Economy Of Deregulation Research Articles

Funding of Agricultural Public Extension Service in a Deregulated Economy: A Study of Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Funding of Ebonyi State Nigeria Agricultural Public Extension Service in a deregulated economy was studied. The specific objectives were to describe the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents; identify the major recommended packages/technologies and services extended to the farmers and examine the trend in the funding of agricultural extension services from 2001 to 2010. A total of 240 contact farmers were selected using a multistage random sampling technique. Data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics. The study found that majority (65.42%) of the respondents were males; had a mean age of 49 years, married; had a relatively large household size of 8 persons; and relatively low educational status. Average farm holding was 0.90 ha and personal savings were the major sources of farm finance. Government funding of the agricultural public extension dwindled throughout the period with budget estimate at the peak of N220.4 m recorded in 2013 and the lowest of about N69.3 m in 2001, whereas the highest actual expenditure was about N99.5 m in 2010 and the lowest amount of about N37.1 m was also recorded in 2009. A big difference between the budget estimate and actual expenditure was observed in 2009 with a budget deficit of about 46.5%. The amount farmers were willing to pay for extension services was not also stable with the highest amount of about N9.2 m in 2005 and least amount of N800,000.00 in 2003. The amount expended by government was higher than the amount farmers are willing to pay with 98.2% difference in 2004. The study indicated that the proportion of farmers willing to pay for extension services is low. This could lead to reduced adoption and utilization of improved technologies and decline in farmers’ and farm productivity in a deregulated economy. Recommendations such as educating farmers on cost of extension services and the need for their contribution, backing up extension services with interest free loans, deregulating extension services in a gradual process and in phases, and improving the country’s educational system were made among others.

Nigerian Energy Billing in A Deregulated Economy for Self-Reliance And Sustainable Development

Electric energy which is placed on top of the energy stratification and its uses at home, industry, agriculture, and in transport is indispensable. Tariffs are ways in which electric utilities derive their income from customers through effective electricity bills. This paper examines and analyses the energy billing in a deregulated economy in terms of its benefits for sustainable development especially for its capacity in eliminating subsidies, improvement in public financing and sale of assets. It as well shows its improvement of macro performance in generation of energy, transmission and distribution system. Moreover, electric energy and billing are cost effective as well as competitive with improved service to consumers while at the same time encouraging private investment, lower consumers’ tariffs. various tariffs system such as flat demand rate, straight rate, block rate, Hopkinson rate, Doherty rate, Wright rate and further proposed two important tariffs demand rate known as Zarma, and Otokpa demand rate. Recommendations were made and finally conclusion were also made that energy is very sensitive to either remain in the hand of government or private alone. Both have a role to play collectively.

The Political Economy of Deregulation in the U.S. Gas Distribution Market

Causes and consequences of deregulation and restructuring in utility markets in US states continue to draw heated debate. It is unclear why different utilities choose retail restructuring, price caps or sliding-scale plans. Various economic and political reasons lend themselves to explaining regulatory decisions. This study uses a stylized capture model to formulate predictions about regulators’ net benefits from a particular form of deregulation. Empirical hazard model evaluates the revealed choice at each regulator-utility pair. Among state-level political factors, frequency and timing of commissioner re-elections, system of selection of commissioners, and party composition of the commissions and state legislatures are significant in explaining the pattern of deregulation. Utilities’ prices, capacity and scope of operations help explain the timing of deregulation. Market concentration contributes. A negative significant association between the prevalence of restructuring (and sliding-scale plans), and of price caps across utility industries is identified.

Managing Free Education Programme in a Partially Deregulated Economy: Nigeria in View

Managing Free Education Programme in a Partially Deregulated Economy: Nigeria in View

Socio-Economomic Characteristics and Profitability of the Contact and Non-Contact Farmers in Oyo Agricultural Zone in a Deregulated Economy

This paper assessed the differences in the socio-economic characteristics and profitability of contact and non-contact farmers in the Oyo zone of the Oyo State Agricultural development project (OYSADEP). Descriptive statistics which include frequency counts, tables and figures were used to analyse cross-sectional data for 80 randomly selected farmers. Gross margin analysis was employed to determine the overall financial returns accruing to both categories of farmers. Results show that (54%) of the contact farmers had more formal education while about 56% of the non-contact farmers did not have. About 60% of contact farmers had no subsidiary occupation. This is about twice the proportion for their non-contact counterparts. The gross margin analysis indicate that the contact farmers but made a profit which is about six times as high as that of the non-contact farmers. The study supports some of the earlier findings that a positive correlation exists between the development of infrastructure and rapid flow of agricultural inputs in the OYSADEP. Ultimately, the study supports earlier suggestion that retaining and further supporting the ADP system will remove the current credibility gap between Government and farmers engendered through frequent changes in government policy, programmes and projects. This suggestion holds a major stake in the drive for food security and poverty alleviation.

