Deployment Of Autonomous Weapon Systems Research Articles

CROSSING BOUNDARIES: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THE CHALLENGE OF IHL COMPLIANCE

The introduction of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) marks a transformative juncture in the modern landscape of warfare. Promising operational efficiency, enhanced soldier safety, cost reduction, and workforce minimization, these systems have ignited a global discourse concerning their compliance with international law and the necessity of comprehensive regulation. This study delves into the multifaceted challenges associated with the deployment of AWS within the context of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) while evaluating their alignment with the principles of IHL, especially in terms of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). The research begins by establishing a fundamental understanding of autonomy, delineating the criteria that define AWS, and addressing their legal categorization—whether they constitute a method of warfare or serve as a replacement for combatants. By employing a diverse range of research methodologies encompassing system analysis, comparative legal analysis, synthesis, comparison, analogy, deduction, classification, interviews, and case studies, this study provides a comprehensive examination of the intricate AWS-IHL relationship. Further depth is added to the theoretical analysis through real-world case studies, including the STM Kargu-2 and the United Nations (UN) expert group's involvement in Libya, offering practical insights into the challenges posed by AWS in armed conflicts. Additionally, consideration is given to the SGR-A1, an autonomous system employed for border safeguarding, further illuminating the complexities of AWS in practice. This research aims to provide a nuanced and insightful understanding of the pressing regulatory and challenges arising from the utilization of AWS within the contemporary framework of IHL.

Value elicitation on a scenario of autonomous weapon system deployment: a qualitative study based on the value deliberation process

Ethical concerns on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) call for a process of human oversight to ensure accountability over targeting decisions and the use of force. To align the behavior of autonomous systems with human values and norms, the Design for Values approach can be used to consciously embody values in the deployment of AWS. One instrument for the elicitation of values during the design is participative deliberation. In this paper, we describe a participative deliberation method and results of a value elicitation by means of the value deliberation process for which we organized two panels each consisting of a mixture of experts in the field of AWS working in military operations, foreign policy, NGO’s and industry. The results of our qualitative study indicate not only that value discussion leads to changes in perception of the acceptability of alternatives, or options, in a scenario of AWS deployment, it also gives insight in to which values are deemed important and highlights that trust in the decision-making of an AWS is crucial.

Autonomous Weapon Systems and Human Control

The deployment of autonomous weapon systems (‘aws’) in military operations is a major concern for the international community. While the military in particular argues that increased autonomy mitigates the risks of death and injury for civilians, scientists and civil society emphasise that humans still have to play a decisive role when increasingly outsourcing core competences to machines. In 2017, a Group of Governmental Experts (‘gge’) met for the first time to discuss legal and ethical issues of aws. The centrepiece of the debate was (and still is) the role humans play in an increasingly automated battlefield. In the past couple of years, consensus has been emerging on the necessity of maintaining human control. It will be argued in this contribution that human control (in abstracto) is not merely a political demand. It is also a legal obligation derived from international humanitarian law (‘ihl’). This contribution seeks to analyse relevant rules of ihl with a specific focus on the legal nature of the Martens Clause arguing that human control (in abstracto) is not only politically desired but that it is legally required. That being said, the various concepts aiming to implement and operationalise human control (in concreto) will be examined with a view to offering solutions for a potential regulatory framework on aws at the United Nations (‘UN’) in Geneva.

Accountability and Control Over Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Framework for Comprehensive Human Oversight

Accountability and responsibility are key concepts in the academic and societal debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems, but these notions are often used as high-level overarching constructs and are not operationalised to be useful in practice. “Meaningful Human Control” is often mentioned as a requirement for the deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems, but a common definition of what this notion means in practice, and a clear understanding of its relation with responsibility and accountability is also lacking. In this paper, we present a definition of these concepts and describe the relations between accountability, responsibility, control and oversight in order to show how these notions are distinct but also connected. We focus on accountability as a particular form of responsibility—the obligation to explain one’s action to a forum—and we present three ways in which the introduction of Autonomous Weapon Systems may create “accountability gaps”. We propose a Framework for Comprehensive Human Oversight based on an engineering, socio-technical and governance perspective on control. Our main claim is that combining the control mechanisms at technical, socio-technical and governance levels will lead to comprehensive human oversight over Autonomous Weapon Systems which may ensure solid controllability and accountability for the behaviour of Autonomous Weapon Systems. Finally, we give an overview of the military control instruments that are currently used in the Netherlands and show the applicability of the comprehensive human oversight Framework to Autonomous Weapon Systems. Our analysis reveals two main gaps in the current control mechanisms as applied to Autonomous Weapon Systems. We have identified three first options as future work for the design of a control mechanism, one in the technological layer, one in the socio-technical layer and one the governance layer, in order to achieve comprehensive human oversight and ensure accountability over Autonomous Weapon Systems.

