Deontological Inclinations Research Articles

When You Think of and Identify Yourself as a Nurse, You Will Become More Deontological and Less Utilitarian.

This study aims to examine how the activation of the role of nursee and professional identification as a nurse can influence moral judgments in terms of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In Study 1, a priming technique was used to assess the impact of activating the nursing concept on moral reasoning. Participants were randomly assigned to either a nursing prime or neutral prime condition. By using a scrambled-sentence task, participants were prompted to think about nursing-related or neutral thoughts. Following the priming task, participants were asked to respond to 20 moral dilemmas. The process dissociation approach was employed to measure the degree of deontological and utilitarian tendencies in their moral reasoning. In Study 2, participants completed the nursing profession identification scale and the moral orientation scale before engaging in moral judgments similar to those in Study 1. The findings revealed that priming the concept of being a nursee resulted in an increase in deontological clinical inclinations while having no significant effect on utilitarian inclinations. Additionally, a positive correlation was observed between identification with the nursing profession and deontological clinical inclinations, whereas a negative correlation was found with utilitarian inclinations. Deliberation orientation acted as a complete mediator in the relationship between nursing professional identification and deontological tendencies and as a partial mediator for utilitarian tendencies.

Intergenerational transmission of moral decision‐making inclinations

AbstractObjectiveThis study investigated the intergenerational transmission of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, examining whether these pass from parents to adult children and exploring the potential moderating effects of parenting style and intergenerational involvement in this process.BackgroundFamily factors, including religious norms and work values, influence moral development, but the intergenerational transmission of two moral inclinations—utilitarianism (emphasizing consequences, e.g., sacrificing one person to save five) and deontology (emphasizing intrinsic norms, e.g., refraining from intentionally harming the innocent)—remains underexplored.MethodWe measured these inclinations in 171 parent–adult child pairs using a moral decision thought experiment and questionnaires on parenting style and intergenerational involvement.ResultsPositive correlations emerged between parents and adult children for both inclinations. “Emotional warmth” in parenting style and intergenerational involvement showed significant negative moderating effects on the transmission of utilitarianism between generations.ConclusionThis study provides empirical evidence of intergenerational transmission of moral inclinations. Higher emotional warmth and increased intergenerational involvement inhibit the transmission of utilitarian inclinations, leading to reduced prioritization of better consequences.ImplicationsEnhanced emotional warmth and greater intergenerational involvement by parents can deter the transmission of utilitarian inclinations among adult children, prioritizing adherence to intrinsic norms over intentional harm for greater benefits.

Are people really less moral in their foreign language? Proficiency and comprehension matter for the moral foreign language effect in Russian speakers.

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more willing to sacrifice one person to save five in a foreign language (FL) than in their native tongue. This may be due to the FL either reducing concerns about sacrificial harm (deontological inclinations) or increasing concerns about overall outcomes (utilitarian inclinations). Moreover, proficiency in a foreign language (FL) may moderate results. To test these possibilities, we investigated the moral foreign language effect (MFLE) in a novel sample of Russian L1/English FL speakers. We employed process dissociation (PD)-a technique that independently assesses concerns about rejecting harm and maximizing outcomes in sacrificial dilemmas, and we assessed measures of objective and subjective foreign language proficiency and of dilemma comprehension. Results replicated the pattern of increased acceptance of sacrificial harm in FL demonstrated in earlier studies, but a PD analysis showed no evidence of increased concerns for utilitarian outcomes in a FL; instead, this pattern was driven by reduced concerns regarding sacrificial harm. However, people who reported better dilemma comprehension in the FL demonstrated both stronger deontological and utilitarian responding, and people with higher objective proficiency displayed stronger utilitarian responding in the FL than those with lower proficiency. These findings show that utilitarian inclinations are affected by reading dilemmas in a foreign language mainly in low-proficiency speakers, and that while emotional concerns for sacrifice are reduced in FL, better comprehension can increase such concerns as well as concern for outcomes.

The long and the short of it: 5-HTTLPR and moral judgement

Differences in moral sentiments are widespread. Increasingly, their biological correlates are investigated to elucidate potential sources of divergent moral attitudes and choices. Serotonin is one such potential modulator. We investigated the effects of a functional serotonergic polymorphism, 5-HTTLPR, which was previously linked to moral choices albeit with inconsistent findings. N = 157 healthy young adults completed a set of congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas. In addition to the traditional moral response score, this set allows by using a process dissociation (PD) approach an estimation a deontological and a utilitarian parameter. While there was no main effect of 5-HTTLPR on any of the three moral judgement parameters, there was an interaction effect between 5-HTTLPR and endocrine status on PD parameters, which was mainly due to the deontological but not the utilitarian parameter. In men and free cycling women, LL homozygotes showed reduced deontological tendencies compared to S allele carriers. Contrariwise, in women using oral contraceptives, LL homozygotes had increased deontology parameter scores. Furthermore, LL genotypes in general reported less difficulty in making harmful choices, which were in addition associated with less negative emotions. The findings suggest that 5-HTTLPR might be involved in modulating cognitive and emotional processes contributing to moral decisions.

