Demand For Safe Assets Research Articles

Identifying the Effects of Demand for Safe Assets

Identifying the Effects of Demand for Safe Assets

The Financial Origins of Non-Fundamental Risk

We formalize the idea that the financial sector can be a source of non-fundamental risk. Households' desire to hedge against price volatility can generate price volatility in equilibrium, even absent fundamental risk. Fearing that asset prices may fall, risk-averse households demand safe assets from leveraged intermediaries, whose issuance of safe assets exposes the economy to self-fulfilling fire sales. Policy can eliminate nonfundamental risk by (i) increasing the supply of publicly backed safe assets, through issuing government debt or bailing out intermediaries, or (ii) reducing the demand for safe assets, through social insurance or by acting as a market maker of last resort.

The paradox of safe asset creation

Safe asset demand increases loan risk. This arises in a competitive model in which securitization vehicles create safe assets by pooling loan payoffs purchased from loan originators. Equity investors allocate their wealth between originators, who need skin-in-the-game due to moral hazard, and vehicles, who need loss-absorption capacity against aggregate risk. An increase in demand for safety fosters safe asset creation through a securitization boom: originators sell more of their loan payoffs to vehicles, equity is reallocated from originators to vehicles, and the two effects contribute to an increase in loan risk. The model is consistent with a broad set of facts in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis.

Winds of tapering, financial gravity and COVID-19

Real interest rates have fallen dramatically since the early 1980s. Economic theory states that lower real rates discourage savings while promoting spending. However, today, in the world economy, we face a global saving glut problem in which, even in negative real rates, economic agents keep saving. This situation leads to excess demand for safe assets (US Treasuries), lower bond yields, and higher equity valuations. Thus, the world economy has become more dependent on major economies, especially the United States. In this research, we aim to measure the dependency of the world economy on United States monetary policy. We called this new methodology “financial gravity” and tried to quantify the nature by using panel data analysis. We define monetary dependency (financial gravity) by US Investment flows and their reaction against International Reserves, Credit Default Spreads (CDS), and Foreign Exchange Rates. Our empirical findings support that financial gravity is positively related to international reserves and negatively related to Credit Default Swap Spreads (CDS) and Foreign Exchange rates. We also analyzed the COVID-19 period and found that pandemics positively contributed to world reserve accumulation due to economic lock-down measures, fiscal stimulus packages (unemployment benefits), and decreased global spending.

The European banks’ role in the financial crisis of 2007-8: a critical assessment

ABSTRACT Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, opinion has been divided over whether its root cause was weak regulation and bank funding problems or the pressure of investor demand for US safe assets. New research on the European banks’ role in the crisis may finally help to resolve the issue. Far from being peripheral players in the crisis, European banks were deeply implicated in its causal origins as evidenced by their activities in the two US debt markets that were at the heart of the crisis: those for collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and for asset backed commercial paper (ABCP). These activities would seem to lend weight to the conclusion that regulation and bank funding issues were the key causal variables in the financial crisis. However, it is a conclusion only made possible by ignoring the pre-crisis connection between the federal funds rate and the rate of ABCP demand from the institutional money market mutual funds (MMMFs). This paper argues that when this connection is closely examined, it turns out that the evidence surrounding the European banks’ role in the financial crisis gives greater weight to the safe asset demand explanation of the crisis.

