Democracy In Serbia Research Articles

Marching the Victorious March: Populism and Memory Appropriation of the Yugoslav Partisans in Today’s Serbia

AbstractThis article examines the changing paradigms in the official politics of memory as linked to the rise of populism and authoritarian democracy in Serbia, focusing on the appropriation of the People’s Liberation Movement and the victory against fascism in the Second World War. The article places the memory of the Second World War in the framework of anticommunism and ethnicization as dominant prisms of historical interpretation within state-sanctioned memory politics in contemporary Serbia. Understanding the populist memory politics in Serbia as based on the dichotomy of heroism and victimhood, this article focuses on the heroic aspect of the dominant narratives as exemplified in the notion of Serbia’s liberation wars. The Victory Day and Day of Liberation of Belgrade are in focus as the most prominent commemorative events that illuminate the tendency of memory appropriation. After theoretical consideration about authoritarianism in Serbia, populism and memory politics and a brief background on the notion of liberation wars, the article moves on to the analysis of memory politics. The study is based on media discourses, state papers and observation of official commemorations and practices.

Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences

Although the principle of separation of powers in Serbia has been regulated following the parliamentary model in the span of three decades, it has in practice functioned most often as a semi-presidential system. This paper analyzes two groups of factors that are the cause of presidentialization. Institutional factors that systematically create an environment suited for presidentialization include shortcomings in the constitutional design, the proportional electoral system and oligarchic tendencies in the party system. Direct election gives the President of the Republic strong legitimacy, and by retaining the position of party leader, in an electoral system with closed electoral lists and weak intra-party democracy, the head of state can easily control the parliamentary majority, the government and the parliament, thus upsetting the balance of power. Another group of factors that strongly affect the action of the aforementioned institutional aspects are a political culture with a strong authoritarian tradition and a lack of respect for the constitution and the democratic tradition. The consequences are strong authoritarian and populist tendencies and a departure from the liberal concept of democracy. The options proposed by the academic and political public as a solution to the situation blocking the consolidation of democracy in Serbia include the normativization of the incompatibility of office of the head of state and party leader, the abolition of direct elections, and a semi-presidential system.

Views on Freedoms Between Democracy and Authoritarianism

Transitioning from one system to another might be difficult for one country. That happened with Serbia, which proved that the process of transition and adaptation to liberal values could exhaust the country. In this paper, the author examines political rights, the election process, civil liberties, and the status of the media and civil society during Milosevic's reign and in the post-Milosevic era. The author argues that Serbia has not developed democracy in full capacity yet and that Serbia is an example of semi-consolidated democracy. In this text, the author uses quantitative and, qualitative criteria to examine the situation of democracy in Serbia during the Milosevic era, and in the post-Milosevic era. The main focus was on civil liberties, political rights, media freedom, and civil society. To examine these things, we used primary and secondary sources. The author analyzed the period from 1994 up to 2018/19. The paper structure is the following. In the first part, the author gives basic information about the country's history. The second section outlines political rights, civil liberties, and elections. In the third section, the author examines media freedom and civil society with a focus on the Milosevic era and the post-Milosevic era. In the conclusion section, the author sums up and briefly emphasizes the paper’s main findings.

Przywództwo polityczne w ramach „stabilokracji” a stan demokracji: przykład Serbii

The aim of this article is an attempt to answer the question of the impact of Aleksander Vucic political leadership on democracy in Serbia. In this analysis it will be used the new concept of stabilitocracy which describes the semi-authoritarian regimes in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, in order to measure the state of democracy in Serbia I will analyse the Democracy Index produced by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Nations in Transit reports (Freedom House) and the Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders. I will summarize the article with some conclusions regarding the need for further research.

RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SERBIA

Renowned international organizations classify Serbia as a democracy. However, they usually assess the state of democracy on the basis of the narrow theoretical concept of electoral democracy, which easily creates a fallacy that the free elections represent not only a necessary but sufficient condition for democracy. The concept of liberal consolidated democracy, in addition to procedural aspects, implies stricter normative and analytical criteria, such as the rule of law and the mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability, which constitute institutional guarantees for the application of fundamental democratic principles. In the absence of these mechanisms, electoral democracies become defective. According to relevant research, Serbia is classified as a semi-consolidated (defective or flawed) democracy. Irregularities in election procedures, as well as the violation of elements that guarantee respect for democratic norms and institutions in recent years indicate a certain democratic "regression". Bearing this in mind, the paper examines the extent to which the rule of law represents support to the consolidation of democracy in Serbia and points out to the potential causes of the observed deficiencies in this area, which aggravate the consolidation of democracy.

Shvatanje demokratije Božidara S. Markovića

Overcoming the obvious democracy crisis is possible to be done by taking an insight into our democratic thought. This paper reminds, directs, actualises, values and reminds scientifically-democratic thought of Bozidar S. Markovic, in a real context of strenuous processes of intoducing and consolidating democracy in Serbia. Understanding democracy of Bozidar S. Markovic is a theoretical framework which satisfies criteria of scientific generalisation, for it includes characteristic and essential landmarks of democracy and criteria of methodological contextuality for different and specific experiences of certain countries and their people. In this paper the frameworks of democracy are being thematized, with its characteristics, good and bad sides in the circumstances of our current political practice.

Media Discourse and the Quality of Democracy in Serbia after Milošević

The article examines the quality of democracy in Serbia via the quantitative analysis of media discourse. It reveals robust competition, participation and accountability in the first decade after regime change, followed by major recent decline, thus showing that expert assessments from influential indices of democracy underrated democratic quality in the former period and overrated it later. Also revealed are the advantages of complementing expert assessments with those based on media discourse. The content analysis examined 1,921 coded items from print and electronic media coverage of major political conflicts at strategic points in the country’s democratisation.

Big dreams and small steps: comparative perspectives on the social movement struggle for democracy in Serbia and North Macedonia

ABSTRACTThis paper provides a comparative analysis of social movements’ characteristics and capacities to struggle against illiberal tendencies and incite political change in Serbia and North Macedonia. First, we discuss the illiberal elements of political regimes in the countries in question, Serbia and North Macedonia. Then, we provide a comprehensive overview of progressive social movements in the two countries, formed and organized as a response to different authoritarian and non-democratic tendencies. Finally, we point to some differences in their organizing, coalition-forging and issue-defining principles, which, we believe, may help to explain the relative success of social movements in North Macedonia in producing relevant political outcomes, compared to the weak political impact of social movements in Serbia. Empirical data were collected during the summer of 2018 through in-depth interviews with members of social movements in North Macedonia and Serbia.

Kulturni obrazac i dostignuti stepen demokratije u Srbiji

This paper deals with some important determining factors of influence in culture and the reached degree of democracy in Serbia. Understanding of the relationship between culture and democracy will assist in the fashioning of decisions that affects these areas. Democracy is a word we often hear and exploit, forgetting that democracy relies on the development of culture, so that, today, democracy indeed exists only formally and declaratively, as there can be no democracy without essential influence of culture. The basic problem of the underdeveloped culture in Serbia is not technological in nature: large quantity of carbon dioxide, global heating or waste materials are only the symptoms. The problem lies in the culture itself and in our mind mode. Efforts for the restoration of economic growth are essential, since they are replies to the questions like: what are really the future development targets; whether these are the goals of economic welfare, employment, environment protection and improvement of educational structure; and whether the cultural level in population is meeting new technological challenges. Investment in research, infrastructure and energetics, education and culture, would have multiple positive effect on the strengthening of competitiveness. The findings of this paper support the calls for a comprehensive reform, if we consider the fact that the market mechanisms operate in culture, that relativism is becoming the idea of culture, and that culture is identified with consumption, with an economic standpoint of value in culture. Maladjusted countries, under globalization conditions, would be the ones to fall behind evolutionally, technologically and culturally speaking, or the ones that do not have a development strategy and a social cohesion strategy, and particularly fail to sufficiently invest in education and culture. In the future, a competitive advantage will lie in development, knowledge, culture and technological progress. Societies must define their priorities and must relay a clear message what is important and what is not, what represents public interest, and what does not.

