental life, and on the other hand provide an epistemologically sure foundation for other branches of philosophy. As we shall see, it is this psychological aspect of Brentano's philosophy which leads him to his conception of the substantiality of place. Surprisingly, however, the psychological considerations which underlie Brentano's thinking will be shown to raise a series of questions strictly ontological in nature, questions which are not without a systematic interest of

Young children's reasoning about beliefs

We present three investigations of children's early understanding of belief, that is, their knowledge of such internal mental attitudes as thinking, knowing, and guessing. The findings demonstrate that even quite young children, 3-year-olds, understand beliefs as internal mental states separate from desires but joined with desires in a larger belief–desire reasoning scheme. Such young children can appropriately predict actions given information as to a character's beliefs and desires, understand that information about beliefs is a necessary addition to information about desires to explain or predict actions, can appropriately infer the presence or absence of belief given information as to a character's seeing or not seeing a relevant situation, and can predict the appropriate emotional reaction to the outcomes of belief–desire caused actions. The results are situated in a larger description of young children's mentalistic naive psychology.

The Basic Periods in the Child's Mental Development

Abstract One of the chief tasks of age-related psychology is the study of the problem of ascribing periodicity to individual mental development. Only by taking into consideration the general principles whereby that periodicity is constructed can one identify more or less definitely the corresponding age-related periods of that development, and find criteria to confirm those periods, and, most importantly, to explain their concrete distinctive psychological features. A psychological description of a particular age that doesn't rest on some kind of periodization of mental development is less unequivocal. Each age constitutes a qualitatively distinct stage in a person's mental development.

Depressionen som fattigdommens og underudviklingens symptom: Et case-studie af en colombiansk landsby

Eisass, P. (1988). Depression as a symptom of poverty and underdevelopment; a casestudy of a Colombian village. Nordisk Psykologi, 40, 345–357. The author has stayed several times in an isolated Colombian village, inhabited by Indians who have left their original cultural background. The villagers are characterized by a widespread depressive symptomatology. They do not consider themselves mental patients in need of therapy, but consult Indian shamans for healing. A psychological description must therefore use the anthropological differentiation between disease and illness in order to take people's own experience of their symptomatology into account.

Legal issues between psychology and law enforcement

AbstractA state of flux characterized by opinion and debate exists in the field of forensic psychology. Law enforcement psychologists are experiencing a growing need to be conversant with legal issues and decisions that impinge upon them, such as the recent judicial trend toward requiring psychological screening for high risk occupations. This article presents and integrates some of the recent developments and problematic areas in the field. A description of law enforcement psychology, psychological testing for high risk occupations, and the legal and ethical guidelines and problems associated with each is provided. Employee testing, the Frye decision, and the prediction of dangerousness and the duty to warn (protect) are discussed in conjunction with relevant case material and law.

Transpersonal psychology: A reply to Rollo May.

Upon reading Transpersonal or Transcendental? by Rollo May (1986) in the last issue of The Humanistic Psychologist, I could not help but notice how very different his image and description of psychology is from my own. In the spirit of mutual understanding, I offer the following as another way to look at the nature of approaches to psychology. In this rapidly growing Fourth Force in psychology, there exists a number of scholarly attempts to outline, define, and describe the nature of theory and practice (e.g., Boorstein, 1980; Tart, 1975; Walsh & Vaughan, 1980; Wilber, 1980). Regardless of the specific theoretical foundation, however, there remains, for me, an identifiable essence or structure which characterizes any particular approach as transpersonal (see Valle & Harari, 1985). It is this core essence which must be examined if one is to understand psychology. The prefix trans literally means both and as well as across. With this in mind, I feel that May (1986) misses the central point when, in reference to psychology, he concludes that . .it is a contradiction in terms to think one can make a psychology by or 'leaping across'. . .the person (p. 87). Rather than discarding or throwing out our humanness, psychology calls each of us to acknowledge that there is more to being human than just the behaviors, thoughts and emotions which one expresses through his or her personal awareness and individual ego-identity. Self-identity and the process of individuation are truly essential aspects in understanding the human individual, personal aspects which are central to the psychologist's practice, inquiry, and investigation. In addition, however, there is an extensive literature, both ancient and modern, which affirms the existence of human experience which is beyond the level of personal self-awareness, experience in which identity is not confined to the individual mind or more limited sense of self. These aspects or potentials, which express themselves through the medium of our personal emotions and thinking mind, are also a key part of the psychologist's interests.