Глобальные дисбалансы: эволюция подходов

The article examines the current state and causes of global imbalances’ sustainability – the phenomenon whereby some major systemic countries run large and persistent current account deficits, which are mirrored by large surpluses in a number of other countries. The widening of global imbalances during COVID 19 pandemic contrasts with their dynamics during previous global downturns, when the scale of imbalances narrowed. The article analyzes various explanations of global imbalances: intertemporal choice with a difference in the rates of return, demographic changes, global savings glut, dynamics of oil prices, exchange rate manipulations, twin deficits, demand for safe assets. The significance of each of the causes of global imbalances changes over time, and currently fiscal policy has been playing an increasing role to determine the movements of current account deficits. The global fiscal response to the pandemic, especially in advanced economies, has been unprecedented, which led to significant reduction in government savings. The scale and dynamics of global imbalances are largely determined by the state of the US balance of payments: it is a reflection of the ability to generate safe assets and to finance trade and budget deficits cheaply by using the dollar’s status as the dominant world currency. There are differences in theoretical approaches regarding the macroeconomic effects of global imbalances. But persistent current account deficits and surpluses lead to accumulation of stock imbalances – the difference between countries’ foreign assets and liabilities. The ongoing negative changes in the net international investment positions of many leading advanced economies indicate an increase in external indebtedness. This creates risks to both debtor and creditor countries and threatens the stability of the global financial system.

Credit cycles with market-based household leverage

We develop a general equilibrium model in which households’ mortgage leverage is determined by supply and demand forces, where the price of credit impacts the quantity of leverage households choose. Mortgages are supplied by financial intermediaries, who offer households a menu of mortgage contracts whose pricing varies with intermediaries’ equity capital. In the model, growth in the demand for safe assets that replicates the falling interest rates in the 2000s causes an empirically realistic boom in household borrowing, debt-financed consumption, and house prices. This boom results in a larger bust in asset prices and household borrowing in future financial crises.

Comment on “The supply and demand for safe assets”

Comment on “The supply and demand for safe assets”

The US current account, sustainability, and the international monetary system

In this paper, we examine the sources of the US current account imbalances and discuss the role of the international monetary system in enabling the US in carrying such external deficits. There is evidence that the stochastic properties of the US current account are not compatible with the intertemporal national budget constraint. We argue that this is likely to be related to the dominant role of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve asset, which allows the US to meet international demand for safe assets and allows borrowing at very low interest rates. Results from a structural VAR model indicate that temporary shocks dominate the current account in the short run, whereas domestic permanent supply shocks and preference shocks contribute significantly to US current account movements in the long run. To the extent that temporary shocks stem from aggregate demand, stabilizing aggregate demand is important in achieving long-term sustainability in the current account. Finally, the paper discusses the role of the international financial system and the international role of the U.S. dollar in contributing to US external imbalances.

The Side Effects of Safe Asset Creation

Abstract We present an incomplete markets model to understand the costs and benefits of increasing government debt when an increased demand for safety pushes the natural rate of interest below zero. A higher demand for safe assets causes the zero lower bound (ZLB) to bind, increasing unemployment. Higher government debt satiates the demand for safe assets, raising the natural rate, and restoring full employment. However, this entails permanently lower investment, which reduces welfare, since our economy is dynamically efficient even when the natural rate is negative. Despite this, increasing debt until the ZLB no longer binds raises welfare when alternative instruments are unavailable. Higher inflation targets instead allow for negative real interest rates and achieve full employment without reducing investment.

Contagion Impact and Safe Asset Shortages: Implications for Secular Stagnation

This paper investigates the contagiousness of safe asset shortages as an implication of the secular stagnation hypothesis. Our motivation is to quantify the degree of financial contagion of safe asset demand among developed and emerging markets. We know that the insufficient supply of safe assets in developed economies led to increasing demand for risky EM Bonds. However, lower yields might not be observed in Emerging Economies due to expected inflation. To investigate this idea, we proxied expected inflation via a new variable called the Marginal Impact of Inflation (MII). Our dataset consists of 2-year and 10-year generic government yields, and we analyzed the reaction of developed and emerging economies to the United States and the United Kingdom’s safe asset demand. Our findings confirm that demand for US and UK safe assets shows the contagious impact for Developed Economies, not for Emerging Economies. Additionally, longer yields show stronger statistical evidence than shorter yields, as suggested by the secular stagnation hypothesis. According to empirical results, expected inflation is statistically insignificant for long-term and short-term yields for emerging economies. Thus, we can conclude that the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis is the problem of Developed Economies rather than Emerging Economies in that manner.

