Democratic Civil Military Relations Research Articles

Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations and the Enduring Value of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal

Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations and the Enduring Value of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal

Some Assembly Required: Explaining Variations in Legislative Oversight over the Armed Forces

AbstractLegislatures vary widely in how they affect democratic civil–military relations. In some countries, legislative oversight plays a critical role in guiding their defense establishment. In others, legislators are largely ignorant and happily so. In this article, we explain the sources of these variations in fifteen democratic states. After discussing the importance of the legislature's role in democratic civil–military relations, we clarify what we mean by oversight. We argue that variations in oversight are explained by the number and scope of legislative committees charged with military oversight and party politics within those committees. After reviewing alternative explanations, we present oversight patterns in fifteen democratic countries across the world. We then briefly examine Germany's Bundestag and Japan's Diet, as the comparison of these cases challenges most existing explanations of legislative oversight and serve as hard cases for our argument. We conclude with implications of legislative oversight for broader debates about civilian control of the military.

The Ratification of Omnibus Law: A Sign of Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia

Indonesia as a post-authoritarian democratic country has made impressive progress in its democratic transition. However, there is a significant contradiction in the democratic process, particularly in policy and law-making. This article queries to what extent democratic deconsolidation contributes to the ratification of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in Indonesia. This research uses a qualitative method by using academic literature, news analysis, and official government documents. The study employs various theoretical approaches, including horizontal accountability by Wolfgang Merkel, discursive participation by Jürgen Habermas, and democratic civil-military relations by Samuel Huntington. The first finding shows that the accumulation of Joko Widodo's political power has affected the quality of debate and the agreement during the deliberation of the Omnibus Law in the parliament. Second, the opaque process by limiting public participation has narrowed the space for the democratic mobilization of the citizens. Third, the increasing number of retired armed forces in domestic affairs has resulted in the dual function of military power in securing the country and the economic development agenda. The study shows that the deconsolidation of democracy has contributed to the ratification of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation which was deliberated through a non-transparent mechanism.

No Right to Be Wrong: What Americans Think about Civil-Military Relations

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have “the right to be wrong” about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans’ trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans’ views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military’s judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans’ views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their “right to be wrong.”

From Challenged Statehood to Democratic Civil-Military Relations: Defence Reform in Montenegro

ABSTRACTAfter gaining independence in 2006, Montenegro succeeded in establishing democratic civilian control over its armed forces in a short period of time, earning membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program in 2006, Membership Action Plan in 2009, and NATO in 2017. This essay evaluates this swift process of defense reform in Montenegro and argues that such successful establishment of democratic civil-military relations was only possible because the 2006 referendum on independence settled the question of statehood and removed it from the political agenda. The same level of success was not possible in the prior union of Serbia and Montenegro, because Montenegro’s and Kosovo’s independence aspirations generated uncertainty regarding the country’s future and created incentives to maintain non-democratic civil-military relations, even as the country was undergoing democratic reforms in other areas. Once the question of statehood was settled, the new state was able to reform its defense sector and establish democratic control over its armed forces with unusual speed.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.

Book Review: Democratic Civil–Military Relations: Soldiering in the 21st Century

Book Review: Democratic Civil–Military Relations: Soldiering in the 21st Century

Rethinking Civil–Military Relations in Turkey: The Problems of the Democratic Governance of the Defense and Security Sectors

This article aims to explore the problems of democratic governance of the defense and security sectors in Turkey. In recent years, to democratize its civil–military relations, Turkey has successfully dealt with the first-generation problems of making institutional reforms to eliminate the military's intervention in politics. Democratic civil–military relations, however, cannot be achieved only by getting the military out of politics, but also require the elimination of second-generation problems concerning the democratic governance of the defense and security sectors. In this respect, Turkey faces significant challenges related to its ineffective defense policy-making structures, insufficient parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sectors and civil society's very low level of participation in defense and security debates. Turkey needs to make reforms in these problematic areas in order to democratize its civil–military relations.