Serbia’s delayed transformation: Illiberal practices, external approvals and the politics of opportunity

본 논문은 세르비아의 문제가 많은 변화에 대해 상세히 서술한다. 민주당이 이끈 정부가 (주로 제대로 기능하지 못하는 기관들로 인하여) 여러 범위에 걸친 문제를 해결하고 세르비아의 미래를 강화하기에는 무능력했으며 이러한 점이 해로웠다는 것이 2012년 선거에서증명되었다. 그 결과로, 세르비아의 진보당이 정치계에서 중심적인 역할을 차지하게 되었다. 그러나, 진보당의 선거공약은 곧 버려지며기존의 문제 접근법을 반 권위적으로 보이게 만들었다. 마찬가지로염려되는 것은 서구가 이러한 경향을 비판하기 꺼려한다는 점인데,이는 세르비아뿐만 아니라 더 넓은 서쪽 발칸 지역의 민주주의 증진에 대해 진정 관심을 가지고 있는지 의심하게 한다.This article elaborates on Serbia’s problematic transformation. The incapacity of the Democratic Party-led government to tackle a whole range of issues(mostly due to malfunctioning institutions) and consolidate Serbia’s future proved detrimental in the 2012 elections. As a result, the Serbian Progressive Party came to occupy a central role on the political scene. However, the party’s electoral promises were very soon abandoned making the adopted approach look semi-authoritarian. Equally worrying has been the West’s unwillingness to criticise this trend, which has encouraged suspicion about its genuine interest in promoting democracy in Serbia as well as the wider Western Balkan region.

On parliamentary democracy in Serbia 1903-1914 political parties, elections, political freedoms

Parliamentary democracy in Serbia in the period between the May Coup of 1903 and the beginning of the First World War in 1914 was, as compellingly shown by the regular and very detailed reports of the diplomatic representatives of two exemplary democracies, Great Britain and France, functional and fully accommodated to the requirements of democratic governance. Some shortcomings, which were reflected in the influence of extra-constitutional (?irresponsible?) factors, such as the group of conspirators from 1903 or their younger wing from 1911 (the organisation Unification or Death), occasionally made Serbian democracy fragile but it nonetheless remained functional at all levels of government. A comparison with crises such as those taking place in, for example, France clearly shows that Serbia, although perceived as ?a rural democracy? and ?the poor man?s paradise?, was a constitutional and democratic state, and that it was precisely its political freedoms and liberation aspirations that made it a focal point for the rallying of South-Slavic peoples on the eve of the Great War. Had there been no firm constitutional boundaries of the parliamentary monarchy and the democratic system, Serbia would have hardly been able to cope with a series of political and economic challenges which followed one another after 1903: the Tariff War 1906-11; the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1908/9; the Balkan Wars 1912-13; the crisis in the summer of 1914 caused by the so-called Order of Precedence Decree, i.e. by the underlying conflict between civilian and military authorities. The Periclean age of Serbia, aired with full political freedoms and sustained cultural and scientific progress is one of the most important periods in the history of modern Serbian democracy.

Book Review: James Dawson, Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria: How Ideas Shape Publics

Book Review: James Dawson, Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria: How Ideas Shape Publics

Dawson, James Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria: How Ideas Shape Publics (review)