The supply and demand for safe assets

Safe assets are demanded as stores of value (to smooth consumption inter-temporally) and as collateral (to facilitate credit intra-temporally). Some are supplied publicly (government bonds) and some privately (asset-backed securities). Private assets are heterogeneous in quality, and information about their quality reduces their safety properties. We show that government bonds discourage both production of (crowding quantity out) and information about (crowding safety in) private assets. Hence, the optimal supply of government bonds need to take into account their dual roles and their impact on the quantity and informational content of private assets.

Foreign Safe Asset Demand and the Dollar Exchange Rate

ABSTRACTWe develop a theory that links the U.S. dollar's valuation in FX markets to the convenience yield that foreign investors derive from holding U.S. safe assets. We show that this convenience yield can be inferred from the Treasury basis, the yield gap between U.S. government and currency‐hedged foreign government bonds. Consistent with the theory, a widening of the basis coincides with an immediate appreciation and a subsequent depreciation of the dollar. Our results lend empirical support to models that impute a special role to the United States as the world's provider of safe assets and the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

Is real estate considered a safe asset in East Asia?

ABSTRACT The demand for safe assets has increased in recent years. However, the supply of safe assets has remained concentrated in a few Western developed countries, and it cannot meet the demand for safe assets in East Asia. For historical and cultural reasons, we believe that real estate serves as safe assets in East Asia. To verify this issue, this study employs two sets of data, which, respectively, include three East Asian countries and eight Western countries, from 1998 to 2019 to construct two panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) models that we use to determine the differences between the housing markets in East Asian and Western nations. The empirical results show that house prices in East Asia tend to increase with economic policy uncertainty (EPU), indicating that real estate is a good hedge against uncertainty. In Western countries, however, real estate does not hold its value well in times of uncertainty. Therefore, this study confirms that real estate is a safe asset in East Asia, but not in Western countries. To lower the excessive price of houses in East Asian countries, this study recommends increasing the supply of other safe assets.

The Implications of Globalisation for the ECB Monetary Policy Strategy

This paper assesses how globalisation has shaped the economic environment in which the ECB operates and discusses whether this warrants adjustments to the monetary policy strategy. The paper first looks at how trade and financial integration have evolved since the last strategy review in 2003. It then examines the effects of these developments on global productivity growth, the natural interest rate (r*), inflation trends and monetary transmission. While trade globalisation initially boosted productivity growth, this effect may be waning as trade integration slows and market contestability promotes a winner-takes-all environment. The impact of globalisation on r* has been ambiguous: downward pressures, fuelled by global demand for safe assets and an increase in the propensity to save against a background of rising inequality, are counteracted by upward pressures, from the boost to global productivity associated with greater trade integration. Headline inflation rates have become more synchronised globally, largely because commodity prices are increasingly determined by global factors. Meanwhile, core inflation rates show a lower degree of commonality. Globalisation has made a rather modest contribution to the synchronised fall in trend inflation across countries and contributed only moderately to the reduction in the responsiveness of inflation to changes in activity. Regarding monetary transmission, globalisation has made the role of the exchange rate more complex by introducing new mechanisms through which it affects financial conditions, real activity and price dynamics. Against the background of this discussion, the paper then examines the implications for the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. In doing so, it asks two questions. How is the ECB’s economic and monetary analysis affected by globalisation? And how does globalisation influence the choice of the ECB’s monetary policy objective and instruments? ...

Money Creation in Decentralized Finance: A Dynamic Model of Stablecoin and Crypto Shadow Banking

Stablecoins rise to meet the demand for safe assets in decentralized finance. Stablecoin issuers transform risky reserve assets into tokens of stable values, deploying a variety of tactics. To address the questions on the viability of stablecoins, regulations, and the initiatives led by large platforms, we develop a dynamic model of optimal stablecoin management and characterize an instability trap. The system is bimodal: stability can last for a long time, but once stablecoins break the buck following negative shocks, volatility persists. Debasement triggers a vicious cycle but is unavoidable as it allows efficient risk sharing between the issuer and stablecoin users.

The causes and challenges of low interest rates: insights from basic principles and recent literature

PurposeWhat causes the downward trend of real interest rates in major developed economies since the 1980s? What are the challenges of the near-zero interest and inflation rates for monetary policy? What can the policymakers learn from the latest developments in the monetary and interest rate theory? This paper aims to answer these questions by reviewing both basic principles of interest rate determination and recent academic and policy debates.Design/methodology/approachThe paper critically reviews the explanations for the downward trend of real interest rates in recent decades and monetary policy options in a near-zero interest rate environment.FindingsThe decline of real interest rates is likely an outcome of multiple technological, social and economic factors including diminished productivity growth, changing demographics, elevated tail-risk concerns, time-varying convenience yields of safe assets, increased global demand for safe assets, rising wealth and income inequality, falling relative price of capital, accommodative monetary policies, and changes in industry structure that alter the investment and saving behaviors of the corporate sector. The near-zero interest rate limits the space of central banks' response to economic crises. It also challenges some conventional wisdoms of monetary theory and sparks radically new ideas about monetary policy.Originality/valueThis survey differs from the existing work by taking a broader view of both economics and finance literature. It critically assesses the economic forces driving the global decline of real interest rates through the lens of basic principles and empirical evidence and discusses the merits and limitations of each proposed explanation. The study emphasizes the importance of a better understanding of economic forces driving diverging trends of corporate investment and saving behaviors. It also discusses the implications of the neo-Fisherism and the fiscal theory of price level for monetary policy in a low interest rate environment.

Safety Transformation and the Structure of the Financial System

ABSTRACTThis paper studies how a financial system that is organized to efficiently create safe assets responds to macroeconomic shocks. Financial intermediaries face a cost of bearing risk, so they choose the least risky portfolio that backs their issuance of riskless deposits: a diversified pool of nonfinancial firms' debt. Nonfinancial firms choose their capital structure to exploit the resulting segmentation between debt and equity markets. Increased safe asset demand yields larger and riskier intermediaries and more levered firms. Quantitative easing reduces the size and riskiness of intermediaries and can decrease firm leverage, despite reducing borrowing costs at the zero lower bound.

Dollar Safety and the Global Financial Cycle

US monetary policy has an outsized impact on the world economy, a phenomenon that Rey (2013) dubs the global financial cycle. Changes in the US dollar also have an outsized impact on the world economy, while shocks in foreign countries have smaller impacts on the U.S. We build a model to rationalize these facts stemming from the special demand for dollar safe assets. In the model, dollar safe assets trade at a premium; that is, they offer especially low returns. Banks and firms that have the collateral to issue dollar safe assets can collect this premium. Institutions in the U.S. do so against dollar collateral, while institutions in foreign countries do so against local currency collateral, but in the process take on exchange rate risk. Changes in U.S. monetary policy impact the supply of dollar safe assets, but do not offset shocks to safe asset demand. Shocks to U.S. monetary policy and shocks to the value of the dollar transmit across the globe and are a global risk factor. We present evidence from movements in the Treasury basis that support the mechanism underlying our theory.

Dynamics of Market Anomalies and Measurement Errors of Risk-Free Interest Rates

Two-market anomalies since the 2008 global financial crisis – the widespread failure of covered interest parity (CIP) in foreign exchange swaps and negative 30-year US dollar interest rate swap-Treasury spreads have been challenging for conventional asset pricing models. Using a three-factor non-Gaussian-term structure model for the US Treasuries, an estimated short-rate premium tends to move in tandem with the CIP deviations and negative swap spread. The dynamics between the premium and two-market anomalies are found to be cointegrated, suggesting a long-run equilibrium between them. As the premium is found to be empirically related to demand for Treasuries, including the Fed’s quantitative easing program and demand for safe assets, it may reflect a convenience yield embedded in the yield curve such that the observed Treasury interest rate is lower than the true risk-free interest rate. The anomalies manifest such measurement error as additional spreads on the observed US dollar interest rates for pricing the corresponding instruments, consistent with recent studies that the US dollar and its interest rates play an important role in determining the CIP deviations.