It is conventional to suggest that democratic states rely on widespread stores of among their populations. As far back as Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, in the good judgement of political representatives has been presented as an essential feature of democratic practice.1 Representatives are elected on the basis of credentials that suggest to voters they can be trusted to make good decisions on behalf of the population they govern. In the literature on in democracies, this kind of is sometimes dubbed vertical to signal the asymmetrical relation between truster (the voter) and trusted (the representative). So-called horizontal trust is the term given to describe among citizens, whether engaging in shared political institutions specifically, or in wider public space on a daily basis. Both forms of trust-among citizens and between citizens and their representatives-must be present in order to proclaim that a state is characterized by a climate of trust.2There are thought to be many virtues to a political state characterized by such a climate, all of which stem from the belief that widespread underpins a general willingness among citizens to comply more or less voluntarily with democratically determined legislation. These virtues range from the simple willingness to abide by laws that cannot, always, be coercively enforced; to high rates of participation in democratic decision-making procedures; to a widespread commitment to contribute to social-justice policies. The latter, in particular, is of special concern to egalitarians of all stripes who are being forced to confront recent evidence suggesting that states with higher and increasing rates of ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity struggle to sustain the that is needed to sustain support for these policies.3The contributions to this issue complicate our understanding of the relation between and democracies, suggesting among other things that may be less important than some have thought, and furthermore that distrust can serve important democratic ends. Together, the pieces press forward the political philosophy of in democracies in crucial ways, by asking readers to think clearly about when and where is a value in democratic states, and when and where it is a hindrance to the achievement of democratic values.By and large, the authors in this issue treat as a combination of attitude and behaviour: to say that we others is to say that we have a particular attitude towards them, and also that we act on that attitude. It is of little value to say that we others, but then refuse to follow that claim up with a relevant trusting action; a parent who claims to her child with her car, but then refuses to hand over car keys, can hardly be described as genuinely trusting her child to drive. What type of action is a trusting one? An action that manifests a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to others' free will; in extending our trust, we are giving others space to disappoint or betray us. For some scholars of trust, we will make ourselves vulnerable to others only when we believe (though the belief may not be a conscious one) that others possess good will towards us. If good will were necessary for trusting relations, however, very little would be extended, since especially outside of private, intimate, settings we cannot know much about others' attitudes towards us.4 It is enough rather to believe that others do not possess ill will in order to extend the kind of civic on which democratic states rely.One might say, and indeed many do, that there is a difference in kind between the we extend to intimates and the we extend to strangers with whom we happen to share political space. And, indeed, there are many differences-but they are contextual rather than foundational. That is, at its foundation, the we have in intimates and the we have in fellow citizens is the same-it is an attitude that supports behaviours that illustrate a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to others' freedom to act in ways that will ideally respect, but may disappoint, the extended trust. …