SEER, 94, 2, APRIL 2016 382 she critiques a constitution based on human rights. It is unclear what sort of constitution McAuley would propose to replace it. Again, she asks — ‘should the Declaration on Human Rights have been taken as a founding document for the constitution? The question is intriguing but unanswerable’ (p. 317). What would the Russian constitution look like if human rights had not underpinned its foundation? The point is that the Russian government is violating the constitution, but its aspirational quality is crucial to the success of Russian civil society and its struggles in the court system. McAuley argues that giving such rights to society from on high has stopped Russians from engaging in collective action to defend their rights and interests and ‘distracted attention’ away from state corruption. This is a charge better laid at the feet of the Russian government than the human rights provisions of the Russian Constitution. School of Global and International Studies Emma Gilligan Indiana University, Bloomington Dawson, James. Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria: How Ideas Shape Publics. Southeast European Studies. Ashgate, Farnham and Burlington, VT, 2014. xii + 212 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £65.00. Odd as it might sound, it is not very common to find academics who do comparative work on Serbia and Bulgaria. The two neighbouring countries are of comparable size, similar economic and social structure, languages that are, more or less, mutually comprehensible, and a great deal of shared history — of antagonism but also of mutual influences. Scholars who study Serbia are more likely to also cover far-flung Slovenia, courtesy of the common Yugoslav legacy. Those few people in the West who work on Bulgaria do not necessarily share an interest in Yugoslavia’s successor states, unless of course their principal focus is ethnopolitics (cf. Maria Koinova, Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Kosovo, Pennsylvania, PA, 2013). It is therefore laudable that James Dawson has ventured into such a comparison, which does contribute to our understanding of the region (even if there are only a small number of sources in Serbian and Bulgarian quoted). Dawson’s argument, sketched in brief, is the following: although Bulgaria, an EU member since 2007, appears to have moved further on its democratization path, it lags behind Serbia when it comes to as key a dimension as political culture. Standard measurements of democratic governance fail to capture the significance of the public sphere. By that measure, Dawson contends, Serbia has more solid grounds for consolidating a liberal democratic regime than REVIEWS 383 Bulgaria. Through extensive ethnographic fieldwork in two major provincial centres, the cities of Niš (southeast Serbia) and Plovdiv (south-central Bulgaria), he finds that old-school nationalism directed against minorities, and especially against Roma, to be more pervasive in the Bulgarian case. Secondly, Dawson faults the post-1989 elite in Bulgaria, particularly those hailing from the ranks of the anti-Communist centre-right, for succumbing uncritically to the false promise of market fundamentalism, confusing economic and political liberalism. By contrast, even socially conservative Serbs ‘who laugh at jokes about Roma in the kafana recognize the dangers of supporting parties that are either openly intolerant or are led by politicians “compromised” by links to the Milošević regime’ (p. 130). Serbia is populated by ‘careworn democrats’ who are equally repulsed both by the nationalists-turned-Europeans as Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the corrupt politicians with roots in the 1990s anti-Milošević opposition. While it is hard to dispute Dawson’s criticism of the deficiencies and blindspots in the two countries’ public culture still the book leaves one to wonder whether it makes such a profound difference. In fact, Bulgaria and Serbia have consolidated very similar political systems which combine free elections with weak institutions, a fragile rule of law and an unhealthy (and deteriorating) media environment. And the reason democratic rule is more vulnerable in Serbia has to do less with the spread of liberal values in society than with checks and balances. In Bulgaria, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov is dependent on support from outside, in the form of political legitimacy and billions of...

Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria. By James Dawson. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014. 224p. $119.95. - After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia. By Jessica Greenberg. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2014. 248p. $90.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria. By James Dawson. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014. 224p. $119.95. - After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia. By Jessica Greenberg. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2014. 248p. $90.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

Democracy in Serbia on the eve of the First World War

The author describes and analyzes the political life in Serbia 1903-1914. The Constitution (1903) and the Electoral Act (1903) provide a strong institutional basis for electoral democracy. Elections were held in 1903, 1905, 1906, 1908 and 1912, and despite some irregularities, they were free and fair. There is a broad right to vote, among the broadest in Europe. The main political processes were democratic, according to the criteria of the early 20th century. The democratic character of the political system has undoubtedly contributed to strengthening the loyalty of the majority of population to the state. This was an important factor of the success of Serbia 1912-1918 war.

(Too) High Expectations of Democracy in Serbia? Interpretation of Empirical Research Results

The paper presents the findings of a public opinion survey and a focus group study on the attitude of Serbian citizens towards democracy, which were conducted in 2010 within the project “Democracy in unstable social spaces – Serbia,” jointly done by the University of Vienna, the Vienna-based Institute for the Danube Area and Central Europe and the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade. The opinion survey identified deep dissatisfaction of citizens with the general situation in their society, their negative assessments of the actual performance of democracy in Serbia, low confidence in key political institutions, and diminishing willingness for activism and participation in political activities. The focus group study revealed that citizens have high expectations of democracy but remain passive in building the young democratic system of Serbia because neither the political, work nor social environments stimulate them for civic engagement. The paper concludes that a majority of citizens do not expect incentives for progress from within the system but rather expect them from outside, though they differ in views on where these incentives should come from.

