Democracy In Divided Societies Research Articles

A Cycle of Elections without Democracy?: Nigeria’s Troubled Democratisation in Perspective

Elections are the lifeblood of democracy which avail voters the opportunity of choosing and legitimising a government. While the holding of elections marks a good feature of democracy, the quality of such elections determines whether they conform to acceptable standard in terms of meeting the democratic aspirations and the needs of the people. Although research on democratization in Africa has grown in recent years, democratization itself has been slow to take hold in most African countries. Countries that appeared to be making a transition to democracy in the mid-1990s have stalled or reversed their transition in recent years. In Nigeria, since 1999, with the passing of a new federal constitution, elections have become more regular as witnessed in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. Diligent observation however, would confirm that these elections were flawed as a result of malpractices and improper electoral administration such that the political experiment is usually referred to as civil rule rather than democracy. Findings gleaned from the five rounds of elections in the country since 1999, in spite of the staggered successes, show the limitations of elections in consolidating democracy in divided societies.

Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes?

AbstractTwo schools dominate the literature on democracy in divided societies: consociationalism and centripetalism. The first advocates group representation and power sharing while the second recommends institutions that promote multi‐ethnic parties. Although often presented as mutually exclusive choices, in reality many new democracies display a mix. Drawing on the experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland, this article examines the empirical and theoretical relationship between centripetalism and consociationalism. The aim is to explore the conditions under which they reinforce each other (friends) or work at cross‐purposes (foes). A better understanding of the interaction between consociational and centripetal elements in post‐conflict societies not only yields a more nuanced picture of institutional dynamics, but also holds lessons for institutional design.

Others in Deeply Divided Societies: A Research Agenda

This article identifies a central problem in the theory and practice of democracy in divided societies: the systematic exclusion of Others. Defining the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma of consociational power-sharing, whereby in including the main groups to the conflict it works to exclude those beyond these groups, the article offers the first systematic conceptualization of this issue. The article outlines the type of individuals and groups affected by the EAI dilemma, the varying strategies they adopt to navigate power-sharing frameworks and the potential routes out of this normative and empirical puzzle. Finally, it lays out a challenge for scholars to build on this conceptualization and address the EAI dilemma in future research.

Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria

Introduction - The Kurds as Barrier or Key to Democratization David Romano and Mehmet Gurses PART I: AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE KURDS 1. Turkey, Kemalism and the 'Deep State' Michael Gunter 2. Iraq, Arab Nationalism and Obstacles to Democratic Transition Ozum Yesiltas, Florida International University 3. Kurds, Persian Nationalism, and Shi'i Rule: Surviving Dominant Nationhood in Iran Gareth Stansfield 4. The Syrian-Kurdish Movements: Obstacles Rather than Driving Forces for Democratization Eva Savelsberg PART II: DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 5. Democracy, Civil War, and the Kurdish People Divided Between Them David T. Mason 6. Communal Groups, Civil Conflicts, and Democratization in Latin America John A. Booth, University of North Texas 7. Democracy and Self-Determination in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Nicole F. Watts PART III: THE KURDS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 8. The Ebb and Flow of Armed Conflict in Turkey: An Elusive Peace Gunes Tezcur 9. The Iraqi Kurdish View on Federalism - Not Just for the Kurds David Romano 10. Between a Rock and Hard Place: The Kurdish Dilemma in Iran Nader Entessar 11. The Emergence of Western Kurdistan and the Future of Syria Robert Lowe PART IV: REGIONAL ISSUES 12. From War to Democracy: Transborder Kurdish Conflict and Democratization Mehmet Gurses 13. Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas Ofra Bengio

Post-Conflict State Building: the debate on institutional choice

A significant theoretical and empirical question underlying much of the literature on post-conflict state building is which institutions offer the best prospect for peace and democracy in divided societies recovering from conflict. This debate is highly relevant for many developing countries. With much invested by third parties in post-conflict reconstruction and a mixed track record of success at best, the question explored by this article is whether consociational institutional designs—widely applied in policy practice and severely criticised in academic discourse—can accomplish the twin goals of peace and democracy in divided post-conflict societies. Examining the claims of supporters and detractors of consociationalism, the article finds substantial conceptual and empirical evidence that consociational institutions hold significant promise for building democratic states after conflict in divided societies.

Set up to fail: consociational political structures in post-war Iraq, 2003–2010

Since Arend Lijphart's development of the theory of consociationalism in 1969, dominant schools of thought have accepted that ‘power sharing’ and ‘group autonomy’ are the basic preconditions of democratic governance in divided societies. The constitution and electoral framework adopted by post-invasion Iraq instituted many of Lijphart's recommendations, including proportional representation, federalism and a parliamentary system with a weak presidency. But this democratic framework has failed Iraq. Eight months on from its 2010 parliamentary election and still struggling to establish an effective government, Iraq is facing constitutional crisis. This article uses the case study of Iraq to uncover fundamental flaws in orthodox arguments about democracy in divided societies and it goes on to recommend changes that would better enable stable and effective governance.

Electoral Democracy in a Divided Society

This article analyses the 2008 gubernatorial election in Indonesia's Maluku province and puts its result – a resounding victory for incumbent governor Karel Ralahalu – into the broader context of the discourse on democracy in divided societies. Through a detailed analysis of Ralahalu's electoral strategy, the article illustrates how the incumbent used a combination of populism and comprehensive networking with key organizational stakeholders to secure an easy victory. The author also highlights the peaceful conduct of the election and the overall significance of the fact that key political, religious and ethno-regional actors seem to have accepted that democratic elections are now the only legitimate means to distribute formal political power. In short, it is argued that democracy can indeed work in divided societies, especially if it is based on institutional arrangements that promote cross-communal communication and cooperation.

Agonism in divided societies

This article considers how reconciliation might be understood as a democratic undertaking. It does so by examining the implications of the debate between theorists of ‘deliberative’ and ‘agonistic’ democracy for the practice of democracy in divided societies. I argue that, in taking consensus as a regulative idea, deliberative democracy tends to conflate moral and political community thereby representing conflict as already communal. In contrast, an agonistic theory of democracy provides a critical perspective from which to discern what is at stake in the politicsof reconciliation since it understands community as a contingent achievement of political action. As such, an agonistic account of democracy suggests the possibility of retrieving the concept of reconciliation from a statesanctioned project of nation-building for a democratic politics centred on the possibilities of self-determination and solidarity among citizens divided by a history of state violence.

‘Democracy’ in Northern Ireland: experiments in self–rule from the Protestant Ascendancy to the Good Friday Agreement

Pierre van den Berghe has argued that democracy in divided societies can take five different forms: Herrenvolk democracy, ethnic democracy, liberal democracy, multicultural democracy and consociational democracy. My article argues that each of van den Berghe’s five versions of democracy, or relatives of them, has been experimented with in pre–partition Ireland and Northern Ireland. While all have clear limits, the one that is most suited to Northern Ireland’s conditions is consociational democracy. The article discusses some limits of the consociational approach in Northern Ireland but also defends it against common criticisms.