Anticipatory Stress Increases Deontological Inclinations: The Mediating Role of Emotional Valence.

Previous studies have explored the differences in moral judgments under normal situations and acute stress using the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). The present study examined whether anticipatory stress (i.e., induced by an anticipated speech) could elicit similar effects and further explored the mediation of emotional responses between acute stress and moral judgments with a process-dissociation approach. Fifty-three undergraduate students (20 males and 33 females) were randomly assigned to the stress and control groups. In the first stage, they were instructed to prepare a public speech (the stress group) or just recall events during the previous vacation (the control group). In the second stage, they reported emotional valence and arousal for each moral dilemma in a set of 12 moral dilemmas, followed by judgments on moral acceptability of the agent's action. The manipulation check confirmed that anticipatory stress was reliably induced, as indicated in both self-reported and physiological data. The traditional dilemma analysis revealed that participants in the stress group would make fewer utilitarian judgments than those in the control group. The process dissociation (PD) analyses further revealed that the stress group exhibited higher deontological inclinations than the control group, but no significant differences in utilitarian inclinations. Emotional valence played a mediating role in the association between stress and deontological inclinations. To sum up, our study extended the investigation of the relationship between acute stress and moral judgment to anticipatory stress, clarified its distinct impact on deontological and utilitarian inclinations, and revealed the mediating effect of emotional valence.

The effects of individual moral inclinations on group moral conformity

• Individuals tend to conform to the group's moral judgments even without the presence of the group's members. • Individual's moral inclination affects their conformity tendency. • people with utilitarian inclinations conform to a greater extent and more frequently than people with deontological inclinations. Conformity has been shown to affect behaviors ranging from attitudes to moral decisions. The current research examined how individual moral inclination (i.e., utilitarian vs. deontological) affects moral conformity in online settings. To this end we designed a trolley-like moral dilemma paradigm in which participants rated moral decisions both individually and after being exposed to other people's ratings. We validated the task with 363 participants, demonstrating that in online settings individuals tend to conform to the group's moral judgments. Using an additional 346 participants, we showed that individual differences influence the conformity tendency, such that people with utilitarian inclinations conform to a greater extent and more frequently than people with deontological inclinations. We conclude that people with prior utilitarian inclinations are more disposed to moral conformity.

Contingencies of self-worth and the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations

ABSTRACT Many studies have tried to understand what makes people adopt deontological or utilitarian inclinations when forming moral judgments or making moral choices. The present research examined the impact of motivational factors: contingencies of people’s self-worth on the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. Study 1 found positive correlations between two contingencies of self-worth: basing one’s self-worth on being a virtuous, moral person (Virtue) and outperforming others (Competition), and the strength of deontological inclinations and utilitarian inclinations respectively. Studies 2 and 3 found that increasing saliency of Virtue as a source of one’s self-worth selectively increased the strength of deontological inclinations, leaving utilitarian inclinations unchanged, while the opposite was true for increasing saliency of Competition as a source of self-worth and the strength of utilitarian inclinations: such priming increased utilitarian inclinations while deontological inclinations remained unchanged.

Challenges in Process Dissociation Measures for Moral Cognition.

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) for moral cognition was created to separately measure two dispositions of moral judgment based on the dual-process theory of moral reasoning: deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In this paper we raise some concerns from a psychometrics perspective regarding the structure, reliability, and validity of the moral PDP as a measure of individual differences. Using two simulation studies as well as a real sample of N = 1,010, we investigate the psychometric properties of the moral PDP. We present novel evidence showing that (1) some correlations between PDP parameters are mathematical artifacts, and as such cannot be taken as evidence in support of a theory, (2) there are severe response inconsistencies within dilemma batteries, and (3) reliability estimates for these scores seem to be far below the accepted standards. We discuss some potential theoretical and content-related reasons for these statistical issues and their implications. We conclude that in their current form, PDP measures of utilitarian and deontological tendencies are sub-optimal for assessing individual differences.