Psychological Description of Young Schoolchildren's Planning Methods

Analysis of teaching practice shows that success in learning depends, in many respects, on schoolchildren's ability to foresee impending actions, to define different ways of accomplishing an assignment, to analyze the specific features of each variant, and to select the best. The ability of pupils to organize their actions in advance and the premises for the genesis and development of that ability have not been sufficiently studied in psychology, although the planning function of thought has been noted in many investigations, and certain forms of its expression in performing specific tasks have been described.

Max Weber and the Methodology of the Social Sciences.

Huff provides a rare, full-scale study of the origins and development of Max Weber's methodology, which focuses on Weber's neglected early methodological essays that were not translated into English until the 1970s. He explores Weber's writings in light of developments in postempiricist philosophy of science, and shows that Weber was well aware of the epistemological foundations of the descriptive psychology school, whose intellectual heir was Husserl. This volume will help scholars and students understand in the broadest sense the issues central to the logic of social scientifi c explanation, and will appeal to philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, as well as scholars of Weber.

The corporeality of shame: Px and Hx at the bedside.

In order to appreciate the role of the phenomenon of shame in the context of the clinic - both as normal self evaluation and as neurotic response - a philosophical anthropological description of shame is offered. Not only are Biblical metaphors recast , but more recent phenomenological psychological descriptions taken from Max Scheler and others are cited. These necessarily require some account of the patient's body in shame, taken from both his perspective and the physician's. In short, the corporeality of shame is constituted as "ce que enveloppe le corps".

Some constituents of descriptive psychological reflection

We have attempted to delineate various components of the researcher's participation in the reflection phase of descriptive psychology. The characteristic attitude or posture, operations for the comprehension of a particular event, and activities which achieve general knowledge have been touched upon. This presentation is a preliminary attempt to bring into view the complex process of analysis in descriptive research and is intended as an invitation to more faithful and detailed accounts of the process in the future.

A taste of facility. A Sartrean look at psychiatry.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1979) was a French intellectual, philosopher and literateur who stood on a common platform of philosophy and psychology. His importance to us lies not only in his great impact on twentieth century thought, but also because he outlined a fairly elaborate system of descriptive psychology as a prelude to his ontological description of the world. His treatises on 'Imagination' and 'Emotions' are classics in the existential tradition. His novels and plays are based on the same themes as concern a psychiatrist in his daily clinic. His principal text of philosophy, 'Being and Nothingness', contains a whole chapter on 'Existential Psychoanalysis'. Not surprisingly, therefore, he has had a significant impact on our approach to mental patients. With the increasing emphasis on the scientific method, the philosophical moorings of medical science became more and more blurred. The result was an impersonal view of the diseased. Thus during this period it had become common practice to view human beings as objects worthy of study from the disease view point. As a result the disease and its causation became more important than the diseased person himself. It must be granted that progress in medicine often results from this passion with causation. However, a causal view of phenomena presupposes that clarity about the phenomena exists among us. Prior to the problem of establishing the etiological basis of a disease entity, there is the problem of uncovering the phenomenal character of the disease in question. This task may not be formidable in most branches of medicine, but in the case of psychiatry the disease entities are human realities themselves expressed in the life activities of fellow-men. This is where empirical psychology breaks down and why some psychiatrists tend to resort to the existential-ontological departure. The point is to liberate man from the speculative subject-object relationship and to stress his uniqueness and individuality. This movement started with Binswanger (1881-1966) who was the first psychoanalyst to use Heidegger's principles to criticize Freud (4,5). He was in the quest of a genuine psychology (7). There have been other psychiatrists of repute who emulated his example. Some prominent psychologists who have been influenced to varying degrees by existentialism are Allport, Angyal, Fromm, Goldstein, Maslow and Rogers (10). At the same time, existential philosophers have themselves been keenly interested in psychology and psychiatry. Karl Jaspers began life as a psychiatrist and his first major work was his General Psychopathology' (12). Jean-Paul Sartre has been keenly interested in psychology and has written a lot on the subject (17). Admittedly, Sartre's impact on psychiatry and psychotherapy has not been as significant as on literature and politics (7). But he has, along with Heidegger, provided a unification which has helped in the understanding of the normal human mind as well as the abnormal one. The series of steps Sartre took towards his totalization of human experience are of great interest to a psychologist because of his investigation of psychic phenomena in the process. This detailed evaluation of individual phenomena is, he says, the only way we can make psychology progress. His insistence on the unambiguous description of such phenomena is in the great Husserlian tradition (28). Here, we shall take a look at the series of steps Sartre took towards his composite view of human psychology.