Principal-agent theory in complex operations

Originally developed for identifying costs of coordination between labor and management in economics, principal-agent theory challenged traditional explanations for friction in political relations, especially in a democracy, between elected officials and the permanent bureaucracy. Not without controversy, the approach recasts democratic civil–military relations, featuring as agent a unique, military ‘bureaucrat’ refining goals of the state, a role normally assigned to the principal. At the same time, principal-agent applications reached international institutions as a collective actor in their own right. Drawing from civil–military relations and international institutions, this article poses still greater expansion for principal-agent dynamics. Principal-agent theory offers significant promise in complex international operations mixing inter-state, state, sub-state, and nongovernmental organizations because it clearly delineates culturally bounded normative arguments from resource-based logics; it also suggests moves such as building flexible membership institutions ahead of time to improve cooperation among international actors during the next crisis.

Prospects for “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces”?

A clear breach of authoritarian rule within the Arab world in 2012 manifested in public uprisings among significant sectors of society. As a relatively autonomous institution within the authoritarian system of rule, the military played an essential role. In many cases, the militaries in the Arab world aligned themselves with resilient protestors or fractured, thereby easing the end of the authoritarian status quo. Though the end result is still undecided with unprecedented changes in the making, future relations between civilians and armies will be a critical factor. After authoritarian regimes collapsed but before democratic regimes are strongly established, new civilian leaders struggle to diminish the military’s ability to directly determine the course of events. This article also draws on theoretical reflections and experiences from earlier transitions to democracy witnessed in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe, in order to provide a reliable map of ways the Arab world might travel, as well as the tools for diagnosing the situation. Finally, this article reflects on what may be necessary to establish democratic civil–military relations in a moving Arab world.

Civil–Military Relations and Democratic Control over the Armed Forces in the Republic of Serbia

This article focuses on the democratization of civil–military relations and the implementation of democratic control of the armed forces in the Republic of Serbia. By analyzing the basic parameters of democratic civil–military relations, we attempt to evaluate whether civil–military relations in the Republic of Serbia can be classified into a type of relations that occur in consolidated democracies. Based on an examination of legal documents and other data, this article concludes that democratic changes since October 2000 have greatly influenced the course of relations between military and political elites and that civil–military relation in Serbia meet most of the defined parameters. However, due to the difficulties in the implementation of this control in practice, civil–military relations in Serbia can only partially be classified as a type of relations that occur in consolidated democracies.

Towards More Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Les relations entre civils et militaires en Turquie ont traverse recemment une periode de transformation radicale. Le role dominant de l’armee turque dans la politique depuis 1960, par ses interventions directes et indirectes, ainsi qu’au travers de mecanismes institutionnels et non-institutionnels, a considerablement diminue. A partir du debut des reformes liees a l’adhesion europeenne visant a democratiser les relations civiles-militaires, puis d’une serie d’enquetes baptisees Ergenekon et Balyoz, dans lesquelles des officiers militaires ont ete accuses de planifier des interventions visant a renverser le gouvernement actuel, l’armee a perdu a la fois ses prerogatives en politique et sa credibilite aux yeux de l’opinion publique. Bien que les relations entre civils et militaires semblent aller dans un sens plus democratique, en soumettant fortement l’armee au controle civil, il semble cependant que les civils ne traitent pas les forces armees de facon juste dans les enquetes en cours. Par consequent, en depit de tous ces changements positifs, il n’est pas clair que la Turquie s’oriente vraiment vers une gouvernance plus democratique des relations entre civils et militaires.

The changing role of the military in Turkish politics: democratization through coup plots?