Validation of the Korean version of the Moral Judgment Scale: A process dissociation approach to moral dilemmas

Conway and Gawronski proposed a scale that independently measures utilitarian and deontological inclinations underlying moral judgments, based on an individual's endorsement of acceptable or unacceptable responses to 10 congruent and 10 incongruent moral dilemmas. This study aimed to develop and standardize the Korean version of this scale and examine the psychometric characteristics of various indexes extracted from it. The English version was translated and back-translated by two independent bilinguals. Inconsistencies between the backward translated version and the original version were resolved by consultation with an independent psychologist. Using an online survey, Korean adults aged 18 years or older were asked to read 20 dilemmas in the Korean version and indicate whether the action undertaken in each dilemma was acceptable, the probability that they would undertake the action themselves, and their level of tension and happiness. A total of 469 adults participated. Participants additionally answered questions that assessed utilitarianism and their level of antisocial personality disorder. Analysis showed that it was appropriate to use 20 dilemmas (10 incongruent and 10 congruent) in Korean adults but psychometric characteristics were different from those of the original English version. The correlation of probability that utilitarianism would drive responses (KU) and the probability that deontology would drive the responses (KD) was -.23 (p < .001). KU showed a significant correlation with utilitarianism (.18, p < .001) and a near-zero correlation with antisocial personality disorder. KD showed a correlation of -.27 (p < .001) with utilitarianism and a correlation of -.13 (p < .01) with antisocial personality disorder. A previous study that proposed that utilitarian and deontological inclinations are independent in moral judgment found a near-zero correlation between U and D, which was different from the result of the present study. Additionally, the limitations and implications of this study are discussed.

Personality and moral judgment: Curious consequentialists and polite deontologists.

How does our personality relate to the ways in which we judge right from wrong? Drawing on influential theories of moral judgment, we identify candidate traits that may be linked with inclinations toward (a) consequentialist judgments (i.e., those based on the outcomes of an action) and (b) deontological judgments (i.e., those based on the alignment of an action with particular moral rules). Across two studies (total N=843) we examined domains and aspects of the Big Five in relation to inclinations toward consequentialist and deontological judgments. In both studies, we found a unique association between intellect (curiosity, cognitive engagement) and consequentialist inclinations, in line with the view that deliberative cognitive processes drive such inclinations. We also found a consistent unique association between politeness (respectfulness, etiquette) and deontological inclinations, in line with the view that norm-adherence drives such inclinations. Neither study yielded a significant unique relation between deontological inclinations and compassion (sympathy, empathic concern)-or any other emotion-infused trait (e.g., Neuroticism)-as would be expected based on emotion-centered views of deontological moral judgment. These findings have implications for theories of moral judgment, and reveal how our personality may guide our approach to questions of ethics and morality.

Effects of Instrumentality and Personal Force on Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Harm-Related Moral Dilemmas

Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

Disgust and Moral Judgment: Distinguishing Between Elicitors and Feelings Matters

We investigated the scope of the effect of disgust on moral judgments. In two field experiments (Experiment 1, N = 142, Experiment 2, N = 248), we manipulated whether participants were exposed to a disgusting odor. Participants then rated the permissibility of actions in two kinds of moral problems: dilemmas and transgressions. In both experiments, disgust did not affect moral judgments when we compared across exposure levels. However, self-reported disgust did predict moral judgments in the following cases: In Experiment 1, it was linked with decreased acceptability for dilemmas and transgressions alike; in Experiment 2, it was linked with decreased acceptability for dilemmas only. Findings also differed across the experiments when we regressed feelings of disgust onto participants’ utilitarian and deontological inclinations. Overall, the findings suggest that subjective feelings of disgust may provide a more sensitive measure of the effect of disgust on moral judgment than basing analysis on the presence of disgust elicitors.

The Characteristics of Moral Judgment of Psychopaths: The Mediating Effect of the Deontological Tendency.

PurposeMany studies explore the relationship between moral judgment and psychopathy in western culture, but the mechanism underlying this relationship remains unclear. By far, no research about this topic in the background of Chinese culture exists. In the current study, we adopt one of the creative process-dissociation approaches to explore the relationship between the psychopath and moral judgment.MethodsAdopt the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathic Scale, the Chinese version of Interpersonal Reactivity and Process-dissociation approach to explore the relationship between the psychopath and moral judgment.ResultsTraditional utilitarian moral score of the high psychopathy group are significantly higher than that of low psychopathy group (t= 2.97, p<0.05), people with high psychopathy utilitarian tendency U factor score and people with low psychopathy have no significant difference (F= 0.85, p = 0.36).ConclusionIndividuals with high psychopathy tend to make fewer deontological moral judgments because of their decreased deontological tendencies rather than their increased utilitarian tendencies. They may make more acceptance choices not to increase the well-being of the majority of people, but because of their increased acceptance of hurting others in the moral dilemma.

Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments.

Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.