Illiberal Resilience in Serbia

Since 2000, overt resistance to democratization in Serbia has been rare. However, illiberal actors and networks have persisted within the formal framework of democracy itself; coopting formal institutions to their own particularist interests and adapting to the constraints and opportunities of electoral competition. Though rooted in domestic political culture, this process can only be understood as part of a dynamic interaction with international policy. The project of liberal democracy in Serbia has thus become transnational; both underpinned and undermined by the actions and policies of external actors. Serbia has become a country where political contention is vigorous, but illiberal forces have shown an ability to adapt to the new conditions.

Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-party democracy in before and after regime change

Has the onset of democracy in Serbia facilitated the democratization of the country’s main political parties? By most accounts, the answer is no. Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ thus appears all too relevant in a Serbian context. This paper seeks to understand whether and to what extent this remains the case in a post-Milosevic context. Have Serbia’s political parties evolved organizationally since the early 1990s? Are parties’ organizational structures uniformly undemocratic or do differences exist with respect to different parties? To answer these questions this paper relies on domestic media coverage, interview with party members, as well as party statutes.

Between the general and specific: Political tolerance and general support for democracy in Serbia and Europe

Political tolerance is one of the basic values of a democratic society. At the same time, it is also a controversial value - political freedoms are often used to undermine democratic order. In light of the early findings of low level of political tolerance in Eastern Europe (e.g., Bahry, Boaz & Gordon, 1997; Gibson & Duch, 1993), it is important to investigate both its general level and the association with the support for general democratic norms. This paper presents results of a comparative research of political tolerance in Europe, with special focus on the situation in Serbia. The first part of the paper presents descriptive findings abut the support for general democratic norms and the degree of tolerance in approximately 30 European countries. The second part analyzes the relationships between the general acceptance of democratic norms and political tolerance, i.e., the application of the abstract norms to specific groups. The research is based on the World Values Survey data (WVS; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). WVS data include the so called 'the least liked group' measure of political tolerance, developed by Sullivan et al. (1979, 1982). The results, once again, indicted the gap between widespread endorsement of abstract democratic norms and readiness to grant the basic political liberties to various specific political groups. Although the level of political tolerance is low across Europe, intolerance is still more widespread in East European countries. Serbian respondents appear similar to those from neighboring countries.

Nikola Pasic: The Radicals and the "Black hand" challenges to parliamentary democracy in Serbia 1903-1917

Given that the issue of the functioning of parliamentary democracy in Serbia 1903-1914 has not been thoroughly explored, an attempt is made to define the capacities of Serbia?s parliamentary system confronted with military interferences in political processes. The paper looks at the conflict between the democratic forces, led by the Prime Minister Nikola Pasic and his Radicals, and a group of conspirators within the army, which in 1911 formed a clandestine society "Unification or Death" (Black Hand), led by D. Dimitrijevic Apis. Political influence of the army significantly increased with the dynastic change effected in 1903. In a predominantly rural society (almost 90 percent of the population) the army took up the function of the middle class and its mission to expedite the process of national liberation. Due to unconstitutional and non-parliamentary actions of military circles the period may be described as one of fragile but functional democracy. Seeking to suppress the army's praetorian aspirations, Pasic and the Radicals took various measures to force it into its constitutional role. Sharpened during the First World War, the conflict led in 1917 to a show trial known as the Salonica Trial. The leaders of the Black Hand were sentenced to death and executed. Similar trials stood by military conspiracies in other European countries during the Great War show that democracy is always threatened in times of extreme crisis such as war. In that sense, Pasic may have deemed the extreme measures against the Black Hand necessary for the preservation of the democratic system established in 1903.