The exposure of alleged coup plots in 2007 has shaken the guardian role of the Turkish military in politics. What were the conditions that led to the exposure of the coups and what is their significance for the future of Turkish democracy? Drawing on insights from southern Europe, the article argues that failed coup plots can lead to democratic civil–military relations especially if they work simultaneously with other facilitating conditions, such as increasing acceptance of democratic attitudes among officers, consensus among civilians over the role of the military, and the influence of external actors, such as the European Union. The article focuses on such domestic and international factors to analyse the transformation of the Turkish military, the splits within the armed forces and the resulting plots. It argues that one positive outcome of the exposed conspiracies in Turkey has been the enactment of new institutional amendments that would eradicate the remaining powers of the military. Yet, a negative outcome of the coup investigations has been an increase in polarization and hostility. Turkish democracy still lacks mutual trust among significant political groups, which creates unfavourable conditions for democratic consolidation.

Stirring from Beyond the Borders? American Military Assistance and Defense Reform in Indonesia

This paper seeks to assess and consider the security component of the new security re-engagement between the United States and Indonesia, especially those pertaining to military assistance to the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Specifically, it seeks to address two broad questions: (1) why the US chose to engage the TNI using military assistance they way they have in recent years, and (2) given the context of Indonesia’s ongoing defense reform process, whether US military assistance would assist the process and how. In addressing these questions, this paper will review US military assistance programs in general and to Indonesia in particular. It will also assess the trends and challenges facing US military assistance in terms of instilling democratic civil-military relations and improving Indonesia’s defense reform.

Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress

This article examines an important (and most problematic) component of the democratic civil–military relations (CMR) concept (understood in terms of democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the armed forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies). It focuses (1) on the democratization of intelligence, that is finding a proper balance between intelligence effectiveness and transparency, and (2) on what particular factors support or arrest progress in the democratization of intelligence. The article provides supporting examples from Brazil and Romania, two developing democracies that have been undergoing major reforms of their intelligence systems for almost 20 years, in terms of both transparency and effectiveness.

The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations

In June of 2010 the publication of an article entitled, Runaway in Rolling Stone magazine captivated the nation and ended the career of the commanding general in Afghanistan. The incident captured the national and international media for almost a week. For an intense period between 48 and 72 hours, when General Stanley McChrystal's job hung in the balance, a focused national security dialogue occurred on the topic of whether or not he should retain his post. General McChrystal and his staff were not criticized for their lack of military competence, for their dissent over policy, or for failure to implement strategy. Their professionalism--especially those professional competencies related to understanding the roles and responsibilities of military leaders vis-a-vis the civilian leadership in the context of democratic civil-military relations--was found wanting. Among other lessons, this case illustrates the deficiencies of the Professional Military Education (PME) system, which gives short shrift to the promulgation of civil-military relations norms in its leader development curricula. Currently, the US Army is midway through its Profession of Arms Campaign during which it is refreshing and renewing its understanding of the Army as a profession. (1) Among the areas being assessed is civil-military relations--especially the Army's interaction with and support of the Nation and its elected and appointed officials. (2) The case of General McChrystal's relief is detailed here for review so its elements can be mined and analyzed, thereby strengthening the civil-military norms at issue in the case. The incident provides an opportunity to examine the national dialogue of June 2010 as a window into the state of national consensus on principles of strategy and civil-military relations norms. Recommendations are offered in an attempt to emphasize the development of the political skills required to navigate the nexus of political-military collaboration and media engagement at the strategic level. PME curricula with sufficient emphasis on civil-military norms will yield commanders better prepared to lead, staffs more capable of supporting them, and enhanced trust between the and military spheres that is essential for strategic success. The case presents a unique opportunity for all actors involved in the national security process: senior military officers, the civilian national security team, members of Congress, the media, scholars, and the public at-large to weigh in on matters of civil-military relations and strategy. Its study will help to hone the strategic competencies of the national security community, particularly the importance of a solid grounding in the fundamentals of the American system, the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military actors within it, and the norms of civil-military relations in a democracy. The Case Unfolds On Monday, 21 June 2010, an eight page article was released to reporters ahead of its planned publication date of 25 June. (3) Runaway General, the work of Rolling Stone reporter Michael Hastings, was intended to profile the Afghan war's commanding general and the progress made on the execution of the war's strategy. Instead, a firestorm erupted around the disparaging remarks reported in the article that General Stanley McChrystal, and especially his staff, made related to senior administration officials, including President Barack Obama. Hastings was embedded with Team America, the moniker that General McChrystal's staff had assigned to itself. (4) What was originally intended to be a brief visit with the staff was extended by a number of days when volcanic ash stalled air travel in Europe. In the meantime, McChrystal and his staff let down their guard with the embedded journalist still in their midst and spoke candidly about the civilian leadership. Hastings' reporting laid bare Team America's irreverent attitudes and detailed the mocks and insults hurled at members of the administration's national security team. …