Moral Values Related to Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Empirical Survey that Reveals Common Ground for the Ethical Debate

In the political debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems strong views and opinions are voiced, but empirical research to support these opinions is lacking. Insight into which moral values are related to the deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems is missing. We describe the empirical results of two studies on moral values regarding Autonomous Weapon Systems that aim to understand the perception of people pertaining to the introduction of Autonomous Weapon Systems. One study consists of a sample of military personnel of the Dutch Ministry of Defense and the second study contains a sample of civilians. The results indicate both groups are more anxious about the deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems than about the deployment of Human Operated drones, and that they perceive Autonomous Weapon Systems to have less respect for the dignity of human life. The concerns for Autonomous Weapon Systems creating new kinds of psychological and moral harm is very present in the public debate, and this is in our opinion one element that deserves to be carefully considered in future debates on the ethics of the design and deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems. The results of these studies reveal a common ground regarding the moral values of human dignity and anxiety pertaining the introduction of Autonomous Weapon Systems which could further the ethical debate.

From the Autonomy Framework towards Networks and Systems Approaches for ‘Autonomous’ Weapons Systems

The legal debate surrounding the development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems (aws) has stagnated in recent years, having arguably hit the hard limits of legal doctrine. At the heart of this impasse lies the focus upon autonomy as both the innovative and defining feature of aws. Thus, the autonomy of the weapons system places it in a legally liminal zone between agent and object, revealing a set of legal problems that revolve around issues of control, influence, responsibility and liability, and questions of legal compliance that follow from the prospect of autonomous lethal decision-making. This paper seeks to explore alternative framings to the same underlying technology as a means of escaping the limits imposed by the autonomy framework that has dominated the debate to date, and to examine the consequences that flow from pursuing these approaches from legal and regulatory perspectives. In particular, emphasis is placed upon the networks approach, and the systems approach, which this paper sets out and differentiates from the orthodox emphasis upon autonomy. These alternative approaches suggest that the legal problems arising from the autonomy framing are the easiest set of issues to address, insofar as these frame legal problems, while the networks and systems approaches seem to touch upon legal mysteries to which no ready legal or regulatory responses can be made. Rather than dismiss the network and systems approaches, however, this paper suggests that appropriate, adequate and robust legal and regulatory responses must consider the insights and challenges that these approaches pose, and that pursuing these approaches will lead to powerful converging arguments supporting a moratorium on the deployment of aws.

Use of Weapons: Should We Ban the Development of Autonomous Weapons Systems?

ABSTRACTThe use of robotic systems in warfare dates back to the Second World War. Recent advances in technology compounded by the need to reduce military budgets while increasing effectiveness have raised the likelihood and desire for increasing levels of autonomy in these robotic systems. Relinquishing control of such platforms to increasingly intelligent and capable artificial intelligence (AI) has led to a public backlash and calls for a ban in their development, backed by many high profile names in AI research as well as the wider scientific community. The purpose of this article is to assess the validity of the arguments for and against the research into, and the development of, autonomous weapons systems (AWS). By answering the question “should we ban the development of autonomous weapons systems?” this article will clear the way for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the deployment of AWS. It will make the case that not only should governments and defense contractors make use of these systems in the future but that to not do so would be to hold back the progress of a range of military technologies that hold the distinct possibility of creating safer more humane battlefields and lower the barriers to entrance of conflict, something much needed by western forces to combat various threats around the globe.