Deconfounding the effects of acute stress on abstract moral dilemma judgment

People often make moral judgments under acute stress. Increasing studies have investigated the influence of acute stress on moral judgment, but the findings are quite divergent. This study attempted to address the inconsistency by employing a new approach, the CNI model, which disentangles the effect of three determinants of moral decision-making, sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), or general preference for inaction (I). Seventy-eight undergraduates (45 females and 33 males) were randomly assigned to the stress group or the control group. All participants made judgments on a set of 24 moral dilemmas. Responses to self-reported questionnaires and heart rate were recorded for assessing the levels of stress. The traditional dilemma analysis indicated that acutely stressed participants made more deontological judgments than participants in the control group. The process dissociation analysis showed that the stress group had higher deontological inclinations than the control group. Moreover, the CNI model analysis revealed that the stress group showed a stronger sensitivity to moral norms and a higher general preference for inaction than the control group. In sum, our findings resolved interpretational ambiguities of traditional analysis and extended our understanding regarding the mechanism underlying the association between acute stress and moral judgment.

Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies

Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorist’s claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.

Chronic Stress and Moral Decision-Making: An Exploration With the CNI Model.

Stress is prevalent in our daily life, and people often make moral decision-making in a stressful state. Several studies indicated the influence of acute stress on moral decision-making and behavior. The present study extended the investigation to chronic stress, and employed a new approach, the CNI model, to add new insights regarding the mechanism underlying the association between chronic stress and moral decision-making. A total of 197 undergraduates completed the Perceived Stress Scale and made moral decision-making on a series of deliberately designed moral dilemmas. The results indicated that higher chronic stress was related to more deontological moral choices. The process-dissociation analyses revealed that chronic stress was marginally significantly associated with deontological inclinations but not with utilitarian inclinations. And the CNI model analyses suggested that the high-stress group (above the median) showed a stronger general preference for inaction than the low-stress group (below the median) did, but there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or sensitivity to moral norms between the two groups. Finally, the implications of the findings were discussed.

Reflecting on God's will: Reflective processing contributes to religious peoples' deontological dilemma responses

Religious people tend to reject harm on moral dilemmas where causing harm maximizes outcomes, which is consistent with deontological but not utilitarian philosophy. Past research suggests that non-reflective processes drive deontological judgments, such as affective reactions to harm or heuristic application of moral rules. Yet, for religious people, reflective processes may also play a role in driving deontological judgments. We examined this possibility in three studies. Unlike most research, which treats deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we employed process dissociation to assess them independently. Religiosity was associated with increased deontological and reduced utilitarian response tendencies—but time pressure (Study 1) and cognitive load (Study 2) reduced deontological tendencies among religious people. Increasing the salience of religious values attenuated this effect, without impacting utilitarian tendencies or the responses of less-religious people (Study 3). Thus, reflective consideration of religious values may contribute to deontological response tendencies among religious people.

Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers

Researchers have used “sacrificial” trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) to model competing influences on moral judgment: affective reactions to causing harm that motivate characteristically deontological judgments (“the ends don’t justify the means”) and deliberate cost-benefit reasoning that motivates characteristically utilitarian judgments (“better to save more lives”). Recently, Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu (2015) argued that sacrificial judgments reflect antisociality rather than “genuine utilitarianism,” but this work employs a different definition of “utilitarian judgment.” We introduce a five-level taxonomy of “utilitarian judgment” and clarify our longstanding usage, according to which judgments are “utilitarian” simply because they favor the greater good, regardless of judges’ motivations or philosophical commitments. Moreover, we present seven studies revisiting Kahane and colleagues’ empirical claims. Studies 1a–1b demonstrate that dilemma judgments indeed relate to utilitarian philosophy, as philosophers identifying as utilitarian/consequentialist were especially likely to endorse utilitarian sacrifices. Studies 2–6 replicate, clarify, and extend Kahane and colleagues’ findings using process dissociation to independently assess deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in lay people. Using conventional analyses that treat deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we replicate many of Kahane and colleagues’ key findings. However, process dissociation reveals that antisociality predicts reduced deontological inclinations, not increased utilitarian inclinations. Critically, we provide evidence that lay people’s sacrificial utilitarian judgments also reflect moral concerns about minimizing harm. This work clarifies the conceptual and empirical links between moral philosophy and moral psychology and indicates that sacrificial utilitarian judgments reflect genuine moral concern, in both philosophers and ordinary people.

Clarifying Gender Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments: The Complementary Roles of Harm Aversion and Action Aversion

Moral dilemmas entail situations where decisions consistent with deontological principles (following moral rules) conflict with decisions consistent with utilitarian principles (maximizing overall outcomes). Past work employing process dissociation (PD) clarified that gender differences in utilitarianism are modest, but women are substantially more deontological than men. However, deontological judgments confound two motivations: harm aversion and action aversion. The current work presents a mega-analysis of eight studies (N = 1,965) using PD to assess utilitarian and deontological response tendencies both when deontology entails inaction and when it requires action, to assess the independent contributions of harm aversion and action aversion. Results replicate and clarify past findings: Women scored higher than men on deontological tendencies, and this difference was enhanced when the deontological choice required refraining from harmful action rather than acting to prevent harm. That is, gender differences in deontological inclinations are caused by both harm aversion and action aversion.