Democratization Of Law Research Articles

THE CONJECTURAL FUNCTION OF LAW REINFORCED BY ALGORITHMS IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA

Through this paper we aims to illustrate the increase in the power of the predictive function of Law that will be generated by the use of intelligent integral legal search engines (IILSE). They will allow a more effective strategic conjectural analysis by virtue of the sociological, psychological, normative and axiological information that they will provide to the legal operator for their decision making. To this end, we use an interdisciplinary analysis perspective of Law, highlighting the advancement of artificial intelligence systems in a transparency society where data is a valuable asset. The IILSE integrated with an efficient natural language and with algorithms created to obtain the aforementioned interdisciplinary information will be a valuable aid instrument for: greater linguistic precision, normative interpretation, weighting of legal principles, prediction of judicial sentences, democratization of Law and a significant decrease in the differences in the practical effects in force between the traditions of Civil Law and Common Law.

Actualization of Pancasila as the Foundation of Indonesian Political Law

Pancasila is a major cornerstone in the making of law (law and Legislation) with a new or replacement of law (political law), so that the values of the Deity, Humanity and Society (nationalistic; democratic; social justice) must be actualized into the substance of the law, the legal structure and legal culture to be built, is expected to strengthen national integration, democratization of law, achieve prosperity and social justice by putting pancasila, ranging from values, goals until the actualization of the various fields of existing law, whether criminal, civil, administrative and the other, as well as the internalization of the structures of law and legal culture of pancasila.

Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services

One of the most significant problems faced by the legal profession in the twenty-first century is the ineffective delivery of legal services. Millions in need of legal representation are unable to afford a lawyer and thousands of lawyers are unemployed. We are desperate for a solution to democratize access to the law through efficient and affordable delivery of legal services. Noted law scholars and economists have argued over the years that corporate ownership of law firms can offer a solution to this problem. For example, corporations like Wal-Mart or Google are especially adept at disseminating services and information to the mass public. These kinds of corporations are also financially situated to make substantial capital outlays and await a later return on the investment. Both of these attributes make corporate ownership of law firms an appealing avenue for increasing access to legal services. Yet professional conduct rules in all fifty states ban corporations from owning or investing in law firms. This Article identifies a First Amendment jurisprudential thread that establishes important constitutional interests in corporate ownership of law firms, interests held by both corporations and individuals. The Supreme Court initially recognized First Amendment protection for the delivery of legal services by a corporate entity in NAACP v. Button and most recently confirmed in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that a corporation, whether non-profit or for-profit, enjoys the same free speech rights as an individual. Under this precedent, blanket bans on corporate ownership of law firms cannot survive. This expanded understanding of First Amendment rights for corporations parallels the economic realities of modern law practice and the regulatory changes underway in the United Kingdom and Australia. Now is the time for regulators to embrace the benefits that can accrue from corporate ownership, in particular the democratization of law through the delivery of more accessible and affordable legal services.

The Province of Jurisprudence Contested

Allan Hutchinson’s recent book, The Province of Jurisprudence Democratized, is regarded as presenting the opportunity for considering what is involved in seeking to establish the province of jurisprudence as a distinctive field of inquiry. The scale of Hutchinson’s ambition matches John Austin’s original efforts to determine the Province of Jurisprudence, but seeks to replace an analytical approach to jurisprudence he associates with Austin by a theoretical approach committed to advancing “strong” democracy. This provokes an initial reflection on the nature of theoretical disageement, and in particular disagreement which goes beyond trivial theoretical contestability so as to contest the nature of the subject matter that is being investigated by establishing an appropriate field of inquiry for it. Three different techniques are introduced which are capable of demarcating the subject matter of jurisprudence through establishing a field of inquiry favouring a particular theoretical viewpoint: axiomatic disengagement, ambitious insight, and a split field of inquiry.Hutchinson’s principal concern with the democratization of law, legal theory, and the province of jurisprudence is examined in detail. The process of democratization and its anti-elitist character is traced through Hutchinson’s opposition to the aloof philosophical analysis of the universal in favour of an engagement with local and particular issues. However, the weight Hutchinson places on his conception of strong democracy, so as to provide a different understanding of the the law-power nexus and of the relationship between law and morality operating in strong democracies, is shown to be misplaced. Two related failings are pointed out. First, there is a failure to recognize competing groupings within the people, which contradict the uniform collective body Hutchinson associates with those formerly governed by elites and then constituting those liberated to exercise self-governance. Secondly, this links into Hutchinson’s exclusive preoccupation with the participatory axis of democracy – which he regards as the core feature of strong democracy, and at the same time the basis for the law-power nexus and the law-morality relationship within a strong democracy. This is revealed as an inadequate and impoverished understanding of democracy once the presence of competing groupings within the people is acknowledged. Hutchinson’s one-dimensional representation of democracy along a participatory-representational continuum is rejected for failing to recognize a distinct fiduciary-beneficiary axis, which a richer understanding of “for the people” conveys. These corrections have important consequences for a role for law that cannot be reduced solely to politics, and for a broader sweep to analytical jurisprudence than Hutchinson allows.Hutchinson’s own efforts to capture the province of jurisprudence are then assessed. These are recharacterized as seeking to establish within a split field of inquiry a theory of strong democratic law, but, in the absence of a convincing account of the nature of democracy and its relationship with law, the project is judged to be unfulfilled.