Defining the Emerging Notion of Meaningful Human Controll in Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) 2016

The emerging notion of ‘Meaningful Human Control’ (MHC) was suggested by NGO Article 36 as a possible solution to the challenges that are posed by Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). Various states, NGOs and scholars have welcomed this term. However, the challenge is that MHC is not defined in international law and as of present, there is no literature that extensively or normatively defines it. In this paper, I seek to discuss questions that I consider helpful in defining the MHC. Control that is exercised by humans over weapons they use has been changing in nature and degree. In the beginning, weapons were mere tools in the hands of fighters who exercised direct control. With the invention of technology, there has been considerable automation of control that was previously exercised by humans. The invention of drones has seen remote control of weapons, making it possible for humans to project force while thousands of miles away from the target. On the horizon are AWS, robotic weapons that once activated, do not need any further human intervention. In the case of AWS, humans seem to be ‘surrendering’ or delegating control of weapons to computers. In as much as this may seem convenient, efficient and safe, it raises far reaching concerns. For that reason, many scholars and organisations are insisting that MHC over weapons must be maintained. In order to define MHC, I propose that the international community must ask the following questions: i. What is the purpose of MHC? ii. Who should exercise that MHC over weapons and when? Is it manufacturers, programmers, the individuals who deploy them or all of them? iii. Over what aspects of AWS should one exercise MHC?In answering the above questions, I note that one of the major concerns is that AWS may create a legal responsibility vacuum. For that reason, I suggest that MHC exercised by humans over AWS should be of such a nature that the weapon user is potentially responsible for all ensuing actions of the robots. To define the nature of control that allows responsibility, I consider the international law jurisprudence on the notion of ‘control’ as the basis for responsibility. I point out that such control should be exercised over the ‘critical functions’ of AWS, in particular, those that relate to decision-making. There are already disagreements in the AWS debate as far as what decision-making means. I therefore discuss how that word should be defined as a step towards the definition of MHC.I note there are various actors involved in the development and deployment of AWS. The fundamental question is whether each actor needs to exercise MHC or whether the term should be defined as a cumulative concept – summing up the different roles that are played by designers, roboticists, programmers, manufacturers, states and combatants. I argue that if MHC is meant to be a legal standard upon which the responsibility for use of AWS is determined, then one of the common mistakes among debaters is the attempt to define MHC without a specific actor in mind. The suggestion that the definition of MHC should be a standard focussing on a specific actor is not to imply that there should be only one standard and all other actors should be forgotten. Rather, the term MHC should zero in on each actor, producing separate definitions and standards to which the different actors should adhere to. Because the control that is exercised by the aforementioned actors is subject to different standards, the test for the meaningfulness of the control exercised by each of them ought to be different.

Robots and Respect: A Response to Robert Sparrow

Robert Sparrow recently argued in this journal that several initially plausible arguments in favor of the deployment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in warfare are in fact flawed, and that the deployment of AWS faces a serious moral objection. Sparrow's argument against AWS relies on the claim that they are distinct from accepted weapons of war in that they either fail to transmit an attitude of respect for enemy combatants or, worse, they transmit an attitude of disrespect. In this reply we argue that this distinction between AWS and widely accepted weapons is illusory, and therefore cannot ground a moral difference between AWS and existing methods of waging war. We also suggest that if deploying conventional soldiers in a given situation would be permissible, but we could expect to cause fewer civilian casualties by instead deploying AWS, then it would be consistent with an intuitive understanding of respect to deploy AWS in this situation.

Autonomous Weapons Systems, the Frame Problem and Computer Security

ABSTRACTUnlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are unaffected by psychological factors that would cause them to act outside the chain of command. This is a compelling moral justification for their development and eventual deployment in war. To achieve this level of sophistication, the software that runs AWS will have to first solve two problems: the frame problem and the representation problem. Solutions to these problems will inevitably involve complex software. Complex software will create security risks and will make AWS critically vulnerable to hacking. I claim that the political and tactical consequences of hacked AWS far outweigh the purported advantages of AWS not being affected by psychological factors and always following orders. Therefore, one of the moral justifications for the deployment of AWS is undermined.