Military Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America

AbstractDespite the recent shift to democratic regimes and market-based economies, in many Latin American countries the military retains important economic roles as owner, manager, and stakeholder in economic enterprises. Such military entrepreneurship poses a challenge to the development of democratic civil-military relations and, by extension, to the development of liberal democracy in the region. While scholars have noted this situation with concern, they have given little attention to distinguishing the different types of military entrepreneurship, which reflect distinct historical patterns and implications. This article identifies two major types of military entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers, determined to build national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige; and nation builders, seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion. Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador demonstrate important differences between these two types in their origins, paths, and political consequences.

Small States and (In)Security: A Comparison of Ireland and Slovenia

This article compares the defense and security policies of two of Europe’s smallest states: Ireland and Slovenia. The Irish military has a relatively small permanent force, based in part on their being sequestered from any major threat due to their island location, but there is also the precedent against a large military stemming from the nation’s long occupation by the British military. The Slovene military evolved concurrent with the Slovene state: a small, homogenous entity that embraced Western institutions and values. Despite a relative lack of experience in democratic civil-military relations, Slovenia has tenaciously promoted its place in the world, and developed an active and professional military within a democratic state. This essay aims to add to the theoretical understandings of the major security decisions—especially with respect to the civilmilitary dynamic—that small states make. This comparison is key in understanding overall patterns of democratic governance and civil-military relations. When compared to other states in the Northern Hemisphere, Ireland and Slovenia do not hold privileged positions in the defense and security realms, perhaps not meriting even a second glance. However, in a world of states that are interrelated through regional and global intergovernmental organizations, where the impetus for small-state participation is on the rise, understanding how states react internally at key stages in the development of the security apparatus can deepen our grasp of the issues and concerns that buffet the smaller players in the international realm. Thus, this article seeks to describe the interplay of the international ambitions of two small and successful European states and the influence on their respective civil-military dynamics. The research question that frames this comparative study is, What is the impact on the civil-military dynamic from Ireland and Slovenia’s joining the EU and their association with NATO (in Slovenia’s case as a member, in Ireland’s case via the Partnership for Peace)? Though not perhaps explicit, the dependent variable is the civil-military dynamic, with the common dependent variable each country’s commitment to

National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations

(2009). National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Defense & Security Analysis: Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 255-269.

Who guards the guardians and how: democratic civil-military relations

* Foreword (David Pion-Berlin) * Acknowledgments * Introduction (Thomas C. Bruneau) * Part One: Actors and Institutions * Chapter 1. Military Professionalism in a Democracy (Thomas-Durell Young) * Chapter 2. Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons (Jeanne Kinney Giraldo) * Chapter 3. Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control (Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr.) * Part Two: Roles and Missions of the Military * Chapter 4. Strategy Formulation and National Defense: Peace, War, and the Past as Prologue (Douglas Porch) * Chapter 5. The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Paul Shemella) * Part Three: Issues in Civilian Control of the Military * Chapter 6. Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies (Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski) * Chapter 7. Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective Governance (Jeanne Kinney Giraldo) * Chapter 8. Conscription or the All-Volunteer Force: Recruitment in a Democratic Society (Edwin R. Micewski) * Chapter 9. Professional Military Education in Democracies (Karen Guttieri) * Conclusion (Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson) * About the Editors and Contributors * Notes * Bibliography * Index