Demand For Dollars Research Articles

The Story of De- dollarization and Internationalization of the Chinese Renminbi

In recent times, numerous commentaries have written about de- dollarization. We analyse the factors which are contributing to de- dollarization. On the economic front, there is reduced fiscal and financial capacity of the US economy that can strain economic trust in the dollar. The internationalization of the Chinese currency is another factor. Additionally, a lower forecast for the world economic growth outlook, a higher debt financing in the United States, and a war in Europe are also leading to central banks around the world buying more gold and reducing investment in the US treasury bonds. While these factors may lead to reduced demand for dollars and increase the use of alternate international currencies, including digital currencies, we argue that dislodging the dollar as a global anchor currency is at best going to be restricted by economic and geopolitical reasons. JEL Codes: E42, F33, F34

Digital Assets and the Exorbitant Dollar Privilege

This paper analyzes how the rise of digital assets, particularly Stablecoins, affects the US dollar's dominance in global financial markets. It discusses whether Stablecoins, backed by US debt or other assets such as cryptocurrencies, could replace traditional US safe assets. On the one hand, Stablecoins could increase the demand for dollar reserves, strengthening the international role of the dollar. On the other hand, if Stablecoins are backed by non-dollar reserves, the global demand for dollars may decline, potentially reducing its international role.

The Global Domain of the Dollar: Eight Questions

Since the late 1950s, the rest of the world has come to use the dollar to an extent that justifies speaking of the dollar’s global domain. The rest of the world denominates much debt in U.S. dollars, extending U.S. monetary policy’s sway. In addition, in outstanding foreign exchange deals, the rest of the world has undertaken to pay still more in U.S. dollars: off-balance-sheet dollar debts buried in footnotes. Consistent with the scale of dollar debt, most of the world economic activity takes place in countries with currencies tied to or relatively stable against the dollar, forming a dollar zone much larger than the euro zone. Even though the dollar assets of the world (minus the United States) exceed dollar liabilities, corporate sector dollar debts seem to make dollar appreciation akin to a global tightening of credit. Since the 1960s, claims that the dollar’s global role suffers from instability and confers great benefits on the U.S. economy have attracted much support. However, evidence that demand for dollars from official reserve managers forces unsustainable U.S. current account or fiscal deficits is not strong. The so-called exorbitant privilege is small or shared. In 2008 and again in 2020, the Federal Reserve demonstrated a willingness and capacity to backstop the global domain of the dollar. Politics could constrain the Fed’s ability to backstop the growing share of the domain of the dollar accounted for by countries that are not on such friendly terms with the U.S.

The Non-U.S. Bank Demand for U.S. Dollar Assets

The USD asset share of non-U.S. banks captures the demand for dollars by these investors. An instrumental variable strategy identifies a causal link from the USD asset share to the USD exchange rate. Cross-sectional asset pricing tests show that the USD asset share is a highly significant pricing factor for carry trade strategies. The USD asset share forecasts the dollar with economically large magnitude, high statistical significance, and large explanatory power, both in sample and out of sample, pointing towards time varying risk premia. It takes 2-5 years for exchange rate risk premia to normalize in response to demand shocks.

Six decades of inflation and money demand

The present estimates of dollar demand treat inflation as a separate variable in a money market model with annual data covering nearly six decades from 1960 to 2017. The difference stationary series lead to robust error correction estimates in double log differences. Structural breaks for money supply targeting in 1980 and bank bailout policy in 2009 improve the estimates. Inflation has an elastic effect on store of value and transactions demands. Rising income incompletely offsets declining dollar demand. Transactions demand appears to be especially sensitive to a decrease in inflation.

The Non-U.S. Bank Demand for U.S. Dollar Assets

The USD asset share of non-U.S. banks captures the demand for dollars by these investors. An instrumental variable strategy identifies a causal link from the USD asset share to the USD exchange rate. Cross-sectional asset pricing tests show that the USD asset share is a highly significant pricing factor for carry trade strategies. The USD asset share forecasts the dollar with economically large magnitude, high statistical significance, and large explanatory power, both in sample and out of sample, pointing towards time varying risk premia. It takes 2-5 years for exchange rate risk premia to normalize in response to demand shocks.

Global Banks, Dollar Funding, and Regulation

We document that non-US global banks are increasingly heterogeneous in their dollar banking activities and dollar demand. We study the implications for dollar funding markets using data on security-level money market fund holdings. We find that funds charge higher prices to banks with weaker bargaining positions, consistent with theories of over-the-counter markets. For identification, we use exogenous variation in bargaining power due to window-dressing at quarter-ends and the US money market fund reform. We show that post-crisis regulations have reduced competition in certain segments of dollar funding markets and have generated incentives for regulatory arbitrage, with potentially adverse unintended consequences.

Perspektive međunarodnog monetarnog sistema

During the 20th century, the dollar gained the status of the world's most important currency. Therefore, the Bretton Woods International Monetary System was based on the dollar. However, in the 1970s, the situation changed significantly - demand for dollars declined, the currencies of the most important European countries became convertible, the volume of international trade increased greatly, international capital flows were liberalized, the external convertibility of the dollar to gold was abolished, and the currencies began to fluctuate. In this way, the original Bretton Woods international monetary system ceased to exist. In addition to the changes, the functioning of the international monetary system is greatly impacted by the fact that the United States recorded an increasing amount of current account deficits from year to year and, in the 1980s, moved from the position of the net creditor to that of the net debtor, that the euro was created on the soil of the EU and that China became the world's largest exporter and one of the largest (if not the largest) world economies. For this reason, the theoretical assumptions of the international monetary system are systematized in the paper, the role of other world currencies is examined, and the question of why the dollar continues to be the dominant world currency is answered.

The implications of monetary expansion in China for the US dollar

We examine the influence of rapid growth in China's money supply on the US dollar within a framework of monetary models of exchange rates. We develop out-of-sample forecasts of the US dollar exchange rate using US and global data on price level, output, and interest rates, and money supply data for the US, China, and the rest of the world for the period 1996–2013. Monetary model forecasts significantly outperform a random walk forecast in terms of mean squared forecast error in the long run. A monetary error correction model with sticky prices performs best. Rolling sample analysis indicates changes over time in the influence of Chinese money supply in forecasting the US dollar. The expectation is that rapid money growth in China would increase the demand for dollars thus raising the value of the dollar, yet our forecasts are to the contrary for the mid 2000s. This is consistent with anticipation of renminbi appreciation under China’s managed exchange rate, which made holding renminbi more attractive. With the break from a dollar peg in 2005 and subsequent currency appreciation, the distortion was alleviated and the forecast direction for the dollar became as expected.

International Transmission of Monetary Policy: The Usa to India

The present study attempts measure the transmission of monetary impulse from the USA to India by trying to quantify the extent of volatility spillover from the US monetary policy to the exchange rate and interest rate of India. By applying a t-DCC MGARCH model to daily data on Fed Funds Rate, Rupee Dollar Exchange Rate and the Call Money rate of India it was found that there is considerable volatility spillover from the Fed Rate to the exchange rate. Spillover is also clearly evident in case of the call rate. The extent of spillover is higher for the foreign exchange rate than the call money rate. However, it was also noticed that the spillover is asymmetric in either of the cases and is higher during phases of high volatility. In an era of flexible exchange rates excessive dependence of the Indian Economy on short term capital flows to finance the current account deficits which raises the dollar demand and exposes the Indian economy to the Monetary Policy of the US, needs to be reduced. Reforms in the nature of capital flows is also the need of the hour.

Chapter two: The pretenders to the dollar’s crown

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter four: Financial blockades: reserve currencies as instruments of coercion

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter seven: The new shape of Asia

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Conclusion

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Introduction

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter Five: Global trade and global currencies

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter three: The dollar and US power

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter six: The renminbi’s rise and Chinese politics

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter eight: The international monetary system: past, present… and a possible future?

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.

Chapter one: The origins and use of currency power

Today, a Great Power's arsenal extends well beyond the military, embracing soft power and also currency power. The dollar dominates the global economy, used in settling trade and investment deals but also held in reserve in vast quantities by central banks in case of a payments crisis. This demand for dollars keeps US borrowing costs lower than they otherwise would be, reinforcing the country's economic power and helping to pay for the world's strongest armed forces.This Adelphi sets out how the United States has regularly deployed the power of the dollar to put pressure on foes such as Iran, as well as allies including the United Kingdom and Germany. Contributors, including Robert Zoellick, the former head of the World Bank, and John Williamson, a leading expert on currencies, assess how long the US will be able to maintain this ‘exorbitant privilege’ in tandem with a rising China. Beijing, sensing that the global crisis might herald the end of the dollar's supremacy, is eager to gain monetary power by carving out an international role for its own currency, the renminbi. The book examines the obstacles China must first overcome in its quest and the strategic consequences if it succeeds.