Rural Livelihood and Food Consumption Patterns Among Households in Oyo State, Nigeria: Implications for Food Security and Poverty Eradication in a Deregulated Economy

KEYWORDS Rural livelihood; food security; poverty eradication and deregulated economy ABSTRACT Food security is a fundamental objective of development policy and also a measure of its success. Achieving food security is still a major problem for households in most rural areas of Nigeria; therefore the associated symptoms of food crisis are found throughout the country, though with differences based on occupation, agro- ecological, socio-economic factors and rural versus urban location. This paper analyses the livelihood and food consumption patterns among households in rural Oyo State, Nigeria. Analysis of data on a sample survey of rural households in three adjoining local government areas of Oyo State show that a household member consumes N3,465.13 worth of carbohydrate foods; N750.54 of proteins and N191.43 of vitamins. On the average, a household member consumes N1469 wroth of food per month; though with the modal amount skewed towards the civil servants and artisans. Results of the analysis further show that there are short falls of 18% and 11% in carbohydrate and protein intake respectively in three years. The general livelihood patterns indicate that farmers who produce more of food consumed in the study area have the least disposable income to cater for life's basic needs. The results of the study have implications for food security and poverty eradication, especially in a deregulated economy. Therefore, promoting agricultural policies with appropriate price incentives that focus on intensification; diversification and resource-stabilizing innovations will create more wealth for all categories of rural households. In all, more rural financial and agricultural extension services are needed; these will improve the conditions needed for increased productivity and capital accumulation.

Improving Farmers Attitude Towards Natural Resources Management in a Democratic and Deregulated Economy: Honey Production Experience in Oyo State of Nigeria

The study identified the production and management practices involved in honey production; investigated farmers' level of knowledge of honey production; and determined the attitude of farmers towards honey production. Eighty members of the Beekeepers' Association of Nigeria (BAN), Oyo State Chapter, were interviewed through the use of questionnaire in December 2003. The study identified site selection, housing of bees, routine inspection and prevention of swarming, harvesting, processing, packaging, marketing and record keeping as management practices among others. The result showed that the farmers possessed high level of knowledge of honey production (mean knowledge score = 32.5). The result of the hypothesis tested showed significant relationship between attitude of farmers and some selected attributes of knowledge such as source of knowledge (T=3.100); knowledge of ripe honey (T= -2.058); period of harvesting (T=3.497) and method of honey extraction from comb (T=3.008). Farmers in the study area had positive attitude towards honey production and management practice hence, measures should be taken to sustain the favourable attitude of farmers towards honey production.

Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets

Product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents, leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution. It typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects. To study these effects, we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions: monopolistic competition in the goods market, which determines the size of rents; and bargaining in the labor market, which determines the distribution of rents. Product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition. Labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers. We show the effects of deregulation. We then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation, and recent macroeconomic evolutions in Europe.

Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time

We study the employment and distributional effects of regulating (reducing) working time in a general equilibrium model with search-matching frictions. Job creation entails fixed costs, but existing jobs are subject to diminishing returns. We characterize the equilibrium in the de-regulated economy where firms and individual workers freely negotiate wages and hours. Then, we consider the effects of a legislation restricting the maximum working time, while we let wages respond endogenously. Employment effects are sensitive to the representation of preferences. In our benchmark, small reductions in working time, starting from the laissez-faire equilibrium solution, always result in a small increase in the equilibrium employment, while larger reductions reduce employment. The regulation benefits workers, both unemployed and employed (even if wages decrease and even in cases where employment falls), but reduces profits and output.

The political economy of deregulation: The case of intrastate long distance

Observed variation in the decisions of state regulators to deregulate AT&T in the provision of intrastate interLATA telecommunications services provides useful data with which to test the economic theory of regulation against its principal alternative—the public interest theory. An empirical model of the decision to deregulate is specified and estimated. Our results lend empirical support to the economic theory of regulation and fail to support the public interest theory. The results also help to explain the lethargic pace of deregulation of this industry.

Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed"

Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed"

The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia

Research Article| September 01 1989 The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia M. Hadi Soesastro M. Hadi Soesastro Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1960) 29 (9): 853–869. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644831 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation M. Hadi Soesastro; The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey 1 September 1960; 29 (9): 853–869. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644831 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1989 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia

The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia

The Political Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Deregulatory Process. Edited by Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. ii + 164. $15.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

The Political Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Deregulatory Process. Edited by Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. ii + 164. $15.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners

ECONOMISTS increasingly have come to view the regulatory process as a device for transferring wealth among factions in society according to their political clout, but so far it is unclear whether the process has been dominated by the interests of regulated producers, consumers, or some combination of the two.' Relatively little attention has been given in this literature to the rewards that regulators themselves may obtain from the process. One obvious possibility would be for ex-officials to take jobs with firms that were formerly under their jurisdiction. This incentive would be especially strong for regulatory commissioners. Commissioners receive direct salaries that are not large, serve terms of office that are fixed by statute, and face uncertain prospects of reappointment-all of which lead them to take a shorter run view of their situation compared to that of their bureaucratic counterparts in civil service.2 A commission might be viewed as "captured" by regulated firms or related organizations if a large proportion of its membership either has experienced precommission employment or has accepted postcommission employment with such groups. The purpose of this paper is to discover how common this behavior has been.

The Labour Market in a Deregulated Economy

This paper attempts to extend the debate over labour market flexibility by incorporating some of the larger exogenous issues that are currently shaping New Zealand's future as a trading nation. It argues that structural shifts in the face of global price competition have important consequences for labour demand and in turn for both the institutional agencies of industial relations and for operational practices. The increasing importance of the formative role of mu;lti-national corporate practices are also discussed, particularly their tendency to treat labour supply requirements as a special case of factor markets in which the human factor is melded into an integrated socio-economic system. The paper concludes that current changes in labour law have still not addressed the question of the degree of flexibility that a deregulated labour market might require and that the potential for considerable conflict exists between employer and trade union perceptions as to the roles of current institutions.

What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity

What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity